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Foreword
The publication of this book as part of the activity of the Program
for Advanced Study in Public Science Policy and Administration
is of personal as well as institutional gratification to me. Having
served for twenty years on the staff of the Institute of Public
Administration at the University of Michigan before coming to the
University of New Mexico, I recognize the importance of and need
for a significant university contribution to the improvement of the •
public service. In my inaugural address, I set this as a major
goal during my tenure as President of the University of New
Mexico. The development of competence and the publication of a
study in science policy and administration by the University of
New Mexico are particularly appropriate because of the large
number of major public and private science agencies located in
this area.
Two purposes were stated in establishing the Program for
Advanced Study in Public Science Policy and Administration, as
part of the Division of Public Administration at the University of
New Mexico: (1) "To provide graduate-level interdisciplinary
course work and research in Public Administration-Science leading
to an advanced degree," and (2) "To add to, and make readily
available, the body of knowledge concerned with the formulation and
administration of public policy in the field of science." The pro-
gram is now entering its fifth year of academic work, seeking
to improve the effectiveness of science-administrators. The pub-
lication of this book significantly contributes toward the accom-
plishment of the second of our stated objectives.
I extend my congratulations and appreciation to the editor,
to the authors who contributed chapters, and to the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, which provided financial support
for the establishment of the University of New Mexico program
and for the publication of this book.
I am pleased that this important work was conceived, developed,
and edited by a faculty member at our University and published by
the University of New Mexico Press.
Ferrel Heady, President
The University of New Mexico
Preface
A great many people and large amounts of money are involved
in the development of public policy in science and technology and
the administration of programs in this field. During the past two
decades, growth has been so rapid that the practice has far out-
stripped education and research concerning the process itself. For
some time the need has existed for an introductory study providing
an overview of the field. In this book we seek to provide approaches
to study and research in this area, as well as to emphasize impor-
tant subareas that have been frequently overlooked in the literature.
I am greatly indebted to the authors of the following chapters.
Despite busy schedules, they undertook to prepare statements in
the areas of their special competence. It is a truism in public
administration that many of the people who know the most about
particular facets of this field are, because of the responsible posts
they hold, usually too busy to write. But wisdom based on the
actual experiences of top-level practitioners is required to give
substance to theoretical and philosophic study. The contributors
to this volume represent both practice and theory.
We look at this study as a beginning and hope that it will stimu-
late other efforts in the same direction. The topic of each chapter
deserves a complete study of its own.
Sincere thanks are expressed to Dr. Reuben Gustavson, who
provided encouragement and wise counsel in the establishment of
the University of New Mexico Public Science Program and the
undertaking of this book. A great deal of assistance in developing
the program was provided by the Regional Advisory Committee
in Public Science Policy and Administration, composed of the
directors and deputy directors of the major science agencies in
the region. Particular thanks are due Ray Powell, Vice President,
Sandia Laboratories and Chairman, New Mexico State Personnel
Board and James McCraw, recently retired as Deputy Manager,
Albuquerque Operations, Atomic Energy Commission. I would like
to thank the officials of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration, particularly James Webb, Frank Smith, and Rich Stephens,
who during their tenure in key posts in NASA sponsored programs
that helped to establish the Public Science Policy and Administration
Program at the University of New Mexico and at other universities.
Interest in improving the competence of science-administrators
has been carried forward by Dee Wyatt, Frank Hansing, and Jerry
Morris, presently with NASA, and by Clarence Ohlke and Frank
Hersman of the National Science Foundation. Special appreciation
is due N. J. Oganovic, previously Executive Director of the U.S.
Civil Service Commission, and his successor, Bernard Rosen. Jack
Young, now with the Office of Management and Budget, has kept
interest in his field alive.
To Betty Wollerman, who typed sections of the manuscript, my
thanks.
Albert H. Rosenthal
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Approaches to Public science Policy
and Administration
ALBERT H. ROSENTHAL
Professor and Director
Program for Advanced Study in
Public Science Policy and
Administration
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque
Public science policy and administration comprises those ac-
tivities of government, at all levels, that are primarily concerned
with the use of science and technology to meet recognized public
needs. It includes: (1) the laws that govern the establishment and
operation of public agencies responsible for administering science
and technology programs; (2) the political processes by which laws,
and regulations issued under the laws, are established and modified
in this field; (3) the network of public agencies, and their organiza-
tional structures, established to administer the programs adopted by
legislation; (4) the policies, regulations, and procedures developed
and administered by the public science agencies in the conduct of
their programs; (5) the impact of public and private organizations
and interest groups in the field of science and technology on
legislation, policies, programs, priorities, and finances; and (6) the
effect of science and technology upon the quality of life and the
public's evaluation of policies and programs as enhancing or
degrading the national well-being.
The field of public science policy and administration is many-
faceted. Each of the elements affect the others. Public views
expressed to representatives in Congress or state legislatures may
.have a deciding effect on legislation and appropriations. Legislation
affects administrative patterns and, in normal course, governs
policy formulation. Public and private interest groups have a
significant impact on legislation, on policy formulation, and on the
impression the general public receives of the effectiveness of
programs.
This book attempts to provide an overview of the field of public
science policy and administration and to explore several of its
aspects in some depth. While other approaches to this subject are
available, the limitations of space and the importance of the areas
selected require us to confine our examination of this field to these
basic approaches: history, organization,law and politics, personnel,
finance, policy, and trends for the future.
HISTORY
Public interest and activity in science go back to the founding
documents of the government of the United States. The framers of
the Constitution specifically empowered the Congress "to promote
the progress of science."1 Every schoolchild is familiar with
Benjamin Franklin's interest in science. Many leaders of the
emerging American government were, like the early Greeks, "whole
men," combining interests in science and technology, architecture,
land use, music and the arts, and government and society.
Public funds have long been expended for agricultural research
and military research and development. The country's leadership
has given great impetus to science and technology in each period of
war. During the Civil War, the National Academy of Sciences was
established as a quasi-governmental agency.2 World War I brought
significant support to research and development (the National
Research Council was established then), and World War n even
more dramatic growth in this field. Before World War n, federal
scientific activities were conducted primarily by the Coast and
Geodetic Survey, the departments of Army and Navy, the Weather
Bureau, the Census Bureau, the National Bureau of Standards, and
the Bureau of Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture.
..-Several excellent studies outline in some detail the early
developments in science and technology in the United States. Daniel
S. Greenberg (in a chapter titled "When Science Was an Orphan")
pointed out that at first "government was not inclined to reach to
the assistance of the scientific community,"3 and that scientists
were not anxious to seek government support on the grounds that it
might influence scientific objectivity.
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A fundamental study initiated during World War II by Franklin D.
Roosevelt and issued as a Report to the President in July 1945
formed the basis for the establishment of the National Science
Foundation and provided recommendations and goals that have, to a
large extent, stimulated and guided the expansion of government
efforts in science and technology in the United States.4 In a letter to
Vannevar Bush dated November 17, 1944, President Roosevelt
commended Dr. Bush for the significant contribution the Office of
Scientific Research and Development (of which Bush was then head)
had made in applying scientific knowledge to the solution of
problems during the war. The President added, "There is, however,
no reason the lessons to be found in this experiment cannot be
profitably employed in times of peace." He gave as his major goals
"the improvement of the national health, the creation of new
enterprises bringing new jobs, and the betterment of the national
standard of living." He outlined four specific goals:
1. To make known to the world, as soon as possible, the
contributions made during the war effort to scientific knowl-
edge, and to diffuse and use such knowledge to stimulate new
enterprises providing jobs and making possible the improve-
ment of the national well-being
2. To organize a scientific program as a "war against disease"
3. To address the question, "What can the government do now
and in the future to aid research activities by public and
private organizations?" and to consider the respective roles
of public and private research efforts and their interrelations
4. To establish an effective program for developing scientific
talent in American youth to maintain a future level of
scientific research in the United States comparable to that of
the war years
President Roosevelt closed the letter with an exciting statement of
policy:
New frontiers of the mind are before us, and if they are
pioneered with the same vision, fullness and drive with which
we have waged this War, we can create a fuller and more
fruitful employment and a fuller and more fruitful life.5
In his Report to the President, Dr. Bush addressed major issues
that are relevant to current discussions of public activity in
science. Emphasizing the fact that scientific progress is essential
in many phases of the national welfare, he pointed out that "without
scientific progress no amount of achievement in other directions can
insure our health, prosperity and security as a nation in the modern
world." Regarding the question of science as a proper concern of
government, he said, "for reasons presented in this report, we are
entering a period when science needs and deserves increased
support from public funds." And on the need to remove rigid
classification and security requirements imposed during the war, he
observed, "many of the lessons learned in the wartime application
of science under government may be profitably applied in peace"—
an issue highly current in the minds of many scientists.
A major, specific result of Dr. Bush's recommendations came
five years after the publication of his report, when Congress passed
the National Science Foundation Act of 1950,bringing the new agency
into being.8
A number of amendments to the act have since expanded the
activities of the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF
received additional authority through the passage of the National Sea
Grant College and Program Act of 1966 and the National Defense
Education Act of 1958, establishing the Science Information Service.7
In 1959 Congress authorized the National Science Board to delegate
authority to the director and the executive committee to approve
grants and contracts and to assume additional functions and
responsibilities. The 1968 amendments to the National Science
Foundation Act, based upon extensive hearings (particularly by the
Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development) during the
mid-1960s, greatly strengthened and extended the responsibilities of
the NSF.
The trend to expand the activities of the NSF continues. The
Senate, toward the close of the 92d Congress, by an overwhelming
vote of 70-8 passed the National Science Priorities Act, which would
give additional authority to the NSF and more than $1 billion over a
three-year period to carry out the purposes of the act:8 "to
authorize the National Science Foundation to conduct research,
education and assistance programs to prepare the Country for
conversion from defense to civilian, socially oriented research and
development activities and for other purposes."9
Another milestone in the history of public science in the United
States was the President's Message to Congress of March 16, 1972.
In this message, which has become known as the Presidential
Message on Science and Technology, President Nixon said, "The
ability of the American people to harness the discoveries of science
in the service of man has always been an important element in our
national progress."10 He called for cooperative endeavor:
Finally, we must appreciate that the progress we seek
requires a new partnership in science and technology—one
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which brings together the Federal Government, private enter-
prise, State and local governments, and our universities and
research centers in a coordinated, cooperative effort to serve
the national interest. Each member of that partnership must
play the role it can play best; each must respect and reinforce
the unique capacities of the other members. Only if this
happens, only if our new partnership thrives, can we be sure
that our scientific and technological resources will be used as
effectively as possible in meeting our priority national
needs.11
The President also stressed the importance of wisdom in public
policy decisions in science:
The years ahead will require a new sense of purpose and a
new sense of partnership in science and technology. We must
define our goals clearly, so that we know where we are going.
And then we must develop careful strategies for pursuing
those goals. . . . The investment we make today in science
and technology and in the development of our future scientific
and technical talent is an investment in tomorrow—an invest-
ment which can have a tremendous impact on the basic quality
of our lives. We must be sure that we invest wisely and well.12
ORGANIZATION
A network has evolved of public agencies and organizations that
are responsible for the administration of scientific activities,
including those in research and development (R &D). Although
almost every federal department and agency conducts at least one
program that could be included in a listing of federal R &D
activities, only those agencies that were established primarily to
work in this field and the major coordinating agencies are discussed
here.
For approximately a decade, at the top of the federal hierarchy
was the Office of Science and Technology (OST), established in the
Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan 2 of 1962,
effective June 8, 1962.13 The director and deputy director were ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The director served as the President's Advisor in Science and also
chaired the eighteen-member President's Science Advisory Council
(PSAC), composed of the heads of major departments and science
agencies. It is interesting to note that as the head of the OST the
director could be called on for questioning by congressional com-
mittees, but as presidential advisor he might be restricted from
testifying by the President on the grounds of executive privilege.
Dr. Edward D. David, most recent head of the OST and science
advisor to President Nixon, was the subject of a recent Saturday
Review article.14 A major difficulty in the job, wrote Daniel S.
Greenberg,
is that Dr. David is politically chaste and Mr. Nixon is scien-
tifically illiterate, par for high achievers in serious science
and serious politics. . . . While David is the most outside
man of Nixon's official inner circle (he usually speaks to the
President only two or three times a month), his place on the
periphery is not unusual in the fifteen-year record of efforts
to institutionalize scientific advice at the presidential level.
However, several advances are at least partly credited to the
influence of the OST and PSAC: "Budgets have started to rise
again, following the damaging decline that set in under Johnson. . . .
Henceforth, reversing a budget-cutting trend that traditionally puts
long-range science first in line for the ax, all government depart-
ments are authorized to support fundamental research."
Dr. David's own position, quoted in the Greenberg article, is of
some interest: "I look on science and scientists as the antidote to
politics. Science is the technique for establishing reality. In all
these arguments about pollution, energy, drugs, product safety,
some group has to stand up for reality. That's what science is all
about."
A second, related federal coordinative body has been the Federal
Council for Science and Technology (FCST). The FCST was es-
tablished by the President by executive order in 1959. The major
purpose stated in the executive order is a coordinative one,
providing that "the Council shall consider problems and develop-
ments in the fields of science and technology and related activities
affecting more than one Federal agency or concerning the overall
advancement of the Nation's science and technology."
Recently, President Nixon, as part of his plan to streamline the
top level of federal government and reduce the White House staff,
has transferred the responsibilities of OST and FCST to the Na-
tional Science Foundation.
Other coordinating bodies include the President's Science Ad-
visory Council established in 1951, the National Aeronautics Space
Council (1958), the National Council on Marine Resources and
Engineering Development (1966), and the Council on Environmental
Quality (1969).
As indicated above, almost every federal agency engages in some
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scientific or technological, activity or provides funds for such work.
The Government Organization Manual published each year by the
Office of the Federal Register of the General Services Administra-
tion provides ready reference. Most reviewers are surprised by the
extent and wide variety of federal scientific and research activities.
Agencies that have as their primary purpose scientific or
technological work include the National Bureau of Standards (NBS),
established in 1901; the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), es-
tablished in 1946; the NSF, established in 1950; and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), established in 1958.
A large part of the work of the National Institutes of Health of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and the Health
Services, Mental Health Administration, Consumer Protection, and
Environmental Health Service of that department may also be
included. The same is true of the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Department of Transportation, and several branches of the
Department of the Interior.
The list of Federal R &D installations includes more that 735
laboratories. More than 300 are under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture. The Forest Service alone operates 77.
The Commerce Department, the Department of Interior, and even
the Office of the Attorney General of the Justice Department main-
tain research laboratories. The Department of Defense, by far the
largest financial supporter and user of science and technology, in-
cludes a large number of laboratories, proving grounds, or test
ranges under the departments of the Air Force, Army, and Navy.
The Tennessee Valley Authority, among government corpora-
tions, engages in extensive research, as do quasi-official agencies
such as the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy
of Engineering, and the National Research Council. The Smithsonian
Institution, which was established by public statute, may also be
included under this heading, although it conducts extensive activities
through nongovernment funds and programs.
The Smithsonian Institution sponsors four major laboratories or
research institutes; the Tennessee Valley Authority, nine labora-
tories; NASA, ten laboratories or research centers; and the
Environmental Services Administration, a large number of labora-
tories. A number of small research laboratories, test facilities,
and manufacturing plants are operated for NASA by industrial and
university contractors.
Of special interest is the network of laboratories and research
centers sponsored by the AEC, because some of them have been
proposed for conversion to "national scientific laboratories" to be
used by a number of agencies and universities with common
8interests in scientific research. The AEC-related organizations
include:
Ames Laboratory Mound Laboratory
Argonne National Laboratory National Accelerator Laboratory
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission National Reactor Testing Station
Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory Nuclear Rocket Development Station
Brookhaven National Laboratory Oak Ridge Associated Universities
Cambridge Electron Accelerator Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Health and Safety Laboratory Pacific Northwest Laboratory
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory Plasma Physics Laboratory
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Sandia Laboratories
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Savannah River Laboratory
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
Not to be overlooked in sketching the intricate pattern of
organization for public science policy and administration is the
emergence of science agencies at state and local levels. Every
state conducts some laboratory research activity in its health
department, policy laboratories, road and water departments, food
and drug departments or laboratories, and to differing degrees in
the various states, in other state agencies and departments.
A recent study by the Committee on Intergovernmental Science
Relations of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, Public
Technology: A Tool for Solving National Problems, points out the
need to develop capacities in state and local governments for de-
veloping and testing science applications.15 The Office of Inter-
studies of state government capacities and needs in the field of
science and technology.16 A number of states have established
scientific advisory boards, in most cases serving as an advisory
body to the governor. In California, a separate advisory group
provides advice to the legislature.
The report of the Committee on Intergovernmental Science Rela-
tions recommends that additional funds be provided to support joint
federal-state-local public technology research projects and pro-
poses that "new institutional arrangements be created by the aca-
demic institutions and state and local governments to deal with the
application of science and technology to state and local problems."17
The report also recommends that federal laboratories be made
available for use by state and local agencies wherever possible.
The committee structure in Congress in the fields of science and
technology is an important facet of the organizational approach.
Treated briefly here, it is relevant also to the next section,
"Law and Politics" (pp. 10-12).
Most committees and subcommittees of Congress, both House
and Senate, deal with the parent department or agency in which a
scientific agency or branch is located. For example, the Senate
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Commerce Committee treats legislation concerning the Weather
Bureau and the NBS. The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee deals with the Coast and Geodetic Survey. The Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, established in 1946, was the first
congressional committee created for the sole purpose of dealing
with an aspect of science and technology. The joint committee has
played a powerful .role in the development of the AEC and its
programs and is the only joint committee dealing exclusively with
science.
Since the creation of NASA, several new committees and
subcommittees responsible for aspects of science and technology
have arisen. The Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences and the House Committee on Science and Astronautics
were established with primary responsibility for the space pro-
gram. No full Senate committee has been created with jurisdiction
over science generally. However, the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics is responsible for the programs of the NFS, the
NBS, and related scientific and technological programs.
Much of the work of the full committees is done by sub-
committees. For example, the House Science Committee's Sub-
committee on Science, Research and Development holds hearings
periodically on scientific and technological programs. The reports
of this subcommittee provide valuable texts for advanced students in
this field. The House Government Operations Committee has
established a Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs
and a Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, both of which
have assumed some jurisdiction over the HEW National Institute of
Health Programs. The Senate Government Operations Committee,
a subcommittee on government research, has been replaced by the
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the National Science Foundation of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.
While these committees have major responsibility for particular
aspects of federal programs in science and technology, other Senate
and House committees and subcommittees from time to time
exercise significant jurisdiction in these fields. The House Appro-
priations Subcommittee on Independent Offices withheld further
funds for an NSF project entitled "Project Mohole" in 1966,
eliminating the program. Some scientific programs are supervised
by other House and Senate committees and subcommittees. The OST
came under the jurisdiction of the House Government Operations
Committee rather than the House Science Committee. This lack of a
logical pattern in congressional organization leads Michael D.
Reagan to write, "Unlike the Executive Branch, the Congress has no
single hierarchy, formally or factually, but only a series of little
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hierarchies [committees and subcommittees]. ... If the Executive
Branch can be characterized as pluralistic, the appropriate term
for the legislature is chaotic. . . ,"18
LAW AND POLITICS
Three closely related but distinct elements—the law, the legis-
lative process, and interest-group practices—constitute the political
approach.
In 1954 Don Price defined the dimension of this approach.19
Daniel S. Greenberg in 1967 and William R. Nelson in 1968 brought
attention in an organized and sophisticated way to the politics of
formulating federal science policy and programs.20 Nelson defined
the political approach as "an application of the decision-making
process, but an application requiring the quantification of variables
on a scale far broader than is normally associated with the formu-
lation of government policy."21 He went on to state a basic, although
somewhat idealistic, model for such decision making:
In order to reduce the range of potential error in these
decisions to the realm of acceptable risk, it is necessary that
every possible effort be devoted to an examination of the
conflicting values involved and the most effective ways of
making decisions in which these values will be given due
consideration. The relative merits of proposed programs
must be balanced with the apparent likelihood of successfully
achieving the identifiable objectives of the programs.22
That government activities in science and technology are deeply
political in nature is clear to any observer of the legislative
process or even of significant parts of the administrative process.
All public decision making and policy formulation have their roots
in the political process. In political decision making with respect to
science,
Difficult political decisions are involved at every turn. The
question of how much money should be appropriated for
science, what priorities will be given to various programs,
what individuals, institutions or corporations will be entrusted
to the development of the programs, and what degree of
administrative control and management should be maintained
are absolutely critical.23
A recent analysis pointed out that scientists and engineers have
become increasingly active in political matters:
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....within academic science, now so profoundly politicized,
there is considerable dissent on all manner of political and
professional issues. Some of these divisions unquestionably
are highly functional, in the sense of contributing to stimu-
lating, even creative, exchanges. But others suggest that
scientists, like their colleagues in other divisions of the
multiversity, have entered an era of often trying disputation
that extends far beyond the boundaries of their scholarly
concerns.24
The term "political approach" has several meanings. It can de-
note the total legislative process, including subcommittee hearings
and deliberations, Senate and House committee recommendations,
and legislative action. It includes presidential orders and White
House recommendations. Since many of the votes and recommenda-
tions are made along political party lines, it also includes what is
frequently termed "political influence"—political party activities or
the influence of special-interest groups.
Because of the last definition of the term, for many years
scientists have sought to insulate themselves from the political
process. The very structure of the Smithsonian Institution, although
established by statute, illustrates the effort on the part of scientists
to maintain an independent posture with respect to government and
political process. At the same time, scientists have sought to obtain
substantial support from public funds. During and following World
War n,with the tremendous impetus added by the development of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) programs and by the space effort,
the substantial funds that were made available somewhat obscured
the basic issue. The decline of large military, health, and space
budgets for R & D has brought into sharp focus again the desire of
many scientists to do pure research without government inter-
ference of any kind and, at the same time, to receive large amounts
of public funds to support this research. Harvey Brooks, a spokes-
man for the scientists' point of view, provides a rationale in his
definition of basic research as a purpose of our society and a goal
in itself:
Basic research is recognized as one of the characteristic
expressions of the highest aspirations of modern man. It
bears much the same relation to contemporary civilization
that the great artistic and philosophical civilizations of the
Greeks did to theirs or the great cathedrals did to medieval
Europe. In a certain sense it not only serves the purposes of
our society, but is one of the purposes of our society.25
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The agreement of senators and congressmen with this position
clearly waned, as shown by sharp reductions in specific programs of
basic research. The Mansfield Amendment reveals congressional
intent that funds appropriated to a particular agency, in this case
the Department of Defense, be spent only for purposes clearly
demonstrated to be closely related to the purposes of the programs
of that agency. This issue remains a current one. A recent
response to Congress's desire to tie appropriations for science to
solving high-priority problems was the establishment by the NSF of
a multi-million-dollar program, "Research Applied to National
Needs."26
A classic example of the interplay involved in the political
approach, involving the pressures of both public and private
interests, occurs in the area of energy needs. Public needs for
increased energy have been demonstrated. At the same time,
environmental groups have been critical and active in bringing court
and other actions against the expansion of coal-burning energy
producers. New developments such as the breeder reactor in using
atomic sources for energy are still questionable. Private power
companies are expending vast sums in advertising and unknown
amounts of money to influence legislation. Several governors in the
United States have established special energy committees to provide
advice in this highly sensitive area. And the energy problem, of
course, is only one of many involving science and technology.
PERSONNEL
Only recently has attention been focused on the people involved in
administering science agencies. Because of the relative lack of
attention given to this important aspect of the subject, four chapters
in this book are devoted specifically to this topic and two chapters
touch on it peripherally.
A study recently published by NASA used questionnaires to
determine the functions and the skills used by science adminis-
trators in NASA and the NIH.27 The U.S. Civil Service Commission
also has published a number of studies that indicate the significance
of the science administrator in the overall picture of federal
employment, particularly at the higher levels.
Some scientists have said that administration can be learned "by
the seat of the pants." Outstanding scientists like Robert Oppen-
heimer and Norris Bradbury, who have had no formal training in
management or administration, have made remarkable contributions
as science administrators. James Webb, who holds a law degree,
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provided brilliant leadership as the administrator of NASA. Most
thoughtful observers, however, have concluded that there is a value,
for most people and over the longer range, in identifying and
developing administrative talent in the field of science and tech-
nology, as in many other specialties. In Chapter 2, Dr. Lynton K.
Caldwell addresses the question of "how American society can
match its administrative capabilities to its public needs." Indi-
cating that his objective is to outline a useful program that would
contribute to the nation's science management capabilities, he
provides a list of the attributes an effective administrator needs,
particularly in what he calls "technoscientific administration."
In Chapter 3, former Executive Director of the U. S. Civil
Service Commission Nicholas J. Oganovic and Harold H. Leich, also
of the Civil Service Commission, report on an analysis of the duties
listed in more than two hundred position descriptions of federal sci-
ence and engineering managers at the "supergrade" level, GS 16-18,
in the federal service. In cooperation with the Program for Ad-
vanced Study in Public Science Policy and Administration at the
University of New Mexico, the U.S. Civil Service Commission spon-
sored a questionnaire to approximately two hundred federal scien-
tists and engineers who rated themselves as administrators, and to
the same number who rated themselves as individual scientists and
engineers in several federal laboratories and in Sandia Labora-
tories, a private corporation supported by the AEC.
In many large agencies, professional people are at odds with
administrators. For example, no one has yet been able to define
clearly the respective responsibilities of HEW regional directors in
relation to the heads of the regional professional staffs.23 This kind
of conflict is examined in an article by philosophy professor
Thomas A. Cohan, "Paradoxes of Science Administration."29 Re-
minding us of Hegel's "Lordship and Bondage"30—the paradox in
which the supervisor becomes the slave and the worker is ennobled
by his tasks—Cohan says, "Time and again, the boss begins to
deteriorate as a human being, and the worker gains in moral
stature." He delineates the problem as it exists peculiarly in
science administration:
Granted that science administration raises all the problems
that administration in general does, and that the work of
science is not exempt from the universal paradoxes [that the
supervisor becomes the slave], in what way does the paradox
get its special coloration so far as science is concerned? Is
there anything special about the nature of science that makes
this kind of work different from other types of human
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activity? ... I think much of what an administrator must do
for a scientist is to treat him as a unique human being in sore
need of a multitude of services to enable him to practice his
art. . . . his role is to create an environment that nourishes
scientific creativity.
Wesley J. Hjornevik, former Associate Director of the NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, takes up this significant topic
in Chapter 4.
Closely related but so significant as to require separate treat-
ment is the subject of organizational dynamics as it provides a
more useful environment to the practicing science administrator. In
Chapter 5 Rensis Likert, former Director of the Institute for Social
Research at the University of Michigan, relates the pattern of
organization to the effective administration of complex, large-scale
programs, particularly in creative and technical areas. Likert's
analysis draws on the work of Donald Pelz.31 In a number of other
publications, and in consultation with a number of public and private
organizations, Dr. Likert has developed the concept of "beehive"
organization patterns as opposed to hierarchical organization pat-
terns. He has concluded that, particularly in scientific and tech-
nological research agencies, lateral organization may be the more
useful.
In Chapter 6, C. West Churchman discusses personnel from the
viewpoint of top-level management. He suggests a systems ap-
proach, useful in almost all organizations but especially necessary
in what he calls "the development of sociotechnical systems." In
Chapter 8 Churchman discusses the role of the division chief in
research organizations, or dean in universities—the position at least
one step down from top management and two above actual opera-
tions—in an attempt to portray what the research director should
be trying to do and the resources he should use to do it.
FINANCE
Understanding the financing of public science policy and adminis-
tration is essential to understanding the field itself and some of its
most critical issues. The financial approach yields insights into the
economic importance of public science and technology, provides
measures of the results of decision making, gives indications of
trends, and is an essential tool for analyzing problems of long- and
short-range funding.
Economic importance. A glance at some of the total annual ex-
penditures for science and technology shows that public science
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administration is big business in the United States. Although exact
and comparable figures on expenditures in public science adminis-
tration are difficult to obtain, it is clear that such expenditures rep-
resent significant amounts in overall public spending.
The results of decision making. The financial approach also
provides measures of the results of the political decision-making
processes. The relative amounts made available to agencies and
programs reveal what policy decisions have been made. Assigned
or changed priorities are reflected in increases or decreases in
funding to particular programs.
Determining trends. Perhaps the only accurate method of deter-
mining trends in public expenditure for science and technology is
through application of the financial approach. For example, charges
that public and private support of R & D is waning are not substan-
tiated by the statistics.
In 1961 the federal government spent $9 billion for R &D. A
continuing rise in government R &D spending from $11.3 billion in
1963 to $16.6 billion in 1973 (estimated) represents a 47-percent
increase over that ten-year period (Table 1). National defense and
the space program, which represented 90 percent of the federal
R&D cost until 1966, are expected to account for 77 percent in
1973; other programs have grown steadily, gaining more than
5 percent between 1970 and 1973.32
In 1971, total public and private expenditures for R &D in the
United States were approximately $27.8 billion,33 or about 2.7 per-
cent of the gross national product for that year. Of funding from all
sources (industry, colleges and universities, federal agencies, and
private nonprofit institutions), basic research accounted for $3.9
billion, applied research $6 billion, and development $17.9 billion.
The federal government spent about $15 billion, or 53 percent of the
total. Private R&D spending was up 30 percent from its 1968 level;
universities and colleges, spending $2.7 billion, were up 5 percent
from their 1968 level.
The total R&D expenditure for 1971 represented a gain of about
4 percent over the 1970 level of $26.8 billion.
A significant increase was authorized in funding for the NSF for
fiscal year 1973-74. Congress approved a $704-million authoriza-
tion (of which $650.2 million was actually appropriated) to NSF, or
approximately $50 million more than the amount recommended by
the White House. This congressional authorization was the largest
in the twenty-two-year history of the NSF. The authorization in-
cluded a number of specific budget floors in various categories, an
effort by Congress to ensure that certain major programs are
emphasized. The chief items in the bill included: $274.3 million for
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TABLE 1
Federal R & D Expenditures under the Alternative
Functional Classification System
($ million)
Function
Defense
Space
Health
Advancement of
science and tech-
nology
Environment
Transportation
Energy conversion
and development
Agriculture
Economic security
Education
Government operations
Housing
International co-
operation and de-
velopment
Crime control and
prevention
Communications
Commerce and indus-
try
Total
1963
7,273.3
2,429.7
593.8
296.4
171.9
112.0
265.3
138.8
22.1
9.6
7.6
0.2
9.7
—
6.8
1.5
1 1 ,338.7
1968
8,592.8
4,576.7
1,125.3
544.5
304.1
365.9
344.7
225.9
97.5
86.8
14.9
6.3
20.1
0.6
12.6
14.4
16,333.1
1971
8,161.7
3,207.5
1,217.3
619.3
419.6
684.1
336.9
261.8
149.1
115.0
35.9
39.3
25.1
8.1
12.8
6.6
15,300.1
1972
(est.)
8,702.7
2,960.1
1,386.8
704.6
509.2
607.3
405.2
288.1
153.9
125.5
42.8
55.9
24.8
17.6
14.1
9.0
16,007.6
1973
(est.)
8,860.6
2,929.7
1 ,607.2
777.6
572.2
563.2
452 .1
300.7
170.9
151.5
69.1
53.2
27.0
23.3
16.6
9.6
16,584.5
Source: National Science Foundation, National Patterns of R & D Resources,
Funds and Manpower in the U.S., 1953-1972, NSF 72-300, December 1971, p. 2.
scientific research support; $108.6 million for a series of special
programs such as biological and atmospheric studies; and $87.5
million for programs to apply technology to environmental, urban,
energy, and similar problems.
Thus many observers are puzzled to see growth figures that
reflect increased expenditures for science, including R &D, and at
the same time read public statements by leading scientists pro-
claiming a "crisis in science" because of reductions in funding. A
headline in the Washington Post of December 3, 1970, read
"Research Fund Losses Decried by Scientists." In the article Dr.
Philip Handler, then President of the National Academy of Science,
urged increased federal funds as he announced a report from
committee of the National Academy of Science. The committee re-
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port indicated that reduced research budgets "are now restricting
research activities, morale among life scientists is falling and
apprehensions are rising." The Committee urged steady increases
in recent "on-again, off-again" Federal funds for research and
training.34
According to an article in the National Journal, "A sharp slow-
down in the growth rate in Federal research spending has given rise
to concern that the United States may be in danger of losing its
scientific and technological eminence. Scientists in universities are
turning an increasingly critical eye at the organization of Federal
support and at the scientists-administrators who lead the Federal
efforts."35
The plight of scientists whose budgets have been reduced or
eliminated is explained by the fact that priorities have changed.
Sharp reductions have occurred in the space program and in some
health programs. Priorities for research in the massive defense
area have changed. Large-scale support for basic, undirected
research has been reduced and the large amounts previously made
available to universities, particularly for advanced education in
science and technology, have been cut back. Testifying before
Congress in 1971, Dr. Handler expressed dismay concerning "the
budget proposed for fiscal year 1972. He pointed out that, while an
increase of $116 million to the NSF was planned, $74 million of that
was for activities previously funded by other federal agencies,
largely the Department of Defense, so that for the federal govern-
ment as a whole, this is not an increase in activity; it is merely a
change in bookkeeping."36 Dr. Handler urged continued support for
educational institutions and for individuals in training rather than
the transfer of funds previously used for these purposes to the new
NSF program, "Research Affecting the Nation's Needs."
Problems in range of funding. The financial approach is funda-
mental to many management or administrative problems in public
science. As Elmer Staats and William Carey explain in Chapter 7:
A natural tension exists between the doers of research and the
managers who must find reasons for supporting them. The
researcher expects independence to be creative, along with
stable flow of funds. The public manager also wants scientific
creativity but is bound by rubrics that were devised for
practical pursuits.
A number of leading scientists, including the director of the NSF,
have called for longer range financial support rather than the on-
again, off-again funding that results from rapidly changing appro-
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priations. Sorely needed for sound administration of science
agencies and university science programs, long-range support is
nonetheless very difficult to obtain. The Office of Management and
Budget reflects the views of the White House concerning priorities
and programs. Congressional decisions are often based on pres-
sures from public and private interest groups as well as the
legislators' own assessments of public interest and concern. For
these reasons many thoughtful people are urging an extensive
program aimed at building "public understanding of science." Thus
we see a move away from support of what in the past was called
"basic research" to research directed toward current social
problems.
POLICY FORMULATION
The aspect of public science that attracts the widest attention and
is touched on frequently in newspapers and magazines is policy-
public decisions made in the field. Even relatively minor policy
decisions attract widespread public attention as they are seen to
affect the well-being of the people. While these considerations cut
across other elements in this field, the significance of policy debate
and decision making requires that this approach be given special
treatment.
Public science policy and administration is highly dynamic.
While all government processes reflect frequent change, the oppor-
tunity for new discoveries and the need for dramatic reshaping of
policies, organizations, and programs to take into account new
findings are especially noticeable here.
Atomic developments during and following World War II, for
instance, radically reshaped public activity in science and tech-
nology. Similarly, the policy decision made by the President and
supported by Congress to pour an all-out effort into the space
program resulted in the establishment of a major independent
federal agency and related branches in other departments, the
expenditure of huge amounts of public monies, and the development
of a new technology. A vaccine has practically eliminated infantile
paralytic poliomyelitis, and a new drug has had the same result for
tuberculosis as a public health threat. Such developments have
dramatically modified public organization, financial expenditures,
and programs.
In Chapter 9 Harold Orlans defines "policy" as "the illusion that
intelligence can reduce the confusion of events and guide us toward
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desirable, timely, and orderly objectives," pointing out that govern-
ment policy is frequently the result of self-interest pressures and
may be simply a cover of purely political decisions.
The formulation of public policy in science is little different from
that of public policy in many other areas. It combines some efforts
to create programs in the public interest with initiating or
continuing programs directed toward and supported by special
interests. The agricultural subsidy programs and the oil depletion
allowances are examples of the impact of special-interest groups
on policy.
Even idealistic ally motivated groups differ widely on the "facts"
upon which decisions can be made. For example, some leading
scientists charge that the atomic reactor is dangerous to health and
the environment; others "demonstrate" that it is not. In an effort to
introduce some order in this situation, Congress in 1972 enacted a
technology assessment bill that would create a board, responsible to
Congress, to set up standards and methods of evaluating past and
new technological developments.37
Objectivity
One of the foremost issues involved in public decision making and
policy formulation involves the question, How can objectivity be
assured in the development of factual information essential to this
process? (In a recent article Daniel Greenberg, treating the subject
of technology assessment, makes this point plainly in his title:
"Don't Ask the Barber Whether You Need a Haircut.") For many
years, the federal government has used committees of the National
Academy of Science and the National Academy of Engineering in
conjunction with the National Research Council for this purpose.
Lower level issues have often been assigned by contract to univer-
sity or private research groups. Naturally, when public funds
are expended and the positions of key officials may be known,
objectivity of research findings can be a matter for concern. No
one likes to think that leading scientists or heads of research pro-
grams would subvert their integrity because projects are supported
at the instance of particular leaders. Nonetheless, public confidence
in the findings may be reduced because of the approach taken. Here
is an area where large private foundations, presently undergoing
some congressional questioning, may find a public-interest use of
funds and support.
It is not likely that unanimity can be obtained. The views and
backgrounds of scientists differ. The difficulty lies in distinguishing
honest differences,based on information achieved by sound research
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and study, from points of view developed to support preconceived
ideas or special interests.
Grant decisions
A second area of controversy in the decision-making process
involves the use of peers in allocating grant funds. The NIH have
established many committees made up of experts and specialists
who review grant proposals. Nicholas Wade in a recent Science
article, "Peer Review System: How To Hand Out Money Fairly,"
describes the present system in some detail. (See also Barbara
Culliton's article in the January 26, 1973 issue of Science, "NIH
Training Grants: Going, Going, Gone?") The NSF uses reports of
individual specialists. Many scientists consider this process a
"lottery," since much depends on having someone on the grants
committee who is knowledgeable and interested in one's special
area.
While the use of specialists and peer group committees in grant
allocation has its drawbacks, it may be better than having decisions
made by scientists employed full time by public agencies, who could
be subject to political and other pressures. Possibly, also, in-
novative methods of reviewing grant proposals are needed.
Grant duration
A third aspect of policy making that concerns scientists and other
research managers is the relatively rapid change of programs and
priorities by Congress and by program agencies. The problem is
clear enough. A university or other research group recruits a
highly qualified group of scientists and spends large sums of public
and university funds for equipment. It may have to offer tenure to a
qualified research manager. If a few years later the sponsoring
agency discontinues support, the contractor is in trouble. The
faculty member with tenure must be kept on even though his chief
qualification was for the defunct project. No easy solution is in
sight. Some proposals have suggested longer range programs, say,
five to seven years. Some universities are refusing to accept grants
unless they are guaranteed over a substantial time period. NASA
developed the "step-funding" grant program, in which a non-
renewable five-year grant would be reduced by one-third during
each of its last three years. Thus the university or research group
had the opportunity to develop other funds if it wished to continue
the program.
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Level of organization
A fourth policy issue, widely treated in the literature and
proposed in several congressional committee hearings, is that of the
establishment of a Department of Science. In 1960, Senator Hubert
Humphrey advocated the establishment of such a department to pro-
vide coordination and eliminate duplication.38 A number- of scien-
tists and nonscientists have opposed the idea:
... .whatever case may once have existed for a Department of
Science to coordinate programs and develop overall policy
(and it was a weak case to begin with) has been effectively
answered for the foreseeable future by the Executive Office
structure that has developed since 1957. . . . Such inade-
quacies as may now exist in this area are more likely to
require extension and further development of existing ap-
paratus than to call for supplantation by a Department of
Science.39
Only a power near the summit of the Federal structure can
hope for success.40
Another choice involves the recommendation for a unified
department of science and technology. . . . But the proposal
encounters today, as it has since John Wesley Powell ad-
vocated it before the Allison Commission in the 1880's, the
stubborn pluralism of the scientists themselves, the uncer-
tainties of the scientists about the boundaries of their
interests, and the opposition of government scientists more
willing to endure their existing, familiar organizational en-
vironment than to risk the unknowns of a new and untested
arrangement.41
Currently, attention is being focused on strengthening the
coordinative function of the OST and on expanding the responsi-
bilities of the NSF rather than on creating a new department. The
decision to locate OST within NSF was probably based on this prem-
ise. (These changes are discussed in "David, PSAC Exit Pre-
dicted," Science, January 12, 1973, and a Science editorial,
"Departure of the President's Science Adviser," January 19, 1973.)
This has been difficult to accept for advocates of existing depart-
ments and agencies who feel that their R & D activities need to be
closely tied to their organizations' functions. In addition, pressures
continue for the establishment of other departments, such as educa-
tion and natural resources, raising the question of extending the
President's span of control over a larger number of federal
departments.
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Public understanding of science
A fifth area, possibly the most significant aspect of policy
formulation or decision making in science administration, is what
we have called "public understanding of science."
In the past, the general public seems to have been intrigued by a
hazy notion of science, represented by a dedicated researcher in a
white coat working amid test tubes and other mysterious equipment
in search of a cure for a dread human disease. On the other hand,
the strong and informed support of legislators like Senator Lister
Hill and Congressman James Fogerty also had much to do with the
unlimited support given to the development of the NIH. It is diffi-
cult to say whether increased appropriations for health resulted
from personal interest on the part of congressional leaders or from
public desire to see high priorities given to research in medicine.
Both probably played a part.
Because of the interest of leading scientists, and with the en-
couragement of Congressman Emilio Daddario (at that time Chair-
man of the House S u b c o m m i t t e e on Science, Research and
Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics),
the NSF in 1970 sought to revitalize its program in public under-
standing of science. Dr. William D. McElroy, then NSF director,
testified before Congress:
Scientists, science policy, and the very value of science to
society are under sharp emotional and intellectual attack.
Large numbers of our citizens are said to be disenchanted
with science and, by and large, I believe this is true. Although
some reasons for this attitude are understandable and we
scientists must accept a share of the blame, the net result of
this viewpoint is a deplorable and dangerous situation. At the
very time science is experiencing this low esteem, man's
need for its beneficial products is at its highest level. Simply
put, civilized man cannot survive many generations on this
planet without the increased creation of new knowledge and its
enlightened use.42
McElroy pointed out that to the average citizen, American science,
policy is a complex and frustrating subject: "Few public policy
issues have such shades of critical subtlety, few are less under-
stood—much less debated—by informed citizens." He urged two
things: (1) science policy must be considered as a system (effects
upon one part have ramifications upon others), and (2) science policy
must be distinguished from the mechanism for arriving at those
policies. "Because science is absolutely crucial to the future of our
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society, the mechanism for developing national science policy is a
matter of importance to all of us. In the final analysis, science
policies exist to serve society and the Nation, and are but one aspect
of national policy. Science policies, then, should-be developed
through the widest possible participation by well informed citi-
zens."43
A leading environmentalist, Barry Commoner, concurred: "The
age of innocent faith in science and technology may be over,"44 and
"Science can now serve society by exposing the crisis of modern
technology to the judgment of all mankind."45
The participation of large numbers of people in the development
of science policy requires the use of the network of established
groups. The task of involving people in this process will not be
easy, however. Most citizens prefer to sit back and criticize re-
trospectively, explains Peter Schrag, "For most citizens are unable
or unwilling to penetrate the legal and political jungle in which
public issues are often lost. Indeed, in their confusion, they are
only too glad to let someone else—a bureaucrat or an 'expert'—do
all the thinking and assume all the responsibility."46
Systematic advice in the development of science policy must be
obtained from at least five sources, according to McElroy: (1) mis-
sion-oriented agencies of the federal government; (2) industry;
(3) colleges and universities; (4) state and local governments; and
(5) national organizations.47 In addition to calling for means to
involve large numbers of people and groups in formulating public
science policy, McElroy set out five guidelines for policy making:
1. Federal mission agencies should support fundamental as well
as applied research in areas determined to be pertinent to
their mission.
2. Administrative procedures should be maintained so that
individual science projects, so-called "little science," do not
directly compete with large-scale or "big science"programs,
such as the National Research Centers.
3. Federal funds must be of an adequate level and sustained over
a predictable period of time.
4. Problem-oriented research, often of a multi-disciplinary
nature, should be funded in its own right and not at the expense
of certain fundamental investigations which, for a variety of
reasons, seem more productive when nurtured through dis-
ciplined orientation.
5. Priorities, with adequate safeguards to hedge against im-
prudent judgments, can and should be established among fields
of scientific research.48
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In Science, the Endless Frontier, Vannevar Bush quoted James B.
Conant, former president of Harvard University: "in every section
of the entire area where the word science may properly be applied,
the limiting factor is a human one. We shall have rapid or slow
advance in this direction or in that depending on the number of
really first-class men who are engaged in the work in question.
... So in the last analysis the future of science in this country will
be determined by our basic educational policy."
McElroy's testimony embraced this point as well:
Highly trained scientific manpower is essential for perform-
ing scientific research, meeting the requirements of industry
and government, and educating future generations. Because
this training underpins our national science effort, the Federal
Government has a particular responsibility to maintain the
stability and general health of graduate education, and here I
include the humanities as well as the sciences. At the
graduate level, research and education are too closely related
to be separated, and the process itself is too expensive to be
borne solely by the institutions.
McElroy closed his testimony to the subcommittee (referring to
a draft of Chapter 10 of this volume by Dwight Waldo concerning the
"New Romanticism" in science) with the following statement:
Because of this new spirit, I don't think we scientists can look
at science in the future as we have in the past. The science
community, I believe, must make its accommodation with this
new spirit. We really have little choice,for changes will come
whether we like them or not when today's young scientists
reach positions of power and influence.
Thus at this time a great deal more information concerning
science must be provided to the public, through the formal education
system as well as on a continuing basis. The statement "science is
no longer popular" is not true. Science and technology are being
increasingly used and highly supported by government subsidies and
grants. This does not mean that in particular instances there are no
serious questions or strong reactions: the effort to develop breeder
reactors in the use of atomic energy to meet increasing energy
needs is a prime example of controversy; effective research in
prolonging human life has made it possible for people to live longer,
but the quality of that longer life has been neglected. In his Message
on Science and Technology, President Nixon stated:
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In all these efforts it will be essential that the American
people be better equipped to make wise judgments concerning
public issues which involve science and technology. As our
national life is increasingly permeated by science and tech-
nology, it is important that public understanding grow apace.49
Dilemmas in public understanding of science
The following sections explore some of the dilemmas we face in
developing a program of public understanding of science.
Public opinion. Critics say that science and technology have been
oversold, and stress the many unmet needs of our society. Young
student activists, cynical and disillusioned with the results of sci-
ence and technology, attack the concept of computers and picket
computer centers. Yet the computer combined with scientific meth-
od offers the major hope for coping with the complex needs of our
society—protection of the environment, urban renewal, minority op-
portunities, fuller employment, and the like. Many of the positions
of the activists are based on what has been called "New Romanti-
cism" and start with rejecting rational or logical approaches.
"When the irrational guides human conduct it becomes rational,"
wrote Freud; that is, the irrational must be taken into account in
any effort to deal with such situations.
Competing disciplines. Faced with the same kinds of problems
and theoretically directed toward achieving the same or parallel
objectives, science and engineering groups still have become rivals
and even antagonists. How can conflicts between specialized fields
be resolved in favor of the use of knowledge for common objectives?
In particular, how can knowledge in the social and physical sciences
be combined to solve "people problems"? There are high degrees
of specialization within the social sciences—political science, eco-
nomics, sociology, psychology—as well as within the physical sci-
ences. Most so-called interdisciplinary programs are not effective.
Better progress has been made in training people who themselves
have capabilities in several fields. Does this not offer a challenge
to revise educational programs, particularly at the advanced gradu-
ate levels? Dr. Willard Libby at the University of California, Los
Angeles, is developing an advanced program on this premise. Syra-
cuse University and the University of New Mexico have developed
advanced programs in "public science policy and administration"
to build specially designed courses of an interdisciplinary nature
into the graduate curriculum.
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Basic versus applied research. In the training of most scien-
tists, a fundamental premise stressed early in their careers is the
importance of unrestricted research directed solely toward the
"search for truth." In the chemistry or physics laboratory, the
negative finding, properly recorded, is as significant as a positive
result. Few question the value of basic research:
We have repeatedly encountered instances in which a rather
esoteric piece of research finds application in a manner which
the original observer would never have supposed. A most
recent instance is the history of a drug called cytosine
arabinoside.
This drug is by all odds the most promising drug we have
for the treatment of two major forms of leukemia. For one
form of leukemia it has been achieving a 75% cure rate.
Cytosine arabinoside was found originally by a zoologist who
was investigating the biochemical properties of Caribbean
sponges; this compound had never before been seen.50
But another approach to research is needed, one that falls
between "pure" and "applied" research. Using the methodology of
basic research, the scientist would attack a problem recognized as
significant to meeting current needs. Although this practice is not
new—it has been used for many years in health, environmental, and
other research areas—the development of an expanded concept may
be useful in interpreting its value in solving social problems,
particularly those involving the quality of life.
Coordination of public agency efforts. Many major federal agen-
cies are deeply involved in scientific and technological efforts. In
his Science and Technology Message, President Nixon requested
that all federal agencies try to support research in program activ-
ities and other ways. Large sums are spent by individual agencies
without particular regard to common goals or established prior-
ities. There appears to be no discernible overall public science
policy, a lack that has been noted at the international level:
As did the OECD report just described, the UNESCO report
also finds that the United States does not have a single science
policy, but rather a constellation of science policies that have
evolved, largely in an ad hoc fashion. Consequently, much of
the development of U. S. science policies has taken place in
the context of the utilization of science for a variety of
purposes by a plurality of public agencies and private
institutions. The resulting plurality of our science policies,
said the UNESCO report, provides the opportunity for ex-
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tensive discussion of major issues that tends to insure against
mistakes caused by undue dominance of a single point of view.
However, this same plurality "often increases the difficulty of
coordination and of the achievement of a coherent national
perspective on the development and utilization of scientific
and technological resources."51
As the scientific capacities of state and local governments are
developed, more mutual cooperation and coordination will be
needed.
Modernization of the grant system. Closely related to the need
for improved organization of public science agencies is the need for
coordination of the federal grant process. Most procedures for re-
questing grants call for elaborate proposal statements and involve
long delays. In addition, investigators find a morass of complicated
instructions and different forms and procedures among closely re-
lated programs. "Grantsmanship" has become a profession. How
can public grant systems be organized so that the ablest investiga-
tors are assisted, with their time preserved for the investigations in
which they are trained rather than in the drafting of grant proposals?
Constituency. Many people, both as individuals and as members
of large and powerful organizations, are deeply interested in the
future of science and technology. They come from industry, large
institutions, general education, and civic groups. How can their
informed support be enlisted? Are new organizations needed?
Interpretation by scientists. A few scientists are interested and
able when it comes to interpreting their research to the public.
Scientists are trained, of course, to be conservative about their
goals and findings.52 The dilemma is this: How can progress in
scientific and technological research be promptly reported and in-
terpreted to the general public, particularly when the findings seem
to be important breakthroughs, without violating sound scientific
discipline—so that the claims are not later discovered to be un-
founded or to have unanticipated consequences? There is no easy
answer to this question, but a need does exist to encourage scien-
tists to develop skills in communicating their findings to the public.
Most people, including legislators, do not want to hear from public
relations staffs about scientific research; they want to hear from
the scientists themselves.
SCIENCE LEADERSHIP FOR TOMORROW
Most graduate programs in science, engineering, and the social
sciences have a very narrow focus. How can a specific program be
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developed to answer the need for future leadership in science and
technology?
The University of New Mexico was among several universities
asked to design a program toward this objective.53 During 1968,
extensive consultation was undertaken by a small staff at the
University of New Mexico and advice was sought from the heads of
some eighteen science agencies in the Albuquerque area. The
Regional Advisory Committee on Public Science Policy and Admin-
istration, composed of the heads and deputy heads of these agencies,
was formally constituted.
The University of New Mexico program was established with two
objectives:
1. On the basis of graduate research to add to, and make readily
available, an additional body of knowledge concerned with the
formulation and administration of public policy in the field of
science
2. To develop and provide a graduate-level interdisciplinary
curriculum and research program in public administra-
tion-science, leading to the Master of Arts degree, designed
to supplement the scientific and technological background of
advanced students and practitioners preparing for responsible
positions as science-administrators
Guidance in developing a meaningful curriculum was also
obtained from a questionnaire (see pp. 62-63 and Chapter 3) con-
cerning the areas of academic work that have helped science admin-
istrators perform effectively in their present jobs or study. An
interdisciplinary curriculum was set up. Faculty members are
drawn from the Department of Economics and the Medical School as
well as the Division of Public Administration, which administers the
program. In the first three years of program operation, thirty-nine
Fellows were assigned by their agencies to undertake the academic
year course. Seven federal agencies as well as state and local
agencies have participated, including the city of Albuquerque, NASA,
the state of New Mexico, the U. S. Bureau of Mines, the U. S. Air
Force, the U. S. Army, the AEC, the U. S. Navy, the U. S. Office of
Economic Opportunity, and, in 1972, the U. S. Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife.
A few other universities are developing or operating programs
seeking to bridge the gap between the scientific and technological
preparation afforded most researchers and the administrative and
social science skills required to meet overall administrative
responsibilities. Further programs are needed.
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NEW FRONTIERS
A forecast of major issues and programs in science policy and
administration could cover a wide range of topics. We will here
review briefly just a few areas in which significant trends seem to
be emerging.
First, as discussed previously, is a move away from the dual
concepts of basic research and applied research. The development
of programs in the National Science Foundation "directed toward
the nation's needs" and the ripple effect of the Mansfield Amend-
ment have focused research within specific areas and toward
stated goals. If the independence and approach of the researchers
are carefully insulated from preconceived findings and goals, this
may maintain the environment of "pure research" with the differ-
ence that parts of the research program are directed to specific
social problems. We might call this new approach "focused basic
research." It may both stimulate congressional support and awaken
public interest in scientific problems.
Second, the last few years have seen some attention to specific
training for science administrators. While many federal agencies
call for the performance of science management in their programs,
the elimination of NASA support in this area means that there is no
longer a support program for this purpose. Some interest has been
indicated by the NSF and it is hoped that a specific program of
university and other organization support will grow up.
Third, recent attention is being given to new patterns of organi-
zation in science administration. The work of Rensis Likert
(Chapter 5) and the outstanding results of the NASA Apollo program
in using "beehive" organization have aroused the interest of
numerous major agencies.
In addition to changes in the organization of the science agencies
themselves, there is a trend away from continued support of some
agencies established during World War II. Some large federal
organizations have encouraged the establishment of "captive"
agencies, or private corporations entirely supported by public funds,
such as Sandia Laboratories, contractor for the AEC, and the RAND
Corporation.
The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in
Boulder, Colorado, a branch of the University Corporation for
Atmospheric Research (UCAR), illustrates another emerging pat-
tern. A number of universities have formed a corporation, with
subsidiaries designed for special purposes. NCAR receives its total
budget from the NSF and is responsive to priorities established by
Congress and NSF54 but is relatively insulated from political or
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special-interest pressures. The success of NCAR may result in
part from the exceptional quality of its leadership, but may also re-
sult in part from its innovative type of organization.
A fourth trend is toward widespread support for building public
understanding of science programs and their relationship to human
and social problems. For example, in a recent publication, Senator
John V. Tunney and M. E. Levine pointed out the urgent need for
public interest, participation, and debate in the controversial field
of "genetic engineering":
The cry has been raised by many that the impact of science
has been too fruitful. It has been raised by some with regard
to the nuclear sciences. It might well be reiterated in the
near future with regard to the biomedical sciences. . . . All
segments of society should be involved in the debate these new
technologies demand. The techniques must be discussed and
debated among lawyers, doctors, theologians, legislators,
scientists, journalists, and all other segments of society. The
issues raised require interdisciplinary attention. We cannot
begin too soon to consider them.55
The same position has been held regarding other areas of research
and development; that is, "Science is too important to be left to the
scientists."
A fifth trend is toward designing grant mechanisms to provide
effective control in the expenditure of public funds but minimal
control over activities, so that research managers have the greatest
possible freedom in pursuing objectives. The aim is to achieve
more research for the dollar, and to reduce the use of scarce
research funds for other purposes. The pattern of overhead charges
in research administration should be reviewed.
In Chapter 10, Dwight Waldo presents evidence of concern about
the "social relevance" of science and technology in meeting human
problems. He sees turbulence developing in a number of areas of
science policy and administration and concludes that science will
not be allowed to remain a self-directing enterprise. But many
scientists are already interested in using the findings of science and
technology to solve social problems, in~~9irecting their lifework
toward humanistic ends. As this movement grows and significant
advances demonstrate the value of science and technology in meet-
ing society's problems, it is hoped that increased and sophisticated
public interest, understanding, and support will develop for re-
search.
Only through the methods and knowledge of science and tech-
nology can society solve the massive problems it is confronting. As
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Peter Drucker points out, "Consider, for example, the widespread
illusion that a clean environment can be obtained by reducing or
even abolishing our dependence on technology. . . . The truth is that
most environmental problems require technological solutions—and
dozens of them."56
Human Resources for science Administration:
Identification and Development
of Administrative Talent
LYNTON K. CALDWELL
Arthur F. Bentley Professor of
Political Science and Professor of
Public and Environmental Affairs
Indiana University
Bloomington
The general objective of this chapter is a set of reasoned propo-
sitions as to how American society can match its administrative
capabilities to its public needs. The specific objective is an outline
of a university program that would contribute to the nation's science
management capabilities. A model curriculum in the administration
of science and technology is included in an appendix.
Identifying public needs and relating means to ends intended
to satisfy needs are an integral part of the administrative process.
Scientific information and technology have, however, enlarged
the task. Through science, the known needs of man are better
understood, and unknown needs are identified. The range of social
action that may answer these needs has been increased by science
and technology. The range of policy choice in modern technoscien-
tific society is enormously greater than that available at any
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previous stage of human social development. Modern man finds
himself as beneficiary of the legendary three wishes. His choices
become critical, because now he may receive what he requests.
Responsibility, therefore, rests heavily on those who are chosen
to articulate the goals of society and to direct programs of action
for attaining them.
Applying technical means to social ends requires the mediation
of public administrators. The amount of administrative skill
available to any society at a given time is relatively fixed, but
the ultimate capabilities of society for administrative effectiveness
are indeterminate. More administrative talent almost certainly
inheres in all societies than is actually developed and used. How-
ever, for technological societies at the beginning of the last third
of the twentieth century, public needs for administrative skills have
outrun the supply of expertise. The deficiency is partly due to
greater demands of the technoscientific society upon public decision
makers. But it is also partly attributable to the failure of our
methods of selecting and developing public administrators. Our
society has not produced, in sufficient numbers, men with the
combinations of information, skill, and personality that are required
for wise management of the resources created by science and
technology.
Consequences of this deficiency in public administration are
already evident in the growth of alienation and disorder in society.
Failure to obtain the public leadership that the technoscientific
society requires could result in disaster. Matching social needs
with administrative talent now calls for a major cooperative effort
among governments, universities, professional societies, and in-
dustrial organizations. Without this cooperation, current challenges
to administrative competence cannot be met, because the political,
technical, economic, and educational affairs of modern technological
society are complexly interrelated and interdependent. Competence
in the administration of only one or even several of the major
sectors of society is not sufficient to compensate for failure in a
major sector—for example, in the administration of higher educa-
tion or of local government. Moreover, cooperative action is needed
to obtain the policy and financial support that major, national ad-
ministrative development would require.
PUBLIC GOALS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ROLES
Especially at higher levels of public affairs, an administrator
must play several roles, but he is primarily a leader in policy
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making and a director of operations. Unlike a judge or a legislator,
the administrator is an activator who translates intentions into
actualities. To do this, he must interpret the intentions that he
is called upon to actualize. He may adopt the interpretations of
courts, legislators, his administrative associates, or clients. Yet
he may still be creative. Laws and public policies are seldom so
accurate and comprehensive as to absolutely mandate his decisions.
The greater the complexity or ambiguity of the policy area, the
greater his leeway in policy shaping.1
This latitude available to the public administrative decision
maker is the reason why his goals are of greatest social impor-
tance. Administrative goals tend to become public goals. The
individual public official, sensitive to legal restraints,.bureaucracy,
politics, and public opinion, may object that this imputation of
latitude is unduly exaggerated. There are occasions when admin-
istrative action has little freedom for maneuver.2 But the primacy
of administrators in the policy process is widely accepted and
supported by evidence.3
The power of decision is seldom exercised by the public
administrator as an isolated individual. His decisions almost
invariably take in the views of others, not only those in his immedi-
ate agency but also his peers in related offices, program specialists
and technicians, and auxiliary administrators of personnel, bud-
getary, and fiscal policy. The goals of the administrator tend
therefore to be those accepted, although sometimes only tacitly,
by the functional groups through which his work is done. His
accomplishments as administrator are dependent upon his playing
a role within this operational context that facilitates the achieve-
ment of goals which he and his associates may have significantly
influenced.
The training and development of the public administrator, if
they are to be effective, must therefore assist him in trying to
achieve goals in a manner consistent with his own success and the
public welfare. To do this, they must help him understand the con-
text in which his activities are carried on. Within this context
the operational goals of public administration are shaped, and the
administrator's understanding of his operational environment is
essential to his effectiveness in goal selection and attainment.
A meaningful discussion of the development of administrative
talent requires establishment of "parameters of administrative
action." In everyman's language, these parameters could be
stated as the conditions and necessities that cause administrative
behavior to occur in the way it does. It is hardly feasible to con-
sider the identification and development of administrative talent
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without some reference to the interaction of factors that determine
what administration is and what it can do.
Two sets of factors govern the performance of administrative
roles. The first is functional; the second is contextual or environ-
mental. Functional aspects of administration are largely inherent
in the ways in which human beings work together. These ways
are conditioned by environmental factors and influenced by inter-
actions among the individuals involved. The properties and limita-
tions of human physiology and psychology, and of the existing
technologies of organization, communication, and information han-
dling, make some roles and tasks of administrators inevitable,
regardless of cultural milieu.
Technology presents a special difficulty in defining the param-
eters of administrative behavior. It is not only an environ-
mental or cultural influence; it also may become a psycho-physical
extension of the individual personality. The complex interrela-
tionship between human behavior and technology has become the
subject of a large and growing literature. For example, students
of automation, biotechnology, cybernation, information science,
and human engineering evidence a growing concern with the
interrelations between man and mechanized technologies and the
effect of these interrelationships upon organizational and adminis-
trative behavior.4
There is greater certainty that administrative behavior is
significantly affected by these interrelationships than there is about
precisely how it is affected. The typewriter, the telephone, the
computer, statistical techniques, and systems theory have influ-
enced administration in numerous ways. The synergizing effects
of these technologies on the people involved with them may be more
significant than the identifiable effects of specific techniques. But
the relevant sciences are not yet sufficiently advanced to yield
understanding of the man-technology interface that would enable
its complex relationships to be brought under intelligent, purposeful
control. Therefore, the technological problems of administrative
behavior must be met with an honest recognition that their signifi-
cance is not fully understood.
The psycho-physiological and technological aspects of adminis-
tration occur in a cultural milieu that determines what the
administrator is trying to accomplish. Environmental parameters
of administration include the goals of organizations and societies
involved in the administrative process. Also included among these
parameters are assumptions, laws, and procedures that influence
priorities among goals and that determine permissible routes
toward goal attainment. The environment of administration may
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be as complex as its technology. Since the environment sets fixed
conditions to which society and its administrators must respond,
many tasks of administration are mainly adaptive. But environment
is made up of multiple elements, social and physical, some of which
are highly variable.
The individual administrator may affect the immediate social
or physical environment of his organization. But the larger en-
vironment within which his organization functions is beyond his
immediate personal control. The individual administrator performs
his roles in an environment that is rarely subject to direct personal
or organizational variation. It channels and constrains the per-
formance of his tasks, and within its context are the goals which
his organization pursues. This context and the goals that have been
established within it are sometimes referred to as "the task
environment."5
An ability to deal perceptively and creatively with organizational
goals within the task environment is an attribute of administrative
effectiveness. This dictum is not intended to suggest that environ-
ment is always the critical factor in administration or that, because
environments differ, every administrative role or function is
unique. On the contrary, the scientific approach to the study of
administration is based upon the assumption that its functional
aspects constitute a generic social process.6 Scientific manage-
ment, management science, and organization theory are predicted
on the premise that there are forms of behavior and interaction
that are common to collective human effort. The student of admin-
istration is concerned with the operation of certain basic processes
(delegation or reporting, for example) in a changing and varied
environment. The study of interactions between functional and
environmental parameters is now frequently designated as the
"ecology of administration."7
The first major proposition of this chapter is that the identifica-
tion and development of administrative talent can be explored with
meaning only in relation to the roles that administrators play. The
nature of these roles, which are shaped by environmental forces
as well as by basic human necessities, determines the tasks that
administrators perform to meet role expectations. These roles
and their performance are in themselves goal-shaping operations.
The relationship between administrative action and its consequences
for society is therefore of major concern to anyone responsible for
the training and development of administrators. The influence of
the roles played by administrators in the formulation and attainment
of public goals is fundamental to any general, educational effort
toward effective public administration of science and technology.
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CONTEXT OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
To interpret the roles of the administrator, certain pertinent
characteristics of the modern technological society must be re-
viewed, for this is the environment in which his tasks are shaped
and take on significance. The United States and the administration
of its public policies for science and technology are of chief
concern; although the social context of American public administra-
tion is basically the same as that of other contemporary technolog-
ical societies, some of its characteristics are significantly more
accentuated. The characteristics of concern here are largely the
results of the relatively uncontrolled thrust into American life of
science-based technology during America's peculiar historical
development.
In brief, those aspects of greatest concern are
1. Specialization
2. Complex diversity
3. Interdependent movement
4. High level of information demand
Following is an analysis of how these characteristics of the Ameri-
can technological society affect the environment in which the roles
and tasks of the technoscientific administrator are performed.
Specialization is an inevitable concomitant of the growth of
knowledge and technique. The capacities of human individuals to
learn and do are limited. Only through a division of knowledge and
skill among its members can the capabilities of society be ex-
panded. But this expansion through specialization creates new
problems. Communication and cooperation require more attention.
Responsibility tends to be fractionalized. Generally accepted goals
are more difficult to set and common values more difficult to
define. Goal interpretation and the coordination of diverse skills
become increasingly important among the tasks of administration
as the trend toward specialization continues. In a society of
specialists, the phrase "government by the people" becomes
anomalous. The concept can no longer hold the same meaning that
it had in an era of town meetings and courthouse politics.
In America today technical specialization has accentuated a
second aspect of social development—complex diversity. Societies
may be complex, but homogeneous rather than diverse. They may
be diverse—culturally heterogeneous—but uncomplicated in struc-
ture. American technological society is both complex and diverse,
and the two traits interact to create a society which defies
generalizing description. Valid generalization is possible, but
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exceptions are numerous and often of critical importance in the
processes of government and public administration. For example,
generalizations regarding the p o l i t i c a l attitudes of industrial
workers, college professors, ethnic minorities, and corporate
leaders are invariably subject to exception.
There is a counter-generalization to the proposition that Amer-
ican society is complexly diverse—Americans in mass are alleged
to be a people of stereotyped conformity and routinized behavior.
The effects of public education and mass communications do tend
to produce uniformities in American life that are further extended
by mass production technology. It is apparent that American
society tends toward uniformity in some respects and diversity in
others. Which of these tendencies is the more significant in public
policy and administration depends upon the issue in question. The
diversity of the social context is probably the more significant
factor in the decision-making process because it is the accommo-
dation of differences, in decisions sufficiently coherent to be
operational, that poses one of the greatest challenges to the admin-
istrator's special role and skill. The uniformities of American
life are preponderant. They are never absolute. The mass goals
of American society as expressed through government are very
general and diffuse, with ample latitude for dissent in the formula-
tion of a goal or in its practical implementation.
The American economy is highly interdependent, a moving and
changing system in both space and time. Highly pluralistic and
physically dispersed, it lacks monolithic cohesion. The economy
works when all of its constituent parts are functioning, but it is
vulnerable to disruption at many points. The November 1965
electric power failure in the northeastern states and parts of
Canada illustrates the possibility of major ramifications of other-
wise minor technical obstructions.8 Added to technological inter-
dependence is the human frailty of the federal form of government
and the federated organizations of unions, trade associations, and
professions. The techno-economic system or its subdivisions can
be blocked by human failure or intent as well as by technological
breakdown. A very small number of strategically placed persons
can obstruct the operations of interdependent systems in the United
States in ways vastly disproportionate to their numbers, status, or
knowledge.
This society of interdependent variables moves and changes with
more coherence than its complex structure would seem to permit.
In recent decades change within the "system" has occurred at an
accelerating pace. But the rate of mobility of change varies greatly
among the components of the system. These differentials give rise
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to stresses within the system—as for example, when the economic
structures of communities change, but the political structures
remain static. The dynamism of the system, added to its complex
diversity, makes it unstable and its behavior difficult to predict.
Yet, because the interdependent system is vulnerable to disruption
and to unforeseen effects of change, prediction becomes a major
preoccupation.
A consequence of accelerated rates of change is obsolescence.
Things, systems, and people become dysfunctional before they are
worn out. Numerous complications in all aspects of administration
are introduced by obsolescence. In large part, obsolescence occurs
because knowledge increases more rapidly than adjustment to its
implications. The more extensive and rapid the increase, the more
obsolescence. And demand for more knowledge and for its rapid
transmission and dissemination is another major aspect of the
technological society. It is truly a society of built-in obsolescence.9
The quantities of information required to administer public
affairs in a technoscientific industrial economy have been growing
at unprecedented rates. The growth of knowledge appears to create
the necessity for its use. Technological societies tend to do what
they can do, with feasibility becoming a criterion of policy. For
example, in response to the congressional query, "Why supersonic
transport?" representatives of the aerospace industry replied that
it was the logical next step.11 The test of technological feasibility
as a criterion for what society should do has been sharply criti-
cized.11 To say that society should do a thing because it can is,
in effect, to say that technicians should determine priorities and the
direction of public policy. The relationship of technical information
and feasibility to the process of policy determination is problematic
and widely disputed. The growth of science and technology has
created a "high-information-level culture," emphasizing the pro-
duction and management of knowledge.12 Since repositories of
effective knowledge are the minds of men, the specialization of
modern learning and technique makes the administrator's task of
coordination more important and more difficult.
This knowledge is used to formulate, shape, or implement policy
most often in the process of administration. This not only means
that more knowledge is now required for administrative perfor-
mance, but also that the individuals who are placed at the critical
points of policy decision—the administrators—become more and
more the interpreters, mediators, and synthesizers of the work of
specialists. In principle, these have always been administrative
tasks, but they become more difficult as the administrator becomes
less able to apply informed critical judgment to the recommenda-
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tions of highly specialized associates and subordinates. For this
reason the education of the technoscience administrator should help
him to cope more wisely with the criteria of policy choice. The
essence of this choice is evaluation of the possible uses of knowl-
edge, surely the single most important responsibility of techno-
science administration and one which is shared with other branches
of society. Its importance is concealed by its latent or implicit
character. Our society and its educational institutions have not
understood, or at least have not made explicit, this responsibility
of the administrator. Prevailing images of "the administrator"
as a man of action are often inconsistent with the administrative
capabilities for farsighted judgment that society needs.
To be an integrative force in his organization, an administrator
must unite his role as director of operations with his role as
leader of policy making. Technological society, however, presents
a major hazard to accomplishing this task of synthesis. The danger
lies in the tendency, which has been noted, for techniques to
displace other factors in policy choice. To discover the ends that
society might most wisely pursue to meet its needs, policy leaders
must avoid accepting technical feasibility as a governing criterion.
To properly relate means to ends, the administrator must assert
the primacy of social goals over operational techniques.13
Control of administrative policy and political action through
technology is as old as government itself. The Greeks had tech-
niques for it.14 To be effective as policy leader or as operations
director, the administrator must work through the system in which
he performs. He must live with the system to survive, and the
system in American government and industry is strongly influenced
by technical concepts and procedures. He must master the tech-
nology of administration, or it will most assuredly control him.
The technical infrastructure of administration is most evident
in the organization of functions of finance, personnel, and planning.
These aspects of administration are controlled through rules and
specified procedures that can as easily retard goals as advance
them. Technical procedures are often reliable and impersonal
means for protecting the primary goals of organizations from
diversion of administrative efforts toward socially illegitimate
ends. The "automation of honesty" (exemplified by electric voting
machines and computerized accounting systems) is not inconsistent
with the attainment of primary social goals. But as procedures
are elaborated, refined, and amended, they may become so com-
pendious and complex that only a technical expert can really
comprehend them, and even the technicians may disagree over their
interpretation.
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At some vague point of elaboration, technical controls begin to
lose their efficacy. Their very complexity enlarges opportunity
for conflicting interpretations. Administrators, aided by their own
staff technicians, can learn to manipulate the rules and techniques
to reduce their utility as control devices. But manipulating the
techniques of administrative control absorbs personnel, time, and
attention. Administrative efficiency in attaining primary goals, the
ostensible purpose of the organization, is diminished in the process.
One of the purposes of "systems management" is to rationalize,
streamline, and monitor technical procedures to prevent their
interference with primary goals.
Can a society in which technical achievement is widely accepted
as an end in itself fully realize the benefits or even the full power
of its technology? The primacy of technical goals has clearly
induced remarkable technical achievements. But goals are usually
complex. The larger the goal, the more likely it is to be am-
biguous. The values in postulated goals are difficult to analyze.
Critics of the technological society contend that its technological
achievements too often attain goals of relatively minor social
utility. It is plausible that only through a scientific analysis of
social needs and values, and through the development of criteria
for wise choices among alternative courses of action, can the
beneficial possibilities of the technoscientific society approach
realization. This proposition would be well worth considerable
cost in testing, could it be formulated so as to be verifiable.
Beginnings of a systematic analysis of the decision process
and of the assessment of advantages among alternatives have been
made by Herbert A. Simon and his associates.15 A new science of
management decision is beginning to provide the information and
the indicators that can bring more rationality and predictability
into an environment -of uncertainty and change (see Chapter 6).
Science, as well as ethics, is now capable of joining technique to
policy and making it easier for the administrator to play his direc-
tive role more consistently with his role of policy leadership. The
technological society increases the administrator's burden of re-
sponsibility, but it also provides tools and understanding that make
the burden easier to bear. Sophistication in the uses of technology,
and awareness of its social implications, are clearly major objec-
tives in the development of administrators.
TASKS OF TECHNOSCIENTIFIC ADMINISTRATORS
The functions of the administrator, as they tend to be understood
in contemporary American society, may be classified as direct and
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latent. Those classifications correspond generally to the roles of
manager and of leader in policy development described earlier in
this paper. The direct or managerial functions of administration
are commonly specified as the tasks of administration. They are
made explicit in a job description, a contract, a letter of appoint-
ment, a legislative act, an executive order, or verbal instructions.
Latent functions are inherent in the nature of administrative action
and are not often explicitly identified as administrative tasks or
duties. Nevertheless, ability to perform the latent functions of
administration is generally sought in prospective administrators.
This ability is commonly and vaguely identified as "capacity for
leadership."16 In the more stable and less dynamic decades of
the nineteenth century, latent functions of the administrator tended
to be subsumed under the word "character." Leadership, however,
is a preferred value during change and uncertainty when future
conditions are not expected to be like those of the past or present.
Conversely, character is valued where traditional standards and
relationships can be sustained and where the challenge of change
can be faced with norms and methods that have proved reliable
in the past.
The displacement of character by leadership as an essential
attribute of administrative capability is more a consequence of
the changing environment of administration than of administrative
functions. When the conditions affecting public policy tend to favor
a firm exemplification and defense of status quo values, the latent
functions of public administration indicate a need for men of
"character" in administrative positions. Persuasiveness, innova-
tiveness, drive, and rapport with organizational rank and file are
less significant attributes during relative environmental stability.
Under conditions increasingly prevalent in the United States since
1930, the policy functions of public administration have required
innovative leadership. To the extent that it has not been forth-
coming, public administration has failed to achieve its full potential
and the quality of public life has suffered.
Administrators commonly p e r f o r m certain specific tasks.
Among them are handling of superordinate-subordinate interper-
sonal relationships (especially through communications), planning
(especially regarding future policy and financial commitments),
appraisal of current progress toward specified goals, and reporting.
The operational aspects of these tasks may be facilitated by tech-
niques which can be taught and learned. When tasks can be reduced
to commensurate techniques, it becomes possible to develop objec-
tive criteria for measuring operational performance. Competence
in performing the technical tasks of administration is an important
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attribute of success in many administrative situations. But excel-
lence in performing these techniques (as distinguished from the
tasks themselves) indicates no more than competence as an ad-
ministrative technician. It does not imply total effectiveness as
administrator.
With the growth of organizational size and complexity, coincident
with the growth of technical implementation of administrative
action, the number and importance of administrative technicians
have increased. These workers differ from those that we have
called "administrators" primarily in that their functions are direct
and specific—not indirect and latent. They perform the so-called
staff management, personnel, fiscal, and logistical functions. These
technical areas may afford avenues to the more generalized levels
of higher administration. But proficiency in administrative tech-
nology does not necessarily indicate promise in fulfilling the latent
functions of administration. And it follows that training in the
technical aspects of administration does not in itself provide an
adequate apprenticeship for higher levels of administration.
To distinguish administrative technicianship from administration
in the broader sense is in no way derogatory to technical tasks
or to the need for proficiency in their accomplishment. The dis-
tinction is drawn to indicate that reliable criteria for identifying
and developing administrative talent must take account of all the
tasks that the administrator must perform. It is easier to be
concrete, specific, and even quantitative about the jobs that the
technician must do. Of course, more than technique is involved in
successfully accomplishing tasks in the technical aspects of admin-
istrative operations. Administration is a human relations process,
and its most technical procedures are (or should be) intended to
provide for some nontechnical human need. Efforts toward identi-
fying and developing technical proficiency should not fail, therefore,
to find ways of obtaining in prospective administrative technicians
a sufficient level of human relations skills for effective participa-
tion in cooperative enterprise. A common cause of failure in
applying technical knowledge to administrative problems is the
inability or unwillingness of people to accept technical solutions
because of human relations reasons.17
The latent tasks and functions of administration belong chiefly
to its higher echelons and are performed primarily to fulfill an
administrator's role as policy leader. The term "latent" is used,
because this aspect of administration is more often tacit than
explicit in descriptions of administrative duties. The policy leader-
ship function is also latent in that its overt manifestations are often
delayed until occasion for public action arises. The policy leader-
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ship function is further obscured by the variety of ways in which
it can be performed. Much of it may occur in day-to-day decisions
regarding the operative functions of an organization. Some of it
occurs in decisions regarding personnel, budget, and finance. It is
often difficult for anyone, including the administrator himself, to
tell the extent to which his role as director of operations is
simultaneously a role of policy leadership.
No informed person doubts the importance of these latent func-
tions of administration in shaping and executing public policy for
science and technology. When students of administration or govern-
ment gather to worry collectively about the role of the adminis-
trator in society, it is this leadership function, its absence, or the
manner in which it is performed that is the ultimate object of
concern. The primary objective of executive development, mid-
career management training, and advanced graduate education in
business or public administration is to induce and develop organiza-
tional leadership capability in prospective administrators. Policy
leadership is a major ingredient of the leadership function. Much
of the superficially technical or analytic training now provided
in advanced management education is, in fact, intended to enable
the future top administrator to be an effective policy leader, com-
municator, and decision maker in a task environment populated
by specialist technicians.
The tasks of technoscience administrators in fulfilling policy
leadership do not differ, in principle, from those of other adminis-
trators. Although the focus of this paper is upon the administrators
of predominantly technical or scientific programs, its relevance
is not confined to this specific sector of higher administration.
Nevertheless, the administration of technoscientific programs,
industrial and governmental, tends to differ in degree from other
areas of administration—primarily in two particulars. Although
the purposes of the programs may appear to be clear to average
citizens, corporate stockholders, or their elected representatives,
the means by which the specified purposes are realized are beyond
the understanding of anyone untrained in the relevant technoscien-
tific specialities. An obvious corollary is that technoscientific
programs tend to be administered by highly educated specialists,
who are seldom "common men."
The specialized nature of the work and of the men who direct
it tends to remove the administration of technoscientific programs
from the degree of popular scrutiny or control that democratic
theory in America has historically assumed necessary for self-
government. The advent of advanced technology and science-based
public policies has increased the complexity of the decision
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process. Specialized knowledge and concepts not possessed by
many people or their elected representatives are growing factors
in major public policy decisions. Paradoxically, in an age of
science, the citizen must accept more and more policy decisions
on faith. He must defer to the judgment of specialists and of those
public officials whose knowledge of technoscientific capabilities
and public needs equips theni for dealing with matters beyond the
experience of most people.
The latent functions of higher technoscience administrators
require mediation between technical and scientific subordinates and
associates and the nontechnoscientific public and its representa-
tives. The top administrator who must play this mediating or
interpretative role is himself, characteristically, a product of ad-
vanced technical and scientific training. His formal education and
professional experience seldom contribute to his ability to play this
role. He may do well in it—one can identify scientists and engineers
who have become administrators with great political and social
effectiveness. But these notable successes are seldom attributable
to prior education or experience in their professional specialty.
The overarching influence of science and technology in con-
temporary society now makes the adequate performance of this
policy leadership role of highest importance. Growing recognition
of the necessity to ensure that this role is adequately performed
explains the recent emergence of science policy and administration
as a field of study in American universities. Today, there is
widespread concern at the highest levels of government, industry,
and education, that the nation's human resources for science policy
administration be more readily identified and more fully developed.
When the need is recognized, why have we been so slow to imple-
ment the concern? In part, the explanation may be that it is easier
to sense the need than to define its dimensions. Without a clear
view of what the welfare of men in a technoscientific society re-
quires of its administrative leadership, there is no visible goal for
this aspect of training and development. The technical functions
of administration and their associated tasks are more readily
visible and definable. But universities and training programs have
not been notably successful in combining education for the direct
and latent functions of administration in the way that these functions
combine in the actual lives of administrators. Technical education
tends to find its purpose in technique itself. Too often it proceeds
on a pedestrian level of mere proficiency, unelevated by a view
of its relationship to higher purpose. This is why the earlier
portions of this chapter have dealt with the context of the techno-
scientific society and the rules, functions, and tasks of its adminis-
46
trators. These discussions have established the premises and
foundations for considering methods of developing the kind of
administrative capabilities that our future welfare and security
require.18
METHODS OF DEVELOPING ADMINISTRATIVE TALENT
In the development of administrative talent, opportunities are
more important than techniques. Administrative development nec-
essarily must be, in large degree, self-development. The function
of formalized development programs is, therefore, less that of
applying training techniques than of opening the way of the growth
of personal capabilities. But opportunities and techniques should
not be thought of as dichotomies. Techniques are often employed
to enlarge opportunities, but they should be subordinate to the
process of internalized personal development that occurs only
within the individual personality.
Because most administrative development is and has always
been self-development, the effective "self-made" administrator
tends to be skeptical of the usefulness of formal administrative
development programs. If innate administrative capability develops
only in response to the challenges of life in organizations, then
learning in seminars, libraries, and conferences can hardly be
expected to contribute to on-the-job effectiveness. It may be argued
that those individuals who have the required capabilities find the
opportunities to demonstrate and develop them. Certainly some
administrators have done so—many of them with great success.
But two questions remain to be answered. First, does all of the
talent that society possesses for administrative leadership identify
itself in this voluntary and unassisted manner? And, second, would
our known capability be more rapidly developed and more effec-
tively used if thoughtful attention were given to its development ?
There is really no way to determine how much talent for admin-
istration exists in society. There is no reason to believe that
all that is activated is all that is there, or that the talent that is
employed is either quantitatively or qualitatively all that is needed.
Estimates of high-level administrative manpower needs are highly
conditional. That is, they are based on a definition of "need" that
can hardly escape some element of the subjective and the arbitrary.
If highly technical qualities were required of high-level administra-
tors, such as the specialized training required of electrical engi-
neers or surgeons, needs would be easier to estimate. But the
qualities sought at higher levels of administration are not so
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specialized as to limit their application to specialized opportunities.
There is a point of saturation in the ability of society to absorb
technical and professional specialists. But administrative capa-
bility, although often combined with technical or professional
specialization, is not inherently confined to a narrow field of
application.
Because of the indeterminate scope of administrative opportun-
ity, estimates of administrative manpower needs are of limited
value in planning educational programs for administrative develop-
ment. Such estimates are obviously important in the internal
planning activities of particular industrial or governmental organi-
zations but would have direct relevance to educational programs
insofar as a determination of an agency's future quantitative and
qualitative needs in administrative manpower were joined to explicit
plans for administrative development in which formalized educa-
tional programs were employed. For the United States, now and
for the decade ahead, no estimate of the supply of administrative
manpower talent in relation to the needs of a technoscientific age
seems better than the pragmatic "not enough."
There seems to be little likelihood that our society will obtain
enough of the high-level administrative leadership required to
resolve its difficulties. The practical task for those persons and
agencies concerned with meeting the need is to do their best to
narrow the "talent gap." No comprehensive national effort to
identify and develop administrative talent has been publicized, nor
does one seem probable. The task is fractionalized among many
institutions; yet collaboration is needed among the principal types of
institutions that are trying to develop administrators. These
institutions are universities, government, industry (in the broad
sense), and the professions. Their interrelating functions in
creating administrators should be acknowledged here, although
discussion of the means for effecting their collaboration will be
reserved for later.
Any practical effort to narrow the administrative talent gap
must identify its objectives. In relation to the individuals for whom
development opportunities are to be provided, answers must be
found to the questions: Who? When? How? and Where? Who are
the most promising recipients of administrative development oppor-
tunities, and how can they be identified? When, in the life histories
of these individuals, can their promise be most accurately assessed
and special development opportunity most profitably offered ? How
can development opportunity most effectively be provided—do dif-
ferent phases of development require different methods? And,
where can formalized development efforts best be undertaken—on
48
the job, at short-term agency-sponsored training courses, in
professional associations, or on university campuses? None of
these questions have unequivocally "right" answers. Circum-
stances determine which answers may be best in a given instance.
Identifying the persons capable of growth in the qualities
required for high-level administration is basic to all other aspects
of the development effort. Unfortunately our diagnostic and predic-
tive methods for ascertaining administrative capability are not
very reliable. Self-selection and the judgment of peers and admin-
istrative superiors appear to be as reliable as any means yet
discovered, provided the judgment of the persons concerned is
thoughtful and informed. Psychological tests have been employed
to identify administrative aptitude. But the variety of methods
and measurements that have been reported from corporate enter-
prise and from government suggest that no generally reliable
psychological tests for administrative aptitude has yet become
available.19 These are obvious weaknesses in the subjective and
empirical methods most commonly employed. Successful execu-
tives tend to be unduly confident regarding their ability to pick
their successors. In all cases, the efficacy of the method is depen-
dent upon a correct appraisal of the need.
The question Who ? leads directly to the question When ? At what
stage in the life of an individual can his aptitude for administration
be assessed? Individuals, as well as organizations and their task
environments, change with time. Some estimate of trends in each
of these factors is required, to identify the type of individual most
likely to meet the administrative needs of the foreseeable future.
Because of limited ability to see very far into the future, and
because of the relatively short time between the maturation of per-
sonality in early adulthood and the attainment of high-level adminis-
trative responsibility, the most practical method of identifying
talent is to look for indications of promise among persons on the
job. This method is something better than mere trial and error if
those making the selection are guided by appropriate criteria.
To find the "right" criteria for identifying promising talent,
consideration must be given to the two major roles of the adminis-
trator. In his role as director of operations, technical qualifica-
tions are pertinent. The criterion of technical proficiency is
seldom neglected in the selection of administrators, but it is often
misapplied. The man who knows the most about the technical
operations of an enterprise is not necessarily the person best
qualified to relate those operations to the broader needs and
activities of the organization. The appropriate criterion for techni-
cal competence in the administrator is an understanding of the
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essential processes of the organization, their human and material
resource requirements, and their relationship to organization goals
and objectives and to the task environment. The ability to see
relationships must be joined to a basic understanding of technical
processes.
Of importance equal to the perception of relationships is the
ability to synthesize these relationships into a plan of action. Skill
in perceptual analysis may qualify a man for scholarship or opera-
tions research. But the administrator who fulfills the requirements
of the technoscientific age must be capable of performing the
creative act of synthesis. Traits of intellectual curiosity, breadth
of interest, and ability to imagine are indicators of the quality
of mind that the policy aspects of administration require. Added
to these traits, however, must be intellectual discipline. Evidence
of this quality is thoroughness in marshalling the evidence relevant
to a decision, ability to rationally order priorities among organiza-
tional tasks, and demonstrated capacity to see a task through to
termination.20
These characteristics of administrative capability are not likely
to be demonstrated in combination in an individual until he has
had some significant organizational responsibility. The "perfor-
mance test" is still the most reliable method of identifying admin-
istrative talent. If this is true, then formalized programs for
administrative development should be planned primarily for an
early career or mid-career clientele. Further, the most effective
contribution of universities to administrative development will be
at the graduate and postgraduate school level. It is possible to
learn about administration at the undergraduate level, but this
learning would be most usefully directed toward understanding
administration as a social phenomenon rather than toward develop-
ing personal capabilities for administrative responsibility.
If the premises developed in this chapter are correct, the
undergraduate years should broaden the intellectual foundations
of the prospective administrator. The breadth of view and the
intellectual flexibility gained through an adequate liberal arts
education will be of greatest value in helping the future adminis-
trator develop the insight and perspective that his responsibilities
require, and it will prepare him better to cope with the inevitable
threat of personal obsolescence.21
Administrators of scientific and advanced technological pro-
grams may need graduate training in science, medicine, or engi-
neering. Too, not all graduate s t u d e n t s in the sciences or
professions will wish to follow careers of research, teaching,
or professional-practice. Some of them, including some very able
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students, will become sufficiently concerned with the social im-
plications of their discipline to alter their career expectations.
Today, many young physicists, chemists, biologists, and engineers
elect a social or behavioral science as a minor field in a doctoral
program. The combination of policy studies with science has not
been easy in most universities. But recognition of the need for such
combinations is growing, although the existing arrangements for
graduate and postdoctoral fellowships discourage deviations from
single-track specialization.
The graduate school is a change-over point at which the special-
ist in a scientific or technical field can move toward an administra-
tive career. At this stage in his life, the prospective administrator
may not have been tested in action. But he may possess sufficient
personal maturity and understanding to enable him to accurately
appraise his own capabilities and to permit others to make a
preliminary estimate of his potential. Post-doctoral study in
public policy and administration for science and technology would
ideally prepare the prospective administrator to conceptually relate
his technoscientific knowledge to social needs and purposes per-
tinent to his future policy decisions (see Chapter 1).
Postdoctoral study in science and public policy would extend
the duration and increase the cost of education for prospective
technoscience administrators whose prospects for administrative
careers would be uncertain. But this graduate education would
equally prepare them for alternative careers. Science policy re-
search has become an employment field in the federal government
and may be a small but growing field in state government. There
are also limited opportunities for this type of work in research
and development organizations and in policy-oriented technoscience
journalism. In addition, research and teaching in public policy for
science and technology are growing in American universities;
the graduate student who has not established himself in govern-
mental or industrial technoscience incurs no great risk by enlarging
his educational experience through science policy studies.
A second cross-over point from science or technical specializa-
tion to administration is during early or mid-career when the
individual's aptitude for administration has been demonstrated
and his professional knowledge and experience have added greatly
to his value. To make the transition at this point may require
a considerably heavier investment than would be required at the
graduate or postdoctoral level, before earnings and financial obli-
gations have risen. A man who has been immersed for a number
of years in scientific or technical work, but has shown an aptitude
and a desire for a new career in administration, may need a break
HUMAN RESOURCES: IDENTIFICATION OF TALENT 51
in his work experience to reorient himself for new responsibilities.
One means of providing for this reorientation is a leave of absence,
usually for a year, for study in a university. The Career Education
Awards Program sponsored by the U.S. Civil Service Commission
illustrates the administrative "sabbatical experience," in which
promising junior officials in government are given an opportunity
for a year of study in one of several universities that have estab-
lished special programs to assist their development as public
executives.22
Not all scientific or technical people who aspire to managerial
positions have aptitude for administrative work, and fewer yet could
effectively play the roles required of top-level administrators.
Pay and prestige attract some persons toward administration, but
many of them have no great inclination toward administrative roles
or responsibilities.23 For lower levels of management, the educa-
tional development may not be the same kind that is needed to
prepare top administrators. Yet the development of supervisory
personnel should'not be slighted. Sabbatical leaves may not be
indicated at this level of responsibility, but proficiency at the
supervisory level is essential to the functioning of the entire agency
and to the full effectiveness of top-level administration. Moreover,
it is at this level that positive indications of aptitude for higher
administrative responsibilities can be observed.
Turning from the Who and When to the How and Where of admin-
istrative development, the following propositions are basic to the
discussion of specific efforts.
Regardless of the level or magnitude of the development effort,
the environment of an organization will greatly influence whatever
benefit the organization receives. Payoff to the organization
implies retention of its administrative talent. Organizational in-
vestment in administrative development does not pay off if too
many of its individual beneficiaries move out into other organiza-
tions. Some outward movement of talented administrators may
indirectly benefit the organization. In government, departmental
officials often move into central control agencies but retain sym-
pathy for their former employer. But an organization that dis-
courages self-development, fails to encourage it, or tolerates
indifferent performance will not obtain good results from the best
conceived development effort.
Organizations heavily populated by scientists, engineers, or
other professional workers often have accentuated value conflicts
among their personnel. The assumptions of scientists and mana-
gers concerning the nature of work and the nature of authority are
often widely variant. As scientists and technicians become more
52
numerous and more influential in governmental agencies and indus-
trial corporations, this area of potential value conflict requires
increasing attention.24. Robert Best suggests counseling within the
organization to reconcile, so far as feasible, the individual aims of
scientists and engineers with those of their corporate employer.
This communicative process could be more readily achieved if
scientists and engineers better understood the necessities of organ-
izational life and the administrative process. Best believes that
"new emphasis is needed in the college curriculum on the role
scientists and engineers will play as employees in a corporation."25
The tasks of administrative development are divided between
what governmental and industrial organizations can do best and
what educational institutions can do best. Interaction and coopera-
tion between the schools and the employing organizations are
gradually evolving a widely applicable pattern for administrative
development. Our examination of this pattern in this chapter will
be confined to those parts relating to the development of capabil-
ities for highest administrative levels. The methods of development
are largely implicit in the pattern and will be described within that
context. For convenience, the principal elements of this pattern
are described under appropriate subheadings.
ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT-AIM INTEGRATED
AND CONTINUING PROCESS
Because of the forces of change and obsolescence in our society,
education cannot be a one-time, terminal affair. Personnel planning
in a present-day organization must anticipate a continuing flow
of human resources through the organization and must act to offset
obsolescence and to mobilize capabilities for future contingencies.
Ad hoc and "single shot" training programs will not adequately
assist this effort. To be effective, the organization's development
program must be woven into its pattern of operation. University
programs for administrative development can maximize their con-
tributions only if a long-term and continuous relationship to govern-
mental or industrial programs can be established. The reasons
why this continuity is important appear under other elements of the
development pattern.
ESSENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT-ENLARGEMENT OF
OPPORTUNITY FOR SELF-DEVELOPMENT
Self-development is not peculiar to administration, but to a
greater degree than in more clearly programmed professions, the
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administrator is a product of his own experience. His direct mana-
gerial functions can be described only in part, and his implementing
technique inculcated only partially through training. Because high-
level administrators reach their assignments from a variety of
backgrounds and over diverse routes, formal development education
is best adapted to their need when it combines common intellectual
experience concerning the basic tasks of the administrator with
great flexibility for individual development. Much self-development
of administrators will occur in interaction with other administra-
tors under the perceptive guidance of mature scholars, experienced
in both the world of public and business affairs and the world of
research and academia.
Formalized administrative development programs gain force
and effectiveness if they can channel the "lessons of experience" of
the prospective or mid-career administrator into his growth in
perception and skill. Shared experiences among a peer group of
administrators may be a valuable learning experience when validly
interpreted. Experience can be a false teacher and in an age of
galloping change and obsolescence, must be carefully appraised
for present and future relevance. In no case, however, should
experience be discounted prior to a critical review.
ENVIRONMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Development for higher administrative responsibilities entails
a reintegration of the individual's previous knowledge and experi-
ence. New knowledge may be required, but often its most useful
function is to catalyze the reorganization of knowledge already
possessed. Although we have no reliable explanation of how this
process occurs in the individual, we have empirical evidence that
certain types of experience or interaction are favorable to its
occurrence. As suggested, exchange of ideas and evaluation of
prior events among persons of comparable, but varied, experience
is one such type of interaction. Joint efforts among developing
administrators to solve complex organizational problems is another.
In addition, action research (directed toward some specific decision
or course of action) has emerged as a .method especially well
adapted to modern management training.26 In all of these alterna-
tives, the guiding presence of a perceptive and thoughtful academic
mentor or adviser would be highly desirable. His presence is
needed to draw significance from exchanges that might otherwise
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fail to get beyond the "swapping of yarns" as in a firehouse or
country store.
The development process seems to require variety in inter-
personal association. The administrative learner makes most
apparent headway when vigorously interacting with a peer group
large enough for variation in viewpoint and background, but not
so large as to prevent meaningful and sustained intellectual inter-
change. The "critical mass" for such associative learning does not
appear to have been established. Personalities, as well as mere
numbers, are factors in the equation, suggesting that a range rather
than a specific number would be the most reliable estimate of a
catalytic group of learners. I would place the range between ten
and fifteen individuals with a twenty percent margin upward or
downward for exceptional aggregations of personalities. This
collegial relationship is possible only where its participants share
common facilities for study and informal association. Major high-
level administrative development programs, such as that of the
Administrative Staff College at Henley-on-Thames,27 provide a
physical setting that facilitates this interaction. Similar physical
arrangements have been generally sought in other high-level ad-
ministrative development programs, including those sponsored by
the United States Civil Service Commission and, to some extent,
by the armed services. Because special buildings, common rooms,
seminar rooms, or reference libraries are elements in these
arrangements, the cost of providing this type of development
opportunity is high compared to many other forms of graduate
education. And yet, if the facilities for interaction learning are
viewed as comparable to the laboratories and instruments required
for graduate education in science, medicine, and engineering, the
relative costliness of the facilities diminishes.
The learning process seems to require isolated reflection as
well as intellectual interaction. Over structuring the formal devel-
opment program should be especially avoided to provide uncom-
mitted time in an amount reasonable to the needs of the learners.
But there is also something to be learned by exposure to strongly
contrasting attitudes and values. One of the great advantages of
mid-career development programs on college campuses is the
academic contrast to the normal environment of bureaucracy or
professionalism. The utility of this exposure to the intellectual
and cultural diversity of academia is that it affords a kind of
shock therapy for the complacent or narrow technician who aspires
to responsibilities requiring broader perspectives and more refined
perceptions.
Because self-development is the essence of the process, well-
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planned development programs should provide for self-teaching.
Materials facilitating individual study include special collections
of books, magazines, and reports that pertain especially to the
administrative process, the politics and sociology of the policy
process, and public policy for science and technology. Ideally,
publications in these areas, and in a broader range of scientific
and humanistic fields, should be brought together in a common
room used exclusively or primarily by the administrative develop-
ment group. In addition to encouraging self-instruction, this library
and tools for its use (such as bibliographies) help to economize
the use of the learner's time, which by any scale of measurement
is expensive. Carefully prepared syllabi and well-planned special
libraries could free the learner from the wasted time and effort
of trying to locate his own study materials. Learning to search
libraries may have some value to the incipient researcher but its
value to the prospective administrator appears minimal.
INFORMATION CONTENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
A model curriculum that would seem to optimize the academic
contribution to administrative development is included in this
chapter (pp. 60-63). Eric Ashby declares that the education of the
administrator must equip him to do four things: ". . . to know how
to code his requests to experts; to teach experts how to code their
requests to him; to know how to integrate the replies he gets into
a simple decision; and how to transform this decision into action."28
Ashby is right, of course, in asserting that "there is no cut-and-
dried curriculum which provides this equipment." But it is pos-
sible to identify, as Ashby does, "certain ingredients in the higher
education of administrators." Various curricula may be devised
to provide these ingredients, but there is no stereotype for them
to follow. The model suggested here merely illustrates one way
of organizing a curriculum. Yet, because there are a limited
number of ways to provide the information and experience that
high-level administrators need, some similarities can be expected
among the various curricula that may be devised. The purpose
of the model curriculum would be to assist the administrator in
seeing relationships between ends and means and in learning how
to bring them together. The purely technical content of such a
curriculum would be low, although some techniques must be under-
stood to be used or controlled by the administrator.
The information content of administrative education should not
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be separated from its practical significance. I suggest that the
things that the administrator needs to know may be organized in a
curriculum to correspond to the major roles that he plays. Ashby's
four elements related principally to the role of director of opera-
tions, although, of course, the latent function of policy leadership
may be played simultaneously with the more direct and overt func-
tions. The substance of a formal development program for high-
level administrators in a technoscientific age should include the
following major categories:
1. Structure and Operation of the Techno-economic System of
Modern Industrial Society
2. Strategy of Scientific Inquiry and Its Relationship to Techno-
logical Innovation and the Advancement of Learning
3. Synergistic Effects of Scientific and Technological Innovations
and their Implications for Society
4. Tools and Techniques of Administrative Analysis and Decision
Making
5. Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of the Administrator
6. Art and Science of Communication with Professional Asso-
ciates at all Organizational Levels and with "the Public"
The specific content of these categories is obviously subject to
variation. Whatever the mixture, melding the topics into a coherent
body of experience must be attempted. This objective may be
sought in several ways, but most of them are forms of problem
solving or, as Ashby puts it, "exercises in the art of making viable
decisions in areas of ignorance." But these problem-solving
exercises should be undertaken with the best possible understanding
of the context of the decision and its implication for the future.
This integrative phase of development has been sought through case
studies, action research, management games, and policy analysis.
No one of these methods or combination of them can be intelligently
prescribed for an administrative development program without
knowing how it will be used. Each should be realistic enough to
allow for the constraints of time, knowledge, and social acceptance
that limit all administrative action.
POLICY BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT
How can the development experience for high-level administra-
tion that has been outlined in this chapter be provided? Although
the broad range of development experience has been acknowledged,
our focus has been on that experience provided in universities
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for the higher levels of administration. In formal education, pro-
grams for high-level administration appear to belong to the
graduate or postgraduate phases. Formalized development pro-
grams may or may not carry certification by diploma or academic
degrees. Degree requirements, as conventionally prescribed, have
tended to compromise flexibility. The growth of knowledge continu-
ally outpaces the adjustive responses of academia. Agreement
in the academic community as to what its degrees should represent
is more apparent than real. Even the most liberal-minded members
of university faculties often become arch-conservatives when
changes in degree requirements or the authorization of new degrees
is discussed. Although formalized programs may be highly flexible
and individualized, their relative costliness and the need to specify
their intended outcomes suggest that some form of appropriate
certification that will satisfy the sponsoring agencies is desirable.
Certifying successful completion of a program gives the funding
agencies some tangible indication of participant accomplishment.
The time, attention, and facilities to meet the needs of high-level
administrative development programs can be obtained, but only
if someone is willing to finance them. At present, the most proba-
ble sources of financial support are the governmental and industrial
organizations that need the kind of high-level administrative talent
described in this chapter. Programs for high-level administrative
development require time to plan and implement. The necessary
investment to make them effective is relatively great, and univer-
sities could not justify allocating resources to such education
without reasonable prospects of long-term continuity. This con-
tinuity and the necessary funding can be provided only through
common-purpose collaboration between the universities and the
government agencies and industrial corporations that employ the
administrators, provide the leaves of absence, and pay the principal
costs of the advanced education.
Collaboration among government agencies, industries, univer-
sities, and professional societies is essential to matching the
nation's administrative capabilities to its varied needs. But we
have not yet developed systems for obtaining administrative capa-
bilities that are comparable to those devised for procuring tech-
nological hardware and services. We do not hesitate to budget
funds for maintaining computers, accelerators, reactors, or other
physical components of our technoscientific system. But we are
reluctant to spend money to protect or upgrade the utility of the
most valuable component of the system—man himself.
In developing systems and hardware, the combined contributions
of the four principal sectors of our technoscientific society—
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government, industry, universities, and professional societies—have
been accepted as normal and indispensable to the attainment of
national goals. Innovative arrangements have been worked out for
developing space technology and weapons systems. The nation
pioneered government-industry-university-professional collabora-
tion in agricultural science and is beginning to explore its utility
for biomedicine and health care. But we have no adequate system
as yet for developing the most important component of these, or
any other, major national systems—the administrative capability
that guides the system and without which it would not work or would
not work well.
The Civil Service Commission is attempting to remedy this
deficiency for the government of the United States. But the re-
sources which it and various other administrative agencies have
been able to muster are not yet adequate. The commission should
be assisted to enlarge its commitment to mid-career development
education. The prejudice against assistance for self-development
should be combated insofar as it prevents government sponsorship
of programs in which self-development must occur if the public
interest is to be served.
Attention should also be given to the effects of Internal Revenue
Service policies on self-development or on education for transfer
to a new occupation. In an age of epidemic obsolescence, the
efforts of individuals to upgrade their own capabilities, or to move
into new fields of endeavor, should be accorded at least as much
consideration as tax write-offs on the depreciation of plant or
equipment. Why not accord a comparable benefit to the individual
who must spend money to forestall or overcome the effects of
technological change ?
The nongovernmental industrial sector may be less favorably
situated than government in developing administrative capabilities
needed in the future. Theoretically, so-called private enterprise
has a freer hand than government in developing its human re-
sources, and competition is alleged to spur self-improvement.
But in fact, the competitive environment of business may reduce
the ability of talented individuals to develop their potential, if it
requires absence from their jobs. If government cultivates its
administrative resources and industry does not, or does not do so
adequately, an eventual preponderance of techno-economic power in
government seems probable.
In the technoscientific society "knowledge becomes a tool of
power, and the effective mobilization of talent becomes an important
way of acquiring power."29 In this society, the university becomes
intensely involved in innovating ideas and technology. But its
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role in mobilizing the administrative talent of the future is still
largely unperceived and unappreciated. Our prevailing thought
patterns are old-fashioned, overvaluing the once-scarce machine
and undervaluing the abundant and expendable man. Now, in an
age of enormous productive potential, the material object is
expendable—only man is unique.30
Do we need a special institution—for example, a National Foun-
dation for Administrative Development—to give us greater assur-
ance that the power of knowledge, dramatically increased through
science, will be freely applied in a socially responsible manner?
Has managing the scientific superculture become as important as
expanding its parameters through research and development? In
principle, I would answer "yes" to both questions. A continuing
and well-funded agency for assisting the development of the nation's
administrative resources seems to me as valid as appropriating
public money to educate scientists, engineers, and other profes-
sionals whose contributions are heavily dependent upon the wise
management of science and technology.
A National Foundation for Administrative Development could
help provide a mix of industrial and governmental administrators
in university-based development programs. The foundation could
also assist universities to establish effective programs and could
stimulate state and local governments to upgrade their administra-
tive personnel through training. (The idea may seem utopian, but
the need is very practical.) The world is becoming a dangerous
and endangered place, largely as a consequence of our failure to
bring adequate social guidance to science and technology. Few,
if any, more practical measures could be taken in this techno-
scientific society than the installation of a system for ensuring—so
far as feasible—adequate administrative leadership.
In 1968 the National Academy of Public Administration31 began
a study of the conversion of professional specialists to managerial
and executive roles. Phase I of this research is concerned with the
transition of scientists and engineers to administrators. The
results of this study, when available, should add materially to our
ability to design training and development programs to meet the
needs outlined in this chapter. The following section outlines the
substance of a curriculum for the development of administrators
with special reference to technoscientific programs.32 Obviously
this model could not be applied without modifications to fit the
resources and organization of particular training centers or uni-
versities. In view of the thesis developed in this chapter, it should
not be surprising that emphasis in the curriculum is on guided
self-development rather than on formal classroom courses.
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MODEL CURRICULUM
General considerations
In the design of any curriculum, certain assumptions regarding
purpose and clientele are essential. This model assumes study at,
or equivalent to, the graduate level of the university. It assumes
students who have a significant background of understanding in
science or technology, many of whom will also have had practical
work experience in a scientific, technical, or professional field.
The curriculum could be offered as a "field" toward the Ph.D. (for
example, science, in engineering or public health), or it could be
the area of major concentration for the degree of Master of Public
Administration. But the curriculum could also be pursued by
advanced or postdoctoral students without reference to academic
degrees.
Important to converting scientific and technological specialists
to administrators are the personal interactions of a peer group
among its own members and with skilled faculty leadership. In
addition, periodic interaction, seminar style, with articulate, com-
petent administrators would be highly desirable. These adminis-
trators' would, ideally, spend two or three days with the study
group. Because variations in the experience of mature students are
greater than would normally be expected in undergraduates, special
attention is needed to develop a foundation for the group interaction
aspect of the curriculum. The perceptiveness, experience, and
human relations skills of the university faculty are of particular
importance.
Although peer group, interchange is valuable to the educational
experience, the curriculum for developing the technoscientific
administrator at early or mid-career must also provide for highly
individualized development. Attention to common and basic under-
standing is important but it is equally important to allow each
individual opportunity to optimize his aptitudes and to minimize
his inadequacies. A really good curriculum will permit the adapta-
tion of the program of study to the needs and capabilities of each
individual student. The counseling and advisory "costs" of such
flexibility would probably be higher than those normally expected in
graduate education. But there is no evidence to suggest that routine
academic course offerings can provide the experience needed for
the development of administrative skills.
The purpose of the curriculum is to assist the development of
administrative capabilities with special reference to scientific and
technological programs and issues. To pursue this purpose, special
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facilities for study are needed. These include a "common room"
for seminars and informal meetings, a reference collection of
pertinent literature, and direct accessibility to at least one or two
key faculty members knowledgeable in the needs of the specialist -
in-transition and in the organization and "folkways" of the uni-
versity. These arrangements should not isolate the student from
the university, nor should they tie him by lead-strings to a faculty
adviser. They should maximize the usefulness of his academic
experience, whatever its duration.
What attributes of an effective administrator would a program
and curriculum for technoscientific administration be designed to
develop? The following listing of qualities has been suggested by
the Albuquerque Operations Office of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission.
Ability to seek and obtain cooperation from his peers, so that
his decisions almost invariably are taken in concert with
others.
Leadership, or the ability to persuade and inspire people to
perform at or near the potential of their abilities.
Sensitivity to the restraints of law, bureaucracy, politics, and
public opinion.
Ability to identify priorities of the various activities and goals
of his organization and to recognize changes in priorities over
a period of time.
Perception of the effects that an operational decision or policy
change can have on the organizational environment.
Ability to effectively communicate organizational goals to
those who execute them and to obtain appropriate feedback
on performance.
Ability to synthesize diverse views of both peers and experts,
to comprehend basic differences in view, and to narrow down
the number of choices to arrive at a decision.
Ability to interpret the views and activities of scientific/tech-
nical personnel and mediate these with organizational re-
quirements and needs of the non-scientific/technical segment
of the organization and the general public.
The attributes of administrative effectiveness may be formulated
in various ways but this list is consistent with the needs emphasized
in this chapter. For it is not only knowledge and technical skill
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that the wise administration of our technoscientific society re-
quires. Administrative effectiveness also implies the ability to
translate knowledge and technical skill into action through people.
So cultivation of these personal attributes is essential to the
development process.
An actual curriculum can be constructed only at the university or
training institution for which it is intended. Without knowledge of
the particular organization, procedures, and resources of an
institution, it is hardly feasible to design a program of education
for it to administer. Moreover, university faculty cannot be counted
upon to cooperate in implementing a curriculum they did not help
to develop. Consultants from outside an institution can play a
useful catalytic and informational role in curriculum building.
But the basic work and definitive decisions must be undertaken
by those who are responsible for the program.
Substantive content
The following four categories are suggested as basic elements
of a one-year graduate curriculum. The categories are not neces-
sarily integral courses. They could be organized as academic
courses, provided a university could accommodate their multi-
disciplinary character. Each of the categories could be organized
as a one-semester course, two offered each semester. The four
courses would account for approximately one-half of the required
program time. The other half could be divided between individual
instruction and work on a common action research or decision
problem. Faculty leadership of extraordinary intellectual breadth
would be required, even though participation of scholars from
several disciplines were obtained.
Structure and Operation of the Techno-Economic System
of Modern Industrial Society
The content of this category would be derived from history,
economics, political science, sociology, and law, as well as busi-
ness and public administration. Possibly the closest approximation
to its substance is represented by John Kenneth Galbraith's
The New Industrial State.33 Its objective would be an integrative
view of the complexity and dynamism of modern society. The
outcome should not be an anthology of social science perspectives,
but a genuine synthesis of knowledge concerning the task environ-
ment of contemporary public and industrial administration.
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Strategy of Scientific Inquiry and Its Relationship to
Technological Innovation and Advancement
of Learning
This category draws upon the history, philosophy, and sociology
of science and technology. Understanding of its substance is needed
by scientists and nonscientist alike. Advanced graduate study in
science, engineering, or medicine does not necessarily include
consideration of science as an intellectual or social force. The
prospective high-level administrator needs to understand the nature
of scientific work and its effect upon the attitudes, habits, and
values of scientists. An academic course in this category might
usefully employ case studies of scientific inquiry. Representative
of the substance of this category would be Kuhn's book, The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions.3*
Synergistic Effects of Scientific and Technological Innovations
and Their Implications for Society
No discipline corresponds to this category, which includes the
new fields of science and public policy and the political science of
science. This is the broadest of the four categories and, more
than the others, involves the actual substance of scientific knowl-
edge. Among the topics germane to this category would be the
impact of science and technology on man's behavior and self-image
and on his relationship to his environment. Other areas of concern
would be the reciprocal effects of science and technology on social
structure, aesthetics, ethics, cosmology, and religion. No single
book adequately represents this category, but a growing number of
journals encompass its substance. Among them are the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, Scientist and Citizen, arid Impact of Science
on Society.
Tools and Techniques of Administrative Analysis and
Decision Making
The objectives of this category are the ability to understand the
significance and limitations of technology and proficiency in using
that ability. Computer programming would not be a relevant skill
under this category, but understanding how to communicate with
computer technicians would be. For the higher levels of adminis-
tration, technique is relevant primarily in its broadest sense. No
single book summarizes the content of the category, but two books
suggesting its essence are those of Simon, The New Science of
Management Decision and Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzweig, The
Theory and Management of Systems.
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers some personnel questions about the
manager in scientific and engineering organizations: Where does
he come from? How does he differ from the individual contributor?
What does he typically do? How can he be developed to a high
degree of effectiveness ? The chapter combines three approaches
to this subject:
1. A review of numerous books and articles in this field, al-
though no comprehensive sweep of the literature is claimed.
(The well-known exponential curve describes the increasing
output on this subject, as in so many other aspects of modern
society; a bibliography published by the U.S. Civil Service
Commission lists 93 pages of references on scientists and
engineers)2
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2. A consideration of some aspects of personnel programs for
scientists and engineers in the federal government, the
nation's largest multilaboratory enterprise
3. Reports of several recent studies of federal scientists and
engineers
IMPORTANCE OF MANAGERIAL SKILL
The critical importance of managerial skill in conducting tech-
nical enterprises in today's world is stressed by many writers.
Several authors state that this element is largely responsible for
the present technological gap between the United States and Europe.3
In the American electronics industry, a drastic future shortage
of competent managers of scientists and engineers has been fore-
cast, and a major effort to develop the managers of tomorrow
has been urged.4
The shortage of able managers may be common to all com-
panies:
The demand for able and highly trained managerial per-
sonnel far exceeds the supply of this limited human resource,
and few firms appear to have an adequate supply of manaT
gerial talent for any level of management responsibility.5
The federal government, too, suffers from similar shortages.
A deputy director of the Department of Defense for Research and
Technology has said of its 79 defense in-house laboratories, "there
is stagnation resulting from an inadequate flow of new blood for
key R & D management positions."6
A statement on the importance of technology to our society
comes from a former Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology:
In the course of supporting science and its applications,
the Government and the people have come to realize how many
of the problems of the modern world are affected by scientific
and technical considerations and how vital scientific and tech-
nical progress is to many of the goals we set for ourselves.
As a result, scientific and technical people play an important
part in the Government; they comprise 40% of the top three
Civil Service grades, for example.7
Although authorities claim that the need for technological mana-
gers is increasing (and no author was found who disagreed), little
precise information is available on the numbers actually needed
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in the United States in the years ahead. The National Science
Foundation, for example, estimates the number of U.S. scientists
(excluding engineers) to be roughly one-half million, of whom
298,000 are included on the National Register of Scientific and
Technical Personnel. Of the latter group, some 63,000 or 21 per-
cent are primarily administrators or managers.8 But no future
projections of managerial needs are made.
Science and engineering, of course, will feel the same pinch
as other fields during the immediate future from the smaller total
number of persons who will be entering the 35-45 age bracket.
The low birth rates of the Depression of the 1930s and early 1940s
will pose a problem in managerial talent for all fields and will
place a premium on the identification and development of competent
young administrators in the years ahead.
DUTIES OF THE TECHNICAL MANAGER
To do a systematic job of selecting, training, and motivating
technical managers, it would seem elementary to start with an
analysis of duties or a statement of typical tasks that they perform.
Only by understanding the job to be done can one intelligently map
out recruitment and development plans for a particular occupation.
Two statements of such tasks throw such light on this important
subject. The first lists the following typical duties in fairly general
terms:
Setting organizational objectives
Evaluating risks
Discovering problems inside and outside the organization
before they lead to crises
Establishing priorities
Appraising results of programs
Planning future courses of action
Making decisions in complex areas involving subtle and
elusive problems9
The second statement was developed for a preliminary study of
research administrators by the Space Sciences Laboratory, Uni-
versity of California. The study listed the following specific func-
tions of R & D administrators:
1. Budgeting
2. Assessing and evaluating personnel—hiring and firing
3. Long-range planning of important areas of R & D; developing
new R & D programs
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4. Short-range planning—selecting and approving specific proj-
ects and work assignments, reviewing ongoing work
5. Coordinating plans and projects with objectives and policies
of the organization and funding sources
6. Creating and maintaining good morale and human relations
7. Criticizing scientific and technical ideas; encouraging devel-
opment of good ideas
8. Maintaining adequate work levels on projects and adherence
to schedules
9. Disseminating the R & D activities and accomplishments of
the organization
10. Keeping up with scientific and technical events in the field
11. Conducting research or development work—personal proj-
ects10
To explore this subject further for this chapter, the University
of New Mexico in November 1968 undertook a special study of
the duties of science and engineering managers in the federal civil
service, prepared by Isadore Risen. A representative sample was
drawn from the job description files of the Bureau of Executive
Manpower of the U.S. Civil Service Commission.
These files include all top-level positions in the three highest
career grades (GS 16, 17, and 18 and certain other equivalent
levels) in every federal department and agency in the competitive
civil service. Approximately 2800 position descriptions were found
in the fields of natural science, medicine, and research engineering.
A random sample, approximately 8 percent, deemed representative
of distribution among agencies, fields of work, and grade levels,
yielded 209 position descriptions of managerial or related staff
jobs. In considering the following tabulation of duties (Table 2),
one must keep in mind that the data come from written job descrip-
tions, indicating what management had in mind when each job was
established, and that actual job performance may vary. Also it
should be emphasized that the sample represents only the highest
levels of the career service. First- and second-level managers
and even some third-level managers are normally in lower grades.
Immediately after the tabulation was completed, Risen prepared
the following statement of duties for a typical federal science
manager. It represents an impressionistic composite of what the
top science manager does in government.
1. He is a line manager in about 75 percent of the cases checked,
with the same problems of staffing, organizing, budgeting,
laying out work, and reviewing performance that any other
line supervisor has. He may be the head of a giant laboratory
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TABLE 2
Duties Listed in 209 Position Descriptions
of Federal Science and Engineering Managers
(Grades GS 16-18 and Equivalent)
Duty
Technical liaison. Service on many committees, infra- and
inter-agency; speaking engagements before many organi-
zations-Bother agencies, local and state governments.
foreign governments, and contractors; affiliation with
professional organizations to help stay abreast of changes
in the field.
Program planning. Long- and short-range planning of re-
search activities; in most cases, joint planning with other
agencies, universities, and contractors, including the
development of policies and procedures
Line management. Management of large organizations and
small organizations, and management limited to technical
direction as opposed to general administration
Technical advising. In an age of specialists, being a
specialist who advises his boss, other agencies, college
laboratories, and private contractors
Program coordination. Coordinating research with work
being done by outside organizations
Program evaluation. Evaluating research being done in
different places, different research organizations
Individual research. In addition to some line or staff man-
agement function, performing individual research
Staff management work. Performing usual management
functions— personnel, budget, space, equipment, supplies,
etc.
Preparation and presentation of scientific papers. Self-
explanatory
Contract administration. Negotiation, checking of con-
tractor capacity, and managing the contract
Contract evaluation. Monitoring contractor performance to
see whether the contract has been fulfilled
Systems development. Systems development, operations re-
seorch, and management "games."
Manogemenf analysis. The usual organization and proce-
dural study made by management specialists
Technical direction of contract work . On-site technical
supervision of the contractor's performance
Public information. Preparation and dissemination of re- .
ports and articles
Congressional committee presentations. Self-explanatory
Times Listed in
209 Position
Descriptions
Number Percent
171 81
168 80
160 76
136 65
102 49
88 42
51 24
45 21
44 21
18 9
16 8
12 6
10 5
5 2
4 2
3 1
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or the supervisor of a small group, or he may direct only the
technical or scientific effort of the group.
2. He is a program planner, coordinator, and evaluator. The
"program" is a research activity. This research effort must
be related to similar activities being undertaken in other
agencies by private contractors, other governments (including
foreign governments), and college laboratories. Integration
of all these research efforts is crucial to the success of the
total research program. The growing use of contracts as part
of a unified research program is a unique feature of federal
science management today.
3. He is a technical adviser. A scientist and research engineer
is generally an expert in a-narrow specialty, and others are
constantly looking to him for advice—his boss, contractors,
his associates, other agencies, universities, and other gov-
ernments. He may be the only person in the entire world with
the answer to their problem.
4. He is usually up to his ears in technical liaison activity. He
is constantly representing his agency before other agencies,
contractors, governments, professional societies, university
laboratories, and sometimes congressional committees. He
is on many special committees both within his agency or on an
inter-agency basis. Because of his specialized knowledge,
he is in great demand by organizations outside his agency that
have a particular interest or stake in his research activity.
5. He is engaged in individual research in about 25 percent of
the cases checked. This is very hard to measure because
he undoubtedly contributes very substantially to the research
success of fellow scientists that he supervises. It should be
remembered that many scientist supervisors are like deans of
a college in that the supervision they exercise can be de-
scribed as "leadership among equals." Yet the leadership
they do exercise is probably more technical than administra-
tive, and they do contribute scientific ideas that go far to
solve research problems.
6. He is engaged in preparing and presenting scientific papers
in about 20 percent of the cases checked. This is one of the
hallmarks of success for a scientist—an invitation to read
his paper before his peers.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCIENCE MANAGER
Several authors stress the personality differences between the
typical individual worker in science and engineering and the typical
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manager of a technical operation.11 One study traced these differ-
ences back to high school activities.12
The individual scientist or engineer is often described as intro-
verted, absorbed by detail, possibly somewhat brusque in personal
relationships, and seeking neat solutions to problems. These
characteristics, often associated with successful achievement as
an individual, become handicaps when the person attempts to make
the transition to managerial work.13 The science manager is
dealing in areas of human relationships where black-or-white
solutions may not be possible; he must have a tolerance for am-
biguity. Leadership ability requires interest in people rather
than introversion, as well as the capacity to take some risks in
areas where results cannot be predicted.14
On the other hand, the able individual technical worker has
some traits that are useful if he aspires to the managerial role:
objectivity in solving problems, planning ability, motivation toward
high productivity, intellectual curiosity, and perseverance.15
The following is an excellent statement of the need for managers
to be aware of human relationships.
What is the heart of the broad managerial process ? I might
put it in these words: management requires a humanist out-
look on life rather than mere mastery of technique. It is
based on the capacity for understanding of individuals and
their motivation, their fears, their hopes, what they love and
what they hate, and understanding the ugly and the good side
of human nature. It is an ability to move these individuals
to help them define their wants, to help them discover, step
by step, how to achieve them.16
As to the educational backgrounds of science administrators,
a wealth of information is buried in files of the U.S. Civil Service
Commission (with respect to those on the federal rolls) and is
slowly coming to light as scholars have an opportunity to delve
into the data. Two studies are pertinent to this chapter, both
prepared as background papers for a conference of representatives
from universities and federal agencies at Bloomington, jointly
sponsored by Indiana and Purdue universities and the Civil Service
Commission in November 1965.
The author of the first study identified 377 federal science and
engineering administrators in the three top career grades (GS 16-18)
who were R & D managers.17 His analysis showed that 73.4 percent
of these had been educated in seven principal fields (Table 3).
The absence of business administration, the social sciences, and
the humanities from the top seven fields indicates that education in
HUMAN RESOURCES: CAN QUALITY BE ENHANCED? 71
TABLE 3
Educational Backgrounds of Science Administrators
Field of Study Persons
Physics
Mathematics and statistical mathematics
Electrical engineering
Chemistry
Aeronautical engineering
Mechanical engineering
Chemical engineering
Total
64
58
49
46
24
24
10
275
technology is the primary background of federal science adminis-
trators.
The author of the second study analyzed the educational records
of a somewhat more restricted group from the same source. He
identified 161 federal civilian laboratory, scientific, or technical
directors. Their fields of study appear in Table 4. The study con-
cluded with a profile of the typical federal laboratory director:
In common with his university or industrial counterpart, the
federal laboratory director has had long service in his
present laboratory environment and with his present em-
ployer.* He is somewhat older and better educated than the
average industrial facility director, and younger and less well
educated than university counterparts. (Education in this
context applies to terminal degree by field of specialty, thus
comparing engineering laboratory directors with other engi-
neering directors, and biologists with biologists.) He has had
somewhat more "bench" experience than his industrial and
much less than his university counterparts. He has "come
up through the ranks" in his own laboratory environment, and
in all probability will remain in his present position until
retirement if the laboratory or facility is in the engineering
or physical sciences. If it is in the biological sciences,
he may go on to a university or to industry after several
years additional experience in his present position. He has
probably come from one of the latter environments, for most
*Interpreted in the case of industrial or university directors as
industry or universities in the generic sense.
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TABLE 4
Educational Backgrounds of Science Directors
Major field (only one field indicated)
Engineering
Physical sciences and mathematics
Biological sciences and medicine (MD/DVM)
Behavioral science
Social sciences
Subtotal
Major fields (two fields indicated)
Engineering and physical sciences/mathematics'
Engineering and biological sciences/Medicine
Physical sciences/mathematics and biological sciences
Biological sciences/medicine and social sciences
Subtotal
Total
Persons
41
47
43
5
_3
139
Persons
8
2
9
3
22
161
biomedical laboratory directors have had lengthy experience
in other occupational categories prior to Federal service.
The Federal laboratory director has had little technical
training, offered either by universities or Government, since
completing his terminal degree. The probability that he will
have more training before retirement is quite small.18
SHOULD THE TECHNICAL MANAGER HAVE A TECHNICAL BACKGROUND?
Granted that human relations awareness and leadership ability
are essential to the science manager's success, should he come
from a technical field or can he be a capable all-around adminis-
trator who is not qualified in technology?
An overwhelming number of commentators on this subject affirm
the importance of having a technical staff under the management of
technically qualified persons.19 In addition to his knowledge of the
the work itself and of the unique characteristics of the scientists
and engineers who perform it, a technically qualified manager is
more acceptable to the group supervised:
Scientists and research engineers want the decisions which
intimately affect their environment to be in the hands of
first-class scientific or technical leadership. There is no
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substitute for having in the top post of a research installation
a technical man whose individual scientific contribution has
been indisputably accepted by his peers over a period of
years.20
An attitude survey of a broad sample of federal science adminis-
trators and engineers in 1965 tended to confirm this statement. The
study was undertaken by a committee under Dr. Allen V. Astin,
then director of the National Bureau of Standards, for the Federal
Council for Science and Technology. The survey form, completed
by 1025 persons in many departments and agencies, presented
51 statements which the respondents were asked to rate by showing
the five they considered the most important and the five they
considered the least important. Two of the 51 statements are
pertinent here:
Management should know enough about scientific work to
provide conditions which permit productive work.
Statistically this ranked fifth in importance among all 51 state-
ments. Note that it does not directly require that management
be technically qualified, as the second pertinent statement does:
Intermediate laboratory managers and supervisors should be
competent in technical skills.
This statement ranked twenty-first in frequency of identification
as one of the most important among the 51 statements. So, although
not one of the top-ranking items, it was singled out for special
emphasis by a fairly large number of respondents.21
The position of a principal advocate of the nontechnically quali-
fied manager of technical functions is as follows:
One reason for the separation of science from policy is the
wide assumption that only scientists can administer scientific
enterprises. This one can be changed with ease. Executives
should choose the administrators of all enterprises, whether
scientific or not, according to their ability as administrators
and not according to their field of specialized knowledge.22
Another opinion is that scientists should be supervised directly
by scientists, but that the next level should be composed of non-
technical persons specially trained for such assignments,23 and a
similar one (voiced during a symposium conducted jointly by the
Federal Council for Science and Technology and the Civil Service
Commission in 1964) is that the third level of supervision does
not require a technical background (for example, the manager
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over- several laboratories), although the speaker acknowledged
the difficulty of training a nontechnical person for this role. The
discussion group in which he participated, however, did not agree
fully:
In the long run, there is no solution but . . . real competence
in both the technical and administrative areas. . . .
Because the profession of research management is so new,
the method of finding people, selecting them, advancing them,
and keeping them alive technically is not well understood.
Over the next decade or so, we will have to learn more about
it, and we can only find this out by trial and error.24
An intermediate position argues for an appropriate mixture of
scientists and administrators:
But if science, as such, cannot give us automatic answers to
our great issues of public policy, that does not mean that
scientists cannot play an important role in answering them.
The administrator and the scientists are not two quite differ-
ent categories of people. Indeed, it seems to me that the
whole history of American government shows that the scien-
tist and the engineer have often moved successfully into many
of the most responsible and difficult administrative positions.
In this respect American government has had an experience
similar to that of American private business. . . .
These considerations argue, it seems to me, for having a
few men with quite general administrative background in the
top ranks of even those agencies with heavily scientific
programs. On the other hand, I would argue with equal
emphasis that the administrative personnel of almost all
agencies ought to have a fair proportion of men with some
training and experience in science and engineering. If admin-
istration is to serve as a useful layer in the pyramid of policy
between the peak of political power and the base of science
and technology, it needs in its composition an appropriate
mixture of general competence and special knowledge.25
It may be that the argument is more apparent than real; few
would dispute that first-line supervisors should be qualified in
the specialized work they supervise, but at some step near the
top of the hierarchy, management must cease to be expert in every
profession practiced near the base of the pyramid:
Can a commanding general be expert in medicine, religion,
supply, construction, road-building, railways, retail stores,
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show business, and all the branches of fighting that work
under his command? Can the head of any federal department
be an expert in all the work that he directs? Or the head
of a bureau ?26
The following statement summarizes the situation with respect
to the federal civil service:
Similarly, American administrative reformers gave up as
their goal an administrative class of the civil service based
on an education in the humanities; instead they see that
general administration, in many fields, must usually be built
on a foundation of scientific or professional competence.27
And it is not only American reformers who have come to this
conclusion. The administrative class in the British Civil Service,
long regarded as a model by Americans and others, has come under
attack in Britain itself. The Committee on Civil Service, under
Lord Fulton's chairmanship, reported the findings of a two-year
study in 1968. The British civil service has enjoyed a high reputa-
tion for efficiency and integrity, based largely on a tradition of
recruiting young persons of liberal rather than technical education.
Yet the committee recommended a basic change in this long-
established system:
[1.] First, the Service is still essentially based on the philosophy
of the amateur (or "generalist" or "all-rounder"). This
is most evident in the Administrative Class which holds the
dominant position in the Service. The ideal administrator
is still too often seen as the gifted layman who, moving
frequently from job to job within the Service, can take a
practical view of any problem, irrespective of its subject-
matter, in the light of his knowledge and experience of the
government machine. Today, as the report of our Manage-
ment Consultancy Group illustrates, this concept has most
damaging consequences. It cannot make for the efficient
despatch of public business when key men rarely stay in
one job longer than two or three years before being moved
to some other post, often in a very different area of govern-
ment activity. A similar cult of the generalist is found in
that part of the Executive Class that works in support of the
Administrative Class and also even in some of the specialist
classes. The cult is obsolete at all levels and in all parts
of the Service. . . .
[2.] Thirdly, many scientists, engineers and members of other
specialist classes get neither the full responsibilities and
76
corresponding authority, nor the opportunities they ought to
have. Too often they are organized in a separate hier-
archy, while the policy and financial aspects of the work are
reserved to a parallel group of "generalist" administrators;
and their access to higher management and policy-making is
restricted. Partly this is because many of them are
equipped only to practice their own specialism; a body of
men with the qualities of the French polytechnicien— skilled
in his craft, but skilled, too, as an administrator—has so far
not been developed in Britian. In the new Civil Service a
wider and more important role must be opened up for
specialists trained and equipped for it. ...
[3.] Scientists and other specialists are also open to criticism
here: not enough have been trained in management, particu-
larly in personnel management, project management, ac-
counting and control.28
In carrying out the managerial function over technical work, the
British have sometimes split the assignment between two people —
one from the administrative hierarchy (that is, a nontechnical
administrator) and one from the technical hierarchy (for instance,
an engineer). This is what they call a joint hierarchy, and a
variation is called a parallel hierarchy. (Note that this is different
from what we describe on p. 79 as parallel ladder.} But in practice
the technical hierarchy is subordinate to the administrative one.
The management consultants who studied this form of organization
for the Fulton Committee recommended that it be superseded by
one hierarchy:
... In our view, therefore, there is no case for joint or
parallel hierarchies . . . we consider the best organizational
form to be a single integrated structure under a single head.
Where the administrative content is preponderant, it may be
that a non-specialist with the right background may be most
suitable to head the group. However, in all the situations we
examined, it would have been more appropriate had the head
of the group spent most of his career as a specialist and
been given the necessary training and experience in the
administrative procedures of government. It is essential,
in our view, that such posts as these, and higher ones, should
be open to specialists with the appropriate qualifications and
that personnel and management procedures should be devised
to assist and encourage them to fit themselves for top
posts. . . .
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. . . We saw that this principle had already been accepted
in the research establishment we visited. Not only did the
Head of the Establishment—a scientist—have a significant
autonomy in respect of financial expenditure but he was also
the single head of an organization which included scientists,
other specialists and administrators.29
To summarize this much-discussed issue, there is general
agreement that the immediate supervisor of scientists and engi-
neers should be technically qualified, and that the person at the
very top in a large organization (for example, a large corporation
or a government department) need not be, although the trend seems
to favor the technically trained top manager. The area of disagree-
ment lies in the intervening echelons; here the preponderance of
opinion argues for requiring technical competence in addition to
administrative skill at levels considerably above the first-line
supervisor (see Chapter 1).
INTAKE OF JUNIORS WITH MANAGEMENT POTENTIAL
If the need for technical managers is critical, and if, ideally,
they should emerge from technical fields, it would seem desirable
to pay considerable attention to management potential in recruiting
young scientists and engineers. But comparatively little comment
on this important subject was found in the books and articles
reviewed for this chapter. Apparently recruiters are primarily
looking for high technical competence, and university students, as
well, are concentrating on preparation for technical assignments.
One observer believes that recent engineering graduates are not
likely to be attracted to the administrative aspects of engineering
work, since they are more interested in professional and technical
development.30 On the other hand, those engineers who are becom-
ing aware of the need for courses in the behavioral sciences to date
must go outside schools of engineering to find such offerings,
for example, to schools of business administration.31
That a high proportion of engineering students will eventually
find themselves in managerial roles seems indicated by a study
published by the University of California at Los Angeles. Fourteen
years after graduation, 60 percent were in clearly managerial
positions while only 8 percent had no supervisory responsibilities
at all.32
The Bloomington conference of universities and federal agencies
included the following statement in the summary of its proceedings:
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It was recognized that universities have a part in the general
broadening of the interests and knowledge of persons em-
ployed in Government. It was thought to be particularly
important that scientists and engineers (especially those who
will later be managers) achieve breadth in undergraduate
education. With a basic education including sophistication
in the social sciences they should be better able to interpret
and learn from their experiences.33
The strongest statement on the need for a technical organization
to assess managerial potential in its junior intake comes from
the vice president of a research and engineering company:
When we interview people in colleges, we look first for a
strong technical background and then we look for indications
of leadership potential. When new people start with the com-
pany, we make a very concerted effort to spot as early as
possible the ones who have some interests and some leaning
and some ability for administrative matters.34
Two suggestions seem to come naturally out of this discussion:
(1) that engineering and science faculties encourage interested
students to take optional courses in the behavioral and management
sciences, wherever they may be offered on the campus; and (2) that
recruiters assess leadership potential as well as technical com-
petence, so that intake will not be restricted to highly competent but
introverted graduates.
THE DUAL LADDER SYSTEM
Traditionally, in the old-style industrial or federal laboratory,
advancement in grade and status came chiefly by promotion into
supervisory and managerial posts. The poor changes of advance-
ment as an individual worker created a strong incentive for the
ambitious to compete for administrative assignments, even if
they considered them distasteful. In many cases this situation
led excellent technical people to leave the field of their competence
in order to flounder unhappily in their new management jobs.
"Spoil a good plant pathologist to make a poor supervisor" is
the way one of the authors first heard this cliche, from Dr. W. W.
Stockberger, pioneer director of personnel of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture in the 1930s.
' As a distinguished federal science administrator has noted:
The administration of scientists requires that some scientists
of high professional reputation be moved into administrative
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positions. For those few who also have administrative talent
this is proper. But when excessive administrative responsi-
bility is a necessary concomitant to promotion, scientific
productivity is lost . . ,35
In recent years many technical organizations have attempted to
solve this problem by deliberately setting up a channel for advance-
ment of qualified scientists and engineers outside of the supervisory
line. This plan is variously known as the "dual ladder" or
"parallel ladder" or "two-track" system. Numerous references
to it are found in the literature.36
The general idea of the dual ladder system is to allow technical
people to seek advancement to high salaries and prestige by con-
tinuing their creative role as individual contributors. In this way
the productive output of the organization is maintained or even
stimulated, and persons who have no liking or aptitude for manage-
ment are not tempted into such a role. A study of a number of
technically oriented companies indicated that most of the high-
quality companies had established dual ladders, while the lower
quality companies seldom had done so.37
Related to the dual ladder plan is a principle known as the
"impact of the man on his job" or the "man-in-job" concept.
Traditionally in a personnel system based on job evaluation,
primary attention became centered on the characteristics of the
job, and the special qualifications of the person in the job were
sometimes overlooked. Under the newer emphasis, it is recognized
that in professional work the impact of the person's qualifications
and performance is crucial. That is, the person can make or break
his grade-level in the personnel structure.
This principle is fully provided for in the federal personnel
system as it affects professional workers. The following statement
is taken from the Civil Service Commission's guide for evaluating
research positions:
The duties and responsibilities of a research position are
especially dependent upon the interplay between the research
situation or assignment (within an appropriate job environ-
ment) and the individual qualities of the incumbent. Creativity
and originality are inherently of central importance in a
research situation, because the purpose of research is to
extend man's knowledge and understanding. Yet, while the
job situation may call for creativity and originality, the extent
to which these qualities are actually brought into play is
dependent in large part on the incumbent. Furthermore, while
nonresearch situations are typically structured as to breadth
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(necessarily so, in order to fix responsibility and prevent
functional overlapping), the research situation is typically
expandable in breadth in accordance with the incumbent's
capabilities. Hence, it is recognized that where the nature
of the research situation involves a high potential for original
and creative work, the work of the position may be performed
at any one of several levels, depending in part upon the level
at which the incumbent is capable of working and his motiva-
tion. This leads to what may be termed a "man-in-job"
concept, based on the interaction of the assignment and the
incumbent. . . .
In recognition of the fact that the incumbent's personal
qualifications do, in a research situation, have a profound
impact on the dimensions of the job which results, this guide
provides for considering both the research situation or
assignment, and the qualifications of the scientists who
occupies the situation or assignment. These factors together
constitute the position actually being performed and form the
basis for determining grade level.38
How this plan actually works in a federal research organization
is illustrated by the following statement in the Agricultural Re-
search Service's evaluation guide:
The Plan provides for consideration of the researcher as
an individual professional scientist. It provides an oppor-
tunity for him to exercise his individuality and initiative and
provides for his advancement on the basis of an evaluation
of his specific scientific contributions. This evaluation is
made by a committee of his "peers" who are familiar with
the area of work involved. The Plan offers a challenge to
each of our research scientists. His advancement depends
primarily upon his own accomplishments. There is nothing
automatic or periodic about these promotions. They are con-
tingent upon the scientist's own efforts.
On the matter of grade relationship with the administrative
supervisor, ARS takes the position that an outstanding scien-
tist can very well be placed in the same grade or, in some
instances, in a higher grade than his supervisor. This is
predicated on the fact that the basic concept of the Evaluation
Plan involves the recognition of the importance and value
of the individual's contributions derived from his personal
originality and creativeness. These factors are unique to the
individual and cannot be supervised in the normal sense. In
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essence, the scientist involved in the conduct of research
has been removed from the normal administrative grade
ladder.39
Some evidence points to the preference of technical workers to
advance up the professional rather than the administrative ladder.
According to one study, 62 percent of the scientists and engineers
queried in industry preferred the professional route and only
38 percent preferred the administrative one.40 Another investigator
found that scientists rate the opportunity to be promoted within the
research field as more important than advancing to supervisory
positions.41
On the other hand, a professional ladder based on the individual's
high qualifications does not necessarily solve all of management's
problems. The literature reflects some disillusionment with the
dual ladder system.42. Individuals often cannot rise as high on the
professional as on the management ladder; persons on the profes-
sional ladder tend to become isolated from the organization, and
they may become difficult to supervise and coordinate.43 A study
of the operation of a dual ladder in a large electronics manufactur-
ing firm found that advancement to senior levels was possible
only by the managerial route.44 Another study also found that the
managerial ladder is the one that gets true recognition,45 and a
third, of a research company,46 ended similarly.
Likewise in federal laboratories, it appears that the top three
career grades are attained by science and engineering managers
and related consulting, staff, and contract-supervision types. The
University of New Mexico study summarized by Risen (pp. 67-69)
identified only 2 individual "bench" scientists, in contrast to 209
line managers and individual workers in consulting or staff roles.
Although the Civil Service Commission's instructions to federal
agencies on how to grade professional positions encourage the use
of dual ladders and set no artificial limits on the advancement
of individual creative workers, that survey indicated that in practice
the "bench" scientist rarely attains the topmost grades. This may
reflect the belief of agency administrators that senior science
administrators and consultants properly belong in higher grades
than even the most productive individual scientists.
A recent study by the Civil Service Commission's Bureau of
Executive Manpower verified the University of New Mexico sample
survey. In making a functional classification of all federal scien-
tists and engineers in the three top career grades, the bureau
found that only 4 percent of the group served as individual workers,
the same percentage as for those in other occupations.47
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To the extent that top positions can be filled only via the manage -
ment ladder, we return to the original problem of forcing highly
qualified technical people to become managers to advance, some-
times against their own preferences.
Another problem of the professional ladder, if not carefully
handled, is the danger that its occupants will be looked on as misfits
who could not make it in the administrative field.48 To avoid such
a stigma, some laboratories transfer scientists from one ladder
to another.49 An executive of Bell Telephone Laboratories would
go even further and eliminate any artificial boundaries between
the two ladders, which he feels tend to fence people in; instead he
would establish a broad classification system that would reward
creative effort wherever found.50
A glimpse into the future may reveal an even greater use of
dual ladders in years to come: American Labor reports that white-
collar unions in Canada are beginning to make such ladders a
collective bargaining objective, so that individual scientists and
engineers can advance to higher levels.51
FIRST RUNGS UP THE MANAGERIAL LADDER
The prediction of managerial potential in any one individual
is still uncertain despite the efforts of numerous psychometri-
cians.52 Further comments on this subject are made by Dr. Lynton
K. Caldwell in Chapter 2 of this volume.
Without going through psychometric procedures it may still be
possible to identify those who show aptitude for the management
ladder by their interest in people or their seeking additional
responsibility.53 These are the ones who might be given trial
assignments as science interns, project leaders, junior members
of management committees, arrangers of symposia, and similar
duties.
As a guide to federal agencies in identifying kinds of experience
that show supervisory aptitude, the Civil Service Commission
recently published the following list as part of its new qualification
standard for white-collar positions:
1. Assignments which involved providing guidance and training
to new employees
2. "Project leader" assignments which involved coordinating
and integrating the work of others into a completed work
product
3. Assignments which required the candidate to work closely
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with others to resolve problems, coordinate activities, or
gain acceptance of a product or procedure
4. Assignment as a "troubleshooter" or source of advice to
others regarding the work of the unit or organization
5. Assignments which involved devising new work methods and
procedures or improvements in existing work practices, and
getting the cooperation of employees in applying the new
methods and practices54
At this early stage in a young person's career the choice of
ladders should not be irrevocable.55 Rather this should be an
experimental career phase to see if the candidate performs accept-
ably in his new administrative role and if he enjoys the experience.
If the trial does not work out as hoped, he could return gracefully
to full-time professional work without stigma or what government
terms an "adverse personnel action."
If the first trial run is successful, two or three similar experi-
ences might help to confirm managerial ability, coupled with
training in human relations skills and the business of the organiza-
tion. If success continues, the next rung might be formal assign-
ment as a section head.56
Regardless of the details, some systematic plan for identifying
and training promising juniors for future administrative assign-
ments is of major importance to all technical organizations. The
report of a special committee of the National Academy of Sciences,
under the chairmanship of James R. Killian, Jr., made the following
comments on this subject in 1964:
The early identification, development, and assignment of
men capable of playing key roles in the technical direction
of big projects is one of the most important responsibilities of
top management in companies engaged in large-scale re-
search and development. ...
Industry, government, and the universities all share a
responsibility to train and develop more managers and project
engineers who combine thorough understanding of the tech-
nology they manage with mastery of the art of leadership.57
PREPARING AN EMPLOYEE FOR HIS FIRST MANAGERIAL DUTIES
When a technical employee receives his first supervisory as-
signment, whether on a trial or a regular basis, in all fairness
he should be given suitable training or coaching in the human
relations aspects of his new role, rather than be left to flounder
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on his own. One of the authors remembers the day when a fellow
worker, after four years on a first-name basis, was elevated to
his first leadership position and let it be known that "Mister"
should be used on both sides.
Many industrial research organizations have established formal
training programs for this purpose.58 A good management develop-
ment program for engineers might include the following training
techniques: classes, s e m i n a r s , evening courses, conferences,
outside reading, job rotation, service on committees, coaching,
understudying executives, advanced management courses, and mem-
bership in professional societies.59
As reported later in this chapter (pp. 91-95, 99-108), a ques-
tionnaire completed by managers in some federal science and
engineering organizations showed that the majority had not been
given training on assuming their first management responsibilities.
This situation is now being corrected; in 1968 the commission
established a new standard for promotion to supervisory jobs
at lower and middle grades that requires all agencies under the
program to give appropriate training to employees who are being
promoted into their first supervisory assignments. This applies
to professional as well as other white-collar positions.60
In the federal service the greatest amount of in-service training
is and should be done by the employing agencies. The Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel agency, conducts a wide
variety of courses that can best be done centrally for the whole
government or introduces new courses on a demonstration basis.
For example, the commission conducts a course for inexperienced
first-line supervisors on nomination and reimbursement from any
federal agency. The prospectus includes the following paragraph:
The first-line supervisor is often selected from among the
most capable employees. In most instances he brings knowl-
edge of his technical area to his new responsibility, but very
little supervisory experience. The transition is a challenge
and is made difficult when there has been a lack of training.
This course provides timely and concentrated assistance to
the employee making this frequently difficult transition. It
introduces him to the basic legal requirements affecting the
management of Federal employees and to selected managerial
techniques and concepts which may be studied in greater
depth in subsequent courses developed for experienced super-
visors.-1 - -
Clearly the Civil Service Commission could never conduct all
the supervisory and management courses needed to serve a govern-
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ment of nearly three million civilians. In a recent twelve-month
period, 4509 scientists and engineers participated in commission-
conducted courses, ranging in length from two or three days to
two weeks. These participants were at all grade levels and there-
fore were by no means all novice supervisors.
The commission's role is rather to stimulate each agency to
conduct its own training programs, to develop model or demonstra-
tion courses and a few central courses where indicated, to improve
the competence of agency trainers, and to coordinate training among
all agencies so that courses in one agency can be opened up to
employees of other agencies. The latest trend is to include state
and local government employees, as well, in federal training pro-
grams where appropriate arrangements can be made.
HOW CAN THE TECHNOLOGICAL MANAGER INCREASE HIS EFFECTIVENESS?
As the technological manager climbs the ladder above his first
supervisory assignment, his need for training continues but be-
comes considerably broader.
One list of the qualifications of a good manager includes such
elements as decision making, willingness to take risks, planning for
the future, working knowledge of all phases of the organization,
organizing and leading a team, and delegating authority.62 Sys-
tematic training at middle management and higher levels by such
methods as seminars and case studies would therefore seem
appropriate to enhance the manager's capacity to meet his respon-
sibilities.
An organization that gears special training programs to each
rung of the management ladder is Esso Research and Engineering
Company, as described by McNab.63 Similarly, the U.S. Civil
Service Commission offers central training programs for techno-
logical managers of federal agencies at middle and higher levels.
These concentrate on the principles of good management and issues
of science policy in a public service setting rather than on scientific
subject matter as such. They are designed to complement existing
agency programs by filling in the gaps.
One such course for middle-level professionals, entitled Super-
visory Scientists and Engineers, offers the following content:
The program will examine the special nature of the mana-
gerial job in R & D organizations by identifying the unique
motivational characteristics of scientific personnel, by dis-
cussing the impact of organizational structure on the produc-
tivity of scientific groups, and by exploring the leadership
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patterns best designed to release and accelerate scientific
creativity. The program will also take up such topics as
the flexibilities of the Federal personnel system in managing
scientific groups, career development concepts applicable to
scientific personnel, and the administrative and financial
practices which permit the most effective direction and con-
trol of scientific groups.64
A management course conducted by the Civil Service Commis-
sion for top professional employees of federal agencies is titled
"Management of Scientific and Engineering Organizations" and
covers the following topics:
Management planning for science and engineering programs
Formulating and administering science and engineering bud-
gets
Direction and development of human resources
Communications requirements of modern science and tech-
nology
Management of in-house resources and contract programs
Behavioral science research and its implications for managers
of research, development, and other technical programs65
A special advanced seminar on science policy for top federal
career officials takes the form of meetings with noted authors to
discuss their works:
The Ideas and Authors program in Science and Government is
designed to afford senior Federal science and engineering
executives an opportunity to meet with individuals outside
the Government community who have made extremely signifi-
cant contributions to the operational and philosophical base
which directly, or indirectly, influences Federal policies and
their application in practice. In addition, the program is
constructed in such a fashion as to afford the senior executive
with responsibilities for direction of major government proj-
ects, an opportunity to interact directly with guest authors,
thus conveying the executive's critical and/or constructive
commentary to the author himself.66
In addition, many agencies conduct their own management
courses, and to an increasing extent individual federal laboratories
are making arrangements with universities nearby to conduct
courses, some for academic credit and some not, at the actual work
site after hours. In 1971, twelve federal agencies sponsored 125
such off-campus study centers in cooperation with 91 schools and
colleges, and more than 26,000 employees participated. (These
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figures cover many fields in addition to science and engineering.)
A typical off-campus center at a federal laboratory is the one at
the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California, run in coopera-
tion with the University of Southern California. The following
courses are offered:
Administrative Systems Analysis
Research in Complex Organizations
Organization and Management Theory
Fundamentals of Public Administration
Public Administration Problems
Problems in the Administration of Financial Resources67
As another example, Florida State University offers a graduate
program at the Kennedy Space Center, Cocoa Beach, Florida, for
NASA employees. This leads to the degree of Master of Science
in Management.68
ROTATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS
In addition to training courses of various types, a planned
program to rotate promising technical people among a variety of
assignments may be useful in intensifying their preparation for a
managerial role. Two current examples may be of interest in the
federal service, one depending on selection of highly qualified
candidates from outside the service and the second one relying
on internal selection:
Grants associates program in NIH
To select and develop managers for the burgeoning field of
medical research, the National Institute of Health (NIH), with the
cooperation of the Civil Service Commission, appoints scientists
with doctorate degrees in health - related sciences to become
"grants associates." Typically the new appointees have had from
two to five years of post-doctoral experience. They undertake a
year's program of seven to ten actual work assignments in a
research management situation. Carefully planned training con-
ferences and seminars are combined with this work experience
under the guidance of a senior scientist who serves as preceptor
to the grants associate. Since its beginning in 1963, about fifty
scientists have completed the program and some have already
advanced to positions of broad responsibility.69
Science and technology fellowships in Commerce Department
In recent years the Department of Commerce has run a program
designed to enhance the abilities of highly selected scientists and
engineers in its technically oriented components, such as the
Environmental Science Services Administration, National Bureau of
Standards, and Patent Office. About fifteen participants are chosen
each year. They undertake first a four-week orientation in federal
science activities, conducted by the Brookings Institution, and then
a one-week orientation in the Department of Commerce. The pur-
%pose of this introductory period is:
. . . . to expose the participants to such broad issues as the
criteria for choice among scientific and technical programs,
the economics of fiscal policy and the budget for science in
Government, technological innovation as an element in the
Nation's economic growth, scientific man-power as a problem
of national policy, the role of higher management in decisions
on technical programs, science and technology in world af-
fairs, and the organization of scientific activities in the
Federal Government.70
The participants are then given work assignments of eight to
nine months in bureaus other than their own, designed to provide
challenging work experience in fields related to their specialties.
These assignments involve decision-making activities and offer
good opportunities for career development. On completion of the
program, the participants return to their original organizations.
Success of the new program is indicated by the later selection of
many participants for key leadership positions.
SHOULD THE TECHNOLOGICAL MANAGER CONTINUE HIS OWN RESEARCH?
Once successfully launched on a managerial career, the scientist
or engineer may be faced by a difficult personal problem: should
he continue to leave some free time for his own technological work-
creative work that built his reputation and gave him deep personal
satisfaction—or should he devote himself fully to his new manage-
ment duties? Can he find equal personal satisfaction through tech-
nological achievements at second hand, that is, by "getting results
through people" rather than by conducting his own "dirty hands"
experiments?
Here again authorities disagree. Substantial numbers conclude
that the manager must spend full time as a manager and delegate
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the actual performance of technological work.71 Pertinent here is a
preliminary study of research administrators in which self-admin-
istered rankings of certain functions were tabulated. The great
majority of respondents gave low rankings to the importance of
doing their own research and to the time actually spent on research.
On the other hand, a majority rated their personal satisfaction in
performing research as high or medium, thus hinting at the frus-
tration a research administrator must experience.72
Other authorities advocate that the technological manager should
continue his own research activities if possible.73 The following
statement was made at a 1964 symposium by a deputy director in
the office of the Secretary of Defense:
One of the troubles of a technical administrator is that every-
thing is all worked out slickly on charts. Except for dividing
by two or three, once in a while, or maybe for using a slide
rule to get some percentages—one never is forced to think
quantitatively at all, and this is very bad indeed. The tech-
nical administrator must participate—either in research,
himself (which is hard to do on a part-time basis and not get
lost and fall behind)—or he must have extensive personal
contact with the technical people.74
The amount of time a technological manager can devote to his
own projects will vary, of course, depending on his particular rung
on the management ladder. So, one would expect a project leader,
on the bottom rung, to spend a considerable amount of time per-
forming the same work as .others in his group. This was borne
out in studies of companies in which the typical project leader
spent about 30 percent of his time on engineering duties and about
70 percent on administration.75 In the upper echelons such a high
proportion of technical work would be rare.
THE ENVIRONMENT FOR CREATIVITY
A large subdivision of the growing literature of scientists and
engineers deals with this topic. There is general agreement that a
light touch is.needed in the management of technological workers.78
Traditional methods of discipline and giving order from the indus-
trial or military past are clearly inappropriate for professionals.
Instead, an academic environment of colleagues working together
is sought, and the term "lead" seems more appropriate than
"manage," "direct," or "control." R & D laboratories often use
"project leader" or "group leader" rather than hierarchical
titles.77
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Elements needed to build a creative environment can be sum-
marized as follows:
Make challenging assignments and set mutually agreed upon
goals
Give the professional sufficient latitude to operate in achiev-
ing these goals
Provide adequate technical tools, as well as clerical and
technician assistance
Provide fair and equitable salary and benefits and adequate
work places
Promote a professional-level environment78
The matter can also be expressed in the following terms:
Management is also responsible for creating an environment
which is receptive to innovation and professionally stimulating
but which does not foster individualism to the point of organi-
zational anarchy. It must recognize the problems, needs,
motivations, and idiosyncrasies of the professional and draw
him into a participating role in the organization so that he can
see an association between his personal objective and the
group objectives.79
Excessive paperwork, punching a time clock, spending time on
subprofessional work, and restrictive delegations of authority for
such things as minor purchases are well calculated to drive out the
creative spirit. Sometimes in large organizations these adminis-
trative annoyances slowly accumulate without awareness by man-
agement of their stifling effect. In the Department of Defense a
systematic effort was made to sweep such accumulations out of
military laboratories. The program resulted in many improve-
ments:
Better communication between professionals and management
echelons
Greater delegations of authority to laboratory management,
for example, for security review of scientific papers
Relaxation of restrictions on purchase of scientific periodicals
and instruments
More favorable interpretation of restrictions regarding em-
ployee training80
In an organization as vast as the federal service, there is an
understandable lag in communicating changes down through the
echelons. The Civil Service Commission has made many changes
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in personnel policies designed to enhance the quality of the staffing
and the environment in federal laboratories, but sometimes the
intervening echelons add restrictions so that the intended flexibility
is lost by the time it reaches the laboratories. To counteract this
tendency, the commission seeks to communicate directly with
federal scientists and engineers through training conferences,
journal articles, and a special pamphlet designed to inform the
technological worker about the personnel system as it affects him.81
A report on joint efforts of the commission and the Department
of Defense to improve personnel practices in defense laboratories
stated that 89 percent of the problems could be solved within
existing federal personnel policies and were caused by internal
procedures and controls:
The key to laboratory effectiveness is flexibility. It is
possible to tailor a system of controls within the Federal
Personnel System which is compatible with the need for a
creative environment within technical organizations. This
can be different from those applied to other organizations . . .
There is no reason why we cannot achieve a tailored
management system for technical organizations, which is
comparable to that of progressive industrial technical organi-
zations and compatible with the Federal Personnel Sys-
tem 82
On a government-wide scale, the Federal Council for Science and
Technology urged agencies to take the following steps:
[1.] To sustain a challenging scientific environment capable
of keeping and attracting good people, the mission of labora-
tories should be broad enough to present a set of scientif-
ically challenging tasks, and redefined wherever necessary
to give them continuing vitality;
[2.] Research directors should have more authority;
[3.] Layers of management over laboratories should be reduced;
[4.] Full advantage should be taken of the flexibility existing
in Civil Service regulations, and these regulations should be
less often used as a rationalization for ineffective personnel
management.83
REPORT OF A SPECIAL STUDY OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
To throw additional light on many of the points discussed in
this chapter, the authors conducted an informal questionnaire sur-
vey, with the cooperation of Professor Albert H. Rosenthal,
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Director of the Program for Advanced Study in Public Science
and Administration of the University of New Mexico, during the
winter of 1968-69. The questionnaires were circulated in several
federal laboratories and in Sandia Laboratories, a major public-
private agency established under a contract with the Western
Electric Company for public purposes and financed by public funds.
The results are reported in Tables 5-21, which appear in the
appendix to this chapterXpp. 99-108; see also pp. 13 and 28).
Usable responses were received from 193 federal scientists
and engineers who rated themselves as administrators and from
195 who rated themselves as individual professional workers. The
survey should not be taken as representative of all federal
scientists and engineers, since it was heavily weighted in favor of
engineers and physical scientists, omitting the life sciences, and in
favor of a few developmental laboratories rather than research
laboratories. (More than half of the responses came from the Army
Department's White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.) As to
levels of responsibility, the respondents represented lower and
middle rather than top levels.
From Sandia Laboratories, 161 usable responses were received
from scientists and engineers who rated themselves as administra-
tors and 144 from those who rated themselves as individual
professional workers.
The results are reported separately for federal administrators
and individual workers, and Sandia administrators and individual
workers. The small number of cases precludes any definitive
conclusions, but within the limitations mentioned, the study may
throw some light on the characteristics and attitudes of administra-
tors as opposed to individual professionals.
Salary Differences (Table 5). As might be expected, the adminis-
trators as a group were clearly ahead of the individual workers in
salaries. Sandia respondents were substantially ahead of the
federal respondents in both groupings.
Highest Degree Attained (Table 6). The Sandia respondents in
both groupings showed a marked edge in level of educational attain-
ment over the federal groupings. This may explain, in part, the
salary advantages shown in Table 5.
Year Highest Degree Attained (Table 7). The administrators
are definitely the older group, judging by the year of attaining
highest degree. This may, in part, explain the salary advantage of
administrators over individual workers noted in Table 5. No
marked differences are apparent between the federal and the Sandia
respondents.
Professional Field of Highest Degree (Table 8). This study
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agrees with many predecessors in indicating how few technological
administrators come from nontechnical disciplines. The four
groups are all heavily weighted toward engineering, with the indi-
vidual federal workers showing a high proportion in physics and
mathematics as well.
Plan for Selecting and Training Technological Administrators
(Table 9). The question regarding this item was put to the sample
groups in different ways: The administrators were asked about
the situation when they made the initial move into administration,
while the individual workers were asked about the situation in their
present organization. The responses are therefore not directly
comparable, although the results are very close. It seems clear
that the great majority of respondents were skeptical about the
existence of a systematic plan.
Plan for Advancing Individual Workers to Higher Levels without
Taking Administrative Duties (Table 10). The question regarding
this item was asked in the same way as the question in Table 9.
Again, the great majority reported the absence of a systematic
plan. The Sandia administrators felt somewhat more strongly than
the individual workers that there was no such plan.
Importance of a "Two-Track" System (Table 11). The ques-
tionnaire briefly defined the two-track system in the same terms
as this chapter (pp. 78-82) and asked respondents to rate its
importance. No great difference is shown among the four groups
of respondents; the majority affirmed the desirability of having
such a system.
Extent to Which Organization Provides for a Two-Track System
(Table 12). The responses to this item indicate that despite
numerous articles in the literature recommending a two-track
system, most respondents in several federal laboratories and in a
major industrial laboratory did not think such a system existed
in their organization. These responses, compared with those in
Table 11, hint at potential dissatisfaction among the individual
workers. That is, most of them rated the importance of a two-track
system as being high, yet a majority reported that their present
organization does not provide for one. The responses of the indi-
vidual workers to this item can be compared to their responses
in Table 10, which asked the question in a different way. This
internal test of consistency of responses seems to yield satisfactory
results.
Ways of Selecting and Training Technological Administrators
(Table 13). The four groups of respondents were in very close
agreement on two methods of selecting and training administrators:
more than half of each group favored an internal tryout by assigning
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candidates to minor administrative duties, and a quarter of each
group favored periodic screening of candidates by a committee of
senior professionals. Regarding the other three choices offered
to respondents, no pattern was detected in the answers of the four
groups.
Desirability of Manager Performing Research (Table 14). A
large majority of all four groups voted yes on this question, with
the individual workers showing a somewhat larger affirmative
response than the administrators. Some respondents wrote in
qualifications to their answers. The general tenor of these com-
ments was to the effect that the administrator must keep up with
his field, if not by doing research then in other ways.
Research Time Available, Administrators Only (Table 15).
Almost half of the administrators reported no research time avail-
able, although a majority rated individual research as highly
desirable on Table 14. Here again is a hint of potential frustration.
Kinds of Professional Employees Supervised, Administrators
Only (Table 16). An attempt was made to have respondents assess
the extent to which their employees were in the same field as them-
selves, in related fields, or in different fields.
Entrance into First Administrative Assignment, Administrators
Only (Table 17). The leading method by which the responding
administrators first came into administrative work was through
suggestions by supervisors or other officials, followed by their
taking the initiative themselves.
Advancement to Present Level, Administrators Only (Table 18).
Administrators were asked whether they could have advanced to
their present levels as individual workers. A majority replied that
they could not have done so, in a sense verifying their responses
on Tables 10 and 12.
Training Received, Administrators Only (Table 19). A majority
of administrators replied that they had received no special training
or coaching on beginning their first administrative assignments.
This points to the need for management action to ensure that new
supervisors are properly prepared for their changed responsi-
bilities.
Courses of Value, Administrators Only (Table 20). The adminis-
trators were queried about the courses that had assisted them in
preparing for administrative roles and about the university gradu-
ate-level courses they would recommend to prepare people for such
roles. The replies were by free answers rather than by check-lists
and related courses have been grouped in the summary in Table 20.
As to recommended courses, the responses of the federal and the
Sandia administrators were surprisingly similar. Judging from
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this study, an ideal curriculum to train new administrators would
concentrate on such subjects as organization and management
(preferably in the context of technological organizations), super-
vision, leadership, personnel management, psychology, communica-
tions skills, and possibly finance.
Preference for Administrative versus Individttal Professional
Work, Individuals Only (Table 21). Finally, the individual workers
were asked whether they had ever made a definite choice between
administrative and individual work and were asked to amplify their
responses. The great majority replied that they had not made such
a decision, and nearly half (exactly the same percentage of federal
and Sandia respondents) said they would welcome an opportunity
to move into administration. This result differs from the findings
of other studies reported earlier in this chapter.
NEED FOR BETTER PERSONNEL DATA ON SCIENCE MANPOWER
Despite the many statistics and studies cited in this chapter,
there is still a serious lack of current information on science
manpower in the United States. The problem was delineated several
years ago in the Killian report of the National Academy of Sciences,
which listed the following item among its seven major themes:
The pressing national need for meaningful, reliable data,
expertly analyzed and coordinated, on the allocation and
utilization of scientists and engineers. Because of the inade-
quacy of such data, decisions affecting utilization have so far
been based largely on hunches, intuition, and fragmentary
information.84
The report was supported by an accompanying article, which
included the following statement:
Reports and monographs about scientists and engineers
are accumulating, it is true, but since the study of the subject
is still in its early stages, having begun on any scale only
during the past decade, relatively little "hard" information
has been established. Definitions and classifications are not
yet standardized, so that to the query of how many scientists
and engineers were working in 1960, several answers over a
range of about 20 per cent or more can be obtained. It is
ironical that the Bureau of Labor Statistics knows much more
about the wages of streetcar motormen than about the salaries
of research scientists.85
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A second article with the report gave as one of its conclusions:
The time is now ripe to give serious attention to developing
more adequate, timely, and decision-oriented information
concerning one of the nation's most valuable resources—its
scientists and engineers—and their work, objectives, support-
ing personnel, and other factors closely related to their
utilization and development.86
As one step in the effort to standardize the reporting of data on
science and technical manpower, the National Science Foundation
requested the Civil Service Commission to develop a functional
classification scheme. The resulting study, published in 1966,
covered professional personnel in engineering and the physical,
biological, mathematical, social, and health sciences and listed
standard codes and categories.
Functional Classification for Scientists and Engineers
Code Category
11 Research
12 Research Contract and Grant Administration
13 Development
14 Test and Evaluation
21 Design
22 Construction
23 Production
24 Installation, Operations, and Maintenance
31 Data Collection, Processing, and Analysis
32 Scientific and Technical Information
41 Standards and Specifications
42 Regulatory Enforcement and Licensing
51 Natural Resource Operations
81 Clinical Practice, Counseling, and
Ancillary Medical Services
91 Planning
92 Management
93 Teaching and Training
94 Technical Assistance and Consulting
99 Other-Not Elsewhere Classified87
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If the science community can agree on such a standardized
classification, as well as on standard occupational definitions, it
may be possible in the future to visualize a national reporting
system that will continuously yield trends on intake, mobility,
career development, turnover, and functional patterns of techno-
logical manpower in this country on a real-time basis. Within the
Civil Service Commission, plans are under way toward such a
system for the federal work force, and we hope that it can become
part of a larger system for the whole economy. Such a plan would
allow meaningful comparisons among universities, nonprofit organ-
izations, private industry, and federal laboratories.
CONCLUSION
To answer the question in the title of this chapter, it seems
clear that the quality of science administration can be enhanced
by systematic planning and follow-through. The literature in this
fairly recent but fast-growing field gives many case studies and
examples in industry and government of planned programs that
appear to give better results than hit-or-miss efforts.
Details must necessarily vary according to the history, environ-
ment, and mission of each organization, but several guidelines seem
to be emerging that can be applied in the selection and development
of competent science administrators. The answers are still sug-
gestive rather than definitive, and much additional thought and effort
need to be applied to this important problem. With these qualifica-
tions, the following suggestions for improving the quality of science
management are offered by way of summary:
1. Undergraduate and graduate students of science and engineer-
ing who are interested in managerial careers should be en-
couraged to take such courses as psychology, organization,
and management as optional subjects.
2. Selection programs for entrance-level scientists and engi-
neers should seek a due proportion of candidates who show
evidence of administrative interests and ability as well as
those with high academic records in technical subjects.
(Note: These two groups are not mutually exclusive.)
3. A planned effort should be made to assess the administrative
interests and potential of junior scientists and engineers so
that, early in their careers, those who show promise can be
exposed to administrative opportunities. Methods for such
exposure might include formal administrative internships,
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less formal rotation among a variety of technical and admin-
istrative assignments, or committee work. The key element
here is the tryout concept. If the candidate is successful and
wishes to pursue the opportunity, he can be formally placed
on the first rung of the administrative ladder. If the tryout
does not work, he can be returned to full-time technical
assignments with a minimum of embarrassment.
4. R & D organizations should consider the possibility of some
appropriate "dual-ladder" system for professionals. By
providing opportunities for advancement in individual tech-
nical assignments, management will decrease the motivation
for professionals without administrative potential to seek
advancement by the supervisory route. At the same time, the
system should not rigidly type all professionals as being
permanently on one ladder or the other. Interests and abil-
ities may change and the way should be open for movement
between the ladders.
5. Professionals who are selected for their first supervisory
assignments should be given formal training or coaching in
supervision, management, human relations skills, or related
subjects if they have not recently had such training.
6. Middle-level professionals who are selected for higher mana-
gerial or policy assignments should be given graduate uni-
versity training, or the equivalent, in such fields as advanced
management and public policy implications of science and
technology. Here again rotational assignments may be valu-
able in broadening the knowledge and background of such
persons.
7. Once started up the managerial line, the science manager
should earn further advancement on the basis of his demon-
strated effectiveness and his potential for further develop-
ment, rather than automatically by length of service.
8. Definite efforts should be made to ensure that science
administrators keep up with pertinent developments in science
and technology through such means as science symposia,
refresher courses, or actual participation in research.
9. Every effort should be made to develop and encourage a
stimulating environment for creative work by providing a
challenging and worthwhile scientific mission for the organi-
zation, by eliminating administrative annoyances, and by
building a professional spirit in colleague relationships.
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APPENDIX
Results of Questionnaire to Federal and Sandia
Laboratories Administrators and
Individual Professionals
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TABLE 5
Questionnaire Results Regarding Salary Differences
Median salary
Administrators
193 Federal
$18,760
161 Sandia
$22,720
Individual Workers
195 Federal
$13,280
144 Sandia
$16,400
TABLE 6
Questionnaire Results Regarding Highest Degree Attained
Highest
Degree
Bachelor's
Master's
Ph.d.
None
No response0
ADMINISTRATORS
193 Federal
No.
129
37
13
10
4
%
66
19
7
5
2b
161 Sandia
No.
74
43
44
0
0
%
47
27
27
0
0
INDIVIDUAL WORKERS
195 Federal
No.
152
30
3
6
4
%
78
1'5
2
3
2
144 Sandia
No.
58
51
35
0
0
%
40
35
24
0
0
"Respondents were told to omit answers to any questions they regarded as in-
appropriate.
''Percentage columns may not add to 100 because of rounding of figures.
The tables in this appendix are from N. J. Oganovic and H. H. Leich, Ques-
tionnaire to Federal and Sandia Laboratories Administrators and Individual
Professionals, U.S. Civil Service Commission in cooperation with the Uni-
versity of New Mexico, Program for advanced study in Public Science Policy
and Administration (1968-69).
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TABLE 7
Questionnaire Regarding Year Highest Degree Attained
Year of
Highest
Degree
1930-39
1940-49
1950-59
1960-68
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193 Federal
No.
15
45
90
31
12
%
8
23
47
16
6
161 Sandia
No.
3
45
74
39
0
%
2
27
47
24
0
INDIVIDUAL WORKERS
195 Federal
No.
5
12
62
104
12
%
2
6
31
53
6
144 Sandia
No.
4
20
42
77
1
%
3
14
29
53
1
TABLE 8
Questionnaire Results Regarding Professional Field
of Highest Degree
Field of
Highest
Degree
Engineering
Physics
Mathematics
and
Statistics
Other
Natural
Sciences
Social
Sciences,
Humanities
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193 Federal
No.
118
24
23
11
6
11
%
60
12
12
6
3
6
161 Sandia
No.
107
32
8
13
1
0
%
66
20
5
8
0
0
INDIVIDUAL WORKERS
195 Federal
No.
88
46
45
7
3
4
%
45
24
23
3
2
2
144 Sandia
No.
100
23
5
15
1
0
%
69
16
3
10
1
0
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TABLE 9
Questionnaire Results Regarding Plan for Selecting
and Training Technological Administrators
Did/does your organiza-
tion have a systematic
plan for selecting and
training administrators in
science and technology?
Yes, a systematic plan
Some plan, less than
systematic
No such plan
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193
Federal
No.
11
76
103
3
%
6
39
53
2
161
Sandia
No.
5
43
111
2
%
3
27
69
1
INDIVIDUAL
WORKERS
195
Federal
No.
17
75
94
9
%
9
39
48
5
144 ,
Sandia
No.
7
43
86
8
%
5
30
60
6
TABLE 10
Questionnaire Results Regarding Plan for Advancing
Individual Workers to Higher Levels without
Administrative Duties
Did/does your organiza-
tion have a systematic
plan for advancing indi-
vidual professionals
contributors to higher
levels without taking on
administrative duties?
Yes, a systematic plan
Some plan, less than
systematic
No such plan
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193
Federal
No.
9
75
104
5
%
3
39
54
2
161
Sandia
No.
5
39
114
3
%
3
24
71
2
INDIVIDUAL
WORKERS
195
Federal
No.
23
58
106
8
%
12
30
55
4
144
Sandia
No.
19
37
82
6
%
13
26
57
4
102
TABLE 11
Questionnaire Results Regarding Importance of
a "Two-Track" System
In your opinion, should
a scientific or techno-
logical organization
provide a systematic
two-track system of ad-
vancement for its
professionals?
Yes, an important feature
of a good place to work.
Not too important
Undesirable
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193
Federal
No.
159
13
7
14
%
82
7
4
7
161
Sandia
No.
122
19
7
13
%
75
12
4
8
INDIVIDUAL
WORKERS
195
Federal
No.
170
14
5
6
%
87
7
2
3
144
Sandia
No.
119
20
2
3
%
83
14
1
2
TABLE 12
Questionnaire Results Regarding Extent to Which
Organization Provides for a Two-Track System
Does the personnel sys-
tem in your organization
adequately provide for
the two-track system?
(Can check more than
one.)
Yes, fully provided for
Personnel office should
make greater effort to
publicize the program
Not provided for
Can't get top grades as
individual worker0
ADMINISTRATORS
193
Federal
No.
33
50
87
14
%
17
26
45
7
161
Sandia
No.
15
19
105
4
%
9
12
65
2
INDIVIDUAL
WORKERS
195
Federal
No.
12
43
115
10
%
6
22
59
5
144
Sandia
No.
13
26
88
0
%
9
18
61
0
3These responses were write-ins.
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TABLE 13
Questionnaire Results Regarding Ways of Selecting
and Training Technological Administrators
What are the soundest
ways in which a scien-
tific or technological
organization can select
and train current pro-
fessional employees to
become administrators?
(Can check more than
one.)
Let the employee's apti-
tude and preference for
administrative duties
show themselves in the
normal course of his em-
ployment, without a
special program
Temporary assignment to
minor administrative
duties (acting as unit
chief, coordinator, com-
mittee member, etc.) on
an informal "tryout"
basis
Periodic screening of
possible candidates for
administrative work by a
committee of senior pro-
fessionals
Periodic announcement
of opportunities to enter
a selection and training
program for administra-
tive work
Special training or
coaching for administra-
tive duties, prior to or
following first adminis-
trative assignment
ADMINISTRATORS
193
Federal
No.
80
112
52
78
108
%
41
58
26
40
56
161
Sandia
No.
95
91
40
22
61
%
59
56
25
14
38
INDIVIDUAL
WORKERS
195
Federal
No.
56
112
45
96
91
%
29
58
23
50
47
144
Sandia
No.
48
77
35
51
61
%
33
53
24
35
42
104
TABLE 14
Questionnaire Results Regarding Desirability of Manager Performing Research
In general, is it desir-
able for the science or
technological adminis-
trator to be able to
spend some time on his
own individual investi-
gations or research?
Yes, highly desirable
Doesn't matter too much
Undesirable
Depends on level of job
Other ways to keep up
(reading, etc.)0
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193
Federal
No.
125
30
11
8
6
13
%
64
15
6
4
3
7
161
Sandia
No.
105
31
5
9
3
8
%
65
19
3
6
2
5
INDIVIDUAL
WORKERS
195
Federal
No.
143
17
13
9
2
11
%
74
9
7
5
1
6
144
Sandia
No.
99
17
10
3
1
14
%
69
12
7
2
1
10
"These responses were write-ins.
TABLE 15
Questionnaire Results Regarding Research Time
Available (Administrators Only)
Time Available
No research time available
10% or less
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
More than 50%
No response
ADMINISTRATORS0
193 Federal
No.
92
23
33
19
3
6
13
4
%
47
12
17
10
2
3
7
2
161 Sandia
No.
68
9
31
21
9
6
17
0
%
42
6
19
13
6
4
10
0
"Tables 15-20 show responses to questions asked of administrators only.
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TABLE 16
Questionnaire Results Regarding Kinds of Professional
Employees Supervised (Administrators Only)
105
Professional Fields
Supervised
All employees supervised
in same professional field
as the administrator
In same and related fields
In same, related, and
different fields
All in related or different
fields
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193 Federal
No.
52
75 -
30
20
16
%
27
39
15
10
8
161 Sandia
No.
27
77
40
14
3
%
17
48
25
9
2
TABLE 17
Questionnaire Results Regarding First Administrative
Assignment (Administrators Only)
How did you happen to
enter upon your first ad-
ministrative assignment in
science or technology?
Suggested by supervisor or
other official
Took initiative in seeking
such assignment
"Happenstance"
Other
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193 Federal
No.
82
71
23
13
4
%
43
37
12
7
2
161 Sandia
No.
105
41
8
7
0
%
65
26
5
4
0
106
TABLE 18
Questionnaire Results Regarding Advancement to
Present Level (Administration Only)
In your opinion, could you
have advanced as an indi-
vidual worker to your
present level?
Yes
No
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193 Federal
No.
72
111
10
%
37
58
5
161 Sandia
No.
45
97
19
%
27
60
12
TABLE 19
Questionnaire Results Regarding Training Received
(Administrators Only)
When you began your first
administrative assignment
in science or technology,
did you receive any spe-
cial training or coaching
in your new responsibil-
ities?
Yes
No
No response
ADMINISTRATORS
193 Federal
No.
60
110
23
%
31
58
12
161 Sandia
No.
59
101
1
%
37
63
0
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TABLE 21
Questionnaire Results Regarding Preference for Administrative
versus Individual Professional Work (Individuals Only)
Have you at any time made
a deliberate decision to
continue in individual
productive work in your
profession rather than go
i n+A *-U J " " * t it/a
channel?
No (without further
amplification)
No— would probably not
be interested in administra-
tive work if an opportunity
opened up
No — would welcome
opportunity to move into
administration
Yes — primary aptitudes and
interests are focused on
making individual contri-
butions rather than on
administration
Yes— better opportunities
in individual productive
work
Other
INDIVIDUAL WORKERS0
195 Federal
No.
39
31
91
27
5
2
%
20
16
47
14
2
1
144 Sandia
No.
23
34
68
13
1
5
%
16
24
47
9
1
3
Responses to a question asked of individual professionals only.
Guiding work Relationships
among Scientific, Engineering
and Administrative Professionals
WESLEY L. HJORNEVIK
Deputy Director
Office of Economic Opportunity
Washington, D.C.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The administration of science and technology as we know it
today, institutionalized in large organizations, presents a number of
problems, not the least of which is the task of guiding working
relationships among scientific, engineering, and administrative
professionals. Regardless of the nature of the institution, the
multidisciplinary requirements of complex technological goals ne-
cessitate interaction between professionals of varying value sys-
tems, expectations and satisfactions, and work habits. Although
such institutions are becoming more and more commonplace,
NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) at Houston,. Texas, is a
unique example of this particular phenomenon. Since its creation in
1961, those of us responsible for guiding the development and
operation of MSC have been concerned with this problem on a
continuing basis. In fact, since both our space programs and the
mission of MSC are becoming more varied, we are more concerned
now than ever. This is the result of the expansion of the scientific
content of the flight programs, accompanied by a proportionate
109
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increase in the importance of the scientist as a member of the
team.
In this chapter I have attempted to deal with the practical tasks
of the administrator in inducing teamwork among scientific, en-
gineering, and administrative professionals. Such aspects of the
problem as the influence of professional attitudes on work relation-
ships, the interpretation of goals, communications, and operational
techniques for facilitating goal-directed coordination are discussed.
I have relied heavily on specific situations and experience at MSC
since I am a directly involved practitioner rather than an aca-
demician. Frequent references are made to the applicable litera-
ture, much of which is based on studies of many situations. The
experiences and techniques described, based on the MSC situation,
are a very limited sample and should be assessed with the
knowledge of their limitations. Before proceeding directly to these
topics, however, a brief account of the assumptions underlying the
decision to create MSC will be presented to provide a more
penetrating understanding of why the organization has its present
design.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Early history
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was
founded in 1958. During its early stages of development, NASA had
to organize swiftly and carry out an operational space program
simultaneously. At its birth, NASA absorbed the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), a 43-year-old aeronautical
research agency which had also pioneered in space research. In
addition to NACA, several other smaller groups from the Navy and
Army helped form the initial staffing of NASA. In fact, about
one-half of NASA's 34,000 employees came from other agencies.
About 50 percent of NASA's employees work under the Office of
Manned Space Flight (OMSF). OMSF includes three field centers
and a headquarters staff in Washington. The organizational location
of OMSF and its supporting centers in NASA Headquarters is shown
in Fig. 1. The Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Houston, is
responsible for flight crews and spacecraft; Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC), Huntsville, Alabama, is responsible for the launch
vehicles; and Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, is responsible
for launch operations.
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Professional makeup
Of the 11 major field centers of NASA, MSC is unusual in two
ways that are significant to this paper. MSC has the highest
percentage of technical professionals in relation to total staff
(55 percent), significantly higher than the overall NASA percentage
(38 percent) (Tables 22 and 23). Secondly, MSC has more varieties
of professionals than any other center. Besides engineers, we have
medical doctors, physiologists, lawyers, nutritionists, optometrists,
physicists, geologists, and many others involved in the conduct of
the Apollo Program. The percentage and diversity of our technical
specialists are probably unique in a goal-oriented organization.
TABLE 22
MSC Manpower Profile
Personnel Classification
Professional scientific, engineering, and medical
Professional administrative
Supporting technician
Clerical
Wage Board
Total
Number
2494
653
495
753
141
4536
Percent
55
14
11
17
3
100
TABLE 23
Characteristics of MSC Professionals
Average age, years
Average length of experience at MSC, months
Educational background":
Doctor's degrees
Master's degrees
Bachelor's degrees
35
53
90
424
2304
"During FY 1968, 15 percent of the MSC professional staff participated in the
Advanced Education Program.
Basic mission and policies
The basic mission of MSC is spacecraft engineering and develop-
ment and space flight operations. Four basic policies must be
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explained at this point to understand why the MSC mission is what it
is and to begin to explain what we have done in guiding work
relationships at MSC.
A fundamental NASA policy that had considerable effect upon
MSC was the decision to keep space and aeronautical research as
divorced from development activities as possible. It was the
judgment of Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden that the glamour
and dollars associated with development programs could overwhelm
research effort, and thus that the two types of activities should be
conducted in separate organizations and centers.2 As a result of
this policy, the former NACA aeronautical research centers,
Langley, Ames, and Lewis (Fig. 1), have been largely preserved as
research laboratories, and the major hardware development pro-
grams have been assigned to the other centers either created by
NASA or transferred from other agencies.
The second policy concerns how the development programs would
be executed, that is, how the responsibilities would be divided
between government and industry. In evaluating this problem, NASA
management thoroughly reviewed the experience of the other
government agencies—the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air
Force and the Atomic Energy Commission—that had previously
been charged with managing large development efforts. Various
methods had been used by each of these agencies, and each was
considered. After weighing the matter carefully, it was decided that
NASA would perform technical management of its programs,
including the conduct of flight tests, and rely upon industry for the
design, development, and manufacture of the component systems.
With the existing base of strong technical staffs at the various
NACA centers to build upon, the most effective utilization of
available national resources strongly suggested that NASA manage
its programs with civil service personnel.3 Relying upon NASA's
experienced research personnel for management and industry's
combination of personnel and facilities for design and manufacturing
appeared to be the most effective means of employing the nation's
resources.
Not overlooked, however, was the necessity for NASA's develop-
ment managers to maintain their own technical competence if they
were to be effective managers. In view of this requirement, it was
determined that the task of technical management would also
include conducting certain systems and subsystems tests in NASA
facilities under NASA direction. As a consequence, the new
development centers, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and John F. Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), became conceptual design and test and evaluation
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laboratories instead of merely management office complexes. So
the staffs of these centers would then be able to maintain their
competence, certain test and evaluation functions were assigned to
the centers.
It should be pointed out here that you can clearly run a research
and development (R & D) program from an office; laboratory
environment is not a prerequisite. For example, the development
of the nuclear submarine was managed from a program office in
Washington. Without question, a project manager can go wherever
the laboratory capability exists to buy his technical and research
competence. However, the intent of those who envisioned space
flight was not simply to pursue and complete a project; rather, it
was to build a solid baseline of advanced technological competence
in the United States.
The fourth policy concerned the conduct of space science
research. It was decided that NASA would rely upon the universities
for much of the scientific research—recognizing that many of the
most competent scientists were conducting space research at
universities, and basic research facilities were already available.
Organizational framework
Essentially, then, the following four basic policies and their
consequences established the operational framework for MSC:
1. Separation of research and development
2. In-house technical management and contracted design, devel-
opment, and manufacturing
3. Technical competence maintained by providing laboratory
facilities at development centers to perform in-house testing
4. Reliance upon universities for much of the scientific research
Within this framework, MSC management has developed the organi-
zation, facilities, and management practices that have enabled it to
progress in 10 years from a small cadre of 35 people to a major
government installation whose programs at peak periods involve as
many as 200,000 people from government and industry.4
With these policies established, it was time to establish the
organizational framework for the development programs of NASA.
MSC was created around a nucleus of highly creative and competent
scientist-engineers 'from the Langley Research Center. This group,
known as the Space Task Group, had been working together on a
manned satellite program for some time before they were officially
established as an entity November 5, 1958. Langley Research
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Center was world-renowned as an applied science center. The
Space Task Group members, among them the design engineers who
conceived Project Mercury, reflected the applied research and
development environment of Langley.
President Kennedy's decision in 1961 to land a man on the moon
and bring him safely back to earth by 1970 focused NASA's attention
on the enormity and complexity of the challenge it was nurturing in
Project Mercury. His decision laid to rest the attitude some had
held toward the Space Task Group—that their activity was more or
less a stunt, a premature overreaction to the Russian Sputnik, and
would go away. It was obviously not going away, and it was also
obvious that the immense resources they would need to develop
manned flight would dwarf and bury the efforts assigned any other
center. Consequently, in 1962, the Space Task Group moved to
Houston, Texas. Men who had been primarily producers of re-
search services would now have to learn to be buyers of both
services and products on a very grand scale. It should also be
clear from the preceding discussion that the basic goal of the
organization had been clearly and unmistakably set by the highest
level of government, that it was immense, that it was a development
job and not a basic research mission.
APPROACH TO PROBLEM
Definition of professional
We have chosen to approach the subject of this paper, guiding
work relationships among managers, scientists, and engineers,
from the standpoint of the professional and the organization.
Understanding professionalism is basic to understanding what we
have tried to do at MSC as managers. I use the term "profes-
sionalism" to include engineers, life and physical scientists,
medical doctors, and people from fields such as personnel, law,
resources management, and procurement. The subject of profes-
sionalism, as it applies to scientists, has been treated very
thoroughly by William Kornhauser in Scientists in Industry: Conflict
and Accommodation* In it, he states that the following four criteria
are essential if a person is to be considered a professional:
1. Specialized competence that has a considerable intellectual
content
2. Extensive autonomy in exercising the special competence
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3. Strong commitment to a career based on the special com-
petence
4. Influence and responsibility in the use of the special com-
petence
Nature of negative factors
A manager should clearly understand professionalism because of
its importance to the organization. Because professionals must
necessarily work in organizations in our society, the manager must
do all he can to achieve a balance between professionalism and the
organization. "Professionalism has as its primary function the
protection of standards for creative activities; organization has as
its primary function the efficient coordination of diverse ac-
tivities."6
How does this dichotomy of function manifest itself in an organi-
zation? "The scientific enterprise seeks understanding rather than
utility, technical excellence rather than operating ease, creativity
rather than routine. Specialized organization, on the other hand, is
an instrument designed for utilitarian ends; it places a premium on
orderly and predictable action."7 In other words, the organization's
goals are in conflict with such professional goals as autonomy, the
search for new ideas, and making contributions to the scientific
community.
If professionals need, and are needed by, organization, is there
any chance that such an arrangement will work out, given the
respective goals of the professional and his organization? Korn-
hauser suggests that "the tension between the autonomy and
integration of professional groups, production groups, and other
participants tends to summon a more effective structure than is
attained where they are isolated from one another or where one
absorbs the others."8
Basic differences of approach exist among the professional
subgroups. The scientist wants to know everything about his
particular interest and wants a perfect answer if scientifically
possible, and the resulting requirements may well exceed budgetary
and manpower limitations. The engineer is more used to practical
limitations, but may well ask for more stringent quality controls
than are necessary for the purpose, or for heavier or more expen-
sively produced materials or devices, all of which render solutions
more difficult and more costly. The administrative professional is
more used to dealing with hard numbers of dollars, man-hours,
production rates, interest, and overhead, and has a tendency to think
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in terms of numerical identities or rates for all aspects of a task,
whereas the other professionals recognize that many aspects are
subject to a judgmental range of values and can never be given a
firm number. To assure understanding of these points in admin-
istering NASA's programs, the Civil Service announcements re-
cruiting for NASA administrative positions require that these
professionals have had close prior working relationships with R & D
organizations, or a certain number of scientific or engineering
educational credits, or both.
Methods of handling
The literature also gives us some clues as to what the organiza-
tion can do to facilitate the professional's adjustment to the
organization. "Organizations that use professionals can usually
create for them specialized roles in partially segregated substruc-
tures of the organization so that the professionals may carry on
their own activities as they require. This differentiation of roles in
a variety of specialized substructures of the organization as a whole
helps to preserve professional needs for autonomy."9
Further, there are certain specific things that can be done, as
this listing from Pelz and Andrews10 shows:
1. Distribute authority and decision-making functions as widely
as possible.
2. Recognize that risk-taking is a necessary component of
innovation.
3. Establish an effective and comprehensive communications
system.
4. Minimize the burden of formal structure as much as possible.
5. Reward innovative behavior.
All of the literature seems to come around eventually to one key
point—the organization relies on the professional, cast in the role of
manager, to bridge the gap between the organization and the
professional.
The role of scientist-administrator seeks to accommodate the
professional demand that only professionally trained persons
are capable of judging professional work, and simultaneously
to accommodate the organizational need for administrative
controls. It also seeks to accommodate professional autonomy
by relying on advice rather than orders in matters directly
relating to professional judgment, notably in the formulation
118
of specific research problems and procedures. At the same
time, it seeks to meet the needs of efficient organization by
operating unilaterally on administrative matters, such as the
scheduling and coordination of work.11
IWSC SPECIAL PROBLEMS
In light of the considerations of professionalism, the four basic
policies underlying MSC discussed earlier take on new meaning
because they each harbor potential problems that must be reckoned
with by management. Additionally, three other dilemmas are
inherent in the MSC environment which require further amplifica-
tion: (1) the multiplicity of professional values, (2) the complexity
of the management job, and (3) the long lead time of the Apollo
Program. First, the nature of MSC's work requires that we have a
highly competent technical staff capable of advancing current
technology simultaneously. And, to support this very heterogeneous
effort, we need a broad complement of administrative professionals
who can perform the support activities, which are neither science
nor engineering. Clearly, we have a large organization of what
Peter F. Drucker12 refers to as "knowledge workers," and espe-
cially of people of different knowledges and skills working together.
Multiplicity of values
It is probably an understatement to suggest that our objective,
lunar landing and return, is very clearly viewed with different
emphasis by all these people, depending upon their professional
bias. Our medical doctors would capitalize "Man." In a sense,
they are a constraining influence. They are concerned with "How
much can a man take? What is his limit? Why?" The engineer
would undoubtedly underline the word "landing." His overriding
concern is the technology of flight, the spacecraft, and its per-
formance as a dynamic, complex machine. The scientist would
probably emphasize "moon" and the almost breathtaking opportu-
nity it offers to advance man's knowledge. "Where did it come
from? What was its evolution; what forces have been active?" The
astronaut test-pilot would view the goal from a different polarity:
the challenge, adventure, and opportunity to test and ride man's
most advanced vehicle. The manager would look at all these things
and worry about finding the proper balance.
GUIDING WORK RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PROFESSIONALS 119
Complex managerial environment
The second dilemma for management results from the complex
managerial environment, and it manifests itself in two ways. First,
almost all the technical staff at MSC are managers in a sense,
because all of the design development and manufacture of the
.hardware is done by industry. MSC's job is one of defining the
mission, selecting the approach, giving the contractor require-
ments, monitoring his progress, and approving his product. This
management responsibility includes control of costs and schedules
as well as technical matters.
The environment is further complicated by the controls, as
reasonable as they are, held by NASA Headquarters and the fact that
at least 50 percent of the work is performed by subcontractors, who
take their direction from the prime contractor and not from MSC.
In other words, every action must go through a maze of channels
and approvals. An independent-minded, action-oriented engineer
can find such an involved managerial environment very frustrating.
The second aspect of this particular dilemma is the problem for
those within the MSC environment who are managers of this
contract-monitoring function. They are, in effect, managers of
managers, and so are three steps removed from the actual work,
the technical details with which they enjoy working. These men
have even less time for technical involvement since they must
administer the monitoring organizations which they head and,
consequently, spend much time on personnel, budget, space, equip-
ment, and other administrative matters. Obviously, people adjust to
the circumstances to varying degrees, but the basic situation does
contain some inherent incompatibilities.
Long lead time
The final dilemma, and perhaps the most unsolvable, is the time
factor. The original feasibility studies conducted by NASA were
performed in 1960 and 1961. Although spacecraft design continued
for several years, I feel safe in stating that the basic technological
approaches had been selected relatively early, and that there was
little opportunity as the program matured to incorporate new
technology into the Apollo Program. From then on, it was
essentially the hard, detailed, demanding job of making it work. It
is only natural that the more creative engineers would at some point
begin losing interest and start looking for a new design problem to
solve. In fact, in many industrial situations, the analytical team
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does move on to new projects within the company. However, in MSC
we do not have that kind of flexibility. We had to manage the Gemini
and Apollo Programs simultaneously and have no new large pro-
gram yet to follow Apollo. Therefore, our people are more or less
glued to seeing Apollo through to its finish. The engineer in this
case finds himself deeply involved in technology that is becoming
more and more obsolete each day that he works on it. Consequently,
there is the managerial task of keeping engineers diligently devoted
to the task through the flight test program when their deepest
interests are really in some new advance taking place elsewhere.
Obviously, the task of guiding professional relationships does not
lend itself to easy solution. The problem has been well defined by
Kornhauser, Abrahamson, Pelz and Andrews, Marcson, and others.13
Nevertheless, every institution has its own peculiarities and
must seek its own solutions as we tried to do at MSC. When my
friends from other organizations ask, "How can you have any
problems when your organization has the clear-cut objective of
landing on the moon before the end of the decade?" I can only
patiently respond that the outward simplicity of the goal belies the
very difficult organizational and managerial task involved.
At the same time I must admit we enjoyed several important
advantages, including the esprit de corps engendered by the space
program, an excellent recruiting position, the reception we re-
ceived when we moved to Texas, and the opportunity to build from
scratch, rather than having to modify an existing organization. The
purpose of the original technical professionals who came here was
very specific—to advance space flight technology. It was their
project. They had been a part of the design phase, and they were
able to see themselves in the context of the master plan. They, in
fact, had immense esprit de corps. The related capabilities they
would develop included crew training, mission planning, and mission
control.
BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The organization was created around the idea of projects. There
were three major programs to conduct simultaneously—Mercury,
then Gemini, then Apollo, in an overlapping sequence. From an
organizational standpoint, this is quite different from a situation
where you try to superimpose a project organization on one that has
been traditionally functional. At MSC, we, in effect, grew a
functional organization to support our programs. The climate
created was such that everyone recognized the superiority of the
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program manager. The other administrators, such as I, saw our
roles primarily as assistants to the main effort.
Matrix organization
The concept of the matrix organization—the overlay of programs
across functions—is one of the basic management principles of MSC
(Fig. 2). Program management is necessary so we can coordinate
and manage the spacecraft programs. Functional management is
necessary to provide the skilled functional specialists (profes-
sionals) who furnish technical inputs used in managing the programs
and to provide the reservoir of talent necessary to conceive and
design new programs.
The program organization is one established for, and tailored to,
a specific program such as Apollo, as a general management
activity responsible for the planning, control, supervision, en-
gineering, test, and manufacturing activities involved in producing
the hardware end item. It is similar to the functional organization
in that it is basically getting work done through people. It differs,
however, in ways which have far-reaching effect. The program
organization has very specific objectives which, when achieved,
mean the end of the organization, which is anathema to profes-
sionals because they do not want their careers tied to the life or
death of an organization. The program manager has no line
authority over the functional specialists who are so important to the
program's objectives, which is good from the professional's stand-
point but a potential source of trouble for the program manager.
Each of these organizational concepts has obvious advantages and
disadvantages, and, in almost every case, the advantage of one
coincides with a disadvantage of the other. For example, a program
organization provides full-time attention of its personnel to accom-
plishing the program's objectives; a functional organization does
not. A functional organization provides a reservoir of personnel
skilled in a particular functional area; a program organization does
not. A program organization provides program visibility and a
focal point for all program matters; a functional organization does
not. A functional organization provides relatively free interchange
of ideas and problem solutions in a given functional area; a program
organization does not.
At MSC we have attempted to organize functionally when pos-
sible, to provide the best climate for professional development.
When the program demands it, however, we have had to subordinate
professionalism to the mission goals. It has been said that program
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organization has something in common with weaving: it involves the
interlacing of the traditional vertical "strands" of organization with
the horizontal "fibers" of program organization into a fabric-like
matrix. Thus, two complementary management organizations exist:
the vertical functional organization and the horizontal program
organization, with a resulting matrix structure extending across
such functions as engineering, budgeting, contract management, and
procurement. A series, or hierarchy, of matrices evolves because
program management at MSC involves intracenter and intercenter
functions and often one or more other government agencies.
Since 1961, MSC has operated with this joint program/functional
organizational matrix which attempts to capitalize on the advantages
of each concept and minimize the disadvantages. We believe that an
organization of this type, with proper balance of responsibility and
authority between the program and functional organizations, is the
optimum one to take advantage of the positive aspects of pro-
fessionalism and to minimize the negative aspects. At the same
time, we believe it is the best way to organize so that the profes-
sional can best use the organization's resources and feel the least
conflict with his professional values.
Decentralized responsibility
The second basic principle of MSC's management of its diverse
staff is the concept of decentralized responsibility. With the talent
drawn from the parent Langley Research Center and the advanta-
geous position of MSC when it began staffing for Apollo, we could
carefully select key people in whom we would have the greatest
confidence. For all practical purposes, once a key leader was
selected in any given functional area, he was essentially given a
free hand to recruit and create the type of organization he felt was
necessary to do his job. As a result, an individual achieved
personal self-confidence and a sense of responsibility for his own
organization that perhaps could not have existed if we had done
more hand-holding.
I believe this concept of decentralized responsibility has been
basic to the Center's activities. There is always a great deal of
concern among top-level managers with the idea of management
visibility throughout the organization. But in an operation as
complex and as technical as the conquest of space, the key adminis-
trators simply cannot understand every detail about the spacecraft
or understand every aspect of the flight plan. A highly professional
and diverse organization cannot be run on the basis of all decisions
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coming to the top for solution. One must have people who are
competent, in whom he has confidence, and to whom he can then give
a good deal of latitude to go ahead and assume the initiative and
attack the problems.
Laboratory -etw i ronment
The third significant management principle practiced at MSC is
the concept of supporting the laboratory environment. Of course,
this is an extension of the early basic decision that NASA would
manage its contractors from a laboratory environment in which the
staff could maintain its technical competence. This concept is
implemented at MSC both in terms of the facilities and the
resources required. In spite of the overwhelming importance of the
Apollo Spacecraft Program at MSC, management has provided
manpower and funds so that the functional organizations could
pursue their interests on a modest scale. This might be described
as an in-house parallel to the Independent Research and Develop-
ment Agreements that the Department of Defense (DOD) and NASA
have with their contractors. This practice has been applied to our
engineering organizations as well as our life and physical sciences
groups. Many small, well-equipped research areas have developed
throughout our functional organization. Several conditions favorable
to the environment of a good research laboratory are the following:
1. Strong personal emphases are placed on science-oriented
values using one's ability rather than institutional values,
having freedom to pursue ideas, and making contributions to
basic scientific knowledge.
2. There is frequent contact with colleagues in settings, with
values, and in fields different from one's own.
3. The chief neither gives complete autonomy nor excessive
direction.
4. Laboratory chiefs are themselves highly competent and moti-
vated. Motivation and a sense of progress toward scientific
goals are strong.
5. Chiefs employ participative leadership rather than directive
or laissez faire policies.14
Without the opportunity to pursue the kind of research effort
compatible with his professional values, the professional becomes
extremely dissatisfied. The opportunity for independent research is
necessary for both morale and motivation; and the acceptance and
funding of these relatively small projects by top management
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represents their concession to and understanding of the potential
this research can have for providing the germ for new missions.
In MSC's Space Physics Division, we have five highly specialized
branches with personnel pursuing a large number and variety of
research projects. Only about one-third of these support the Apollo
Spacecraft Program Office. The chief was carefully selected for
his recognized competence and motivation as a research scientist
and has written numerous articles and papers. The scientists
within the division have had considerable freedom in the definition
of their own research. Academic relationships are strongly en-
couraged. Scientific colloquies and biweekly seminars are utilized,
not only for their broadening effects on the scientists, but also to
include the engineers and technicians, so necessary to the research
teams, in the information flow. These factors are helping to
produce some extremely promising research efforts.
For example, our very outstanding cosmic ray group has taken
the lead in proposing a manned orbiting physics laboratory as part
of NASA's long-range program. As a result, NASA Headquarters
has established an ad hoc study group for high-energy cosmic rays
which has nationwide membership and interest. The instrument
development for such a mission has already begun at MSC and is
providing a current research program through use of high-altitude
balloons. One such project, the Cosmic Ray lonization Spectrograph
Program (CRISP) will launch a balloon to the top of the atmosphere
next summer. The 37-million-cubic-feet balloon will be the largest
ever constructed, and the more than 4-ton payload will be the
heaviest ever launched. This program is closely related to the High
Altitude Particle Physics Experiment (HAPPE), a collaboration by
the group with the 1968 Nobel laureate in physics.
Application to operations
These principles, then, constitute the basis for our day-to-day
operations. We try to recognize the professional values and
outlooks of the varied members of the team: the design and test
engineers; the medical doctors; the scientists; the contract, budget,
and legal specialists. It is the job of the program managers to
persuade, coerce, direct, and, finally, order all of the professional
functions to do what is necessary to meet the objectives and
milestones placed upon MSC by NASA Headquarters.
This is our normal mode of operation for conducting the majority
of our business. Right now, in the management of the Apollo
Spacecraft Program, this decision-making process is crystallized
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in the Apollo Spacecraft Configuration Control Board. Comprised of
each functional director and the manager of the program office, it
controls both the configuration of the spacecraft and the mission and
approves all significant changes. This board provides each func-
tional director ample opportunity to present and defend his position
on any matter before the board. However, the buck has to stop
somewhere, and in this case it is with the program manager. It is
up to him to hear all sides of the case, weigh the trade-offs, and
decide what alternative best serves the overall objectives of the
program. These meetings are held regularly every Friday. Be-
cause of the large attendance, the meetings also serve as an
excellent means of communication, since all of the interested
parties can observe the decision-making process in action and
better understand the reasons for the decisions. Periodic concern
with the size of meetings has usually given way to this critical
communication need.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES
Through these basic principles and their application, we have
tried to operate in a manner conducive to both professionalism and
the attainment of mission objectives. In addition, however, we have
experimented with various other means of facilitating goal-directed
coordination between multidisciplinary professionals. These opera-
tional practices fall into a graduated order in which the degree of
formalized organizational change is the distinguishing character-
istic. The six practices that I wish to discuss here may be
described as follows:
1. A multidisciplined effort achieved by assigning the required
professionals to a project office for the duration of the
project
2. A multidisciplined effort achieved by creating a small,
coordinating project office but leaving the professionals in
their respective organizations
3. A multidisciplined effort achieved through informal working
groups and panels without any organizational change
4. A multidisciplined effort achieved by physical colocation of
personnel without any f o r m a l or informal organization
changes
5. A multidisciplined effort achieved by assigning specific mis-
sions to an organization or individual
6. A multidisciplined effort achieved through a flexible personnel
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classification system that permits a diversified staff within
any given functional organization.
Each of these degrees of adaptation has been used in varying
situations with varying degrees of success.
Development of lunar receiving laboratory
As an example of the first practice, I might tell how we went
about designing and building the very unique laboratory for re-
ceiving and analyzing, the rock samples brought back from the
moon. Although only a small part of the relatively massive manned
lunar landing program, it is a good example of how many disciplines
had to work together to do a job and how we successfully accom-
plished it. This is a unique and outstanding facility, since it must
first be a quarantine facility and then fulfill its role as a scientific
laboratory. Consequently, its design and completion required the
inputs of many different scientists, construction engineers, and
administrative specialists.
About three years after the inauguration of the Apollo Program,
serious thought was given to the kind of laboratory facility which
would be needed to handle the lunar samples which the astronauts
would bring back from the moon. Careful handling of the samples
under controlled conditions would be required to preserve the
unique information contained in them.
The scientific implications of our first opportunity to study
extraterrestrial material are obviously tremendous, and the in-
terest of the scientific community in the project was, and still is,
worldwide. In fact, the proposed experiments of approximately 110
principal investigators from universities and research institutions
around the world were approved by NASA to be performed on these
samples as they became available. And, I doubt seriously that any
of these scientists consider their particular project as second-rate.
However, they were not to be our only consideration in constructing
these facilities.
A committee of the National Academy of Science pointed out to
NASA that an imperative potential problem was that of back
contamination. Put simply, this meant that we must protect the
earth from the potential hazard of harmful lunar organisms
brought here on the return trip.
In addition to NASA and the scientific community, three other
government agencies—Public Health Service, Department of Agri-
culture, and Department of Interior—were directly interested,
128
because of their specific statutory responsibilities for possible
contaminants entering the United States. It was obvious to us that
we would be dealing with some very delicate professional inter-
faces. We would be trying to satisfy not only some very outstanding
scientists but three distinctly independent agencies.
As we looked at the job which faced us, several things were
clear. We were about to build a facility which would be unique in
the world. Its design and construction would distinctly be an R & D
effort, and the time factor was very severe. Assuming that we
would be able to make a lunar landing on schedule, there was
absolutely no cushion in the schedule for completing the Lunar
Receiving Laboratory. Also, financial resources were marginal.
We had very strict budgetary orders from Congress on the
construction costs, and we had to adhere.
These constraints were coupled with the multiplicity of disci-
plines involved: the biosciences, medicine, geology, engineering
(design, systems, construction, and so on), the administrative
functions (particularly procurement and resources management),
the astronauts, and many more. All in all, 1 think we harbored the
fear that we might have all the ingredients for a disaster:
1. An impossible schedule
2. A marginal budget
3. An internal multiplicity of disciplines
4. Specific external interest, also multidisciplinary
5. Other government agencies involved by law
The commitment to build the Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL)
was actually the first attempt MSC had made to create a facility or
hardware to serve basic science. As I mentioned earlier, our
charter was to advance flight technology, and, at this time, we had
not developed an in-house scientific capability for pure research.
So, in effect, this was about to be our first, full-scale experience in
guiding relationships among managers, scientists, and engineers.
To accomplish the job, management established an LRL Project
Office. This usually has a very positive effect on inducing team-
work. Aside from the resources, authority, and maneuverability it
provides the manager, it has a beneficial psychological effect on the
group selected to work with him. By top management's specific
recognition of the importance of the job to be done, the team
members share in a sense of recognition and prestige. It is very
important to team spirit to be able to say "we are a special group."
Although this is less important as a motivating factor to the
individual research scientists, who is notoriously independent, it
still does exercise some influence simply because -he is human.
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The project manager wants to build something that works, on
time, and within the financial constraints of the project. He is
responsible for the integration of the project, for seeing that the
pieces fit. On the other hand, the groups which he is being asked to
integrate—the scientists, engineers, and technicians of various
specialties—all will be working to optimize the returns on their
particular piece of the project—without regard to the optimization of
the project as a whole. Each discipline is being paid to do its best,
and each will try to do precisely that. What we have then is not so
much a conflict between the manager and the specialist but an
interdisciplinary conflict. In this situation, it becomes extremely
important to have a neutral leader. The leader must not be viewed
as being in competition with any of the disciplines involved.
This differs from the attitudes held by the professional con-
cerning the type of leadership he expects in his smaller, more
homogenous functional unit. Here, he expects the leader to be a
highly competent and motivated member of his discipline. It is very
important to him that the judgments which intimately affect the
nature of his work—its professional nature—be made by a leader in
whom he has professional respect. It is also important that he see
the leader as a "fighter," willing to defend—and aggressively, if
necessary—the integrity of the discipline within the organization.
However, when the professional leaves his functional base to
participate in a multidisciplined team effort, it becomes important
to him that the leader be fair, impartial, and neutralized as an
arbitrator.
As the literature points out, when the number of disciplines
cooperating in one organization increases, the balance and process
of goal implementation becomes considerably more difficult, espe-
cially if there is no clearly defined or understood pecking order.
The greater the number and higher the tensions among the various
professions, the greater is the need for a neutral administrator as
final authority.15
A manager placed in such a situation obviously is going to
perform the task of balancing the conflicting requirements of the
participating disciplines. But even more important, he acts as an
interpreter, always attempting to broaden the baseline of under-
standing of the professionals with whom he works. The disadvantage
of professionalism from a manager's viewpoint comes when its
members cannot, or will not, see themselves in the broad perspec-
tive. The creation of a program office offers a kind of alleviation to
this dilemma. Through colocation and common leadership, the
ability to understand each other is increased. The LRL Project
Office was kept intentionally small and its leader was able to get
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involved with his people's work—assist them when necessary—and
know their names. As we had expected, he was able to develop a
genuine rapport with both his people and his many outside inter-
faces.
The professionals in the physical and the life sciences were the
prime consideration in the facility's design, from the quarantine
aspects to the equipment needs of the research areas. Because of
the requirements and specifications of the scientists, the engineers
were needed. To serve them both, administrative specialists in
program control, contracts, and so forth were essential to the team.
Although all were working toward the same clear objective, their
motivations were somewhat different.
To the scientists, the motivation was very definitely the oppor-
tunity to extend knowledge in their respective fields, and because of
the excitement of this opportunity they were very active partici-
pants. The motivation of the engineers was the opportunity to
advance the current technology. The project posed some very
challenging technical problems. Also, the project was an important
front-line Apollo task, which added considerably to its attractive-
ness. But the mission-relatedness had decidedly more motivational
value to the engineers than to the scientists, and it was a prime
motivating factor to the administrative personnel.
These motivations were utilized effectively by the project leader,
and he was able to show a balanced interest and concern in the
different groups. Their image of him was that of a man who would
assist them to do their job, rather than that of a unilateral manager.
This was appropriate, because they were the professionals in their
areas; he was not.
For this project, as for many which NASA has undertaken, the
idea of advisory groups or committees was extremely important.
The scientific community had been asked to establish an advisory
group with appropriately representative membership. They as-
sembled a well-balanced panel which represented the disciplines in
their broadest sense. Although purely advisory, the group was
highly useful. When conflict arose outside NASA or when there
were internal scientific questions, the group was available for
expert consultation.
Within MSC, a Lunar Receiving Laboratory Policy Board was
established in addition to the LRL Project Office, "to make any
necessary (MSC) policy decisions required to implement the design
and construction of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory and to peri-
odically review LRL program plans and status." The board was
composed of representative MSC professionals, as well as the
project manager and the MSC associate director. The board, then,
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was responsible for policy, and the project office was responsible
"for the schedules, costs, and technical aspects of the LRL" (MSC
Announcement 66-57, May 9, 1966).
As the man who actually had to effect the coordination of the
different groups, the project manager found that the scientists were
least organizable—not, however, in terms of their own particular
part of the project. Rather, their difficulty in appreciating their
integration into the overall plan. This, again, was the optimization
factor and was to be expected. He found that the factors necessary
to an interrelated plan—to the business of scheduling the tasks in
some logical order—such as contracts, budget, and operational
procedures, were considerations with which the scientists were not
particularly familiar. Therefore, his role was not only to coordin-
ate, but to educate and aid understanding of what and why things
were being done. He kept up with the project and, as milestones and
schedules were met or missed, he pointed them out, explained the
consequences, and so forth. If the scientists were having trouble,
he would assist them in establishing controls. In effect, he
explained the red tape and made every effort to assist them through
it.
He also found that as early as possible it is good to draw a circle
around an effort and make sure that everyone knows where the
boundaries lie. Without this, equipment wanted and changes to be
made can be endless. In this case, the major constraints were
easily understood; they were time and money.
Development of ALSEP
An example of the second practice involves the method used for
developing the array of scientific instruments to be placed upon the
moon's surface on one of our early lunar landing missions. We call
this instrumentation the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Pack-
age, or ALSEP.
In 1965, the NASA Summer Conference on Lunar Exploration and
Science was held in Massachusetts to recommend scientific pro-
grams covering a 10-year period to begin with the first Apollo
flight. The conference was held under the auspices of the Manned
Space Science Coordinating Committee, a broadly representative
body established to advise the NASA Headquarters Director for
Space Science and Applications. Seven working groups developed a
report which represented the current thinking of some of the
outstanding lunar scientists in the United States, and, as was
NASA's intention at the time, we have made every effort to
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implement those parts of the recommendations which are feasible
within the constraints of available resources.
Although the collection of lunar samples was given highest
scientific priority for the first landing, this did not exclude the
possibility that it might be feasible to obtain other valuable data for
use by physicists, astronomers, geodesists, and so on. Following
inputs from the conference, from the National Academy of Science,
and from other agency and center elements, it was determined that
the concept which best fit these additional objectives would be that
which later became known as the ALSEP.
ALSEP developed as a self-contained package of scientific
instruments and supporting subsystems which would be deployed on
the lunar surface by the two astronauts scheduled to leave the
spacecraft. For a one-year period, it would transmit data to earth
receiving stations to aid us in understanding the composition and
structure of the moon, the magnetic field, the atmosphere, and the
solar wind. The data would be a great advance in our ability to
decipher the evolution of the moon, the state and composition of its
interior, and other mysteries. About nineteen principal investiga-
tors were selected from universities and institutions across the
country and awarded research contracts by NASA.
In the initial planning, ALSEP was given constraints by the
Apollo Program Office. It must fit a given area in the lunar
module, the craft which descends to the surface of the moon. It
could weigh 300 pounds, and 90 minutes would be allotted for its
deployment. It was thought that the flexibility of the space suit
would allow the astronaut to bend over and reach to about 12 inches
from the surface. The intention was to fly the package on the first
four lunar landing missions.
The overall responsibility for the development and integration of
this or any other mission-related activity or hardware rests with
the Apollo program manager. In scale, the ALSEP is roughly
comparable to the larger of the unmanned satellites. However, the
specific job of overseeing and coordinating ALSEP was assigned to
a project office created within the Science and Applications Di-
rectorate, the functional home of the scientists. This Lunar Surface
Project Office (LSPO), then, provides the interface with the
scientific community on the one hand and the Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office on the other, and is aided in doing so by participa-
tion in many formal and informal meetings and reviews.
Because ALSEP represented only one part of the Apollo Pro-
gram, its manager, of course, could not optimize his project or its
schedule independently, but rather was dependent on the optimiza-
tion of the larger Apollo Program. The scientific project was to be
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particularly impacted by those designing the pressure suit and the
portable life support system, the medical group responsible for the
consideration of human factors, those responsible for crew training,
and the astronauts themselves. And, usually, each of these groups
would need information from one of the others before it became
available.
In programs as highly interdependent as those which NASA has
undertaken, it is essential that everyone understand the basic
program plan into which they must be integrated. Each discipline
must be made to feel a part of the program and given control
milestones which they, in fact, have helped to set. Some of these
goals will be more artificially established than others—these can be
relaxed later, if needed—but the key is to extract commitments and
then develop an overall plan which will allow for controlled changes.
This must be done by continually reviewing not only schedule and
cost but also performance goals.
The Lunar Surface Project Office, then, was the body designated
to develop the ALSEP. This necessitated developing a set of
relationships with all of the MSC and outside elements involved in
the project. Table 24 lists the groups and their roles in the project.
To integrate the efforts of these elements, a series of informal
mechanisms evolved to bring together the many disciplines and
conflicting priorities that needed to be resolved. These may be
summarized as follows:
Monthly conferences with the principal investigators were estab-
lished so that all MSC elements could be aware of the scientific
objectives and requirements.
Specific individuals were named as subsystem managers by the
Engineering and Development Directorate to support the project
manager.
The Lunar Surface Operations Panel was permanently estab-
lished as a subgroup to the Flight Operations Planning Meetings to
plan the specific activities that the crew would perform. This panel
included representatives of all the involved elements.
The LSPO representatives attended all meetings between MSC
and the lunar module spacecraft contractor to keep abreast of the
vehicle's status.
Regular meetings were established between LSPO representa-
tives and Bendix, the ALSEP contractor, for reviewing progress.
Representatives of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office re-
sponsible for the status of equipment furnished by the government
(GFE) to the spacecraft prime contractor met regularly with LSPO
management to review progress.
All decisions affecting the interface of ALSEP with the lunar
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TABLE 24
ALSEP Roles
Organization Role
Lunar Surface Project Office,
MSC Science and Applications
Directorate
Bendix
Office of Space Science and
Applications, NASA Headquarters
Apollo Spacecraft Program Office
(MSC)
Apollo Spacecraft Configuration
Control Board
Engineering and Development
Directorate (MSC)
Flight Operations Directorate
(Lunar Surface Operations Panel)
Flight Crew Operations Directorate
Project management
Contractor selected to develop the
ALSEP
Selection of principal investigators
from universities, institutes, govern-
ment and industry laboratories
Mission objectives, systems engineer-
ing (weights and mass properties)
Configuration control
Subsystems (power,environmental con-
trol, communications) management sup-
port
Mission planning
Crew procedures and training
module were brought before the Apollo Spacecraft Configuration
Control Board (CCB) which approved all hardware or mission
design baselines and changes. The CCB is composed of the Apollo
Spacecraft Program manager and each of the directorate heads,
including the director of Science and Applications, and serves as the
principal decision-making body in the program.
Recent developments in the AL?EP project, which I would like to
relate, testify to the complexity of the interrelationships involved in
executing what may appear to be, on the surface, a very simple
thing. I also believe that these developments indicate the effective-
ness of the working relationships that I have described, because
they helped to avoid what might have been a very embarrassing and
disappointing failure.
As ALSEP progressed, it met all the constraints imposed
originally. But, as more knowledge was gained, more constraints
were added. Also, the very specific, overriding concern for crew
safety would be a basic factor in any decisions affecting the
optimization of the total mission. As time passed, the space-suit
people concerned themselves with developing the best pressure
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vessel possible for the safety of the astronauts. In doing so, they
developed a space garment less flexible than anticipated earlier.
The life-support people wanted more emergency oxygen. This
added weight to the back pack and shifted the center of gravity of the
suit. It was moved upward on the shoulders from the earlier waist
position. This limited the mobility of the astronaut. He could now
reach only to about 22 inches from the surface, which affected the
deployment of ALSEP. Also, it affected the stability the astronaut
has when he attempts to maneuver in gravity one-sixth that of earth.
This last point—what can the crew actually do in |- g—is still
very subjective, based on our present knowledge. The data points
available to extrapolate from are very limited. In fact, no really
good simulation is possible. For instance, an aircraft can execute
a parabolic trajectory, a controlled dive, but the simulation lasts
for only about 30 seconds. Also, at MSC we have what is called the
"Peter Pan rig," which is, in unsophisticated terms, a harness
attached to ropes and weights and designed to support five-sixths of
a man's weight. This is a very good training device, but it is
certainly not a perfect simulation.
The uncertainty caused by this lack of adequate testing had a
conservative effect on those responsible for refining the mission
plans for the first lunar landing. The crew was not fully confident
of what they could do in their suit, and the process of deploying the
ALSEP is an involved one, requiring two special tools. Since it is
one package, the experiments must be detached by releasing about
3% dozen bolts. Although in theory this task should not be difficult,
it and the alignment of the instruments do require considerable con-
centration and time, and would effectively require all the time avail-
able to one man for extravehicular activity (EVA) before the need to
retreat to the craft. In other words, to perform both ALSEP and the
lunar sampling exercise, two EVA periods would be required.
The lunar module which ferries the astronauts to the lunar
surface is a complicated vehicle. And, the attention and effort
required for the crew to land and return to the orbiting spacecraft
mean two very active days. To reduce the fatigue factor before the
extremely crucial ascent from the moon, it was decided to perform
only one EVA on the first mission using a less demanding derivative
of the ALSEP hardware. This automatically removed ALSEP from
the first lunar landing mission although, of course, not from the
next three.
A great deal of discussion and debate preceded this decision,
carried on through the various panels and meetings described. As a
result of the close working relationships, the constraints were
recognized and understood. Eventually the problem came to the
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attention of the Apollo CCB for a decision. Because of the partici-
pation of all MSC elements in the total process, with the managers
themselves all participating in the final decision, the solution as
well as the problem was understood across the organization.
Throughout the development process, the Lunar Surface Project
Office served as the focal point for all of the activities. In the
following example of the third technique, a similar array of working
relationships evolved; however, the resulting products were pro-
duced by the formal organizations without a project office to direct
the effort.
Specific flight mission planning
As in the development of the spacecraft, the planning of any
particular mission is an involved process of finding a way within
certain constraints of achieving predetermined objectives. The
design of the mission is basically determined by these objectives,
but the design must also consider spacecraft capability, fuel and
electrical supplies, radiation hazards, ground tracking, communica-
tion, control limitations, crew considerations, and a multitude of
other factors that affect manned space operations.
Because of the breadth of considerations involved in mission
planning, virtually all MSC elements are involved in the process.
The interrelatedness of all aspects of the mission and the require-
ment for compatibility between all parts have been the impetus for
the development of another group of organizations. This is a
semiformal organization to achieve across-the-board coordination
of the mission-planning activities. This organization consists of
boards, panels, and working groups established for specific pur-
poses and, almost always, containing membership from numerous
organizations. These organizations are both working-level groups
brought together for the purpose of doing their work, and manage-
ment groups brought together for the purposes of review and
decision making. Essentially, the mission-planning process is a
matter of taking a set of objectives, a set of operational constraints,
and a spacecraft with given capabilities, and developing an optimal
trajectory and flight plan that achieve as many of the objectives as
the constraints and limitations will allow.
As the subsequent documents are developed—trajectories, con-
straints, flight plans—more and more is learned about what can and
cannot be done. Consequently, as planning proceeds, there is a
continual feedback of pressures for changes in all of the preceding
planning. Trajectory development is a continuous iterative process
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as analysts seek to determine an optimum design that satisfies the
objectives while recognizing the appropriate constraints. Since it is
not always possible to have everything, many trade-off decisions,
must be made.
The semiformal organization that has been created within the
formal does much to break down artificial organization barriers,
increase personal contacts, and increase horizontal information
flow. These matters are the concern of much of the management
research being done today on large-scale organization (Chapter 5).
Perhaps the primary element that assures cohesiveness among
the various informal panels, boards, and working groups is the
Apollo Program. The complexities involved in planning an Apollo
mission are of such a high order that teamwork both inside and
outside the formal organizational structure is recognized as neces-
sary.
As a consequence of this phenomenon, people seem to be very
open-minded in their attitude toward the work of others. They feel a
responsibility to seek out the other person's problems and take the
initiative to do so. This attitude is extremely important, because it
fosters the communication of data. As previously mentioned, a
large amount of specific information is in flux during the mission-
planning period. All participants must be made aware of how
changes impact their own particular planning activity. There is
also the responsibility for resolving problems through participation
in the informal groups. On the whole, the people involved in the
mission-planning process tend to be imaginative, expansive, and
action -or iented.
Although this situation in general is very desirable, it does
contain the potential for management losing the control and visi-
bility that it perhaps should have. But this is an extremely
subjective matter, and specific answers are not easily forthcoming
on the degree of visibility and control necessary. In a highly
professionalized, highly specialized organization such as MSC,
many decisions must be made at lower levels, and it is most
desirable to have a management system that permits this. Higher
management is concerned that all of the decisions fit together. To
date, the informal organization has been very satisfactory, provid-
ing communication links between professional personnel involved in
the mission-planning and decision-making process.
Geographical collocation
In situations where the involvement is less complex but closer
day-to-day relationships are required, a technique we have tried is
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geographical collocation. We have collocated professionals without
changing their line reporting relationships. For example, our
financial people sit right with the engineers or scientists who spend
the money; however, they still report to the Financial Officer. The
reason for collocation is to break down the barriers caused by
professionalism and to attempt to get an identification of teamwork
and common leadership, even though not necessarily line leadership
in the normal sense of the term. Along with this comes effective
communication, which is more than the flow of paperwork and
similar formal communication. It includes getting to know each
other, developing rapport, and truly understanding each other.
An example which illustrates how this works is our mission-
planning interface with the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office. The
program office has the basic responsibility for mission design.
The mission-planning people have responsibility for the detailed
implementation of the design. To make certain that what is
designed is implementable, the operations manager has located a
small staff of mission planners with the mission designers in the
program office. Working together, these two groups of people
essentially become one group and follow the design and detailed
planning for the mission from start, through all the changes, to
finish.
Of course, I am not belittling professionalism. I have already
discussed the rationale of operating in a laboratory environment.
The professional and his professional value system are also needed
to balance the program manager's "go-go" tendency. At the same
time, the professional's tendency to make perfect, rather than
workable, solutions has to be balanced by the schedule and budget
constraints of the program. Simple geographical collocation has
been useful in helping achieve this balance in certain situations.
Specific role assignments
In still other situations, we have found it better not to collocate
and have left the professional in his home organization, assigned
him a special role, and, in effect, created a "two-boss" situation.
In this case, the general technical responsibilities of the functional
organizations were buttressed by the designation of specific in-
dividuals as subsystem managers who had a special personal
responsibility to the program manager.
There are approximately 50 subsystem managers. Each is
responsible through normal supervisory lines to the manager of the
program office for the development of his subsystem to given or
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developed specifications within the cost and schedule constraints of
the program. The subsystem manager has responsibility for all
technical and administrative aspects of the management of his
subsystem, short of official authority to direct the contractor,
which must be accomplished through the program manager.
We developed the subsystem management role because the
traditional horizontal program office and vertical functional organi-
zations were not meshing properly. By superimposing a special
role on individuals in the functional organization we changed the way
the professional operated, even though he stayed in his professional
environment.
The purpose of role assignment is to get the professional to see
his role as directly related to the goals of the organization, instead
of seeing himself just as a specialist or as a member of a
professional organization. The concept has been employed success-
fully at MSC. In fact, within a short time of the implementation of
the concept, each of the functional organizations had reexamined and
changed its organizational structure to be better able to accomplish
the program goals.
Flexible personnel system
Finally, one of the problems frequently mentioned in discussing
work relationships among professionals in a government laboratory
is the restrictions inherent in a bureaucratic, government-wide
personnel system. However, I think the system is overrated as a
source of problems. I believe that the regulations themselves are
fairly flexible; it is during their implementation down through the
hierarchy that restrictions are imposed.16 Thus, in NASA we have
encouraged our personnel professionals to go to the source of the
regulations, the Federal Personnel Manual, rather than write
agency implementing documents.
We have also used the collocation technique to break 'down the
personnel professional's natural inclination to hide behind regula-
tions and paperwork. By making it clear through the rewards
system that they are to identify with, and share responsibility for,
the goals of the technical organization, we have made it more
difficult for them to hide behind a comfortable bureaucratic system.
Another thing which the agency has done is develop its own
tailormade civil service examination. This system, the Aerospace
Technologist (AST) Examination, is used to fill all technical
positions in NASA. Applicants submit a standard government
application form, a transcript of college course work, and certain
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pertinent papers to be evaluated by NASA professionals. The
applicant is given a rating score and placed on the register of
eligibles for the particular specialty for which he is best suited.
The system has four significant features: (1) it is work centered;
(2) it uses an interdisciplinary approach; (3) it emphasizes demon-
strated ability in contrast with experience only; and (5) it is scored
by NASA's own professionals who are experts in the specialties they
evaluate.
Among the benefits that we have received from having the AST
examination system are that it gives the agency the hiring flexibility
to keep pace with the fast-changing technology upon which our
programs are based, it gives NASA much better control over those
we hire, and it gives us the ability to move professionals within
specialty groups.
Because the major hiring effort for MSC was completed several
years ago, I will not dwell on the advantages of the system related
to hiring. The flexibility the system provides in assigning and
reassigning personnel within MSC allows us to reflect the inter-
disciplinary character of the job to be done. In other words, we are
able to assign engineers, mathematicians, and physicists to the
same organization. We do actually have 20- or 30-man branches
with three or four breeds of engineer (such as, electrical, mechani-
cal, chemical, nuclear, aeronautical), mathematicians, and physi-
cists all working together to accomplish their particular mission.
Obviously, this is an embodiment of the collocation concept at the
individual level and is another example of efforts to facilitate
goal-directed coordination among our managers, scientists, and
engineers.
CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS
Seminar series
These then, are six techniques by which we have attempted to
solve the problems of getting professional scientists, engineers, and
administrative professionals to work toward common goals in an
effective, harmonious, and satisfying manner. We have also tried
other techniques, on a lesser scale. I hope that our imaginations
are not yet exhausted and that we will continue to seek new means.
As a matter of fact, the director of administration at MSC is now
conducting a seminar series that I hope other MSC elements will
copy. He has been having high-level MSC managers, as well as
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outsiders, come in to talk to selected groups from the administra-
tive organization about the goals, objectives, and problems in their
particular areas. Although this program was intended for develop-
ment and motivational purposes, I have no doubt that hearing the
problems of the technical organizations, such as the Apollo Space-
craft Program Office, directly from the boss himself does much to
enhance the administrative professional's understanding of his
relationship to the technical organization he supports, and thereby
improves the relationship.
Management evaluation
We are also attempting to evaluate these techniques as we
proceed, to determine their degree of success or failure and to
make improvements as we go. In a development center, such as
MSC, performance is not too difficult to measure. Our job is to
build hardware, flight test it, and achieve a specified set of
objectives. We either meet, surpass, or fail to meet those
objectives. It is all too tempting, particularly when successful, to
equate successful performance with successful management. The
two, however, do not correlate so easily. In an R & D environment,
technical failures do occur in well-managed enterprises, and
technical brilliance can overcome in a poorly managed effort.
Therefore, it is necessary to continually evaluate our managerial
performance independently of MSC's technical achievements to find
out where we stand. One method of doing this is through our
management research program where we have university faculty
and doctoral- and masters-level researchers evaluate elements of
our managerial practices. Recently we have had completed a
doctoral dissertation17 which was basically a study of the relation-
ships among job ambiguity, job tension, and job satisfaction. His
results proved that there is a direct relationship between job
ambiguity and job tension and an inverse relationship between job
ambiguity and job satisfaction. The results also showed that
ambiguity and tension are low among professionals and that job
satisfaction is high. In fact, using a scale ranging from a low of 7
to a high of 35, more than 75 percent of all the respondents to
Hamilton's study scored above the actual median of 23.5.
Although Mr. Hamilton's study aimed specifically at the relation-
ship among ambiguity, tension, and satisfaction, it also included an
evaluation of the managerial styles at MSC. This evaluation was
made to determine the professional's attitudes toward and percep-
tions of his organization as well as his particular position. The
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findings of this part of the study indicated that a consultative, and in
some cases participative, management style exists across the four
organizations included in the sampling. Mr. Hamilton used the
following definition of "consultative": "relatively sensitive and
concerned for the human element in the organization; people are not
viewed as materials and tools, but with motives, desires, and
productive potentialities; members are generally consulted; how-
ever, many decisions are made at the top unless they can be made
more appropriately at lower organizational levels."
Since MSC is a field center of a large government agency and is
assigned specific development missions to execute on given sched-
ules, we are pleased that our management is able, within these
constraints, to create an atmosphere in which professional em-
ployees feel involved and not merely pawns in an exploitatively or
benevolently authoritative environment. No doubt, this is partly
because the technological complexity of the task and the high degree
of specialization required forces a great deal of decentralized
decision making and the participation and consultation of members
of the organization. Nevertheless, in view of the importance placed
upon participative-consultative management by the research con-
ducted so far, we are pleased with the findings. These attitudes
toward the organization must contribute in some way to the high
degree of satisfaction that the professionals found with their
positions.
Now, these findings, assuming that they are the results of valid
research, do not necessarily mean that everything we have done is
correct. However, the low degree of ambiguity and tension would
appear to indicate that we are managing to keep our professional
employees reasonably well directed toward well-identified goals.
Certainly the various means we have employed must have made
some contribution toward the creation of these attitudes in the
professionals' minds. In the near future, we should conduct
research projects, as a continuation of Mr. Hamilton's efforts, that
would enable us to investigate more specifically the relationship
between job satisfaction and the particular organizational arrange-
ments employed.
In summary, the limited but penetrating literature on the
management of professionals provides considerable insight into the
nature of the problem and points the way toward potential solutions.
Each institution facing the problem is going to have to experiment
within the limitations of its own constraints and seek its own
answers.
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Building Effective R & D Departments
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Donald Pelz, after a decade of research on the administration of
research and development organizations,1 wrote a provocative
paper, "Creative Tensions in the Research and Development
Climate."2 In this paper he pointed to a number of conditions
associated with high performance by scientists and engineers.
These conditions state important specifications which a system of
management of R &D personnel should meet to enable scientists and
engineers to achieve high performance levels of creative and
technical accomplishment.
Pelz and his associate, F. M. Andrews, measured "each man's
scientific performance, including his scientific or technical contri-
bution to his field of knowledge in the past 5 years, as judged by
panels of his colleagues; his overall usefulness to the organization,
through either research or administration, also as judged by his
colleagues; the number of professional papers he had published in
the past 5 years (or, in the case of an engineer, the number of his
patents or patent applications); and the number of his unpublished
reports in the same period."
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CREATIVE TENSIONS
Based on extensive analyses of data from 1300 scientists and
engineers in eleven R & D laboratories, Pelz concluded that
"creative tensions" between sources of stability or security on the
one hand and sources of disruption or challenge on the other
contributed to effective performance. Pelz's "creative tensions"
are summarized in Table 25, which is Table 1 in his paper on that
topic.
One tension concerns independence in contrast with interaction.
Pelz points out that scientists and engineers require freedom:
Scientists place high priority on freedom. To measure this
need, an index of "motivation from own ideas" was con-
structed from self-reported (i) stimulus by one's previous
work, (ii) stimulus by one's own curiosity, and (iii) desire for
freedom to follow one's own ideas. This score—the index
might also be labeled intellectual independence—was analyzed
in relation to the four^ performance measures within each
category of scientific personnel. A series of positive correla-
tions appeared. Among the 36 correlation coefficients, 25
were positive (r = +.10 or larger) and none were negative; this
was one of the most stable trends in the analysis, and was
consistent with other research.
But Pelz adds that complete freedom is disastrous:
In these loosely coordinated settings, the most autonomous
individuals were able to isolate themselves from challenge. A
nondemanding organization permitted them to withdraw into an
ivory tower of maximum security and minimum challenge.
There they atrophied (Table [25], tension 4a).
What about the more demanding organizations—those of
moderately tight coordination? Why was autonomy an asset
here and not a handicap? We found that autonomous persons
here had more diversity in their work, not less. One can
speculate that in these departments the technical man had to
face problems important to the organization; personal freedom
enabled him to find the best solutions.
Pelz illustrates the need for interaction combined with freedom
by examining the influence of the individual in establishing goals:
The "decision-making sources" were grouped into four
categories: the individual, his immediate supervisor, his
colleagues or subordinates, and higher executives or clients.
We scored for each scientist how many of the four sources
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were said to have had at least some weight (10 percent or
more) in selecting his technical goals.
The results were clear: both Ph.D.'s and engineers per-
formed well when all four sources had some voice in shaping
their goals but when, at the same time, the individual could
influence the main decision-makers. From this arose cre-
ative tension 5 (Table [25]): influence received from several
others (challenge) combined with influence exerted on others
(security).
Another tension which the administration of R &D should provide
concerns differences and disagreements. In discussing disagree-
ments, Pelz draws upon a label which Weaver (1959)4 borrowed from
British colleagues who built into anti-aircraft computing devices a
"small eccentric or vibrating member which kept the whole
mechanism in a constant state of minor but rapid vibration. This
they called the 'dither.' . . . We need a certain amount of dither in
our mental mechanisms. We need to have our ideas jostled about a
bit so that we do not become intellectually sluggish."
Pelz asks:
How much dither or disagreement is healthy? In our data
the answer depended on the kind of dither. One objective
measure concerned the source of motivation—whether one's
superior, the technical literature, or some other source.
Scientists who responded to the same sources were somewhat
more effective—perhaps because they had similar interests.
On three other measures we found the opposite to be true.
Scientists and engineers did somewhat better when they saw
themselves as different from colleagues in technical strategy,
and when, as scored objectively, they differed from colleagues
in style of approach (when, for example, the individual stressed
the abstract, his colleagues the concrete) or differed in
career orientation.
How to reconcile this paradox? In some preliminary data
obtained by Evan5 for industrial R&D groups, the teams he
found most effective reported personal harmony or liking
among members, but intellectual conflict. Colleagues who
report the same sources of motivation as the scientist's own
probably provide personal harmony and support—a form of
security. When they argue about technical strategy or ap-
proach, they provide dither or challenge.
As R &D teams get older they can remain productive if
they stay cohesive . . . yet have their technical strategies
differ and remain intellectually combative (tension 8).
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TABLE 25 Eight Creative Tensions0
Security Challenge
Tension /
Effective scientists and engineers in
both research and development
laboratories did not limit their
activities either to pure science
or to application but spent some
time on several kinds of R & D
activities, ranging from basic re-
search to technical services
Tens/on 2
Effective scientists were Intel lee- . . . But they did not avoid other
tually independent or self-reliant; people; they and their colleagues in-
they pursued their own ideas and teracted vigorously
valued freedom . . .
Tension 3
a) In the first decade of work, young . . . But young non-Ph. D.'s also
scientists and engineers did well if achieved if they had several skills,
they spent a few years on one and young Ph.D.'s did better when
main project . . . they avoided narrow specialization
b) Among m a t u r e scientists, high ... At the same time, effective old-
performers had greater self-con- er scientists wanted to pioneer in
fidence and an interest in probing broad new areas
Tension 4
a) In loosest departments with mini- . . . More effective were those per-
mum coordination, the most auton- sons who experienced stimulation
omous individuals, with maximum from a variety of external or internal
security and minimum challenge, sources
were ineffective . . .
b) In departments having moderate ... to important problems faced by
coordination, it seems likely that the organization
individual autonomy permitted a
. search for the best solution . . .
Tension 5
Both Ph.D.'s and engineers contribu- . . . but also when persons in several
ted most when they strongly in- other positions had a voice in select-
fluenced key decision-makers . . . ing their goals
Tension 6
High performers named colleagues ... but they differed from colleagues
with whom they shared similar in technical style and strategy (dither
sources of stimulation (personal or intellectual conflict)
support) . . .
Tension 7
R & D teams were of greatest use to ... but interest in broad pioneering
their organization at that "group had not yet disappeared
age" when interest in narrow spe-
cialization had increased too me-
dium level . . .
Tension 8
In older g r o u p s which retained . . .yet their technical strategies
vitality the members preferred differed and they remained intellec-
each other as collaborators... tually combative
"From Donald C. Pelz, "Creative Tensions in the Research and Development Climate",
Science, vol. 157, no. 3785 (July 14, 1967), pp. 160-165. Copyright by the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science. (Used by permission.)
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS FOR R&D DEPARTMENTS 147
Another form of dither is the diversity which comes from
multiple assignments. Pelz reports that
— Ph.D.'s in both research-oriented and development-oriented
laboratories were judged most effective, on the basis of
several criteria, when they devoted only half their technical
time to research as such and the rest to activities described
as development or technical services. Similarly, Ph.D.'s in
development-oriented laboratories were most effective when
they spent only one-quarter or one-third of their time on
activities labeled "development."
— Effective scientists, in short, did not limit their efforts
either to the world of pure science or to the world of applica-
tion but were active in both (see Table [25], tension 1).
—Other findings reinforced the importance of diversity.
Individuals performed better .when they had two or three
"areas of specialization" within their scientific discipline,
rather than one. The Ph.D.'s did their best work not when
they devoted full time to technical activities but when they
spent about one-quarter of their time in either teaching or
administration.
OTHER DEMANDS ON R & D ADMINISTRATION
Other research reveals additional requirements which an effec-
tive R&D administration must meet. For example, development
engineers on large-scale projects have been found to have relatively
low levels of motivation and job satisfaction.6 In contrast to the high
levels of motivation and job satisfactions which professionals
usually have, the development engineers were the lowest of all
classes of employees except production workers. These engineers
reported that their work was highly specialized and that they lacked
career mobility. They were especially dissatisfied with the extent
to which their professional competence was utilized. More than
two-thirds of them reported that they were given assignments which
any competent technical assistant could perform equally well. They
indicated that they spent about one-third of their time on these non-
professional tasks. The frustrations they felt from this under-
utilization of their professional training and experience were
heightened by their feeling of impotence concerning their ability to
correct the situation. They reported that they have little capacity to
exert influence upward. More than one-fourth said that they could
not communicate technical facts upward; two-fifths reported they
were unable to influence their own manager or to suggest upward
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better ways of doing a job; and over three-fifths felt that they had no
chance to have any voice in the solution of larger development
problems. They revealed a situation in which they had little
opportunity to be heard and to communicate and exert influence
upward even though they recognized from their own experience that
they had observations, ideas, and insights which could significantly
improve the results achieved.
Other studies of R &D administration, and of how to manage a
firm so as to make the best use of investments in R &D point to the
importance of efficient lateral coordination,7 if the results of R &D
work are to flow rapidly and smoothly into production and success-
ful marketing. Good vertical coordination is no substitute for
effective lateral coordination in these circumstances.
REQUIREMENTS WHICH R & D ADMINISTRATION SHOULD MEET
Pelz's creative tensions and the results of other studies indicate
that the success of R &D administration will be influenced appre-
ciably by the extent to which the following conditions are met. That
is, the more that the R &D administration of an enterprise uses a
management system and structure which provide the following, the
greater will be the probability of an effective R &D effort:
1. Adequate and accurate communication in all directions, es-
pecially upward
2. Capacity to exert effective influence in all directions on
matters which the individual is convinced are important or
which he feels need to be acted upon if the organization is to
achieve its objectives, that is, the ability to exert influence
where there is no direct traditional authority
3. Supportive superiors
4. Superiors and peers, even though differing vigorously on
scientific and technical matters, supportive and personally
warm
5. Capacity for individuals to have two or more bosses without
threat or jeopardy to the individual subordinates
These conditions, which an R &D administration should meet if
the R &D effort is to be most effective, are demanding. The man-
agement systems most widely used in business and government
today do not meet them. The view that a person can have only one
superior and should be given orders by him and no one else is based
on "hire-and-fire" authority.8 This is a central concept of current,
formal, organization theory.9 Product or project manager concepts
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are recognized as deviating from accepted management principles.
B. C. Ames10 has pointed out that "the concept (product manager) is
an organizational anomaly in that it violates a proven management
precept—i.e., that responsibility should always be matched by
equivalent authority—and yet it works, if properly applied."
Although the management theories most widely used today do not
meet the above conditions, a management system based on the
principles used by the highest producing managers in American
business and government comes, as we shall see, much closer to
doing so.
A MORE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Over the past two decades the University of Michigan's Institute
for Social Research has conducted studies in more than 200 United
States firms, involving thousands of managers and tens of thousands
of employees. These studies have revealed that the highest produc-
ing managers in American firms, irrespective of the kind of work
being done, are using, on the average, the same basic principles of
managing the human organization. These principles differ in
fundamental respects from the principles being used by managers
who are achieving only average or poor productivity, performance,
and earnings.11
It is possible to integrate these findings into a general organiza-
tional theory which can be applied to the structure and management
of any enterprise.12 This organizational theory recognizes that high
levels of cooperative motivation are required among the members
of an organization. The theory states that to achieve the highest
levels of cooperative motivation among the members of an organi-
zation, both managerial and nonsupervisory, it is necessary to fully
harness their noneconomic motives so that they reinforce, rather
than conflict with, the motivational forces stemming from the
economic motives. The theory accepts the view of the highest pro-
ducing managers that the best results are not obtained by merely
buying a man's time and issuing orders—that it is necessary to
harness the noneconomic motives with the economic motives.
Extensive use of research and development, which is character-
istic of highly industrialized nations, increases appreciably the
necessity for cooperative motivation and behavior within an enter-
prise. Complex technologies are needed to effectively use the
results of R&D. To be successful, firms which use these complex
technologies must achieve high levels of cooperative behavior
among the highly specialized persons and departments in the
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enterprise. As increasing use is made of R &D, the extent of
cooperative behavior among the members of an enterprise will
become increasingly important in determining the success of the
firm.
To apply the theory to a particular company or department, it is
necessary to develop operating procedures (for example, for super-
vision, communication, compensation, and decision making) which
are applications of the theory appropriate to the unique conditions
and traditions of that company. A fundamental principle, the
principle of supportive relationships can be used as a guide to
derive the operating procedures most suitable for a particular
company in the light of its history and current situation. This
principle can be stated as follows:
The leadership and other processes of the organization must
be such as to ensure a maximum probability that in all inter-
actions and all relationships within the organization each
member will, in the light of his background, values, and
expectations, view the experience as supportive and one which
builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and im-
portance.13
Consistent with this principle, the highest producing managers
create an organization which approaches the following model:
This social system is made up of interlocking work groups
with a high degree of group loyalty among the members and
favorable attitudes and trust between superiors and sub-
ordinates. Sensitivity to others and relatively high levels of
skill in personal interaction and the functioning of groups are
also present. These skills permit effective participation in
decisions on common problems. Participation is used, for
example, to establish organizational objectives which are a
satisfactory integration of the needs and desires of all
members of the organization and of persons functionally
related to it. High levels of reciprocal influence occur, and
high levels of total coordinated influence are achieved in the
organization. Responsibility for the organization's success is
felt individually by the members and each initiates action,
when necessary, to assure that the organization accomplishes
its objectives. Communication is efficient and effective.
There is a flow from one part of the organization to another
of all the relevant information important for each decision and
action. The leadership in the organization has developed what
might well be called a highly effective social system for
interaction and mutual influence.14
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The system of management based on this theory has been labeled
System 4 for convenient reference. An indication of the leadership
style and operating characteristics of this management system is
illustrated by the items in Table 26. These items compare System 4
with prevailing management systems based upon traditional theories
or organization. The items in Table 26 are from a much longer
table.15
A steadily growing body of data from an increasing number of
studies reveals that firms (plants, departments, and so on) whose
management systems are toward the System 4 end of the continuum,
in comparison with firms whose management systems are more
toward the System 1 end, achieve higher productivity and earnings,
lower costs and less waste, less absence, better labor relations and
employee satisfaction, and better physical and mental health among
their employees.16 Moreover, as firms shift their management sys-
tem toward System 4, they experience a favorable shift in these
variables, provided the shift is not so rapid or great that it exceeds
the expectations and skills of the members of the organization to
successfully adapt to it. That is, the shift, if it is to yield beneficial
results, has to be within the interactional capabilities of the mem-
bers of the organization as determined by their cultural heritage.
When a firm shifts toward System 1 in its management system, the
long-range consequences are unfavorable just as a shift toward
System 4 is favorable. The short-range results from a shift toward
System 1 usually appear to be favorable, but this is due to serious
inaccuracies and inadequacies in the accounting reports of firms.
When all the assets of a firm are considered, a shift toward Sys-
tem 1 decreases the actual earnings of a firm even though there may
be an increase in cash flow from the liquidation of human assets.17
It is significant that the experience of R &D administrators is
consistent with these findings. Thus, for example, when Table 26 is
used with the instructions below, R &D administrators report that
the management systems used by the most productive laboratories
fall at the border between the System 3 and System 4 range while
those of the least productive are in the middle of System 2. -
Instructions: Please think of the most productive research
department, laboratory, or organization you have known well.
Then place the letter h on the line under each organizational
variable in Table 2 to show where this organization would
fall. Treat each item as a continuous variable from the left
extreme of System 1 to the right extreme of System 4.
After you have completed the form to describe the most
productive research department or unit you know well, please
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think of the least productive department, laboratory, or
organization you know well. Preferably it should be about the
same size as your most productive unit and engaged in the
same general kind of work. Then put the letter p on the line
under each organizational variable to show where, in the light
of your observations, you feel this least productive organiza-
tion falls on that item. As before, treat each item as a
continuous variable from the left extreme of System 1 to the
right extreme of System 4.
The reports from R & D administration indicate that the manage-
ment system, System 4, which has been derived from the principles
used by the highest producing managers, appears to resemble the
management system which R &D administrators observe is most
effective in achieving high levels of R &D performance. Since this
is the case, System 4 should be a management system which would
more adequately meet the requirements for effective R &D admin-
istration than do the management systems used by most firms
today, which fall almost entirely in the range from the middle of
System 1 to the middle of System 3.
POTENTIAL VALUE OF SYSTEM 4 FOR R & D ADMINISTRATION
The extent to which System 4 more adequately provides the kind
of management system required for R &D administration can be
tested readily by examining available research findings. As will be
recalled, R &D administration is likely to be more effective when
the five conditions listed on page 148 are met well rather than
poorly.
A form similar to Table 26 but containing many more items and
with each item stated more fully18 has been used in more than
twenty firms to measure the management system being used. Each
manager or supervisor in the firm or department was asked to
describe the management system which, in his experience, is being
used by his firm. The findings obtained were related also to such
end-result measurements as productivity, costs, and earnings of the
firm.
The data obtained using the longer form reveals that System 4
organizations to a greater extent than System 3 firms and to a much
greater extent than System 2 or 1, display the following character-
istics:
1. Communication
a. Communication in all directions, including upward, is
more adequate and accurate.
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b. There is greater willingness to accept communication as
being accurate.
c. Subordinates feel more responsibility for communicating
accurate information upward and for taking the initiative to
see that information, which for effective organizational
performance should flow upward, does so.
d. Superiors, as a consequence, better understand the prob-
lems faced by subordinates and by the organization gen-
erally.
e. The perceptions of each other by superiors and sub-
ordinates are more accurate.
2. Influence, Cooperation, and Coordination
a. All hierarchical levels in the organization, including
nonsupervisory,can exert more influence on the objectives,
procedures, activities, and so on, of the total organization
and of subunits. The total amount of influence is greater;
superiors have more and subordinates have more.
b. This increase in the total amount of influence does not
rely on punitive power or authority but is created instead
by the interaction processes which are used.
c. The motivation for cooperative behavior is greater.
d. The greater amount of influence from nonpunitive sources
and the greater degree of cooperative motivation enable
influence to be exerted laterally as well as vertically.
Lateral coordination is as effective as vertical.
3. Supportive Behavior
a. Superiors have more confidence and trust in subordi-
nates.
b. Subordinates are more supportive in their interactions
with colleagues and others in the organization.
c. Superiors, and in turn subordinates, listen well to each
other and are genuinely interested in understanding the
ideas and contributions of the other even though they may
disagree.
d. Superiors seek to involve subordinates in decisions
related to their work. They generally use group problem
solving in the process.
4. Responsibility
a. The members of the organization at all hierarchical
levels, not just at the top, feel responsible for the organi-
zation attaining its objectives.
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b. The prevailing atmosphere in the organization is one of
"no nonsense." Objectives are set and work is done in an
efficient, highly motivated manner.
Research findings from many other studies using other measur-
ing instruments also have yielded data consistent with the above
result. These have been reported or summarized in several publi-
cations.19
SYSTEM 4 PERMITS TWO BOSSES
As stated above there is a fifth requirement which a management
system should meet; namely, the system must enable an individual
to have two or more bosses without threat or jeopardy to him. The
manner in which System 4 does this has been stated elsewhere:
How would the operation work as a formal system if he (the
individual) were a member of both a functional work group and
a product, or cross-function, work group? These two work
groups each consist of a superior to whom he and the other
subordinates under that particular superior report. Figure [3]
shows these two work groups and the overlapping member,
M-lc, who reports to two superiors. One work group is the
functional-line (e.g., marketing) work group and its superior
is M-l. The other work group is the product cross-function
work group with its superior, A-l.
If both of these work groups have high group loyalty and
are using group decision making well (Bradford et al., 1963;
Maier, 1963; Marrow, 1964a; Schein & Dennis, 1956), sub-
ordinates in each work group would be able to exercise
significant amounts of upward and lateral influence (Likert,
1961, Chaps. 8, 9, 11, 12). (H these groups are not performing
in this way, the superiors of these work groups and, in turn,
their own superiors, as we shall see, have some training and
organization building to do.) This would mean, of course, that
the individual we are considering (M-lc), who is the sub-
ordinate under two superiors, can exert upward influence via
group decision-making processes in both work groups. As a
consequence, when one superior (e.g., product, cross-function
superior, A-l) and the work group reporting to him approach
decisions which are incompatible or in conflict with the points
of view held or decisions being arrived at by the other
superior (marketing department superior, M-l) and his work
group, the individual who is in both work groups is obligated
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Functional line work group, Production cross-function
e.g., marketing work group
Fig. 3. Example of subordinate serving as linking pin for horizontal
coordination.
to bring such information to the attention of both work groups.
This information is relevant data to be used by each work
group in its decision making. Even though the chief of one or
the other groups may be reluctant to consider such informa-
tion, the group members are likely to want to do so. They,
themselves, are likely to be members of other cross-function
work groups and recognize that they, too, sooner or later may
find themselves caught in a developing conflict between the
two or more work groups of which they are subordinate mem-
bers. They will wish, consequently, to resolve this conflict
constructively and thereby help to create a well-established
process and precedent for handling such differences.
Under System 4, both work groups shown in Figure [3] will
be expected to engage in group decision making in order to
resolve the differences. The decision-making processes
should strive to create an innovative solution which satis-
factorily meets the requirements and opportunities presented
by the situations faced by both groups. The focus should not
be, as is often the case with System 2 man-to-man decision
making, on obtaining a decision favorable to a particular work
group or its department, irrespective of how costly it is for
the rest of the organization. The primary objective of the
decision making of the two work groups should be to discover
a solution which will serve the best interests of the entire
organization.
Whenever the members of one or both of the two groups
display inability to use group decision making sufficiently well
to achieve consensus in terms of the best interests of all
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concerned, the higher-level work groups must provide further
training in group progresses. This training of the subordinate
work groups in group problem solving and related processes
should enable all work groups to recognize from their own
experience that everyone in the organization benefits when the
decision making is focused on discovering the best solutions
for the entire organization and that almost everyone suffers
when the decision-making processes break down into a
bargaining, or win-lose battle.
If the individual (M-lc) were in a System 2 organization
and caught in a developing conflict between his two superiors,
the situation could be resolved only by getting one or both of
his superiors to change their decisions and their expectations
regarding his behavior. The individual's only recourse in his
attempt to change the conflicting demands on him would be
man-to-man interaction separately with each superior. He
would have to try to persuade one or both of his superiors to
change their decisions in a subordinate-superior discussion
with each. Often the requested change would be seen by the
particular superior as implying a criticism of him, or as
taking sides with the other superior against him. Neither
criticism nor taking sides is warmly received. In this System
2 situation, the subordinate's attempts to change the decisions
of one or both of his two superiors would not be likely to
succeed, and he would be left in jeopardy, unable to satisfy the
conflicting demands. It is for this reason that a cardinal
principle of System 2 is that a man can have only one boss.
As we have seen, System 4 handles this problem by pro-
viding the resource of group rather than man-to-man inter-
action. With System 4, the i n d i v i d u a l caught between
conflicting demands initiates discussion of the problem in the
relevant work groups. Discussion of it takes place there in a
much more impersonal way than is possible when the sub-
ordinate raises the question personally with each one of his
two superiors.
There is impressive evidence to show that, in comparison
to man-to-man interaction, a work group which uses effective
group decision making with its superior can give him sub-
stantially more information which is valuable to him but which
may involve criticism of him. It can also present a strong
case for a course of action other than the one the superior
initially prefers. In group decision making, individual mem-
bers of the group can "toss the ball" back and forth among
themselves and through such group processes communicate
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safely to the chief information which is important to him, but
which no single individual dares communicate in a man-to-
man session. This kind of group decision making requires two
broadly different kinds of skills. Group members need skill in
leadership and in membership interaction processes in order
to build and maintain a group efficient both in solving prob-
lems and in coping with conflict and differences. Skill is also
required in the intellectual processes of problem solving
(Kepner &Tregoe, 1965) (Majer, 1963).
When an individual has two superiors, one must be
designated to take the initiative on personnel functions, such
as salary review and recommendations. In the System 4
model, decisions are reached through consensus, and rec-
ommendations or action reflect the combined judgment of the
superiors involved. Therefore, it is immaterial which su-
perior is given the responsibility for initiating any necessary
actions and for seeing that the decisions or recommendations
are implemented. It is merely necessary that one superior be
given this assignment.20
EFFECTIVE LATERAL COORDINATION
System 4 with its multiple overlapping group structure and group
problem solving, in addition to its capacity to enable an individual to
have two or more bosses, provides unique resources for achieving
effective lateral, as well as vertical, coordination. Since the
successful use of R&D usually requires effective lateral coordi-
nation, a shift to System 4 can increase appreciably the benefits an
organization derives from its R&D expenditures.
An adequate discussion of the use of System 4 for the effective
lateral coordination required for the successful use of R &D is
another chapter in itself.21
The general trends in American society are likely to make a
shift to System 4 management even more necessary by any firm or
governmental agency which seeks to derive profitable returns from
R&D expenditures. Young scientists and engineers expect to a
greater degree than their predecessors to be involved in decisions
related to their work. Events on college and university campuses
indicate that the next student generation entering R&D employment
is likely to insist on having even more influence upon decisions
affecting itself. If Systems 1,2, and 3 are unable at present to meet
the requirements for effective R&D administration, they will be-
come appreciably more obsolete in each future decade.
ffD
Basic concepts of operational control
C. WEST CHURCHMAN
Professor and Research Philosopher
Space Sciences Laboratory
University of California
Berkeley
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
This chapter is concerned with the concept of control in socio-
technical systems development. It reviews briefly some of the
techniques of control, but its major emphasis is on the meaning of
control. A ship destined for the wrong port may be admirably
controlled in the narrow sense that it travels the best pathway to the
wrong place, but in a broader sense we would have to say that it
was not well controlled at all. The increased capability of
employing control techniques which we have witnessed in the last
two decades has often led to the neglect of the very pertinent
question: Control for what purpose?
MEANING OF CONTROL
Control is derived from a French word which meant "to make a
copy of a record (or scroll)." Hence its historical meaning
suggests the capability of reexamining what has occurred. Its
modern meaning adds the idea of modifying one's plan of action as a
result of this examination.
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Norbert Wiener, whose book Cybernetics inspired many en-
gineers to work on control theory, suggests in the title the
illuminating idea that control is well illustrated by the steering of a
ship (in Greek kybernetes means "steersman").1 Imagine you are
steering a motorboat across a choppy lake. As you observe the
waves deflect the bow from the target, you react to bring the boat
back on course. Note the theme of (1) recording what has happened
and (2) modifying behavior to accomplish the goal. Wiener referred
to the transmittal and recording of what has happened as "feed
back." The illustration of the steersman helps illuminate one
important aspect of feedback control, namely the timeliness of the
recorded message. Imagine your plight if it took ten seconds to
learn where the boat is headed; by the time you had reacted after a
ten-second delay you would probably do exactly the wrong thing.
Control and consciousness are closely related concepts, for
consciousness means an awareness or reaction to what has been
happening. Thus the conscious mind plays one critical role in the
control of human behavior. When you lose consciousness you lose
control of yourself; you can no longer react to what has been
happening.
CONTROL IN SCIENCE
The concept of control is pervasive in science, for science is not
merely inquiry based on observation and reason. Even if every
witness of an Unidentified Flying Object agrees that there was a
large white saucer with green men in it, the scientist remains
skeptical, simply because he has learned that general agreement of
witnesses by itself is not a very sound control procedure.
The concept of a controlled observation in measurement can be
described as follows. A concept like length is defined by a series of
steps to be taken in an idealized environment. This is called the
"standard" of length. When someone makes an observation of
length in a real environment, he must be able to argue on the basis
of the known laws of nature that such-and-such a reading, termed an
"adjusted reading," would be obtained in an ideal environment.
Finally, a number of adjusted readings must be independently
obtained and tested for statistical consistency. One sees that the
process of establishing so-called facts in science is rather com-
plicated, but the important point to be drawn from the example is
that control cannot operate without a theory of natural events. The
measurer of length needs to assume with some confidence the laws
of nature which enable him to adjust his observation to the standard.
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That theory plays a very critical role in all control processes in
sociotechnical systems will be seen.
SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS
Control of sociotechnical systems is a label that may give rise to
a certain amount of repulsion on the part of the humanist. It need
not do so; and it is very essential that we try to understand the
concept of a social system, for a sociotechnical system is simply a
social system some of whose goals or resources can be understood
in technological terms.
A social system, of course, is a system with people in it. But
the major question is: What makes a group of persons into a
system? The word "system" derives from a Greek word meaning
"a whole, compounded of parts." Modern systems theory has
supplied many meanings for "compounded," so that the student is
apt to be overwhelmed by the profusion of authoritative but
conflicting definitions of the word "system" he finds in textbooks.
Rather than add to this confusion by yet another definition, it will
serve us better to list the questions about social systems which are
relevant to the concept of control. All we need accept by way of
meaning is that social systems have a set of goals which are
desirable for some group of people, and that for purposes of
development each system can be broken down into subsystems or
components, each with its own set of goals which presumably serve
the goals of the whole system. In other words, control can best
operate when it can look at specific sectors of a whole and help us
decide whether the sector or component is behaving properly. (If it
still seems that control is anti-humanistic, a judgment on this
matter should be postponed until the details are filled in.)
From this very general account of a social system, the following
questions fall into a rather obvious sequence: (1) What are the goals
of the system ? and correlatively, (2) Whose interests does the
system serve ? At the outset we should recognize that since we are
discussing the development of sociotechnical systems, all our
questions are normative rather than descriptive. That is, we are
asking what the goals ought to be and whose interests should be
served, in order that the system be developed properly.
For example, a hospital is a sociotechnical system, since it is a
social system and some of its goals and resources can be described
in technical terms. Its goal might be defined as overcoming
physiological detriments of people with diseases or wounds. The
people whose interests it serves can be called the "clients." These
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might be all the people in a certain area, with a given income, who
request aid from the hospital and pay the prescribed fee.
It is to be noted that hospitals may have other goals, i.e.,
biomedical research, or income of doctors, administrators, and
nurses. These goals very often conflict and pose a very difficult
problem for control. The more or less obvious way out of the
difficulty is to weight the goals in terms of their relative im-
portance. This might be done, for example, by enlarging the client
into a community (e.g., the citizens of a city), and asking how the
specific goals of some people serve the interests of that community,
e.g., in economic terms. Thus qualitative goals like health, or
research, or income become transformed into the more quantitative
goal of economic benefit.
From the point of view of the use of control in development with
respect to goals, the attempt to encompass diverse goals under one
overriding social purpose can be expressed by the following
question: What is the measure of performance of the system ? It is
easy to see why such a measure provides a basis for control and
planning. In looking ahead, one can scan alternatives and estimate
which one will maximize the imputed measure of performance.
Indeed, the use of mathematical models and simulation provides a
very rich way of scanning alternatives. In mathematical pro-
gramming, for example, the measure of performance, z, is ex-
pressed as a function of the level of activity (e.g., manpower) in
each component of the system, and the solution is an estimate of
that set of activity levels which maximizes z, subject to certain
constraints. Control consists of examining the system after the
solution is implemented to see whether the measure of performance
is satisfactorily near the estimated measure. One can also control
the solution by running the plan parallel with the old plan, e.g., in a
computer simulation.
Finding a suitable measure of performance is no easy matter,
even in firms in a free market. It seems natural to say that the
measure of performance of a firm should be its net profit, but net
profit is usually calculated annually whereas the worth of a firm
for its owners spans numbers of years. Furthermore, the method
of calculating net profit, e.g., for income tax purposes, may fail to
measure the real performance of the firm.
In the case of governmental agencies and other public institu-
tions, the task of finding a suitable measure of performance
becomes even more difficult. There is a strong tendency to use the
amount of activity as a measure (number of students graduating,
number of patients serviced, and so forth), although clearly activity
by itself is not the real value to the client. As previously indicated,
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it may sometimes be possible to translate the objectives of the
system into economic measures, e.g., income streams. Thus a new
school building provides jobs and upgrades education, both of which
can be translated into economic gains to the community. When this
is done, we say that a cost-benefit analysis has been made.
It is important to note that any budgeting process which allocates
resources to programs implicitly assumes a measure of perform-
ance, because the allocation in effect weights certain objectives
more heavily than others. But it does not follow that the implicit
weighting ought to be made explicit. For example, publication of the
measure of performance may set off political battles that damage
the organization. Thus the answer to the question, What is the
measure of performance? may be, "There is no such measure." If
so, then the problem of control becomes difficult but not necessarily
impossible. One may be able to generate surrogate measures,
which, while they do not represent the real values of the organiza-
tion to the clients, nevertheless provide managers with information
about the stability of the organization. In large contracts, for
example, "slippage days" is such an indicator; the client is only
indirectly concerned with delays in various sub-programs of the
contract, but the number of such delays may be a good control
measure, i.e., may tell the manager when he should respond by
changing the system.
The next set of questions are concerned with the manner in which
the system is run: (1) What is the decision maker of the system ?
(2) What are the components of the system ? (3) What are system
boundaries ?
The neuter form "What" rather than "Who" has been used to
emphasize that the decision maker is normally a complex of
individual psychological and social forces rather than one person.
Just as in the case of the client, the questions regarding the
decision maker pose strategic problems for those who wish to
control the system. The system may be conceived very broadly or
quite narrowly, and depending on the choice, the nature of the
decision maker and the system boundaries change. We say that the
components of a social system are capable of being changed by the
decision maker, while everything that lies beyond the system
boundaries cannot be changed by him, although the world outside the
boundaries may influence what happens.
Consider, for example, a large computer installation. From a
narrow point of view, one might assume that the decision maker
consists of those persons who can directly interface with the
computer plus their immediate supervisors. The components might
then be regarded as configurations of people and hardware, plus
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their related software packages. The system boundaries would be
defined by the area and personnel of the computer department. Top
management policy, the budget, and demand for computer services
might then lie outside the system boundaries, the decision makers
being unable to change any of these. We note that the process of
control is directed toward the decision maker, because if changes
are to be made in the light of past events, he is the one to make
them.
But one might set the boundaries of the computer installation in a
quite different fashion, by assuming that the system also includes
all potential users. Now the decision maker, components, and
boundaries are all radically different, because the controller
assumes, for example, that he can influence the behavior of the
users, change management policy, or modify the budget.
It is important to emphasize that the strategic judgments about
the client and the decision maker are never obvious, though
frequently they appear to be so because the organization may have
strong consensus on such matters. To repeat, the controller should
never take consensus as a safe basis for his actions; too often whole
peoples have strongly agreed on policies that lead to their doom.
The components of a system are essentially ways of looking at
the system from the point of view of planning and control. If human
powers of reasoning and observation were strong enough and refined
enough, we probably would not need to think about social systems in
component terms. Ideally, each component has its own measure of
performance which the controller can watch. Here again there
tends to be the fallacy of using component activity as a surrogate
measure (e.g., number of houses built or number of criminals
apprehended in an urban system). The point is that the component
measure of performance must be so related to the system measure
of performance that the controller can judge what a change in the
component measure will mean to the whole system. One of the
simplest ways of representing components occurs in linear pro-
gramming, where the system measure is a linear function of
component measures, subject to certain (linear) constraints. Here
the component measure is often represented as the amount of
activity multiplied by a "relative value" coefficient: the more
important the activity is for the whole system, the higher its
coefficient.
It is important to note that all such linear representations of
components are partially unrealistic, because they assume that the
components are "separable," meaning that any increase in one
component's measure implies a system improvement, if all other
components remain the same. The last two decades have shown that
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the major components of sociotechnical systems are highly "cou-
pled": it is quite likely that "bettering" the performance of a
transportation component will have unsatisfactory side effects in
other components, e.g., produce air pollution, increase traffic
hazards, and so forth. This is one reason why programs that
attempt to alleviate the great social problems of today may be
ill-conceived, since they tend to decouple poverty, education, health,
environment, and population, when in fact these problems are all
strongly coupled.
To say that a linear representation of a system is unrealistic is
not to say that it is useless, because all representatives of social
systems are unrealistic. This is the major reason for control: we
are undoubtedly wrong in serious ways when we plan and act on our
representations of social systems, no matter who we are—VIP, top
manager, bottom manager, individual—and no matter how well
motivated we are to serve the real client. Control is our saving
move, because through it we can record our mistakes and hopefully
change for the better. We should also note that considerations of
convenience and time often lead to adopting partially unrealistic
representations.
In recent years it has become fashionable to treat components of
sociotechnical systems as "black boxes," where one tries to
identify the inputs to the box and the consequent outputs. (The
phrase "black box" is used to convey the idea that no internal
description of the system is needed.) Thus a manager might
despair of trying to understand how a research laboratory actually
works in detail. But he can understand one input, namely money,
and he can understand one output, namely, useful results. His
question may then be phrased, What do I get as output for an
increase of one unit of input? Again the representation is probably
unrealistic, but it may help to gain a fairly convenient grasp of
some of the reality of the system.
The user of black box thinking needs to be very wary of its
basic problem, however, which ancient logicians labeled post hoc,
ergo propter hoc, meaning "after this, therefore because of this,"
or the fallacy of inferring that if one thing follows another in time,
it is also caused by that other. In modern times, researchers often
correlate events by means of regression analysis or other tech-
niques. For example, they correlate inputs at time ti with outputs
at tj+1, and then argue that the inputs caused the outputs.
A little reflection on management practices shows how very
risky this analysis may be, simply because management tends to put
its money where the results look good. Thus if a research
laboratory seems to be doing remarkably well, management will
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naturally increase its budget: that is, the^ output at time ti causes
the input at tj+1! Now correlations made over periods of time do
not by themselves tell us whether, when X and Y are highly
correlated, X causes Y or Y causes X. Other systemic judgments
need to be made to establish the way the causal chain operates; in
many cases it appears more reasonable to assume that outputs
cause inputs rather than the reverse.
The last two questions about sociotechnical systems have really
been the basis of the whole discussion: (1) What is the planner of
the system ? (2) What is the controller of the system ?
Here again the neuter form, "What," is intended to reflect the
complexity of both tasks, the planning and controlling of the system.
Planning means deliberating about alternative decisions in terms of
their outcomes before the actual decision itself. Many decisions
are not planned, or little planned, e.g., routine performances like
running a machine or responding to requests for service, or
emergency actions.
Planning, in this general sense, involves almost every respon-
sible decision maker in an organization and does not reside in a
so-called planning department alone. All managers do some
deliberating about alternatives, e.g., whether to retain or fire, lease
or buy. It is to be noted that not all planning produces actions, as
most planners know.
Controlling is the correlative of planning. If we have deliberated
about a course of action and explicitly settled on one, then we have
in effect "written a scroll," and in control we "copy it"; i.e., we
look at what we had deliberately planned to do and see whether our
perception of reality is producing a satisfactory replication.
Both planning and controlling require fairly explicit judgments
about the nature of the social system, its decision maker, client,
components, and boundaries. Most important, the judgments need to
specify the value basis of the system, i.e., the most important goals
the system should strive for. The German word Weltanschauung or
"world perception" captures this idea very well. It means, in
German philosophy, the framework through which data are filtered
to provide us with meaningful information. Sociotechnical systems
in national defense provide an excellent example. A technical
advance in biochemical weapons is a "datum." If our Weltan-
schauung tells us that survival of the USA is the highest value, then
the datum becomes evidence that we should develop the weapon. On
the other hand, if the Weltanschauung says that man's total survival
is the highest value, then the datum tells all nations not to develop
the weapon.
Today we are witnessing radically different worldviews of
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sociotechnical systems. They have raised many questions. What
should be our attitude toward genetic engineering, for example?
Should we develop the technology with the aim of creating a race of
highly intelligent and healthy men and women? But then, what about
individual freedom to have the children that our love creates ? And
what about the goal of clean air and water that robs man of the
opportunity to use that air and water to produce income and to
provide recreation?
But there is another fundamental aspect of the Weltanschauung
that both planning and control need to consider. The very concept of
control is an admission that our plans, no matter how thoroughly
deliberated, may very well be wrong: the future will not copy the
scroll. Furthermore, if we find to our satisfaction, based on our
Weltanschauung, that the plan was wrong, then we.should have the
opportunity to correct our error. But what does "correct" mean
in this context?
In today's enthusiasm over spectacular developments in socio-
technical systems, we are apt to ignore the implicit grounds of our
enthusiasm. To be sure, after some effort we may be able to
correct a serious flaw in a moon exploration system, a highway
construction design, or a weapons system. These corrections
enable the system to work better with respect to such goals as a
moon landing, traffic through-put, or defense. But note that if these
goals are wrong in the sense that they do not serve society's aims,
then a correction is hardly a correction. If I have lost my way in
the forest and in eagerly following the wrong trial I make sure that
I keep finding my way back to it when I stray, I cannot say that I am
controlling my behavior.
In the very broadest sense, every sociotechnical system contains
the strong possibility of its own destruction, as well as the destruc-
tion of other social systems. Any adequate system of control,
therefore, requires a theory or Weltanschauung which, if valid,
provides grounds for guaranteeing the system's survival.
It seems appropriate to label this aspect of control theory the
"theology" of control, because it tries to develop the basis on which
the systems designer can believe that the systems he designs will
improve in a real sense. The basis can legitimately be called
"God," and the belief a "faith." Of course, today's engineer tends
to shun such obscure issues, because it is impossible to formulate
them in precise terms. For example, one cannot state in clear and
unambiguous terms what "survival" and "improvement" mean, nor
can one find data to substantiate one's faith. But problems are
realities that do not disappear just because one does not think about
them.
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In a recent book J. Forrester proposes to use his theory of
dynamics to design urban communities; in effect he regards cities
as sociotechnical systems.2 Even if one is impressed by For-
rester's simulation methods, the wary reader cannot help but ask
whether some of his suggestions, e.g., with respect to housing,
might not set off the detonator that blows up the whole system.
Note that one need not accept a pessimistic philosophy with
respect to system survival guarantees, for the pessimist has his
own faith which is no better substantiated than the optimist's.
Jacques Ellul tells us that man has become overwhelmed by "la
technique," which dictates his life and robs him of his freedom.3
Technology for him leads to the destruction of human values. But
Ellul's Weltanschauung, which is the opposite of Forrester's, is
also a faith, a faith that God is the Devil, i.e., that the basis of
system change is a force which we can no longer change and which
is evil. Those who devote a portion of their lives to systems
control have the moral responsibility to enunciate their faith in the
nature of the guarantor, be it good or 'evil, Christian or Hindu,
white or black, radical or conservative. No word so adequately
captures the differences in faith as does "change," which means so
many things to today's planners.
But I do not mean to imply that faith is altogether personal, and
that there is no real basis for it. The personal aspect of faith must
confront the social aspect: faith is man's most gigantic inquiry into
his origin and destiny, a collective as well as a personal experi-
ence.
From this lofty pinnacle of systems control, suppose we descend
to the plain and point out that even in the more constrained
environment where specific goals have been set for the system
designer, it is often impossible to tell whether a design is operating
correctly or not. The reason for this is that the controller needs to
make a strong causal inference, namely, that the design causes the
changes that improve the system. For example, the technique
PERT, for controlling large sociotechnological projects, is often
credited with improving system performance by cutting down on
unnecessary delays. Its critics, on the other hand, can frequently
create counte.r-worldviews which argue forcibly that the PERT
technique had little or nothing to do with better system performance
and that the project succeeded despite the need to maintain a PERT
chart. Thus, even at a specific level, the controller needs to make
very general systemic judgments to enable him to infer how his
actions relate to the whole system.
From this account of systems and their controls, it is rather
obvious that scientific control in one old-fashioned sense is not
170
possible. If "scientific" means the employment of objective
evidence unbiased by prejudgments of any kind, then all system
management is unscientific. But it seems wiser to say that such a
meaning of science is far too restrictive; in a broader meaning of
science which includes intuition and faith, the manager-controller
does know some important things about his system. This knowledge
is always a combination of his own intuitive insights, what his
senses tell him and his own reasoning ability. No manager should
ever feel embarrassed about telling the story of his system as he
intuits and sees it.
BOUNDED VERSUS OPEN CONTROL
With this background on the nature of sociotechnical systems, we
can make an important distinction between two kinds of control,
bounded and open. Bounded control is a set of procedures for
controlling a system when one or more of the salient features of the
system are given by some authority outside the control subsystem.
In one of its most restricted senses, bounded control occurs when
the goals have been clearly specified, the decision maker is clearly
delineated, and the available resources (budget) is given. For
example, the NASA Apollo program had these characteristics: the
goal of landing man on the moon was specified, the Apollo manage-
ment was clearly recognizable, and the budget-manpower con-
straints were known.
In open control, on the other hand, the control subsystem does
not recognize any outside authority except the vaguely stated values
of the client. The process of deciding that the USA should try to get
the first man on the moon, and that the budget should be so many
billions of dollars, was an open process. Even the decision-making
body was vaguely defined, for it consisted of NASA management, the
executive branch (specifically the Bureau of the Budget), Congress,
the scientific community, industrial firms, the press, and, vaguest
of all, the public. Note how, when the process passes from open to
bounded control, the decision-making body is carved from the
amorphous mass to become a fairly well-specified group of
individuals, with the rest of society acting as critics or pressure
groups.
TECHNIQUES OF BOUNDED CONTROL
It would be incorrect to infer from its definition that bounded
control is cut and dried. A good deal of creativity is required to
BASIC CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL 171
steer a system toward a specified goal, even when the resources
are plentiful, as the soul of the captain of the Titanic can attest. A
set of mission specifications does not necessarily yield the correct
measure of performance the controller needs, nor does it neces-
sarily tell him how to subdivide the project into programs, nor how
to set time schedules and resource allocations. Finally, and
perhaps most important, the usual specifications of a mission do not
tell the manager how he is to get people to work together as a team,
to feel highly motivated, to understand what they should be doing,
and so on.
Bounded control involves at its best the right mixture of
technique and creativity. No technique by itself should ever take on
the role of leading the project. Consider, for example, statistical
quality control,4 a technique developed by W. Shewhart in the 1930s
primarily to aid manufacturing systems, which are among the most
important sociotechnical systems. Statistical quality control is
ideally suited for bounded control because the quality of the product
can be measured along certain physical dimensions: length, weight,
hardness, and so forth. The technique recognizes that no manu-
facturing system can produce items that are precisely the same in
these dimensions of quality. The controller makes the systemic
judgment that the system is "in control," meaning that the variation
between items can be accurately described by some statistical laws,
e.g., by the behavior of a random variable subject to a probability
distribution. The technique consists of a continuous check on this
assumption. The controller must decide the risk he is willing to
take of making two kinds of errors: (1) allowing the system to
continue when it is no longer in control, i.e., when the controller's
assumption is no longer valid; and (2) changing the system when it
is actually in control. These are, indeed, the fundamental and
inevitable errors of all control systems and neither can in principle
be avoided with certainty.5 (To avoid the first error one should not
run the system at all; and to avoid the second error, one should run
it but never change it—both of which are probably absurdities.)
Once the risks are specified, the technique can be employed, e.g., in
a continuous manufacturing process.
The technique even in more or less standard manufacturing
conditions should not, however, be allowed to dominate. If the
system is judged to be out of control, it is by no means obvious what
should be done about it. The controller must make some strong
systemic judgments about the nature of the imputed lack of control,
including the judgment that no change should be made. To permit
automatic response patterns to the information is in effect to lose
managerial control.
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This point is often ignored in another control technique, account-
ing control. Although this is a somewhat cruder technique than
statistical quality control, in that the limits of variation are set by
more or less arbitrary judgment, the basic logic is the same. The
controller identifies cost centers that are responsible for some
segment of the system. The cost centers are given a set of standard
costs for their operation, e.g., purchasing, manufacturing, and so
forth. If there is a significant variance from the standard, a report
is filed explaining the variance. It does not take much imagination
to see that such an automatic reporting system will generate a great
deal of useless and even mythical information. The fault does not
lie with the control system, but rather in the blind application of one
specific form of response, namely, filing reports.
The final section of this chapter contains references to other
techniques of bounded control. Essentially these techniques aid the
controller in one or more of the following tasks: (1) determining
when to intervene and change the course of the system (as in the two
examples just cited); (2) designing information sources and chan-
nels, e.g., feedback systems; (3) allocation of funds, time, and
manpower to components; (4) developing policies that fit the
capabilities and needs of people; (5) coping with system size.
A METHOD OF OPEN CONTROL: DIALECTICS
In open control there are no "givens," no ultimate authority
which tells us what is right. To be sure, there is a decision maker,
but no one can claim to know what the decision-making force should
be. Not even consensus or majority can be regarded as the ultimate
authority of right and wrong, since consensus often arises from
collective deception.
The naive and unreflective often hasten to adopt a strong
personal relativism when faced with the more ultimate questions of
open control. "No one can tell what's right and wrong in any final
sense," they say; "it's entirely up to each person to decide for
himself and to try to convince other people that he's right." A little
reflection shows us why this kind of response is so superficial. To
be sure, no one can tell us the answers to questions of ultimate
value, of the right client and decision maker, of the right allocation
of resources. But it by no means follows that "it's up to each
person to decide." In no phase of life, including science, are we
ever-able to reach final answers to our questions, but we may adopt
the position that there are better and worse responses. The good
responses are the results of good judgments, just as in the courts
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where no one can really be sure the right verdict and sentence have
been imposed. We see again that the attitude toward questions in
open control is based on systemic assumptions: to adopt a personal
relativism is to assume that the larger system cannot be known
even approximately in an objective sense, which is far from being
obvious. In a chapter devoted to the concept of control, we need to
explore the assumption that open control is possible in a non-
relativistic sense.
In the courts, good judgment is reached in the context of a debate
between opposing positions, where in principle the judge and jury at
the outset are under no strong influences one way or the other. It is
appropriate to generalize this model of decision making to all
decisions in open control. In this connection it is interesting to note
that the word "decision" up to the middle of the nineteenth century
meant a judgment reached in the context of a dispute between two
parties. Its more subjective, "I decide alone" meaning is a
relatively modern invention that works if at all in bounded control.
The methodology of dialectics is the process of confronting at
least two plausible views of how the system should work and what
its values should be. Its prescription is very simple, though often
terribly difficult to follow: whenever you really think you under-
stand the system, then create a plausible counter theory which says
that you are wrong and that a plan other than the one you propose
should be followed.
For example, if you think it is the function of a university to
transmit knowledge, and that the need is to train better teachers and
provide more classrooms, then try to develop a counter worldview
of the university in which its function is to develop each individual's
style of inquiry. In the latter case, better trained teachers and
more classrooms may be the wrong policy altogether. Note that in
two opposing views of the university, the client and the decision
maker shift. In the first view—the information-transmittal picture—
the client is that group of persons who wish to acquire knowledge,
and the decision maker is the faculty-administration who are
experts in transmitting knowledge. In the second view—the style-
of-inquiry picture—the client is anyone who needs to develop his
(unique) style, including so-called faculty, black or white, poorly or
richly educated; and the decision maker is any group of persons who
can help an individual to develop his style.
It is to be emphasized that no set of data by itself can prove that
a particular world image is right or wrong, as all of us are
realizing in connection with one of the biggest sociotechnical
systems, the military. No data, secret or public, can destroy the
dove's or the hawk's conviction, because all data can be accounted
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for within the story each one tells. The data are a trick, mis-
represented, irrelevant, and so on. The role of sound judgment is
to assess the worth of each side's worldview: How direct and
realistic does it sound? How frequently does it undergo basic
changes in the light of new information? How much does it serve
the interests of one side or the other?
It is to be noted in this connection that simulation or experi-
mentation, though highly useful in open control, never settle the
matter in the way they may do in bounded control. If it is given that
we should move commuters faster during rush hours, then we can
experiment with traffic lights, parking laws, and average speed.
But if this objective is not a given, a higher speed will not prove
that a particular strategy is correct, because opponents may show
that it increases risk or inconvenience. Experiments, however, do
help to determine the sensitive points of each side in open control,
so that judgment becomes more refined. But judgment does not
have to adopt either side, especially if it can find a synthesis that is
richer in meaning than both opponents.
CONTROL AND PROGRESS
In the nineteenth century, many thinkers, admiring science,
believed that they could see the dawn of an age of knowledge in
which technology would aid man in the conquest of nature. For
Kant6 it was the convergence of morality and happiness; for Jeremy
Bentham7 the development of legislation based on the measure of
performance of all society, the greatest utility for the greatest
number; for Hegel8 it was "Absolute Mind"; for Marx9 it was the
victory of the proletariat and, as Lenin put it, the withering away of
the state; for the evolutionists like Herbert Spencer10 it was the
evolution of a higher species, or as Nietzsche11 would have it, a
revolution to a higher form of morality. These were grand schemes
of sociotechnical systems, and men like E. A. Singer, Jr.12 sug-
gested systematic ways in which we might measure man's progress.
But Singer, who straddled the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries,
realized that progress does not come in a smooth pattern of
development, but rather involves deep despair and uncertainty.
In the latter part of the twentieth century we have forgotten all
these high-sounding worldviews of our grandfathers, and instead we
tend to look at the world's problems in very specific terms,
breaking the whole down into poverty, or war, or pollution, or
education. Some planners, like D. Braybrooke and C. E. Lindblom,13
recommend the incrementalist approach of taking small but realistic
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steps to overcome system deficiencies. In a way our age represents
a paradox in its thinking. No other age has ever been so conscious
of the complex interrelationships between all facets of the social
system, nor has any other age been so anxious to try to solve the
problems of proverty, pollution, and population. Yet we are a
piecemeal age, without any viable concept of why our sociotechnical
system exists and where it should go; at best we see its defi-
ciencies, not its values.
This paradox of the control of sociotechnical systems may
account for one of the major crises of management today: the
action-revolution movement that wants to end the talk and make
change by disruption. Managers and planners who have a narrow
vision and concentrate on deficiencies tend to view their chief role
as one of survival—for themselves and their institutions. But every
great scheme of progress in the nineteenth century included the
necessity for the destruction of outmoded institutions, as well as the
creation of new ones. It is as though today's managers were
blocked off from one vital area of control, the dissolution of
institutions. Clearly no one knows how to overcome this serious
lack of control, but our basic resource as planners is awareness.
Everyone concerned with control should become aware of what
D. N. Michaels" (p. 93) calls the "psychological" base for resisting
threats to the institutional status quo: "there is the strong
disinclination to jeopardize a satisfying self-image . . . that sus-
tains those who would have to take the risks to self and organization
inherent in changing both."
CONTROL: A DIRTY WORD
One final word is needed about the concept of control. At the
very broad level, control can be regarded as man's basic method of
changing social systems so that they improve in the service of
humanity. But control can also be regarded as an immoral
instrument whereby one group of people force everyone else to
comply with their own concept of right and wrong. The so-called
control of drugs is an example of such an attempt; with all the best
will in the world, legislators attempt to stop people from using
drugs by threatening them with imprisonment. Even granted that
the use of drugs is very harmful, one can still argue plausibly that
such a method of control is immoral, as anyone who lived through
Prohibition (1919-33) can attest. Real control becomes minimal
when it is based solely on rules and laws rather than on education
and mutual consent.
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There can be no question that control is a dirty word in the
minds of many people who are oppressed by the rules of organiza-
tions and government. They appreciate the irony of the etymology
control: they are the scrolls that are being copied from the script
in the heads of the controllers. The problem is not solved by
dropping the word and substituting another. For those who believe
that man can improve his sociotechnical systems through reason,
the task is to free himself from the narrow techniques of control
and become aware of the broader moral implications inherent in the
concept.15
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Twenty years of vigorous public financing of the nation's
research and development (R & D) have not erased troubling ques-
tions of fiscal and management standards. Taken together, budget-
ing, appropriating, and controlling amount to a process; yet few are
satisfied with it. When cornered, sponsors, performers, and
decision makers alike will agree that the processes are chancy,
discontinuous, and inherently unstable. Well-publicized analytic
techniques which seem to work passably well in other areas of
public action appear somehow incompatible with the drives and
dynamics that go with advanced research.
A natural tension exists between the doers of research and the
managers who must find reasons for supporting them. The re-
searcher expects independence to be creative, along with stable
flows of funds. The public manager also wants scientific creativity
but is bound by rubrics that were devised for practical pursuits.
These tensions come into critical, conjunction under the rationing
conditions that prevail today. Budgetary constraints, competition
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for scarce dollars, and the pressures of scientific and technological
opportunities combine to produce acute dilemmas of judgment.
Rationing, for its part, implies choices based on equity. It is a
balancing exercise conditioned by insufficiency of resources, and at
its best it decides outcomes according to preestablished criteria. If
criteria are lacking, rationing resembles the game of pinning a tail
on a hyperthyroid donkey.
Foreign observers, enchanted by the virility of American science
and technology and bent on learning the managerial system associ-
ated with it, are tireless in inquiring into our decision methods and
our criteria for resolving problems of choice in R & D. They make
the habitual mistake of supposing that our public investments in
R & D are planned in a total analytic framework which relates
scientific and technological opportunities to national objectives,
while employing rational criteria to assist the rationing procedure.
In reality, nothing like this exists.
R & D are not programmed or budgeted as a homogeneous
category of discretionary public investment across the federal
government. What emerges as R & D is in reality pieced together
in a decentralized setting by the numerous independent administra-
tive communities constituting the arms of the executive branch.
Within broad missions and objectives of separate departments and
agencies, R&D becomes a means to achieve larger ends and as
such it competes with other strategies for the departmental dollar.
Its utilities are evaluated, if at all, in the same contexts.
Linear decision making is not a feature of the supervision R & D .
Monitoring organizations like the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and the Office of Science and Technology are unfortunately
not equipped to do much more than make running judgments as
to levels of effort, and their most valuable impact is upon "go" or
"no-go" questions involving conspicuous opportunities and costs.
Indeed, the final aggregate outcomes of the budgeting process for
R & D—the total "funds for research and development"—for any
fiscal year are derived numbers which often as not come as a mild
surprise to the budgeteers when the book is in page proof.
ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY
It is understandable that decision makers here and abroad should
assume increasing rationality in dealing with R & D as the new
analytic tools of management are understood and applied to prob-
lems of choice. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) with its cost-benefit, systems-analysis, and cost-effective-
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ness concepts and techniques, looked, at a distance, like salvation
for the baffled decision maker. Quantification of costs, benefits,
and uncertainty is what we all want in comparing alternative paths
in science and technology.
PPBS did in fact add an important and helpful dimension to
planning and budgeting, though not as much as its founding fathers
envisioned. In the few cases where agency heads elected to manage
with the aid of PPBS, the quality of program and budget analysis
was upgraded. The reclassification of budget outlays into program
categories and the emphasis placed upon clarifying objectives and
outputs have begun to make the budget intelligible and almost
readable. But these structural gains were not matched by analysis
of high quality, particularly in posing and examining real alterna-
tives in the program memoranda and special studies which each
year the OMB wistfully called for in the short heyday of PPBS. But
it should be said that PPBS was not a simple reform, nor is it one
to be enacted between breakfast and lunch. In all likelihood it would
take 10 years to reach the level of expectations claimed for PPBS
when it was initiated. Like Christianity, it should be admired for
its potential and not judged harshly on its performance to date.
Sophisticated management techniques and approaches like PPBS,
although saluted ritually in all departments, are practiced princi-
pally in the Department of Defense. Even there they have not
always saved managers from miscalculation and mistakes of
judgment, and this is in itself confirmation of the rule that analytic
methods will help in choosing paths to take but cannot eliminate risk
from decision making.
PPBS has helped to temper hunch and impulse as factors in
deciding what to do next, and it has furnished effective drag on the
military's tendency to want and get all that can be produced
regardless of relative cost and effectiveness. For this we rightly
offer up thanks. But in the civilian departments and agencies it
would be quite difficult to unearth examples of decisions made
wholly or even largely as the result of systematic analysis of
alternatives. The most we can say of PPBS is that it has paid off
in causing program planners to think of cities, education, health,
and transportation as system problems rather than as straight-line
expenditure targets.
But PPBS and its allied methodologies have yet to prove their
worth in the management of R & D. The most diligent ransacking of
the executive branch fails to bring to light analytic cases where
cost-benefit techniques have been used successfully in selecting
R & D alternatives. At the development end of the spectrum where
hardware choices are involved, cost effectiveness analysis has been
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helpful; otherwise we meet only frustration. The government is
still groping without much hope for the insights, institutions, and
methods for selecting certain R&D paths while rejecting others.
Criteria of choice have not been devised even though the recent
dearth of funds has produced the classic outlines of a rationing
situation. This is not to say that, at the stage of administering a
research appropriation, choices are not made in terms of scientific
merit ascertained by peer judgment procedures. But, at the critical
stage of budgeting, the absence of criteria for establishing pri-
orities leaves a disquieting managerial gap.
Uncertainty is the bane of even the best intentioned applications
of formal analysis to alternative investment choices in R & D. This
is illustrated by the report Energy, R&D and National Progress
issued in 1964 by the Office of Science and Technology.2 This was
an attempt to scrutinize a wide range of energy R&D strategies in
cost-benefit terms as well as from the view of scientific merit and
technical feasibility. But, wherever cost-benefit approaches were
used, it became necessary to qualify the results with language such
as this:
In any field, the planning of optimal R&D programs is
imperfectly understood, and we can neither predict the
probability of success nor specify the time lag between
initiation of a research effort and its payoff. Planning is
immeasurably more difficult in a complex field like the
energy sector which involves the simultaneous interactions of
natural resources, science, technology, economics, sociology,
politics, and other factors—none of which is static. All this
means, for instance, is that we cannot predicate a plan on the
adequacy of a particular energy resource, for the status of
the resource may change with time, with technological ad-
vances, with consumer preference, or with any of a host of
direct or indirect influences. In the circumstances, it is
understandable that policies for energy R&D cannot be neatly
blueprinted according to a scientific formula, but judicious
study can elevate such policy making from a gamble to an act.
[Emphasis added.]
Thus, notwithstanding the hopeful sequels and gasps heard from
the parlors of management science, public decision making in R & D
remains all too conventional. Nevertheless, decisions do get made,
and choices are somehow reached. There are pragmatic and
intuitive criteria buried in the plumbing of public decision making,
and diligent flushing would discover them to resemble, more or
less, the following:
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(1) The Quality of the R & D. This is the test of scientific merit
and the perceived skills of the performers.
(2) The Nature of the Opportunity. International cooperation
opportunities may indicate priority for U.S. participation in a
worldwide multidisciplinary study of the Year of the Quiet Sun or,
alternatively, a World Weather Watch. Advanced biomedical en-
gineering may call for intensive clinical R & D in organ transplants.
(3) The Need to Create a Research Base. In the absence of an
adequate research base, the government may feel compelled to
create one, as in the case of urban and housing problems, regional
education laboratories, or experimental preschool programs.
(4) The Level of Ongoing Budget Support. Where heavy public
investment in R & D is already a reality, as in space and medical
research, competition for funds from "deprived" sectors of re-
search or from nonscience claimants may necessitate a reassess-
ment of growth rates and financing levels.
(5) Preserving an Ongoing Research Facility. When there is
heightened competition for R & D funds, government may have to
give first consideration to preventing the erosion of first-rate
research establishments which were set up with heavy investment
costs and could not be duplicated.
(6) Costs, Current and Projected. A decision to stake out a
position of U.S. leadership in high-energy physics and to maintain it
against Soviet competition may involve modest start-up funds but
massive sequential capital and operating costs. In contrast, a
decision to go the route in molecular biology might be a low-budget
and high-payoff investment.
(7) Social Pressures. Public demand may generate irresistible
pressures for investment in heart, cancer, stroke, and infant
mortality R & D, or in intensive behavioral studies of crime and
drug abuse.
(8) Externalities. The dictates of foreign policy may lead to
bilateral undertakings as illustrated by the United States-Japan joint
research program. Intelligence estimates on Soviet or Chinese
thermonuclear weapon capabilities might result in escalating United
States R & D.
(9) Momentum of "State of the Art." Here we confront the
dynamics of R & D—the ability and know-how to advance scientific
or technical thresholds by more than marginal degrees. Opportu-
nities foregone or postponed may be opportunities lost or seriously
compromised. An example might be the question of exploiting
nuclear propulsion technology for large manned-space vehicles in
the post-Apollo period. Whether to opt for unmanned-space ex-
ploration and allow the technology-intensive industrial base to
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suffer attrition or to give priority to manned-space research over
underfunded domestic social programs presents investment alterna-
tives of the most acute sort.
(10) Social Change. Although federal support of medical re-
search grew at astronomic rates in the postwar years, by the late
1960s the government faced problems in the organization and
delivery of health services which argued for allocating a higher
percentage of the federal health dollar to services than to research,
given the presence of rationing requirements.
(11) Technology Assessment. Decisions to proceed with ad-
vanced technology are to a growing extent subject to the test of
social cost and benefit. R & D on nuclear power plants raise
questions of environmental pollution and safety. Development of
high-speed, long-range aircraft may be delayed until noise and
sonic damage are brought under reasonable control.
This is the broad framework within which the government
struggles toward choices. Yet these imputed criteria, although they
are perhaps better than none at all, do not measure up to an
adequately refined or agreed-upon structure of decision criteria for
reviewing alternative R&D investments. If we are to believe that
the days are past when science provides its own justification for
growth budgets, it follows that the demand for accountability
necessitates better standard for analyzing the social merit of
discretionary R & D .
As perplexing as are the problems of choice within a single field
of R & D , they escalate by an order of magnitude when we try to
trade off opportunities and costs across fields. This raises the
issue of commensurability—the budgeteer's old and familiar di-
lemma of apples versus oranges. If rationing decrees that funds
are available for a major move in marine science, or for a
maximum R&D effort to develop an artificial heart, by what
process besides prayer and astrology does the unhappy decision
maker reach a choice?
The problems of choice are made more difficult by the fact that
many areas of research have their own clientele or special interest
support; the result is that some fields are less adequately funded
than others. Every year the budget seems to be a little tighter than
the previous year. In a nation where wants understandably outrun
available resources, the persuasiveness of a particular researcher
or a group of researchers may be able to shift research from one
area to another—areas which at the moment at least are less new or
glamorous or are represented by less vigorous advocates. This is
in the nature of the way forces work in a democratic society. We
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see no formula approach in the offing which would change this basic
condition.
As matters stand, not only are there no answers, but the question
itself offends many as savoring of heresy. We either fall back upon
conventional habits of intuition and bargaining or begin to seriously
think about the need to devise indicators of relative social merit
against which to test the options. If we face the truth, public policy
decisions are taken on the basis of intuitive judgments about social
utility even though the reasoning process leaves no visible tracks.
The step of displaying a social merit matrix with weighted criteria
may seem a short and obvious one, but it is another matter viewed
politically. Perhaps we are also deterred by a disconcerting
suspicion of arrogance associated with the act of even tentatively
positing social values—yet this is where we must start in con-
structing a matrix of social value as a guide to public spending
strategies. The question is troublesome; yet, if we really want
reasons for our priorities, together with clear policy audit trails, it
is very hard to see how we can for long evade the necessity for a
framework which will throw light on the relative social uses of
R & D alternatives.
One of the authors of this chapter achieved passing notoriety a
few years ago when he was caught out with his social merit matrix
showing. His objective, may it be said by way of extenuation, was
solely to provoke constructive discussion and argument about the
usefulness of these concepts in allocating funds for R & D. This
particular formulation consisted of three broad categories of
social values: economic, cultural, and political. They were sub-
categorized as follows:
Economic values
(1) advancement of health and welfare; (2) technological gain,
business expansion, and job creation; (c) conservation of resources,
both physical and human; and (4) return on investment.
Cultural values
(1) exploration of the unknown; (2) understanding of man's
environment; (3) enrichment of education; and (4) improvement of
human relationships.
Political values
(1) national prestige; (2) international understanding; (3) solution
of problems of have-not nations; and (4) cold war advantage.
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It is possible to apply some or all of such value-related factors
to alternative major investments in science and technology to
ascertain first-instance relevance. The next step, and a most
difficult one, .is to contrive a weighting system and to distribute the
weights to categories and subcategories. It can be done, but the
resulting weighted matrix will be biased by the attitudes and
perceptions of the designer. In an open and diverse society,
consensus in such matters comes hard, and the motives of the
matrix maker become suspect regardless of how faithfully he may
think he has aggregated the prevailing social predilections. What
he has not bargained with is the fact that social inertia produces a
surface pattern of assumed values while below the surface exists an
unsuspected turbulence of suppressed preferences which defy quan-
tification. Most sensible men therefore take evasive action; only
the battered budgeteer with his idealism ambles forth in the cross
fire.
But, for all the difficulties and conceptual "hangups," the
question of social merit in scientific choice, first raised by Alvin
Weinberg, demands a response. A society which is waking from its
romantic trance with science and technology will, in time, see the
need to order its values and test its public expenditure options
against criteria of social responsibility.
In a setting where it is difficult to assign research values, we
should make the most of the arrangements permitting us to view
research in identical or closely related fields that cross agency
jurisdictional lines. It is not that we favor duplication for this
purpose; but program-related research cannot be fully organized in
one or in some cases in even a few agencies. Research in the
marine science is a case in point; health research, another; and
pollution control, still another. Given the need for locating re-
search effort with program-oriented agencies, we should take
maximum advantage of the opportunity to evaluate different ap-
proaches, the selection of research centers, the development of
research findings, and the ability to translate research findings into
actionable program choices. \
RESEARCH AND/OR DEVELOPMENT?
Budgeting for research and development as a combined aggregate
of public investment raises painful problems. The distinction
between research and development has always been cloudy. Govern-
ment has found it awkward to budget large amounts for abstract
research and embarrassing to be obliged to explain esoteric
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research meanderings whose project titles seem out of touch with
primary social concerns. Thus, while a good intellectual case
exists for classifying basic research separately from development,
another instinct warns that research might fare badly. The
unhappy reality may be that research, standing by itself, is not yet
strong enough or tough enough to survive the rigors of the market
place.
Indeed, we come increasingly to the view that new and more
descriptive terms are needed if basic research is to hold its own in
a rationing situation. Perhaps we need a classification called
associated basic research, that is, research which is directly or
indirectly supportive of applied research and, ultimately, of tech-
nology. Most if not all research in the life sciences could be
considered "associated" with the pursuit of applied solutions to
health and medical problems. For that matter, much social science
research can be shown to have strong connectives to applied social
strategies. The problem has been that too little effort has been
made to mark the trails leading from general research to usable
knowledge.
It can also be argued that, with vigorous advocacy, research
might be placed within a protective financial shelter. In a very
thoughtful presidential essay, Caryl Haskins speculates3 that we
would be better off if we fussed less over setting ceilings on
research spending and, instead, concentrated on setting assured
floors in the interest of injecting more stability and capacity for
longer-range research planning. Haskins suggests that the findings
of Derek Price, distinguished historian of science, have relevance
to this policy approach, since Price has found that the figure of .07
percent of gross national product (GNP) for the support of research
runs fairly consistently among nations making significant inputs to
science, and he suggests that this may provide an acceptable
criterion for establishing an annual support floor for the govern-
ment's funding of science.
Since technology is quite able to look out for its interests, this
route may indeed provide public policy a handle to determine the
point below which public support should not fall. It would not tell us
how much we ought to budget for science nor how to spread the
research dollar, yet it would give us a standard by which the
science budget would move as GNP moves, as a constant per-
centage, and it could be a standard that would appeal to reasonable
men. The risk, to be sure, is that, in time, the number might lose
its original meaning and the floor become a ceiling. But some risks
must be borne cheerfully and there is enough solid merit to the
concept to justify its trial.
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BUDGET EXPECTATIONS
It is a poor public policy that will not tell science what it may
reasonably expect in the way of social investment through time.
Science has its own standards of productivity and, though they may
be fragile in comparison with the standards of other human
endeavors, they still have relevance and are observable to the
trained eye. Productivity in science, as elsewhere, is affected by
the conditions that are set up for it. Normal administrative
routines—time-and-effort accounting, and erratic budgeting pat-
terns—all work against research productivity, while year-to-year
swings from feast to famine make a shambles of an enterprise that
depends upon organization, motivation, and proximate financial
stability.
Science does not have to enjoy prosperity, but it does require
steady work. Once research is begun with public funds, its
performers should be able to count on up to three years of
stipulated support for an approved research plan. Anything less is
likely to yield less on the investment than would the same dollars
spent on nonresearch activities. Recent and unfortunate experience
on this score argues powerfully, though probably vainly, for taking
general-purpose research out of the annual budget and appropria-
tions cycle in favor of three-year lump-sum endowments, however
modest and below full research cost, to minimize uncertainty and
enable managers to program research within known financial
ranges. Even limited certainty is more attractive than chronic
gambling on better luck next time.
In reasoning that science should be granted a degree of con-
fidence as to prospective budget expectations, we are in no way
proposing a guaranteed annual income. Nor do we favor banishing
all uncertainty. Looking around, the public law is replete with
multiyear appropriation authorizations; for education, for housing,
for highways, for urban renewal, and so on. This process does not
ensure automatic appropriations up to the level of authorizations,
but it does establish a range of expectations which constitutes
settled public policy. At the same time, it provides a rough
yardstick with which to gauge the performance of the resource
allocation system in terms of deviation from the standard, and a
first stage from which to plan future levels of investment. If R & D
as a government responsibility are ever to be liberated from
hitchhiking on national defense and other vehicles of public con-
venience, a place to begin is with a legislative authorization which
legitimizes the independence of research in the family of public
policies.
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THE POLICY PROCESS
In broad terms, we surely have come far enough to accept
certain propositions:
(1) that the government's majority role in science and technology
carries with it a responsibility to formulate and declare goals and
strategies for periods up to 10 years;
(2) that government ought to make up its mind and then disclose
its planned levels of public investment for at least five years into
the future;
(3) that public policy relating to investment choices should be
formulated in the open and in a pluralistic setting involving not only
administrators and scientists but others as well, including social
scientists whose perceptions of needs and priorities deserve
consideration; and
(4) that R & D decision makers adopt the economists' approach of
ignoring "sunk" R & D costs in making decisions about the future.
For example, it should not matter that we have built a manned-
space flight or a new weapon system R & D facility if we decide that
our priorities in that decision were wrong or are not in line with the
needs of the decade ahead, politically difficult though such a
decision may be.
If these propositions hold water, the critical next question is
whether government has the policy machinery to carry them out. It
would be a hard case to make. However adequate present arrange-
ments may be for making particular incremental choices in R & D,
they are limited in their capability to assess R & D in comprehen-
sive and anticipatory terms for goal-setting purposes. Neither the
National Science Foundation nor the Executive Office has been able
to do very much under statutory assignments to formulate national
science policy; hence we have no policy with enough specificity to
fulfill these conditions. The Office of Science and Technology
serves well as a provider of staff advice to the President, a
sometime advocate of science in the corridors of power, and a
communications link with the academic scientists. And it has vastly
improved consideration of science and technology programs that
cross agency boundaries. But this office is too limited in resources
and driven by day-to-day pressures to address itself to shaping
national policy.
The point is not that the federal government should get into the
business of programming science for the nation from "aeronomy"
to zoology. But the point is that perspectives on science as a major
force in the growth and quality of society are needed badly. What
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government should begin to do is to make a start on the kind of
policy analysis that will provide for flows and perspectives—an
arrangement in which R & D are not just a diffusion of puddles on
the landscape but more nearly a system in which currents of
creativity flow, meet, and diverge, enriching one another as well as
the social soil they traverse.
The present pluralistic administration of R & D does not fit these
objectives. If we were to continue for a hundred years on our
present course, we would not end up much better off because the
institutional process simply cannot be responsive to tests of overall
balance, goals, and priorities. Since it was not a system in the first
place, it should not be expected to function as one. Something
different is called for, and there is no assurance that an ivory tower
for science could command a listening audience. There is, however,
an increasingly persuasive case—one which did not exist during the
bonanza years—for a Department of Science and Technology. It
need not be an overstuffed catchall for missionrealted R & D swept
in from all over the government, using some administrative litmus
test for detecting R & D wherever they are carried on. But a few
substantial building blocks could produce a strong new department,
oriented to both high technology and advanced science, which would
provide ministerial stature and a setting for building a center for
R & D policy analysis. The roles of such a center could be these:
to examine the interaction of science with higher education,
social change, international cooperation, technological de-
velopment, and economic growth;
to assess the mix of the nation's investment in R & D, its quality,
and its social returns;
to identify emerging unmet opportunities for investment;
to formulate and experiment with models for R & D investment
which reckon with society's new problems and needs; and
to prepare public reports outlining alternative goals and pri-
orities as a basis for policy formulation and long-range
budgeting.
These are implicit elements in any serious attempt to formulate
national policy, or to begin to apply measures of social account-
ability to science and technology. The fickle fortunes of R & D may
soon be less the function of budgetary quandaries than of social
criticism directed against the brutality of technology as it abrades
the tissues of civilized life. The terms on which social assent to
vigorous R & D is obtained may turn on the degree to which society
is provided assurances of social accountability—environmental
benefits and costs, additions or depletions of resources, effects on
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rates of social change, and gains or losses in the arithmetic of
national power.
THE PROBLEM OF "HOT PURSUIT"
Among the thorniest of decision dilemmas are those relating to
crossing the threshold from advanced research into application.
They can be exquisitely painful when public policy is under great
pressure for humanitarian reasons to invest heavily in biomedical
engineering. Usually, public funds have already been spent heavily
on fundamental research, and the demand for hot pursuit of ripe
research into the development stage is stimulated by both scientific
merit and technical feasibility.
The nature of biomedical research also gives rise to ethical and
moral problems, as well as cost-benefit issues, and the inability of
our decision making process to cope with such questions. Here we
see a striking illustration of the principle of social responsibility in
reaching decisions where science and technology impact on public
philosophy. In this situation, with technological opportunity con-
strained by moral and political attitudes toward human experi-
mentation, the budget maker is only one of many actors and by no
means the most important. Yet the public investment question
eventually must be faced in the context of a "go" or "no-go"
decision, and in dealing with problems of choice in the commitment
of major outlays for biomedical applications one is obliged to
confront four different kinds of questions:
(1) Has uncertainty been minimized ? The element of technologi-
cal gamble has lower appeal in biomedical science than it would
have in other R & D ventures, regardless of the potential payoff.
Judgments about its progress assume critical importance in evalu-
ating the degree of risk. Where uncertainty cannot be reduced to
low limits, our social philosophy leads us to choose more research
rather than to force development.
(2) Will health and medical services be adequate to supply the
new market demand resulting from a successful breakthrough? It is
of little use to bring in a new surgical procedure or a complex
treatment regime if it requires such a concentration of manpower,
funds, and facilities that only a small fraction of demand can be
satisfied. In the absence of an assured delivery capability, the
government should be guided by conservative development criteria,
giving sufficient weight to structural and cost considerations as well
as to technical factors impinging on development possibilities.
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(3) What is the calculus of benefits to be derived? The decision
to invest in biomedical engineering will be affected by expectations
relating to its relative impact on morbidity, discomfort, pain,
disablement, and mortality.
(4) Have total costs, immediate and consequential, of a decision
to develop and deliver a new medical procedure been factored out?
It would be myopic to focus narrowly on the first costs of demon-
strating feasibility to the exclusion of follow-through costs to create
a new supply of manpower and facilities to satisfy the market
demand. A biomedical breakthrough might be proved out for one
million dollars but might involve hundreds of millions to bring
within reach of the people who need it. Nothing could be worse
public policy than to bring a major health benefit within reach only
to have to put it on the shelf for lack of economic resources to
deliver it.
Opportunity costs enter in, as well, especially if the indicated
total investment to benefit a limited category of individuals would
preempt resources that would otherwise have been available for
such alternatives as increasing medical research on a broad
spectrum, improving the general health profile of the poor, or
attacking infant mortality with an effective level of effort.
In the end, social policy may lead to a decision in favor of hot
pursuit; but it will be a better decision if we have taken fully into
account all the benefits and consequences.
GOVERNMENT, RESEARCH, AND CAMPUS
The ideas of independence and accountability in the government's
relationships with nonprofit organizations have increasingly come
under scrutiny, notably by the Carnegie Corporation, but they
remain dusty. University research investigators have been vocifer-
ous in criticizing "green eyeshade" administrative burdens im-
posed by the federal government for time and effort reporting and
for cost-sharing, while important sectors of the Congress have
stepped up countercriticism of recipients of research grants and
contracts on grounds of excessive overhead charges and trivial
research. For the most part, the government continues to finance
nonprofit research by way of project support, although a growing
body of opinion holds that broad institutional grants are all that can
save universities from becoming Balkanized by the national govern-
ment. This love-hate relationship in the research area contributes
little to the reputation of either side and exerts a corrosive
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influence on what began and for a time flourished as a creative
partnership between public policy and higher education.
The probability is that neither independence nor accountability
can be completely achieved except at a prohibitive price. Both ideas
are limited by the realities of the respective environments. For its
part, the government can concede independence in the conceptualiz-
ing and design of university research strategies, and it can move by
gradual stages toward adopting formulas for sustaining grants, but
it cannot abstain from asking that the institutions show evidence of
qualitative objectives leading to social returns. For their part, the
institutions can properly press for removal of meaningless admin-
istrative routines while accepting the correctness of the govern-
ment's need for reasonable evidence of responsibility in the
management and employment of public resources.
But this level of generalization leaves many gaps. As far as
accountability is concerned, the government's legitimate needs run
to assurances of quality in supported research, together with
safeguards against the evaporation of research funds into general
operating costs of universities. The goal of quality can be reached
in part by long-standing peer-group procedures and in part by
standards of merit applied to the output of published reports. The
problem of evaporation is more difficult, but the proposal of the
National Science Board for separate funding of research and
associated expense offers a solution which deserves to be tested
with a group of institutions and agencies. It has much more in its
favor than the device of a statutory limitation on overhead or a
statutory formula for cost sharing which makes no allowance for the
varying needs and circumstances of different institutions and the
differing accounting systems employed.
At best, however, the government-university relationship is
unlikely to regain its original felicity. Too many disturbing forces
have emerged, the latest being campus reaction against federally
financed campus research. University research directors in a
number of instances have taken the initiative to terminate ongoing
research support, particularly that which is classified, because
facilities and records cannot be adequately guarded against seizure
and destruction. Strikes in some academic communities against
government R & D provide a further measure of the deterioration in
the government-university partnership. Government itself is awak-
ening to the realization that it has pursued a misguided policy in
establishing major centers for defense-related R & D in the uni-
versity environment.
One has to begin to think of alternative institutions for perform-
ing much of the R & D which until now has been the university's
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role. Two possible innovations come to mind. One is the "Govern-
ment Institute" suggested in 1962 in the Bureau of the Budget's re-
port on contracting for R & D (the "Bell Report"). The report said:
Such an Institute would provide a means for reproducing
within the Government structure some of the more positive
attributes of the nonprofit corporation. Each Institute would
be created pursuant to authority granted by the Congress and
be subject to the supervision of a Cabinet officer or agency
head. It would, however, as a separate corporate entity
directly managed by its own Board of Regents, enjoy a
considerable degree of independence in the conduct of its
internal affairs. . . . The objective of establishing such an
instrumentality would be to achieve in the administration of
certain research and development programs the kind of
flexibility which has been obtained by the Government cor-
porations while retaining, as was done with the Government
corporations, effective public accountability and control.4
This proposal, which has never been pursued or even seriously
considered by either the Bureau of the Budget or the Congress, was
put forward by Harold Seidman as a possible solution to the public
policy problems created by massive delegations of responsibility
for complex R & D systems to private profit making and not-for-
profit enterprises. In the spring of 1969, the General Accounting
Office, in its report on the use of management fees, took occasion to
sharply remind the executive branch that it had failed to follow up
on its own proposal.5
A second innovation worth considering is one which David
Beckler of the Office of Science and Technology has informally put
forward. It stems from rising concern over the disruptive con-
sequences of federal R & D within universities. The essence of the
idea is to create a new type of nonprofit research institute between
the government and the universities to act as a performer of
research. As Beckler views it, this would be a "bridging institu-
tion" which could involve academic scientists on an elective basis
in conducting research apart from the graduate institutions and
without formal involvement of the universities. Unlike the "Govern-
ment Institute," this entity would operate outside the framework of
federal control but possibly under federal charter and with federal
funds for research. One of the most appealing features of this
proposal is that it would go far to stem the trend toward turning
institutions of higher education into programmatic extensions of
federal agencies—the incipient innovation in the organization of
federal field services.
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SOCIAL COSTS
As we survey the government's organization means for making
choices in R & D, it becomes apparent that an important missing
element is a process for assessing the social costs of technological
investment. The government does fairly well in spotting technologi-
cal opportunities but has not begun to create a methodology for
forecasting and analyzing their direct and indirect effects on man
and society. As stupefying as may be the investment outlays to
develop a supersonic plane, or competitive nuclear power reactors,
these direct outlays may turn out to be just a small part of the
whole bill, with the greater part attributable to social costs.
We are a people with a strong drive for advanced technology, and
on the whole this helps to explain the growth of our national power.
But it has also created major liabilities which at some point become
payable. In time, the exploitation of forests and river basins for
profit led to a social corrective in the shape of conservation
organizations which can bring power to bear on decisions. In the
same way, the exploitation of man and society by technology,
including that portion spurred by public investment and risk
assumption, requires machinery to provide early warning of ad-
verse consequences and social costs. This is just as much an
element of budgeting and accounting as is the scrutiny of inputs to
technological achievement.
Admittedly, technology assessment is difficult to structure and
set in motion. Endless arguments will surround the question of
where such a function should be lodged in the framework of govern-
ment: in the executive branch or the legislative branch, or
independent of both? If we opt for the executive, would we make
technology assessment a responsibility of the very agencies that are
hot for technological change, or would, we prefer that it be a
presidential-level function? We can conceive that assessment ought
to be built into the regulatory sector, yet we know that in a market
economy the regulatory process is already too repressive and
unimaginative a weight on change. Strong objections might be made
against a bureaucratization of assessment, yet one finds much in the
performance of the Food and Drug Administration to admire.
The dilemmas are therefore many. But it is necessary that we
match the dynamics of technology with effective institutional pro-
cesses to guard the public interest. Trial and error is at least as
legitimate in creating effective public institutions and methodologies
as we concede it to be in R & D itself, and we should not be
embarrassed by it. In late September 1972, Congress passed
legislation establishing a Joint Committee on Technology Assess-
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ment with a full-time staff director and an advisory council that
includes the Comptroller General and the Director of the Congres-
sional Research Service.6 Although again we could find many things
to criticize in this solution, standing alone, the merit in it is that it
offers a beginning, a first step in what could become a system
linking the Congress, the executive branch, and nongovernmental
institutions as a network of social criticism leading to a responsible
and accountable technology. Lacking an adequate assessment pro-
cess, society is likely to pay twice for technological change—once in
its initial investment, and again to correct for the unforeseen costs
arising from the adoption of the changed technology. By any
standard, that is very bad budgeting and social accounting.
EVALUATION IN RESEARCH
One of the real predicaments facing the government, as it
launches large-scale social experimentation in the field of human
resources, is the infirmity of its resources for critical evaluation
of the effectiveness of its strategies relative to costs and expecta-
tions .
The Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1967 charged the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to determine
"(1) The efficiency of the administration of such programs and
activities by the Office of Economic Opportunity and by local and
private agencies carrying out such programs and activities; and
"(2) The extent to which such programs and activities achieve
the objectives set forth. . . ."
In attempting evaluation of the war on poverty, GAO came up
squarely against state-of-the-art problems. The issues surrounding
the study were critical ones, involving sociological and economic
strategies in a context of quasi-revolution and changing values.
Matters were not helped by the fact that GAO began its study under
a Democratic administration and finished it after a Republican
administration had assumed power.
In essence, GAO was expected to determine whether the war on
poverty was getting anywhere, and whether it justified its cost to the
public—a fair enough pair of questions to be addressed to most
public expenditure programs but exceedingly difficult to address to
an enterprise that is by nature experimental, research intensive,
and long term in payoff. Adding to the hazards of evaluation was the
existence of widespread attitudinal biases growing out of the war on
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poverty's implicit role in challenging customs, institutions, and
embedded social practices. GAO indeed had a bear by the tail.
In quantitative terms, GAO could see, as well as anyone who
cared to look, that the numbers of people included within the
government's definition of the "poor" had declined almost unbe-
lievably since the initiation of the war on poverty. By that single
standard, the ranks of the poor had thinned by several millions.
What the cold statistics could not prove was a cause-and-effect
connection between the programs, of the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity (OEO) and the decline of poor families as a percentage of
population. For that matter, the statistics revealed nothing of a
qualitative nature concerning the real economic and social condi-
tions in which the new nonpoor found themselves. Perhaps nothing
more could be said than that the war on poverty had not obstructed
the aisles leading to exit from deprivation.
Plainly, the GAO had no objective criteria by which to quantita-
tively evaluate the Community Action, Head Start, or Legal Services
programs or the Job Corps. The question really was whether such
programs were effective, compared with what? Moreover, even the
Community Action Program, despite its name, was anything but a
homogeneous entity: there were literally about a thousand varia-
tions of community action represented by that many communities
with their own social dynamics. In the case of Head Start, a skilled
evaluator could extract a few preliminary objective measures of
short-run effectiveness but could only speculate concerning the
program's lasting benefits. In the case of the Job Corps, evaluation
had to rest on disputed meanings of reading scores, post-training
job opportunities, and dismaying dropout rates.
For its part, OEO had for years lavishly financed evaluative
studies across the spectrum of its activities. In a sense, OEO was
creating a new industry by providing a market for program
evaluation, and perhaps this should be listed as one of the tangible
benefits of the war on poverty. As the GAO struggled, using its own
staff and a field of consultants to try to find answers, OEO itself
was absorbing a large portion of the country's limited capacities for
program assessment. Yet the Congress and the public saw very
little of the product, partly for the good reason that OEO's
programs had not had sufficient longevity or stability to yield
dependable evidence of their merits.
When its work was done and the time came to submit its report,
the GAO took pains to point out that
This task is an extremely complex and difficult one. The
methods of evaluating social programs such as these and the
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indicators of progress or accomplishment are not well
developed or understood. We recognize that, as the scope of
governmental activity broadens and as the complexity of
governmental programs increases, the Congress is recur-
rently confronted with the necessity of appraising accomplish-
ments that cannot be measured in terms of dollars expended
or in terms of such tangible yardsticks as the number of
miles of road built or pieces of mail delivered. We recognize
that it is essential that efforts be made to develop new yard-
sticks of effectiveness, to meet the needs of the Congress.7
All of this points up the problem of the feasibility of program
evaluation in the field of social R & D. The pervasiveness of
uncertainties and risk is, if anything, greater than we encounter in
the physical sciences. We are dealing with social investments, and
we cannot control the laboratory conditions for research. More-
over, the nature of social investment in human resources is
comparable, with private entrepreneurial investment in the sense
that we are putting resources to work with risk through time; we
are not, or should not be, seeking speculative returns before lunch.
Education, health, and economic opportunity have their cycles of
payoff and they are of a duration that will not speed up to match our
impatience, our sense of injustice, or even our anger.
Recognizing that evaluation of social programs cannot be made
on a strictly empirical basis, there remains a question of whether
it is possible to discipline judgments with respect to their value in
something other than strictly political-type debate. Such a debate
recently took place on the merits of the President's proposal to
close down certain Job Corps Centers on grounds of marginal
effectiveness, and resulted in reduction of number of centers and
consolidation of others. The uncertain variables relate to the value
of such centers in areas such as health, discipline, effect on
juvenile delinquency, and many other imponderables.
This is by all odds a major field for intensive research on
research, hopefully in university centers concerned with the impact
of R & D upon society. There is encouraging evidence that scholars
are in fact tackling the decision-making dilemmas. We note that in
1965, Frederic M. Scherer8 of Princeton University advanced the
idea of using panels of experts to choose among R & D opportunities
by supplementing cost-effectiveness findings with their own rank-
ings, using paired-comparison techniques. These rankings would
then be aggregated by scaling factors into a group consensus
ranking. While Professor Scherer's approach seems to be oriented
to the type of R & D to which cost-effectiveness methods can be
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applied, it is worth considering the use of panels of experts in the
"softer" areas of evaluation relating to social R & D.
But Scherer has put his finger squarely on the basic problem
when he observed that "the whole concept of net benefits and values
from programs with essentially political goals is fraught with
hazards." As he wryly notes, "Uncertainty is an inescapable
water-muddier."
Be that as it may, the pressure to assign values to government
programs seems inexorable, and we cannot afford not to experiment
with any approaches which may serve the cause of more rational
choices. The political arena would still be the point of resolution,
but the program evaluator has an obligation to provide the legislator
with the best his profession can produce. Again, needs are infinite;
resources are finite.
Massive social investments await federal funding after Vietnam.
Most of them will involve large-scale experimentation in areas of
human interaction with institutional changes, and there is no
guarantee of effectiveness for the money and energy that will be
spent. We have learned, too, that public opinion is slower to forgive
the government's social mistakes than it is to overlook even more
costly malfunctions in fields of R &D that are touched by mystery.
The conclusion is plain that the government must continue to help
create the quality and quantity of competence in program evaluation
which it will need desperately before long. It can do this by
increasing investment in social science research, and it can justify
the cost in terms of its managerial needs and even "fiscal
responsibility." But this will not come to pass unless the Congress
realizes how improverished we really are in the skills of evaluation
and writes into new social legislation a requirement that not less
than a designated percentage of program funds be earmarked for
program evaluation.
In approaching the evaluation of R & D in the social area it is
tempting'to borrow some of the methodology applied to other kinds
of R & D—such as military and other hardware-oriented programs.
Yet, caution is in order. What may be applicable to the evaluation
of low-income housing may not help at all in appraising an income
maintenance strategy. The differences turn partly on the ability to
define objectives and to quantify end results. Objectives, for
example, may have to be defined in terms both of a time frame and
an expected payoff but with less rigor in the social sector where
variables abound.
Obviously, everyone is searching for measurement methods of
evaluating effectiveness in meeting social problems. The first
barrier is agreement on goals.
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Even when we can agree among ourselves as to our goals, we
may still find ourselves uncertain of premises, standards, and
assumptions leading to the achievement of those goals. Con-
sequently, as a people we find ourselves uncertain about the quality
of our measures.
A major influence affecting the quality of our benefit measures—
especially those of social programs—is the availability of data from
which measures may be constructed. This is intimately related to
the problem of uncertain premises, standards, and assumptions.
Though we may be uncertain about some of our standards, the
necessities of day-to-day performance require that we set such
standards, either explicitly or implicitly. Having set them, we try
to accomulate data on program activities so that our performance
can be measured against our standards. We like to think that the
data that we gather, and the measures that we construct from them,
are relevant to these standards. We like to think that our data
banks, our information systems, are created in response to—and
follow from—our standards. By letter of August 11, 1972, the
Comptroller General addressed all chairmen of congressional
legislative committees suggesting that program requirements be
established in legislation to include "in the authorizing legislation
specific statutory requirements for a systematic evaluation by the
department or agency involved of the results of programs in
operation."9
But this is often not the case. Information systems tend to
become inflexible over time. They may become ends in themselves
to those concerned with their operation. This is a subject on which
much could be said, but it is very important to recognize that our
measures of performance and of benefit, may sometimes simply be
creatures of the available data, and the available data may not be
the most relevant to the standards against which we would like to
measure.
The recent efforts of the President's Panel on Social Indicators
are likely to provide a focus that will clarify our present circum-
stances and move us in the direction of doing better those things
which are possible with the measurement of social program
benefits. While fundamental questions such as hereditary and
environmental influences in education are unsettled—and they may
remain unsettled for as long in the future as they have been in the
past—many of the measures which we may apply to the benefits of
social programs are likely to lack a sound basis, but there is no
doubt that we will continue to apply them.
Our social realities demand measurement; measured they will
be; and if our measures are not as good as they should be, we will
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have to continue to use them for now—and push the state of the art
to higher ground.
CONCLUSION
The present trials of science administration in the public sector
are symptoms of the general search for new meanings and direc-
tions for our public policies. Underlying that search is dissatisfac-
tion with the ordering of priorities and values. If the scientific
community attributes its recent frustrations to either the accidents
of politics or a temporary budgetary crunch, it will miss the point.
The great thrusts of R & D in the last decade were generated by
external fears and forces. The present evidence is that our society
will be less impressed and intimidated by such forces in the coming
years. The motivations for vigor, adventure, and creativity in
publicly orientated R & D will stem from internalized goals and
values.
We are entering an era of humanism concurrently with the
massing of an economic, military, and technological abundance that
spells new strains and dilemmas for men and society. In this
context, the uses of power become our first concern. Whether the
values of science and technology to a civilized and purposeful
society bent on humanism can be perceived and integrated into the
tissues of public policy is the urgent question.
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I am concerned with an organizational role which
is easy to describe denotatively, but extremely difficult to describe
connotatively. Denotatively, it is the role of the division chief in
research organizations and of the dean in universities. It is a
position at least one step "down" from top management, with its
concerns with overall strategies and policies, long-range plans, and
the like. It is at least two steps "above" actual operations, that is,
the workforce (researcher or teacher).
If we were to proceed in a somewhat extroverted way, we could
easily list some fifty functions which this intermediate role could
play, including personnel hiring, recommending promotions or
firings, morale boosting, setting schedules, technical advising,
entertaining visitors, sitting on advisory committees, and so on. It
would be difficult to improve on Hugh Dryden's (1950) description of
the responsibilities of the research director,1 which he broke down
into technical and administrative responsibilities, and personal
development and leadership. Dryden describes very well the
"four-way relationship" of the director, vertically within the
organization, and horizontally inside and outside.
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But emphasis here is on a "systems approach" to the role, that
is, to try to understand what the research director should be trying
to do and the resources he should use to do it. The systems
approach is philosophical in that it attempts to provide a conceptual
basis for the "should." I am not, therefore, directly concerned
with the behavioral science approach (although I shall cite some of
the relevant literature) but rather with the more basic values that
are involved in the elusive role of the research director.
Part of the elusiveness originates from ignorance about Dryden's
"vertical" relationship, or the concept of hierarchy.2 For the
division chief is the essence of the hierarchical structure of the
organization. If we ask why such a role is needed at all, the obvious
answer is size. There are too many projects or curricula to report
to top management, and so we design organizations with intermedi-
ate roles to cut down on the span of control. But this obvious
answer does not help us understand how the role really works in
successful organizations.
In this chapter, we shall develop a somewhat radical theory about
the underlying value system of the division chief with respect to his
role. The theory, in brief, says that a division chief needs to be
"sanely schizophrenic," by holding at the same time two partially
conflicting value systems and their associated views of the organi-
zation.
The first view of the organization is the one held by top manage-
ment that the organization has certain overall goals which it seeks
to attain and a certain amount of resources to attain them. Specific
projects are a means of attaining these goals and should be dropped
if their contribution to the goals is not enough or strengthened if
their net contribution could be ever greater. Since survival is
important, the resources need to be budgeted, and control exerted
wherever there is a serious threat to survival. It should be noted
that this view is also shared by the planner, who in effect is top
management's reflective mind.
The second view of the organization is the one held by the
workforce, in our case the researcher or teacher.3 This view says
that the organization is a set of tasks that are to be performed to
the satisfaction of the individual who performs them and who in
large part decides what the performance is to be. For example, a
research chemist identifies an exciting problem and sets forth the
details of his investigation, or a professor with some graduate
students thinks of a seminar topic and designs a course around it.
According to this view, top management is a means of obtaining
resources to permit the tasks to be performed. Top management
becomes weak when the individuals in the workforce are prevented
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by management from deciding how their tasks are to be done or fail
to attain true satisfaction in their performance. At such times, a
change of management is called for.
In the industrial sector, the second viewpoint was that of the
artisan in a guild. Of course, the industrial revolution of the
worker changed the perspective. But in research organizations and
colleges, the second world view of the organization still holds. We
can dramatize this view by pointing out that professors are
ambivalent about the direction of the organizational hierarchy. On
occasion, they will admit that the dean and president are "over"
them, but in the main they tend to regard administration as a
second-rate university job (for those who could not keep up with the
pace): the dean and president are "under" them. This helps to
illustrate why "hierarchy" is such an elusive concept.
Now an astute top manager may be pleased that his researchers
believe they are the top dogs, because this keeps up their morale,
and high morale may make them more productive.4 However, such
reasoning fits into the first (top management) view of the organiza-
tion and not the second. We see that this morale-building strategy
views the researchers as workers—views them with much the same
perspective as machines; the better oiled they are, the better they
run. From the second point of view of the organization the problem
is not morale but rather morality. It is the moral conviction that
the researcher (or teacher) ought to determine how the task is to be
done and that this is the main reason for the existence of the
organization. It is a moral conviction based on Immanuel Kant's
(1785) conviction that no person ought to be treated as a means only,
but rather as an end. Kant, with 'a deep perception of things to
come, saw the eternal clash between this moral prescription and the
concept of maximizing happiness, or welfare, or profit. If society
strives to provide the greatest good for the greatest number, it
must inevitably treat some people as means only to the attainment
of societal goals and not as ends in themselves. Even a "benevo-
lent" society will, for Kant, act immorally.5
The division chief (or dean), according to the theory, ought to
recognize this clash of value systems and in some sense recognize
that no compromise is possible. If he takes on top management's
viewpoint only, he is acting as a surrogate for top management's
functions and fails to understand the real problems of the re-
searchers (or teachers). On the other hand, if he acts to serve the
researcher's ends as ends in themselves, he fails to accomplish the
organizational objectives at the very point where service is most
needed.
Perhaps the fundamental idea behind the second viewpoint can
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be clarified if we compare it with McGregor's famous "Theory X"
and "Theory Y" (I960).6 In Theory X, management does not trust
his personnel to accomplish their assigned tasks and uses an
information system to control their behavior. In Theory Y,
management tries to create an environment of mutual trust. But
both Theory X and Theory Y are means to management's ends, that
is, both treat personnel as means. "Theory Z," on the other hand,
states that the personnel's goals are the dominating ones in the
organization.
Thus the division manager fully accepts both Theory Z, as well
as top management's view of the world. In the end I shall have
more to say about the idea of holding conflicting view of the world
simultaneously, which I take to be a mark of the mature mind. For
the present, it will suffice to say that "holding" conflicting
viewpoints means that the mind is willing and open to listening and
responding to the debate between them, without feeling the need to
"resolve" the conflict once and for all. Primarily because the
debate is proceeding in a healthy and virulent fashion, the mind of
the division chief is constantly seeking innovative changes that will
raise the issue above a somewhat niggardly clash between adminis-
trators and intellectuals, to a mode of living in which the conflict of
ideas and policies becomes a vital organizational force.
First, we need to elaborate on the two partially conflicting views
of the world of the research organization (or college) and the
manner in which the division manager (dean) may adapt his role to
them. I shall concentrate on the division chief, rather than the
dean, reserving for the end some remarks on the similarities and
differences of these two roles.
Before describing the two world views of the division manager,
it is important to explain the basic orientation of this chapter. I am
not concerned about the techniques available to the manager to
perform some of his duties, but rather with the basic philosophy
which justifies a specific technique. Thus, as we shall see, there
are a number of techniques for evaluating research projects; the
basic question the division manager needs to answer is how to
evaluate one technique against another, or whether a "technique" is
appropriate at all. My basic reference point is research and
development (R & D) in the public sector, although I shall use the
private frequently to illustrate a point, since many techniques of
managing research have been developed in private industry.
Now a very useful philosophy of top management is contained in
the planner's approach, because the planner tries to conceptualize
as clearly as possible what the managers are trying to accomplish
and the possible means for reaching their ends.
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In the terms of the planner, the world of the top manager is
goal-oriented, and the attainment of the goal is supposed to satisfy
some group of "clients" of the system. It is essentially a world of
opportunities which can be translated into tasks or activities, and
the dominating concept of decision making is based on trade-offs
between alternative opportunities. The top manager steers his ship
in those directions which hopefully produce maximum pay-offs.7
This resume of the top manager's world can now be used to
describe the division manager's role in it in some detail. But first
we need to distinguish between the structure of the system and its
dynamics. The structure is essentially the elements that make up
the system at any moment of time, while the dynamics describes
how the structure changes over time and what the managers do
about these changes.
To provide a map for the coming exploration, the following list of
essential considerations will be discussed.
STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Ascertain the goals of top management and their relative
weights.
2. Define the area where the specific tasks of the division
manager lie in the total system.
3. Invent new tasks.
4. Evaluate the list to select projects.
5. Design the research task.
6. Assess the environment.
7. Provide top management with guides for budgeting the divi-
sion.
DYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS
1. Detect changes in top management's goal structure with a
consequent redoing of items 2-5 if changes occur.
2. Exert internal control through:
a. personnel hiring and firing
b. project control techniques
c. termination, initiation, or changes in funding.
In addition to these considerations, we need to say something
about what the manager can expect in the way of supports from
various people both inside and outside the organization. As we shall
see, the general theme is the use of good judgment in accomplishing
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the aims of the division manager; in no case can he reasonably
expect to find a solid, irrefutable base for his decisions. In each
case, however, we will consider what information can assist him
and what techniques are helpful.
TOP MANAGEMENT'S GOALS
Basic to all social systems is a set of interests that the system
is supposed to serve. I shall call that set "the client," though it is
rare that only one person is involved. In the private sector, the
client may be the stockholders, possibly the customers, or possibly
the managers themselves. In the public sector, it is probably the
public, but may also be the administrator or politician. Top
managers do not seem too concerned about identifying the client
precisely. They recognize that the ultimate client consists of those
people who can judge their decisions and, if their judgment is
favorable, increase the managers' resources, or if unfavorable, fire
the managers.
The planner, on the other hand, tries to be more specific. He
attempts to identify the client's long-range interests and then to
break them down into short-range goals and their associated
programs. Hopefully, the long-range objectives resolve the con-
flicts between short-range goals.
In the private sector, the long-range objective is often specified
as "return on investment" or "discounted net return," subject to
certain legal, moral, and stylistic constraints.8 There are some
serious difficulties in making either of these concepts operationally
clear, but they are being used more and more frequently in
corporate planning. The difficulties largely arise because it is hard
to specify what a "return" means to an organization whose lifetime
is indefinite. If one knew that the corporation would cease to be at
some prescribed point in history, then it might be possible to
generate an unambiguous meaning of "return" in terms, say, of the
net worth of the company. Consider, for example, a research
project that is terminated. What is the "return?" If the project is
now in the developmental stage, the return is highly ambiguous,
especially if the development is tied into other activities of the
firm.
Similarly, in the public sector there is bound to be considerable
confusion about the meaning of the long-range objective.9 The
nearest analogy to return on investment is the gross national
product, but this figure scarcely encompasses all that is meant by
the "public interest."
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Despite an inevitable confusion about what top management is
really trying to accomplish, the planner firmly believes that a set of
specific long-range goals does exist which in principle determines
how decisions ought to be made. The goals, at any point in time,
have different weights which represent their relative importance.
These weights are rarely if ever known with precision, but partial
ignorance is never an excuse for failing to estimate. That top
managers do make decisions which they consider to be rational is
the evidence the planner uses to establish the existence of these
weights. Such a set of decisions on policy is often used as evidence
of the implicit weights the managers do use, whether they admit it
or not.10 For political reasons, many top administrators of the
federal government might be very hesitant to say whether a dollar
spent in medical research is more important than a dollar spent in
educational research, but a decision at the level of the Bureau of the
Budget may reveal the implicit weights.
This point is a very important one in our understanding of the
role of the division manager, because basically he must be making
estimates of these goal weights of top management in setting the
tasks of his division, or else there is no rational basis of his own
decisions. Of course the manager may be very hesitant to have the
weights revealed.
But where do the weights come from? The only conceivable
answer is that, if they are rationally derived, they come from top
management's conception of the long-range future of the organiza-
tion and its proper role in serving the client. Otherwise, the
weights are arbitrary, and the whole enterprise becomes the farce
of the conventional or random. It is the planner's basic philosophy
that conflicts between goals are inevitably resolved by establishing
weights in terms of a broader perspective of the system, either in
time or in the level in the organizational hierarchy.
Since there are bound to be uncertainties on the part of even the
most astute top managers regarding these weights and the associ-
ated real long-range objectives, the weights are quite likely to
change over time; this is part of the problem of the dynamics of the
system which will be discussed after we have reviewed the
structure.
The division manager's task is to assist in transforming the
long-range values of the top managers into short-range tasks.11
This is what "task setting" essentially means in the world of the
top manager. The basic idea is to determine those tasks which will
best serve the long-range objectives. Since the real meaning of
long-range objectives is never clear and certain, the division
manager's job is inevitably a confusing one. Ideally, he might like
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to think of the long-range objective in terms of a measure of
performance of the whole system. Then he could think of this
measure as being some function of a set of tasks and the level at
which each is performed (including a zero level for tasks that are
rejected). His job would then be one of determining at what levels
the various tasks should be carried on.
Even though the planner's idealized version of task setting is
rarely achievable in research organizations, it does help to
elucidate what the manager is trying to do in principle. Among
other things, it shows us that the manager can control the level of
certain activities, that is, manage his resources. Essentially, he
does this in two ways—by allocating funds and manpower to a task
and by trying to improve the task itself.
DEFINITION OF THE TASK AREA
But first of all, the manager needs to know what set of tasks he
is supposed to control. In most research organizations, this is done
by using the names of the disciplines as guidelines: chemistry,
electronics, and so on. The difficulty appears when he tries to
understand all the possibilities that lie in any given domain of
research. In the private sector, this can sometimes be accom-
plished in terms of conceivable product lines. In the public sector,
the director of a laboratory will often map out his domain in terms
of research that is needed in the public interest but is not being
done by private -laboratories or universities because of a lack of
profit or pure intellectual interest.
Despite many attempts to classify the sciences, it is safe to say
that we still lack any definitive map of an area of research, which
would guide the division manager in his attempt to understand the
scope of his responsibilities.
INVENTING NEW TASKS
Since precisely defined maps are not available, the division
manager often needs to rely on invention to create new tasks. The
planner's model described above assumes that such a list is
available and that the job is to set the levels within each task. But
how is the list created in the first place ? And once a list is made
available—for example, by consultation with advisors, staff, and
researchers (subordinates)12 how does the manager build an en-
vironment for the invention of new ideas ?
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Several answers to these questions come readily to mind. One is
to follow the leader, that is, watch your most prosperous competitor
and try to match his best efforts. Another is to hire people with
innovative ideas. A third is to play it safe and consider those tasks
which appear to make the most sense to the researchers and other
interested persons in the organization. It should be pointed out that
a division manager who spends a great deal of his time trying to
hire the best people may be wasting his time in a futile task and
creating bad morale in the ranks. There may be neglected talents
in those he considers to be mediocre. That is why some apparently
startling degrees of success have been attained through brain-
storming.13 There is also something to be said for attempting to
understand how ideas propagate and survive in research organiza-
tions."
What is really needed, but will be some time in coming, is an
information system which aids the manager in formulating his
problems. Most management information systems today are de-
signed to assist in solving a problem once you know what it is.
From the manager's point of view, the far more significant issue is
to select the right problem. Solving problems is essentially a task
that operates with well-defined descriptors and classes; problem
formulation essentially operates with "fuzzy" classes.15
EVALUATING PROJECTS
A number of techniques for allocating funds to projects are
available in the literature.16 Essentially the idea is to forecast the
project output and compare this with cost, to obtain a net value.
Uncertainties are handled by judgment and probability theory.
The division manager is apt to find the formulas for evaluating
projects confusing and unconvincing, even in the private sector
where long-range return and market opportunity can be quantified.17
For one thing, there is a strong tendency to use ratios, for example,
the ratio of some measure of total return to the total cost of the
research and development project. Such a ratio might be adequate
if the total cost of a project were some fixed number, arrived at
independently of the costs of other projects. But one of the division
manager's main concerns is to allocate the optimal resources to all
potential projects. In these terms, the cost of a project robs other
projects of additional resources.
For example, suppose Project A receives evaluation score of
30 percent, while Project B receives a score of 25 percent and
Project C a score of 20 percent. Suppose all three projects are
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initially costed at the same amount, but there are only funds for
two. An innocent manager might then infer that A and B should be
selected over C. But it might happen that if all the funds were put
in C, the "return" score would be higher than for the combination
A-and-B. The point is that the ratios should be regarded as at best
suggestive, never as decisive. Of course, this criticism is over-
come in the global theoretical models, but not in the practical
"scoring systems" as described, say, by Dean,18 which are applied
to individual research proposals.
DESIGNING THE RESEARCH TASK
If we turn now to the improvement of the internal design of a
task, we see that the division manager or dean is really at a serious
disadvantage compared to his colleagues in other organizations,
because he knows so little about what his workers are doing. Now
of course there is the question of the extent to which the division
manager should be responsible for the internal design of the
project, since presumably this is the primary task of the project
leader. But a higher level manager should in principle be in a
position to understand how a lower level under him operates.
Otherwise his judgment that "X is doing a good job" has no basis.
Some help is available in development, where techniques like PERT
or CPM19 lay out the overall plan of the project, its phases, and its
rate of progress. But even in development, it is very difficult to
determine whether the work habits are anywhere near optimal.
Both PERT and CPM are based on judgments about the length of
time it will take to do specific subtasks. But these judgments are
based in part on past experience, which may be far from optimal.
Some studies have been made to determine how researchers may
spend their time,20 and it is clear that the majority of it is spent in
communication (mostly talking). But whether this mode of operation
is correct has not been ascertained. Division managers tend to take
output at some quality level as a sufficient guide for evaluating
performance on tasks, without worrying too much about improving
the performance by rearranging time or by technological innova-
tions. The design of inquiring systems is still largely a mystery21
as any reader on "scientific method" quickly sees. We are told
that researchers test hypotheses by means of well-designed experi-
ments, but we are not told how they create the hypotheses they test
(the main point of their endeavor) nor are we told about the many
discussions they engage in which somehow seem to influence their
research efforts so significantly.
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The one obvious way in which the division chief does manage the
internal affairs of the research project is in hiring (or firing). In
most scientific disciplines, reputation becomes a fairly- refined
judgment of the research community. Unfortunately, from the
manager's point of view, a good reputation does not necessarily
mean a highly productive researcher, since his reputation may be
based on results which are not relevant to the organization's
goals.22 As I pointed out above, we find many articles urging
research managers to hire the very best people, on the basis that
excellence of personnel is the only way to succeed. In a way, such
advice makes no sense. If about 5 percent of the active researchers
in a given field are excellent (and this may be too high an estimate),
then it is absurd to expect that every organization will be able to
hire people with the highest reputation. It is probably much more
sensible for the division manager to think in terms of leadership at
the project level, that is, in terms of those people who know how to
get a team to work, how to meet a deadline, how to write a report,
and so on, even though they may not have a high reputation in their
field. In this regard, we may note a real distinction between
division chiefs and deans of universities; the latter are usually
forced to rely on reputation for research or teaching.
Discussing the role of the division chief in the internal design of
a project naturally raises the question of his own required technical
and scientific background. It seems more or less obvious that the
project leader needs to have a level of sophistication in his
discipline on a par with the researchers themselves, just as a
professor does with thesis candidates, but does this obvious
principle apply equally well to all higher levels in the organization ?
We must recall the split personality view of the division chief. We
are asking him simultaneously to be a good manager from top
management's point of view, as well as a good ally of the re-
searcher. To do a good job of task setting from top management's
viewpoint, he has to take on a perspective that is not directly
the knowledge of his scientific specialty. He has to learn about a
new field quite different from his professional training. Further-
more, he must devote considerable time to the managerial area.
The question of technical competence of the division chief, then, is
one of balance between the conflicting objectives of his acting as a
surrogate for top management and as an intellectual advisor or
controller of the research project. I am tempted to say that the
balance is largely one of style, since some division managers will
tend to spend most of their time and energy on their administration
role, while others will tend to emphasize their role in bolstering the
quality of research projects. There is clear evidence that a wide
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variety of styles does occur in practice.23 Evidently, it becomes the
personnel task of the next higher level of management to select
division chiefs whose style is most appropriate to the organization.
If, for example, the research teams are very strong in their
technical and scientific backgrounds, but tend to run off into areas
with low payoff, then the division chief should be someone whose
style of leadership introduces more of top management's concern
into the research process. In such cases, it might happen that very
little technical or scientific competence is required.
Finally, we should note that there is also a group style, which
Thomas Kuhn calls the "paradigm" of a discipline.24 The paradigm
partially determines the value systems of the researchers (the
projects, as well as the method of research, they think are most
important). When the paradigm is very strong, the division
manager may find that his latitude in changing the internal design of
a project is very restricted. In such an event, the two world views
may tend to clash in a very severe manner, because the "profes-
sionalism" of the researchers may tend to work in an opposite
direction to the interests of top management. The division manager
will then have to be someone who thrives on controversy, because
he is not apt to find a satisfactory, permanent resolution.
ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENT
So far we have depicted the job of setting tasks as one of
designing levels of performance to maximize the division's contri-
bution to the overall objectives of the organization. We have been
mainly concerned with those aspects of the organization which the
division chief can change. But of course many things he cannot
control influence the way in which his division performs, and he
needs to have information about them. The class of all such
external influences can be called the environment of the manager.
The environment includes government funding policies, attitudes of
the public and its representatives, weather changes, top manage-
ment policies, and more. Resources, then, are those relevant
aspects that the division manager can control, while the environ-
ment includes those relevant aspects he cannot control. But the
important point about the distinction is that it is based on the
division chief's own decision, which itself is based on his view of
his world. He may decide, for example, that a governmental or
managerial policy is wrong. He then has to decide what he should
do about it. If he decides that realistically he can do nothing, then
he regards the policy as residing in the environment. If he decides
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he has a chance of changing it favorably, he regards it to be
partially a resource he can manipulate to serve his purposes. The
alert manager is one who never takes for granted that constraints
on his decision making are beyond his control; the question is
always an open one.
In the idealized model of task setting, the environment becomes
a set of constraint equations, which limit total manpower and total
budget, as well as various specific activities. Associated with each
constraint is a cost, namely, the cost of not being able to go beyond
the constraint in the various tasks. It is this cost which in principle
guides the manager in deciding whether the constraint can be lived
with.25
PROVIDING TOP MANAGEMENT WITH BUDGETARY GUIDES
We can illustrate the problem of deciding what is a resource and
what is environment in terms of the overall budget of the division.
Of course, no division manager believes that the overall budget is
entirely in the environment and that he can do nothing about the
decision. But division managers do differ in their ideas about how
to present their case to the next level of management. Some would
argue in terms of their own division's work and the need to sustain
or increase its level of activity. They assume that if each division
chief makes his case as strongly as possible, the next level
manager will have the best basis for his own decision and that basis
is entirely up to him. In other words, the decision manager has
neither the responsibility nor the authority to decide on his overall
budget, but he does have both the responsibility and authority to
state his case in his own terms.
There is a growing tendency to suspect that this rather super-
ficial view of the division chief's responsibilities may be in-
adequate. The point can be illustrated by a meeting I attended of the
visiting committee of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS). NBS
conducts a wide variety of basic research projects in both the
physical and the social sciences. These are conducted in divisions
which are defined in both disciplinary terms and application terms,
depending on their main purpose. Each division chief has an
advisory panel. The visiting committee sits above all the panels
and advises the Secretary of Commerce on matters dealing with
NBS as a whole.
The meeting was a discussion between the chairmen of the
advisory panels and the visiting committee about congressional cuts
in funds for basic research. Each chairman in turn explained what
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the cut would mean in his division, that is, the way it threatened this
or that piece of "very important" research. A natural question
from any observer might be how the visiting committee is supposed
to decide what to advise the secretary. Lacking any other guides
than their own scientific backgrounds and interests, they will advise
in terms of their own biases. Change the visiting committee
membership, and you get another kind of advice. Of course a wise
visiting committee avoids the issue if it can, by simply advising the
secretary or Congress to try to restore the cut, leaving the issue
unresolved at a still higher level.
The counter philosophy is that the manager at one level is
responsible for providing the next higher level with information that
enables it to decide on budgetary allocations. Through a combina-
tion of judgment and evidence the division tries to estimate the
gross benefits of its programs, say, in dollar terms. One possible
scale in the public domain, which is by no means universally
applicable, is the "income stream" that a given educational or
research program will produce for a certain group of the public.
The division also attempts to estimate the cost of the program,
again in dollars. But the cost may not be in terms of actual dollars
to be spent, but rather in terms of lost opportunities, that is, the
benefits that might have been attained had personnel been occupied
with some other task. This estimate must be made in terms of
other possible tasks of the personnel throughout the whole organiza-
tion. The division, therefore, needs some feedback from top
management to determine whether its opportunity cost estimates
are correct.26 The general usefulness of this type of management
information has not yet been adequately tested, but it should be
emphasized that when a division manager presents a budget to top
management and argues his case, he is implicitly assuming a
benefit-minus-cost approach.
To summarize the job of task setting examined so far, we see
that it consists of identifying the long-range goals that reflect the
client's interest, so that research and other technical tasks can be
judged for their relevance in deciding how resources can be de-
ployed and the proper design of their deployment, subject to the
constraints imposed by the environment.
DETECTING CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
This account, however, leaves out one very important considera-
tion, namely, that the job of managing takes place over time. Given
perfect forecasting abilities, managers might feel confident that a
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proposed way of structuring tasks would be sure to work out
satisfactorily. But in general, all the relevant information is never
available, and the next phases of a plan may reveal some critical
factors which require modification or even abandonment of certain
aspects of the plan.27
One important aspect of change for the division manager is the
changing value structure of top management. This most frequently
occurs when there is a change in organization, for example, in the
structure of the organization, the personnel of top management, or
the ownership of a private firm. But other types of change, which
may be less abrupt, are apt to catch the division chief unaware.
One type might be called "managerial fads," because it represents
more or less a style of managing which may sweep through the
whole culture. In recent years, we have seen a change from the
"strong-and-forceful leadership" style of managing28 to what might
be called the inquisitive style, where the top manager asks
searching questions of his subordinates about the policies of the
whole organization.29. Not that this style precludes forceful leader-
ship, but its impact is more subtle, and the subordinate suddenly
realizes that he'd better have some sensible answers to give about
matters that are not his direct concern.
Another managerial fad is the adoption of new technologies.
In recent years, we have witnessed this fad in the acquisition
of computers, systems science, program planning and budgeting,
and long-range forecasting and planning. It is perhaps unfair
to call these "fads," but it must be conceded that they are
often adopted without any extensive analysis and largely be-
cause the other fellow is doing it or (as in the case of program
budgeting) a blanket executive order comes through. The best
advice to the division manager is to become a good reader of
management literature, so that he understands the terminology
of new managerial technology, knows something of the pitfalls,
and can be prepared when a directive arrives or a top management
question is asked.
CONTROL
Control is essentially an information feedback device, in which
the consequences of taking action are revealed and appropriate
measures are taken to steer the ship on its proper course.30
The idea can be illustrated in many contexts. Consider, for
example, the obvious need to control expenditures, which every
division manager faces. His original plan, as we have seen,
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consists of allocations of expenditures to various projects. But
unforeseen events may occur: the need for new equipment, the
addition of a higher priced person on a project, resignations, the
need to accelerate or decelerate a project, and so on. It is usually
impossible for the division manager to follow all the impacts of
events on his original plan and to calculate how much his expendi-
tures have deviated from the budget.
But it is a relatively simple matter in many research organiza-
tions to project a line of monthly cumulative expenditures based on
the yearly plan and to check actual versus projected. Naturally,
there is some fuzziness in this simple feedback information system,
because "actual" expenditures are often projections themselves
(such as vacation pay or travel advances). But there is a fuzziness
in all control procedures, so that the manager is always faced with
two types of error: (1) changing the plan when no change is really
necessary, and (2) not changing the plan when a change is necessary.
Students of production control or of hypothesis testing will recog-
nize these as the type I and II errors of statistical theory.31 In
statistical theory, one attempts to assign probabilities, determined
by a specific control plan, to these two errors. That is, there are
alternative ways of reacting to feedback information, and from each
control plan one can infer the probabilities of the two types of
error. In managerial practice, however, it may not be possible to
be so precise, and the manager needs to use his own intuition to
decide when and when not to react.
Also, we still live in the primitive age of budgeting, where nearly
everything is budgeted on a yearly basis, no matter how inappropri-
ate this may be. Consequently, the division manager is held
responsible for coming under, but just under, the budgetary limit at
the end of the year and usually has broad discretionary powers
within the year. This means that his control plan will change during
the annual period. During the first months he realizes that errors,
even large errors, can be compensated later on, because there is
time enough. In the middle period, if he is running short, an anxiety
sets in and he may tend to react very frequently. On the other hand,
if he is running long, then there is much of a scurry to spend the
funds before the end of the fiscal year. So the probability of the
type II error (not changing when change is called for) is high at the
year's end.
This is probably not an optimal control procedure, and un-
doubtedly large amounts of resources are wasted by the arbitrary
annual budgeting procedure, which, it should be pointed out, is a
crude information feedback system used by top management. It
seems to be well embedded in the environment of both top and
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middle management, since neither seems capable of changing it one
bit.
The information feedback system says that the manager should
react, but it does not normally say how. But the How is as
important as the When, and both depend on the Why. The Why gives
the manager an explanation of the breakdown of his plan, providing a
basis for organizational learning. It is really astonishing how
slowly organizations learn from their mistakes. This seems to be
especially true of research organizations and marks a distinction
between research and development. If development means the
process of taking an idea and transforming it into a usable product,
then it is often possible to learn from experience how to improve
plans and estimate times to completion.32 But there seems to be
something frustratingly elusive about the research process which
does not permit a conscious use of last year's failures in setting
this year's plans. Of course, some specific guides can be gener-
ated. For example, if the manager believes that the explanation for
failure is the behavior of certain individuals, he may improve his
plan by eliminating them. Perhaps more significant is learning
about the "blind alleys" of research. For example, at one stage in
the research in computer sciences, most people thought we were on
the verge of automated translation of one common language (for
example, Russian) into another (English, say). The research
community was probably unduly slow in realizing that the available
basic theory of linguistics was not sufficiently strong for the job.
But even this kind of learning is a bit tenuous, since the division
manager can never be sure that a blind alley is blind, considering
how many such alleys have proved to be illuminating in the history
of science.
Nevertheless, even though no completely formal method of
organizational learning is available for research organizations, the
division manager and his staff obviously do learn, since we usually
give some credit to an applicant if he has had extensive experience.
What he has learned, essentially, is the art of reacting to both
positive and negative change. I have already discussed some of the
more obvious methods which can be formalized by information
feedback systems. On the informal side, his art must consist of
recognition of the personal qualifications of his subordinates but
above all a sensitivity to the positive as well as the negative, to real
innovation as well as compliance with set standards of performance
and conduct.
These remarks suggest a rather radical idea about one side of
the manager's role. We can say that the recognized standards of
his tasks, such as budgets, completion times, and quality of the
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finished job, take place in the context of the well-formulated
problem. The division manager knows what he has to do in a
reasonably adequate way, and also knows reasonably well how he
should react when the evidence shows that there is a marked
deviation from the plan. But most division managers also function
in the context of ill-formulated problems, where the nature of the
task is not recognized nor structured in terms of standards and
steps. These ill-formulated problems reveal themselves in various
ways: discontent with the general level of research activity, the
feeling that the division should be more innovative, a lack of good
morale, and so on. But the feelings of discontent are not translat-
able into specific tasks, because no one is able to formulate the
problem well enough so that the manager can see that a solution to
the problem would resolve some or all of the basis of discontent.
In the case of ill-formulated problems it is not possible to use
the idealized model of task setting in terms of long-range goals,
because not enough is known about the nature of the real problem.
Notions like cost and benefit are not used. The situation is much
like that of a traveler who does not know exactly what kind of a
place he is seeking and so the signposts do not give him enough
information. What is needed are some intuitive "surrogate stan-
dards" which act in place of the missing standards (guideposts) of
the well-formulated problem. The two I would like to suggest are
surprise and irrelevance.
The notion here is that in the context of the ill-structured
problem, the manager's role is one of exploration. If nothing
surprises him, he is probably not exploring, because, consciously
or unconsciously, he has already made up his mind. "Surprise" is
an interesting word in its etymology, since it combines "sur,"
meaning "beyond," with "prise," which comes from the French
"prendre," meaning "to take by force" or "seize." To feel
surprise, then, means that one is taken by force beyond himself,
which I interpret as being forceably taken beyond one's preconcep-
tions. The surprised manager is one who is seized by an idea that
he had never been aware of before, which in part transforms his
view of the world and in particular his idea of what the problem is.
The other aspect of exploration is irrelevance. Here again the
etymology helps explain the idea. The etymological background of
relevance is the French "relever," meaning to "relieve" in the
military sense of relieving a siege on a fortress, and so meaning to
"assist" the beleaguered. The manager who realizes he had some
serious problems is beleaguered, but he must be very careful in
choosing his allies. Some information will be highly relevant, in the
sense that it narrows the area of confusion and brings him closer to
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problem formulation. But if all information is relevant, then he has
probably made up his mind what the problem really is, whether he
realizes it or not. One sign that he is still open is that some, or a
lot, of information is irrelevant, meaning that it does not relieve the
siege or that it is frustrating. Irrelevance is analogous to "noise"
in information theory, though the reason for "noise" is not
necessarily the reason for irrelevance.
The thesis is that a manager needs to experience surprise and
irrelevance as critical aspects of his problem formulation. Of
course, the thesis does not imply that he should be in a continuous
state of surprise or find everything very irrelevant. Both surprise
and irrelevance tend to take him farther away from problem
formulation, and so have a negative as well as a positive value. Nor
is it possible to indicate how much surprise and irrelevance are
appropriate. The most we can say is that a manager who finds his
days filled with highly relevant, unsurprising events is probably in
a rut that is deepening to the point where he may become stuck for
life. The manager's problem is easy enough to state: how to create
an innovative environment without ruining the stable environment.
But at the present time, there is no adequate way to formulate this
problem in terms of specific policies.
SUPPORTS OF THE DIVISION MANAGER
We have been describing the division manager's job from the
viewpoint of top management, the things he needs to get done, and
the information he needs to do them. But there is one other aspect
of this role that needs to be discussed, namely, the "people"
resources available to help the manager. Part of these resources
are in the more or less hidden power politics of organizations, part
in external aids, and part in staff and committee activities. Not
much can be said of the first, except that it is undoubtedly an
important aspect of the manager's life. The manner in which he
builds up support and friendship in other divisions, in top manage-
ment, and within his own division, may very well determine the
success or failure of his enterprise. With respect to the second,
the manager clearly needs to know much about the efforts of other
managers at his level, especially since R & D feed into these
efforts.
The external supports of the manager's activities links his
system with other systems. The major aspect of this support is in
terms of funding projects. A large amount of the manager's time
must be spent talking to people from organizations that do or may
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support 'the research work. The general policy is often one of
talking to any person who is even remotely connected with possible
funding sources, a policy that is certainly suspect but hard to
change.
A similar problem arises in connection with proposal writing.
A decision must be reached as to how much time personnel should
spend on this important activity; the decision is especially difficult
in that the best proposal writers are probably the best researchers.
The problem is closely related to the problem of free time for an
individual's own research, which, from top management's point of
view, represents "seed" money for future contracts or grants. The
best technique for handling this bundle of problems seems to be
some sort of cost information system, in which the time of the
manager, staff, and researchers is translated into dollar figures.
This includes time spent in talking to potential or actual clients,
proposal preparation, preparatory research, and so on. If feasible,
costs should be "opportunity" costs, that is, they should reflect the
loss incurred in other profitable activities as a result of time spent
in "advertising" research. The opportunity cost may be zero, or
much higher than the individual's salary, depending on whether no
alternative opportunity is present or an extremely lucrative one is
being neglected.
Since in this chapter I am concerned with the division manager, I
have not addressed myself to the problem of gearing up to a very
large contract. But something needs to be said about the opposite
problem, the small contract, which characterizes a great deal of
R & D in the public, nonmilitary, nonspace domain. Many large
research organizations are poorly organized to go after this type of
contract, because the effort required tends to increase overhead and
to be far less profitable than the large contract. Consequently,
government administrators should recognize that their policies are
forcing many of the larger research organizations to keep within the
defense-space-energy area and should consider whether this is a
wise national policy. It can certainly be pointed out that the small
amounts of funds spent for research contracts on extremely
complex urban problems is an inadequate policy. If we can learn
anything significant through research about how to better the city of
New York in a significant way, the price tag must be at least a
billion dollars per annum.
Finally, we need to examine the aids within his division which the
division manager can draw upon. Some of these have already been
mentioned in such terms as the information system appropriate to
his role, project evaluation and control, and expenditure control.
The division manager can also expect assistance in arriving at a
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choice among alternative strategies and tactics. This assistance
may be informal advice from others in his organization, including
members of his staff and researchers. Indeed, there is consider-
able evidence in the organization theory literature that seeking
advice is important for morale; the quiet manager generates loud
and violent rumors.
But the more critical point is the extent to which division
managers should rely on more formal advice. This usually takes
place in two ways, via committees and via research. An anthro-
pologist from another culture might find in the Washington scene a
rather fascinating ritual, consisting of the convening of advisory
panels who are briefed on various research projects, compliment
the research staff and division manager with perhaps a suggestion
here and there, and take off for home where they forget about the
matter until the next ritual. I have already mentioned the NBS, with
its three institutes with several divisions. The divisions all have
advisory panels; each institute has an advisory panel; the bureau
itself has a visiting committee, the Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for Science and Technology has advisory panels for the
various research units of the Commerce Department, including
NBS; and a President's Scientific Advisory Committee sits on top of
all these.
One might defend this large amount of advice giving by arguing
that it provides a way for the scientific community to upgrade the
level of research conducted within government organizations, but
experience and common sense show that this is rare. Rather, the
advisory committees, especially in recent times, have become
agents for securing more funding, suggesting personnel, and lending
an aura of respectability. I am not necessarily arguing that the
advisory panel system is wrong, but it is certainly misnamed. The
division manager who expects to obtain really significant advice for
decision making from such panels is apt to be very naive. The main
source of advice comes from his project leaders and staff, plus any
consultants he may hire to study his problems in depth.
But the real question is whether the advice of people who do know
the problem of the division manager in depth is worthwhile,
especially when such advice is generated in committees. It should
be recognized that committee-generated advice is a method of
inquiry and must be judged by comparison with other methods. The
general theory which seems to be used in defense of committee
advice is that one or more of a group of experienced persons may
have encountered the same or a like problem before and may have
been able to test the efficacy of a possible solution. Or, one or
more persons may have developed organizational policies which
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imply specific solutions. The fact that the group, using independent
judgments, arrives at a consensus lends a great deal of credence to
their advice.
However, there is a strong case to be made against the use of
committee advice as a partial determinant of decision making.
First of all, it can seriously be questioned whether two or more
persons are really in agreement on a complicated organizational
issue. If the matter under discussion were a technical one, then
independently formed opinion may be valid. But trying to decide
whether to go into a new area of research or continue an old one
which has not fulfilled its promise presents so many facets that
overt agreement may be quite deceptive. What typically happens in
my experience is that A and B will agree on some point which
favors some specific policy; their very agreement on the point
carries them over to agreement on the policy. For example, a
committee is discussing the advisability of continuing research on
computer-aided instruction (CAI). A member points out that CAI
costs four dollars per student per hour, whereas ordinary instruc-
tion costs, say, four dollars per student per week or month.
Another member agrees strongly with the price difference. At this
point, the two of them form a coalition based on the conviction that
research on CAI is of questionable value relative to the national
economy.. The many other facets of the problem—such as techniques
for cutting costs or applications in special areas—are no longer
discussed.
Agreement is a very tricky mood which often leads us down the
wrong pathways. Only a very few mavericks feel inclined to stand
up against an emerging'agreement in a group, as psychologists have
revealed. When a group of subjects is shown lines of differing
length and all the stooges agree that a given line is the longest, even
the independent subject will tend to go along with the rest, despite
what his eyesight tells him. This kind of reinforcement must
operate strongly in the context of fuzzy problems, especially when
the committee member knows that he will not be held accountable
for errors.
As is true throughout this chapter, I am not trying to state
universally valid rules. Many individuals are superb committee
members, who do not buckle even when the group is unanimously
opposed. Much can be done by a committee chairman who makes an
effort to learn about the members, and who, upon sensing an
impending agreement, intentionally calls on members who may have
some good reasons to oppose it. He is especially alert to keep the
talkers from carrying the day by the well-known technique of
boredom. He is also alert for the trickster who twists a meaning
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and appeals to those around the table with the question, "Does
anyone here honestly believe so-and-so?" The adept chairman
should step in and twist the meaning back again by saying, "I do,
because what so-and-so really meant was thus-and-so."
Back of these remarks on the design of advisory committees is a
conviction that the strength of the committee methodology lies in
disagreement, not-agreement. To explain this remark, we should
take another look at the world of the division manager. We have
been considering his division as a component of a larger system
constituting the whole organization, which itself is a component of
some still larger system. We could also regard his division as a
component of the research community, which itself is a part of the
whole of society. Now the characteristics of these larger systems
are at best known only approximately and usually not at all. Yet the
nature of the larger system is quite important in judging the
performance of or planning for the division. What normally occurs
is some judgment, implicit or explicit, about the larger world of the
division.33 "Judgment" is a conclusion arrived at in the context of
debate, as in judgments in courts of law. The decision maker needs
to review the arguments, pro and con, relating to the kind of world
he lives in.
There are several techniques for creating debate in planning.
One may simply ask the staff to prepare two opposing cases to be
argued before the advisory committee. This "adversary" method
has the advantage of creating a competitive environment in which
opposing teams try to persuade committee members to judge in
their favor. But it may create an artificial atmosphere. Another
method is to predesign a balanced debate. A very striking example
of this technique consists of building up the pro and con from
exactly the same data base.34
It should be emphasized that the main point of the debate is not to
decide which is right, the pro or the con, since both may be wrong.
The idea is to create a healthy doubt in the mind of the listener that
his own assumptions are correct; a doubt is "healthy" if it leads
not to frustration but to a well-considered judgment based on
intuition and experience.
We have now explored the role of the division manager with
respect to the aims of top management. We have seen that he has
the responsibility of producing activities in a series of tasks which
have a high potential of serving the goals of top management. If the
real client of top management is the public, then the division
manager indirectly is responsible to the public, and his perform-
ance in principle is gauged in terms of how well the tasks of his
division serve the public's interests.
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THE VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM35
But as I indicated at the beginning, the division manager has
another group of clients and a concomitant responsibility to them.
These are the researchers (or professors).
First of all we need to describe a philosophy of individualism.
I'll begin by a description in its simplest and most direct form,
which is not the form the researchers themselves use. The idea is
that each individual, to use Immanuel Kant's phrase, is an end in
himself and must never be used as a means.36 Each individual is
unique and therefore not to be classified with other individuals.
This is an extremely important aspect of individualistic philosophy,
because it contradicts a very basic tenet of top management's
philosophy. Management believes in policies, and its policies apply
to classes of people, not to individuals. So management frequently
treats people as means to its ends; it sends out directives to the
effect that "all persons satisfying such-and-such properties will be
promoted, or fired, or retired, or whatever." But for the pure
individualist, such pronouncements are wrong and perhaps immoral,
because each person is unique.
Now the only prescription which makes any sense in a pure
individualistic philosophy is Polonius's "to thine own self be true,"
that is, "be what you truly are" or "become what you truly are."
Hypocrisy means lying to yourself, not really understanding what it
is that makes you unique, trying to hide from yourself your true
nature, say, to be socially respectable.37
As applied to the present domain of interest, individualism
recognizes that each person is a researcher, a special kind of
researcher, just as each is a special kind of artist, or teacher, or
student. Each individual by his very nature is continuously trying to
understand the world he lives in. Some do it by going to school in
cloistered halls, some by going to school in embattled halls. The
point is that no one is a better or worse researcher than another
provided that he is true to himself, that is, his research behavior
truly reflects what he is.
One can illustrate the individualist point of view in another
context: the so-called merit system. In our society, men are
"qualified" by various tests to attain positions in law, medicine,
teaching, and so on. In a society dedicated to pure individualism,
the merit system would not exist. Instead, each would practice
those things which best fit his nature, and no one or group would
impose its judgment of qualification on any person who did not
approve.
It must seem a blessing to those well entrenched in the modern
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paradigm of administration that nothing so chaotic as individualism
is likely to occur, because in the world view of the pure individu-
alist, there are no "trade-offs"—no idea that one sacrifices some
of X's benefit to better Y. It is a philosophy antithetical to one still
prevalent view of management, so aptly described by Hower and
Orth:
It assumes that employees (including scientists) are es-
sentially passive instruments, responding to direction and
control but generally incapable of initiating action or even of
maintaining it long without close oversight. It assumes that
people will generally do what they are told to do; it is
management's function to assign them tasks and see that they
carry out instructions.38
The individualist philosophy I have been describing does not
merely modify this "classical" view of management, for example,
by suggesting that people can have initiative if motivated well
enough or if given the opportunity. Instead, the philosophy stresses
that organizations exist to enable people to realize themselves, and
whenever anyone is treated as a means only to another's realiza-
tion, the act is immoral.
But this simplistic philosophy is not the one which the scientific
community has adopted, although the scientists' philosophy bears
considerable resemblance to it. It is the discipline39 rather than the
individual which becomes the focal point. The discipline is a
collection of researchers who understand each other's research and
methods and who set the standards of excellence and acceptability.
The discipline designs the curricula which qualify the young to enter
the research community, decides what research project deserves
funding by judging the method and content, decides what research
output should be published or awarded honors. One discipline does
not officially pass judgment of merit about another, although, of
course, persons in one discipline may be derogatory of work in
another. There is no "merit system" among disciplines.
The name of the game is "creating knowledge," and scientists
can wax quite poetic about the ultimate value of discovering a truth
that was unknown before. The point they make is that managers
and administrators should not use their managerial ends to judge
the ultimate scientific worth of a project; when they do, and when
they use basic science as a means only, then they are "immoral."
The real "value" of the task lies in its scientific worth, and this is
up to the researchers to judge.
Now the research community is not entirely esoteric, nor is it
entirely consistent in its philosophy. Despite its claim that basic
TASK SETTING IN TECHNOSCIENTIFIC MISSIONS 225
knowledge is a value in itself, it badly needs application to keep its
discipline from becoming more or less meaningless play. En-
gineering is an essential part of the enterprise of the physical
sciences, because it so clearly demonstrates in its technology that
the basic physicists are not making up their own rules without any
outside reference.
But here we sense a weakness in the scientist's philosophy. On
the one hand he wants to keep management out of the decision-
making process in judging the scientific merits of research; but on
the other hand he recognizes the importance to his own basic work
of the applications which management directs. The amphibology is
well illustrated in the remark of Gauss, to the effect that it was a
blessing that he could not see the application of his abstract ideas.
It was a blessing, because he was then intellectually freed to invent
a mathematics which later had many applications. In other words,
Gauss's failure to see any use of his ideas was a very useful
failure!
One quickly sees the difficulties of the scientist's philosophy;
they occur at the interface of his discipline with other social
institutions, including other disciplines. He is not clear about how
the total budget of his discipline should be set, for example, and he
is not clear about how important the application of his findings
really is. Normally, he assumes that management, for example, the
Bureau of the Budget and Congress, must set the total budget.
Having conceded this much, he is very uneasy if some bureau begins
introducing ideas of "program relevance" to modify the judgment
of merit of a project. Of course, if he goes to work for a private
company or for the Defense Department, he realizes that he must
yield to management, but he is certainly not happy about doing so if
he is a believer in the philosophy of basic research.
In any event, the scientist's philosophy makes most of organiza-
tion theory irrelevant. For him, the most important organization
with respect to science is a scientific community, which is
essentially nonhierarchical. There may be distinguished men in it,
of course, but they have neither the authority nor the responsibility
to tell anyone what he should do; they may play a role in judging
another's work, but no one person by himself is the ultimate court
of appeals.40 Consequently, in his conscious life the scientist is
fundamentally opposed to hierarchy. If he were forced to state who
was really "in charge" or "on top," he might well choose himself
rather than the manager.
But I am mainly interested in the moral background of the
scientists' position, namely, that scientists ought not to be used as
instruments of management only. The immorality becomes patent
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when scientists are used to create destruction either for defense or
aggression. Although less dangerous, immorality is there whenever
managerial goals dominate basic research to the detriment of
research goals.
The division manager needs to be a moral man as well as a
management man. Although morality is admittedly elusive, the
scientist's moral prescription is clear enough, namely, that he shall
not be used as a means only. To this prescription, the division
manager is committed as firmly as he is to serving the organiza-
tional goals. But the two commitments in today's society often
clash. If the basic research reveals a beautiful piece of knowledge
but apparently has no application, what then? More to the point,
microbiology may find the way to clone humans (make replicate
organisms from the cell of the original organism). Should the
frightening prospect stop basic research?
There is no adequate answer to this question. Anyone who uses
a full-fledged "systems approach" will inevitably have to become
immoral, by using people as means only. Anyone who doggedly
follows the moral law will interfere with other people's happiness.
Since social welfare and morality are both ideals of the human
race, both must be sustained. It is people like the division chief,41
who so vividly see the clash, who must learn that greatest hallmark
of the mature mind: a persistent unwillingness to give in completely
to either ideal, merely because such a concession would make life
peaceful.
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If, as George Bernard Shaw said, love is the illusion that one
woman is different from another, "policy" is the illusion that
intelligence can reduce the confusion of events and guide us toward
desirably, timely, and orderly objectives. To speak of "policy"
can be to dignify government unduly, to mistake congressmen and
cabinet members for intellectuals and intellectuals for seers. For
as anyone who knows Washington must acknowledge, government is
a creature of circumstance as well as plan, practical reality as
well as general principle, administration as well as law, accident
as well as design, events as well as ideas; in brief, one can find
as much inconsistency and pragmatism as conscious, consistent
purpose in government. Whether consistency be the vice of small
or great minds, it is one from which neither politicians nor govern-
ment officials suffer unduly, and if intellectuals want to understand
government and not just spin theories about it, that is a good point
of departure. Government "policy" is often merely the rationaliza-
tion of self-interest, an intellectual gloss on political decision.
Good policy should introduce a tolerable (not absolute) correspon-
dence between the immediate interests of program beneficiaries
and the larger interests of society, between the stated goals of
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programs and their actual consequences. Illusory goals may make
good ideology, but those who prefer reality to illusion must label
them bad public policy.
ACADEMIC SCIENCE
Unfortunately, government policies toward academic science,
that simulacrum of rationality, have been guided by ideological —
that is, irrational—as well as rational considerations.
Three fundamental assumptions have underlain this policy for
many years: (1) that expenditures for basic research should in-
crease markedly, (2) that the output of Ph.D.'s should also be
greatly increased, and (3) that, whenever possible government-
sponsored basic research should be conducted on campus because
of the mutually beneficial relationship between research and educa-
tion.
Perpetual increase in research expenditures
That academic research expenditures should constantly increase
and that attempts to restrain them represent an anti -intellectual -
ism which endangers the health of the economy and the welfare of
the nation are recurrent themes in the lamentations of scientists,
especially during lulls in their seemingly perpetual ascent of
budgetary peaks. Federal budgetary restraints, the New York
Academy of Sciences warns, will "seriously undermine the potential
benefits of science to the economy and human health of the nation
and . . . the world,"1 while, with a perfectly straight face, Jerome
Wiesner forecasts that if current budgetary trends continue, the
United States will be "a very sick country technologically" in five
to ten years.2 Harvey Brooks, for his part, perceives not merely
a "new disenchantment with science and technology" but "a deep
hostility toward science and scientists" and "an apparent revulsion
against science by the whole society" which he (like many other
scientists who contrast the purity of their purpose with the villainies
of industry) attributes largely to the public's confusion of science
with technology.3 It is a strange revulsion to which the government
continues to obligate $17 billion a year. And it is strange logic
which holds that science is good in itself (for "how can truth be
anything but good?" thinks the scientist who lacks Oppenheimer's
sense of guilt and forgets the punishment meted out in Genesis
not for man's technology but for his knowledge of good and evil)
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and ultimately responsible for what is good in industry (such as
economic growth)—but not, of course, for what is bad (such as
atomic bombs, anti-ballistic missiles, noise, pollution, traffic jams,
and many other things that threaten and annoy people).
Though scientists were not wont to protest the extravagance of
the 25 percent annual growth in federal expenditures for academic
research which prevailed from 1957-63, the lower subsequent
growth (often erroneously called decreases) educed the doctrine
that, as our agriculture flourishes on an annual rainfall of 42 inches,
so our science will flourish only on a budget compounded 15 percent
annually (and in physics, I am told, a "budget cut" is now defined
as any increase of less than 15 percent).
The first cogent public formulation of this doctrine was by
Harvey Brooks, in March 1965, in response to the following question
put to the National Academy of Sciences by the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics:
What level of Federal support is needed to maintain for the
United States a position of leadership through basic research
in the advancement of science and technology and their eco-
nomic, cultural, and military applications?4
Brooks's answer was that "on the basis of educational requirements
alone, it appears that a minimum annual rate of increase for uni-
versity research support of 13-15 percent will be required for the
next decade if the United States is to meet its announced goals for
graduate education." That represented the sum of two separate
projections: (1) "the cost of research per man-year of research
effort will increase at an annual rate of 5 percent in constant
dollars"—a figure specifically excluding inflation of the dollar
and confined solely to the so-called "sophistication" factor or the
increased cost of equipment and the higher standard of scientific
living; and (2) an annual increase in the number of graduate science
students which had been about 9 percent the preceding two years
and was then estimated at from 5 to 10 percent for future years.5
Brooks's 15 percent proposal (which was actually closer to 20
percent, allowing for inflation) was accepted as the Johnson Admin-
istration's official target for fiscal years 1966 and 1967. However,
under the mounting demands of our two-front war in Vietnam and
urban America, HEW Secretary John Gardner challenged the
wisdom of that policy in the summer of 19666 and the following
spring even the President's science advisor Donald Hornig was
admonishing his fellow scientists that though "we [that is, the
administration] accept . . . that America must be second to none
in most of the significant fields of science [which he carefully did
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not enumerate]. . . . what is not accepted is the notion that every
part of science should grow at some automatic and predetermined
rate, 15% per year or any other number. . . . "7
For about fifteen years—roughly, from 1949, when GI enroll-
ments had fallen off, until 1965, when the Office of Education
became the predominant source of federal aid to higher education-
research programs were the main channel by which federal funds
flowed to higher educational institutions; and one important reason
for this was because they were widely recognized as a politically
convenient means of aiding graduate schools when no broader
formula for aiding all institutions could be agreed upon. Today,
however, many other programs offer viable alternatives; in 1968,
some $3.2 billion in federal money was spent on such programs of
grants and loans to institutions and students, as compared to
$1.5 billion for on-campus research.8 Accordingly, research can
no longer (or, at any rate, less readily) be justified as a form of
indirect aid to higher education; it must be justified in its own right,
in terms of the benefits society derives from it as compared to the
benefits of alternative programs.
Ph.D.'s in science
As it happens, instead of rising, graduate enrollments have
lately been declining. In engineering, mathematics, chemistry,
physics, and psychology, first-year male enrollments were down
slightly in 1968 from their 1967 levels.9
Therefore, it takes no special talent to question the 15 percent
policy today. The wish of tenured professors for additional security
is understandable but insufficient to warrant such a permanent tax
on our future; a government which thus mortgaged its budget to
every reasonable claimant might just as well go out of business.
The most chauvinistic scientists recognize the ultimate mathemat-
ical confrontation between a 15 percent growth rate in any sector
and a 4 or 5 percent growth of the economy, but they relegate it
to an undefined "near future" or, as Lee DuBridge put it, to "the
next few years"10—a period as ample as "tomorrow."
But tomorrow is already here. Not long ago, the academy may
have provided a limited sanctuary from the harsher conflicts of
society, but who can believe that today, when it is more peaceful in
Washington than at Cambridge or Morningside Heights, and more
fires burn on campus than at the Pentagon? The students' cry of
"relevance" may often be ill-defined and short-sighted, mistaking
journalism for scholarship, politics for morality, protest for
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politics, and change for progress; but in their heartfelt search for
significant truths, they are closer to the call of the true intellectual
than are many scientists. Distance has lent academic research a
certain enchantment in Washington, so that both natural and social
scientists have successfully persuaded both their government and
themselves of the larger national significance of insignificant re-
search. Evidently they have been less successful persuading the
students in their midst. It remains to be seen whether the student
rebels will win more allies among faculty (as at Harvard) and
together wring concessions from academic administrators, or
among administrators (as at Cornell) and exact from the faculty a
greater measure of institutional and social responsibility (and,
perhaps, classroom attendance). Should events take the latter
course, Mario Savio may yet accomplish more good than he
intended.
Whether graduate enrollments rise or fall, to my mind, it makes
little sense to gear total governmental expenditures for academic
research to the number of graduate students who, as research
assistants, receive only a small fraction of the project funds going
to principal investigators. Stipends awarded directly to graduate
students would support their research more effectively and more
cheaply, and would distribute funds in closer correspondence to the
actual number of students enrolled at different institutions.
But the more important question is whether graduate science
enrollments should expand as rapidly in the future as during the
last two decades. Though I believe the answer should be "no,"
public policy should be founded upon the careful and objective
assessment of all the relevant facts, rather than mere opinion.
Unfortunately, the agencies largely responsible for this assess-
ment—the Office of Science and Technology and the National Science
Foundation—have disregarded inconvenient facts and acted more as
protagonists of graduate research than of the public interest.
Thus, the National Science Foundation was embarrassed by, and
did its best to forget, a 1957 study by David Blank and George
Stigler that the foundation had itself financed, which concluded that
"up to at least 1955 there had been no shortage—in fact an increas-
ingly ample supply—of engineers," that there was "no reason" to
anticipate a shortage of doctorates in mathematics and physics, and
that "on the contrary, it is other fields, such as the humanities, that
have reason for concern."11 NSF preferred, instead, to rely upon
Nicholas DeWitt's study of Soviet Professional Manpower which
found that the USSR "has reached a position of close equivalence
with or even slight numerical supremacy over the United States as
far as the supply of trained manpower in specialized professional
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fields is concerned. . . . Our own policies ... in regard to special-
ized manpower resources will decide whether within the next decade
or so the scales will be tipped off balance."12 This impressed
Congress at the time and still more after sputnik, when both NSF
and Office of Education science education and fellowship programs
were greatly expanded. Subsequently, a supposed decline in the
proportion of academic faculty with Ph.D.'s noted in National
Education Association surveys during the 1950s and '60s lent
credence to assumptions of a Ph.D. shortage; and the same assump-
tions were perpetuated by reports of the President's Science
Advisory Committee in 196213 and the National Academy of Sciences
in 1964 (though the latter was tempered by the fact that defense
cutbacks had then produced some unemployment among scientists
and engineers').14
Contrary evidence advanced by Bernard Berelson in 1960, being
uncongenial, was disregarded. Berelson discounted the NEA statis-
tics and disputed the prevalent forecast that the proportion of
faculty with doctorates might decline from 40 percent in the 1960s
to as low as 20 percent by 1970, insisting that enough doctorates
would be forthcoming "to raise the proportion of doctorates. . . ,"15
His judgment has since been vindicated by Allan Cartter of the
American Council on Education and John Folger of the Commission
on Human Resources and Advanced Education. Writing in 1965,
Cartter discredited the NEA findings, pointing out that the percent-
age of teaching faculty with the doctorate had not, in fact, declined
but had risen since 1955, "and has improved within each major
category of institutions (for example, public, private, two-year
college, four-year college, and university.16 One Office of Educa-
tion study showed that, in 1962-63, 51 percent of faculty in four-
year institutions had Ph.D.s.17 In 1967, Folger foresaw a serious
problem of research employment for science doctorates after 1975,
if prevailing trends continued.18
In view of this history, the National Science Board's March 1969
pronouncement that "it is not possible to produce too many highly
educated people in the United States as long as appropriate educa-
tional standards are not sacrificed'"'19 must be deemed either
innocent or irresponsible—either the ignorant or the informed
assault of a special interest upon the public purse. "A foreseeable
consequence of apparent overproduction of graduate school-trained
scientists and engineers," the board argued, "would be the up-
grading of the teaching staffs of the Nation's secondary school
system, an event which could only be deemed desirable in itself."20
Is the diet of the poor, then, best upgraded with cake? Will
students in high schools be the next who must educate themselves
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while their teachers sift the dross of nature for particles of silver?
At a time of turmoil and distress, when trust has diminished
between students and teachers, whites and blacks, citizens and
police, civilians and military, can we do nothing better with our
money than spend $50,000 training a high school teacher when
$10,000 will do ?
That statement of the National Science Board is only one
indication—unfortunately, there are others—of the poverty of thought
among too many of the men responsible for the nation's science
affairs. "By and large," Daniel Greenberg observes, "the states-
men of science are still telling Congress what they told it nearly a
quarter of a century ago."21 Indeed they are, and it is time fora
change; but there are few signs of fresh thinking in the stale
councils of government science affairs.22
The Seaborg credo
Perhaps the most outmoded element in our academic science
policy prescribes that, wherever possible, research, and especially
basic research, should be conducted on campus or in close associa-
tion with a university, because of the natural and mutually beneficial
alliance of research and higher education. This credo was well
expressed in the 1960 Seaborg report, which stressed that "when it
can be managed, basic research should be done in, or at least in
association with, universities."23 In his introductory statement,
President Eisenhower called "particular attention" to the impor-
tance of uniting basic research and graduate education" if the nation
is to produce the research results . . . that will maintain the
leadership of American science" and concluded, "in this great
endeavor, the partnership between the Federal Government and the
nation's universities will assume growing importance in the fu-
ture."24 The report directed its recommendation not only to small
projects but explicitly to "big science" installations:
We specifically reject the view that such large operations
as those of the Ames Laboratory of the Iowa State University
are inevitably alien to the university. We believe that great
fields of research like nuclear physics simply must not be
cut off from universities just because they now require very
large instruments and correspondingly large staffs of special-
ists and technicians. The very difficulties of such large
laboratories, in our view, are an argument for strengthening
their connection to the universities.25
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There is a great deal in the foregoing with which no one would
quarrel: the Ph.D. has traditionally been a research degree and for
those graduate students who will continue to do research, graduate
school is the natural place to learn to do it. And surely the support
of good, as distinct from mediocre, research at universities has
been firmly established as a legitimate and significant function for
both government and private agencies.
However, these valid points of policy conceal less valid points
which the well-written and well-thought Seaborg report left unsaid
in the fervor of its effort to plight the troth between government
and the universities (an effort so fervid that, for a time, doubt
existed if Eisenhower would sign the report before leaving office).
There are, of course, Ph.D.'s (for example, in teaching, adminis-
tration, and clinical psychology) and larger numbers of M.A.'s who
neither do nor wish to do research, as well as those who should be
discouraged from doing, and particularly from publishing, any. Let
us grant, nonetheless, that good research generally remains neces-
sary to good graduate education. But now, years after the Berkeley
uprisings, years of increasing disruption and unrest, can we any
longer say that the increasing level of academic research, which
has put many of the best faculty out of touch with undergraduates
except via microphones and closed-circuit television, has also
been good for undergraduate education and for the general sense
of community and esprit de corps on campus? Government is not
all powerful and is commonly blamed for too many things; I do not
want to add to its grievous responsibilities for peace, war, and
taxes the primary responsibility for what is now happening on
campus. But, insofar as the government is in part responsible,
its relationship to the university bears an uncomfortable resem-
blance to the farmer's relationship to the unhappy goose that laid
the golden eggs.
The "union of research and education" cannot be assessed, as a
public policy, solely in terms of its good and bad consequences
on campus, or as a defense of the university's role in big as well as
little science. In public policy, we must ask not only if an idea is
good and sound but why, among a multitude of good and sound ideas
one is singled out for special attention. In Washington, at any rate,
that choice often has something to do with money; and it may accu-
rately be said that, regardless of its educational and scientific
merit, the Seaborg policy had a certain usefulness in directing
toward universities men and money that might otherwise have gone
to government agencies, independent research organizations, and
even, upon occasion, private industry.
The Wooldridge committee report on the National Institutes of
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Health is an excellent example. Normally, an important function of
private scientific advisers is said to be maintaining professional
standards of quality against political pressures in R & D awards.
Yet in this case, the distinguished private scientists assigned to
evaluate the quality of NIH research gave first priority to the
political interests of academic scientists. Though government
salaries "are likely to be lower than those available in universities
and medical schools" and regulations more troublesome, the
committee found that "the average quality of individual research
conducted intramurally by NIH is in every way equal to that con-
ducted extramurally." Hence, the government was getting more
good research for its salary dollar intramurally than extramurally.
Nevertheless, the committee expressed "serious concern" about
the size of the intramural program. "The value to the nation of the
intermingling of basic research and higher education is such as to
bias us strongly in its favor," the committee declared honestly
enough; and, since the NIH campus at Bethesda was not a second-
rate degree-granting institution but merely a first-rate research
institution, the committee "inclined to the opinion that . . . some
decrease in the present proportion of intramural research" was
desirable.86
Now, the appropriate size of intramural government R & D ex-
penditures has long been of concern to private industry as well as
universities, and this is not the place to review every swing of the
pendulum between the governmental and private sectors in the
Army and the Air Force, on the Hill and in the White House, in the
September 1959 directive of the Budget Director Maurice Stans and
the April 1962 report of Budget Director David Bell, and on many
other occasions.27 According to some accounts, recent criticism
of cost escalation in defense R & D contracts may lead Defense
Secretary Melvin Laird to strengthen military laboratories in the
hope that they will then be better able to monitor the work of
industry.
But governmental laboratories are not the most natural com-
petitors for much of the research that has been done on campus;
in this respect, the NTH labs are unusual as government labora-
tories go. (How many others house a Nobel laureate?) The uni-
versities' most likely competitors for government research funds
are rather a variety of independent research institutions—those
which conduct research for industry as well as the government,
including both nonprofit laboratories like Battelle and profit-making
ones like Arthur D. Little and a host of smaller enterprises
spawned by faculty entrepreneurs; endowed research institutions
like the Carnegie Institution of Washington and the Sloan-Kettering
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Institute; so-called government research centers operated under
contract by universities and other private organizations, like the
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Brookhaven, RAND, and Battelle at
Hanford; and a growing crop of institutes once, or still nominally,
affiliated with universities, which have been, or may soon be, set
adrift from the sponsoring university once deemed so indispensable
to their success, such as the Institute for Defense Analyses, the
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, the Center for Naval Analyses,
the Human Resources Research Office, the Center for Research in
Social Systems, the Stanford Research Institute—and who knows
which will be next ?
How long can government policy remain oblivious of what every
newspaper reader knows: that military-sponsored research is
increasingly unwelcome on many campuses—unwelcome to faculty
and administrators as well as to student demonstrators ?
Let me state my own opinion clearly: Military and intelligence
agencies must inevitably maintain close ties to universities not only
in this capitalist democracy but in communist and socialist nations
as well, because military power and national intelligence dare not
for long be separated from the best scientists, engineers, social
scientists, and humanists, many of whom will always be found in
university laboratories and library stalls. If the Department of
Defense is forced to break its formal ties with these men via grants
and contracts to their universities, it will only have to reestablish
them in other ways via consultantships; grants and contracts with
neighboring, nonacademic organizations; and other formal and
informal, public and private arrangements.
Nonetheless, the first task of rational policy is to face reality
frankly; and it is a simple fact that military, and especially classi-
fied, research has been, or is being, expelled from many campuses.
According to one story that is probably not apocryphal, when Roger
Kyes was Under Secretary of Defense, a group of university presi-
dents complained to him about the volume of DOD applied research
on campus; but when he offered to withdraw that research, the
presidents protested more loudly than before. Today, many presi-
dents would heave a sign of relief at that prospect, hoping to avoid
a "confrontation" on their campus by retreating faster than student
militants advance. From the standpoint of the Defense Department,
an honorable withdrawal from campus may soon be as welcome as
one from Vietnam; and, as the domestic withdrawal does not wait
upon Paris negotiations, it would not be surprising if some such
directives were forthcoming. Already, there has been a significant
reduction in the volume of classified research on campus28; the
Senate has exerted pressure to reduce the volume of defense expen-
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ditures on foreign area research and on the work of DOD research
centers; and an address by Stephen Tonsor recommending the
removal of most defense research from universities has received
President Nixon's general endorsement.29
To summarize, I have tried to show how far government policy
toward academic research has been outdistanced by events, con-
centrating on three of the most basic elements of that policy: that
academic research expenditures should increase by at least 15 per-
cent a year; that we cannot produce too many science Ph.D.'s; and
that, wherever possible, government-sponsored research, and es-
pecially basic research, should be closely associated with higher
education.
Though I have not attempted to spell out in detail an alternative
set of policies, their general outline seems clear:
1. Since the relative stabilization of academic research budgets
helps to direct more attention to undergraduate education and
to the practical needs of society, it should be continued, to
borrow DuBridge's phrase, "for the next few years."
2. The infinite expansion of Ph.D. production should be replaced
with more modest and more selective goals.
3. At least until peace is restored on campus, or the academy
and the government fight again as allies instead of foes, much
military research, as well as certain other kinds of govern-
ment-sponsored research (including some large-scale basic
research and that applied research for which results must be
delivered on schedule or to meet necessary specifications)
should be withdrawn from universities and undertaken by
research institutions.
CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY
If science represents what we know about nature, technology
represents the practical use that we make of some things that we
know. While scientific knowledge is never complete (although in
designated fields it can be, if not completed, at least exhausted
for periods of time) it is, in principle, constantly being purified and
refined of error. One can imagine a time when, after centuries of
diligent effort, all erroneous and irrelevant information will be
winnowed away and the particles of pure scientific knowledge will
stand—like what? a mountain, or an ocean, of granulated sugar?
the gargantuan storehouse of a cosmic apothecary? a vast bank of
computer tapes and programs? of Jorge Borges's Library of
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Babel?30 By contrast, technology is unlikely to be "pure" or
"perfect," though it may be "honest," "simple," "elegant,"
"cheap," or "durable." Because much of the knowledge that is
utilized in technology is not "scientific" but pragmatic. Something
works and therefore is made and used, though why it works is not
understood by those who make or use it and perhaps not by anyone
(as fire, light, air, electricity, or gravity have been used for
centuries without being understood as well, or as poorly, as they
are today). Many aspects of technology are governed not by knowl-
edge but by custom and economics.
That technology expresses the values, standards, and fashions,
as well as the knowledge, of a people is evident not only in our diet,
clothing, furniture, and architecture but also in the number, charac-
ter, and design of our homes, cars, farms, cities, airports, battle-
ships, schools, and coffins. That technology also reflects the social
and economic structure of a society—its allocation of power and
rewards—can be seen by examining the quality and distribution of
common and precious goods, as an archeologist can discern the
structure of a dead society by examining and mapping its remains.
And, unlike science, which has a more contemporaneous quality,
technology also reflects the (vanishing and surviving) heritage of
the past, since no nation can daily replace its inventory of dams and
roads, buildings and tools, mines and towns.
The transmogrification of technology
All of this may be obvious, but it is worth noting because of the
follies that abound .in discussions of technology. "Nothing can be so
absurd but it has been said by some philosopher," Cicero remarked
long before the advent of social science. Somehow, technology is
conceived as a product of machines rather than men, not as good
or bad things that are made well or poorly by good or bad men but
as an independent historical force or even (since social scientists
often view society as part of nature) as a force of nature. This
common transmogrification of technology from the fallible product
of fallible men into a demonic power for good or evil constitutes
a suitable basis for a theology of science, the free enterprise
system, or "scientific" socialism but not for intelligent analysis
or practical action. The anthropological expression "material
culture" is in many ways preferable to "technology," lacking the
dangerous "ology" and conveying the intimate and generally quite
pedestrian relationship between a people's way of life or "culture"
and the artifacts and machines with which they surround themselves.
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It is harder, even for a philosopher, to make a myth of "material
culture."
What the philosophers and intellectuals have in mind when they
glorify or, more often, excoriate "modern technology" are not
the humdrum things we take for granted (though they were wonders
in their day—wheels, glass, paper, books, planks, beds, matches,
streets, sewers, cattle, wheat) but simply what is, or appears to be,
new (the product of what is sometimes called "science" or
"knowledge-based" industry—as if all industry were not based on
science and history, knowledge and custom, what is mechanically
and economically practical and what is culturally and politically
acceptable).
The statistics are all against them, showing the heavy concentra-
tion of R & D expenditures in a few industries; common experience
is against them, demonstrating that little or no "R" or "D" is
necessary for the economic manufacture and distribution of many
staples of life (salt, bread, milk, cutlery, clothing); and a closer
inspection of R & D activities is against them, indicating how many
are redundant, trivial, unproductive (serving to increase costs
without improving quality), or unsuccessful on any reasonable and
objective test of success. Two examples only need be cited of
fruitless and wasteful R & D expenditures in "science-intensive"
industries—airplanes and Pharmaceuticals.
Before becoming party to such waste himself as Department of
Defense comptroller, Charles Hitch observed: "It has been esti-
mated that half the aircraft developed in the United States since
[1945]—military and civilian—have been, in the vernacular of the
industry, 'dogs'—not merely inferior to some other aircraft, but
wrongly conceived, technically unsatisfactory, failures."31 And
after leaving office as commissioner of the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, James Goddard castigated the drug industry for such
duplicative and "phony" R & D practices as "molecular manipula-
tion" that "makes no contribution to medical science at all" but
serves to circumvent competitors' patents, and animal "testing,"
the results of which "can be predicted in advance" and which
"merely . . . flesh out the supporting bibliography that the law
states must accompany any promotional or advertising literature
in which therapeutic claims are made for [a] drug."32
Nonetheless, the ideologists of technology see both our doom and
our salvation in ever more R & D, directed either away from or
toward their hearts' desire: away from bombs (that is, war),
supersonic planes (noise), and large automobiles (traffic jams);
toward world peace, long life, pleasant work, good commuting,
clean air, safe streets, and cool summers. Following the comple-
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tion of Athelstan Spilhaus's experimental city in Minnesota, a
climatic experiment will doubtless be undertaken to develop an
American Garden of Eden. Indeed, I understand that a pilot project
has already been initiated secretly by a great industrial laboratory
in collaboration with the Livermore laboratory and the Hudson
Institute. The water is carbonated; the vegetation, synthetic; the
grass, genuine Bigelow; the insects, glass; the tree, photograph-
ically lifelike plastic walnut with steroid leaves rustling convinc-
ingly in the fan-blown, air-conditioned breeze. The serpent (to be
banished from the domestic market but included in exports to
communist countries) is beyond doubt the treasure of the piece.
It moves exactly like a serpent and talks through a small battery-
powered speaker, and its artificial fangs emit a poison deadlier
than any known to snakes. Eve is a Playboy playmate and though,
when merchandized, each man will be his own Adam,.it is said that,
during the developmental stages, Edward Teller and Herman Kahn
themselves will play the part.
Why does an artificial Eden seem somehow macabre? Not be-
cause of any special technical difficulty of manufacture or any
shortage of prospective Eves and Adams; periodically, zoos receive
offers from persons, probably no madder than many of us, who
would exhibit themselves; no fewer would sojourn in a prefabricated
Eden, and price would be an incentive, not an obstacle, at Nieman-
Marcus or Abercrombie and Fitch. Only if secrecy were obligatory
or the purchaser were obliged to remain in Eden permanently would
sales be affected. For what authentic American would want to be
stuck forever in an old-fashioned Eden ?
If there is any feature that has seemed fundamental to American
society during these decades of our technological triumph, it has
been technological change. Yet as any observer of women's skirts
and automobile headlights knows, much technical change is stylistic
rather than substantive. There is no ready way to estimate how
much of our vast national expenditures on R & D goes for essen-
tially stylistic aspects of science and engineering, but plainly a
substantial amount does. It is safer to make minor changes to
stimulate the seasonal turnover to which we have grown accustomed
than to hazard substantial sums on radically new products.
Probably the largest volume of technical change, in the military
and space industries, involves little financial risk because the cost
of development is borne by the government, which provides an
assured market for the final product. These truly research-inten-
sive industries are economically aberrant islands of socialism in a
sea of free enterprise; and though their scale renders them impor-
tant to the national economy, their high-technology products have
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less obvious effect on our daily lives than newspapers or razor
blades.
The technology of daily life
If we discount unsuccessful or redundant R & D, military and
space R & D, and merely stylistic R & D as having little fundamental
influence on our way of life, what kind of R & D, then, has such an
influence? A reasonable answer is: that which improves the quality
or durability or lowers the cost of products or services used and
needed by many people—food, clothing, housing, transportation,
communications, and medical services are among the most impor-
tant; educational, sanitary, and police services, and recreational
and cultural facilities may also be added, as well as any technical
changes that affect the quality of our environment at home, at work,
or in the local or national community.
It is difficult to find a satisfactory objective measure of "the
quality of our environment" or even of the goods in daily use at
home or work. According to one test suggested by an economist,
a panel given two Sears Roebuck catalogs for, let us say, 1925
and 1965, and asked from which they would prefer to equip their
house with a given sum such as $1,000 (making no allowance for
inflation) invariably prefers the more recent catalog, thus "prov-
ing" what we are in any case disposed to believe—that dollar for
dollar the quality of consumer goods has been improving. There
are numerous other indications of technological improvements that
affect our daily lives, such as the number and quality of telephones,
radios, airplanes, automobiles, roads, eyeglasses, hospitals, and
toilets—the favorite items of World Almanac international compari-
sons. And, insofar as statistics of the average standard of living,
income, national product, or wealth are related to the average
"quality of life" or, at least, the quality of that technology which is
commonly available to the ordinary citizen, we might almost accept
the common opinion that in the "low" technology of daily life as
well as the "high" technology of war and space, most technical
change has been for the better.
Almost—but not quite.
That the quality of many common goods and services has im-
proved may be accepted, although it is not difficult to cite examples
of those which appear to have deteriorated. Some maintain that the
art of repair and maintenance is dying on the altar of mass produc-
tion industries that find replacement more profitable. And a recent
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Wall Street Journal article, "Caveat Emptor—Many People Com-
plain the Quality of Products is Deteriorating Rapidly," began:
Roofs leak. Shirts shrink. Toys maim. Toasters don't
toast. Mowers don't mow. Kites don't fly. Radios emit no
sounds, and television sets and cameras yield no pictures.
Isn't anything well made these days?
Yes, some things are. A man at Consumers Union, the
publisher of Consumer Reports magazine, says that refriger-
ators are better than ever, for instance, and that wringer
washing machines are becoming much safer. But he agrees
that shoddy goods abound, and Wall Street Journal reporters'
talks with Americans from coast to coast indicate that quality
of merchandise is worse than ever.33
But let us forget the difficulty and expense of getting good car
repairs and shirt ironing, the decline of skilled crafts, the unreli-
ability of home deliveries, the carelessness of plumbers, electri-
cians, waiters, and garbagemen. Let us allow that the quality of
most common merchandise has improved, if not from year to year
then from generation to generation: that automobiles and tractors
are better than horses, refrigerators than ice boxes, electric lights
than gas lights, central heat than coal stoves, indoor plumbing than
outdoor privies, and penicillin than prayer.
Let us also disregard the problem of statistical averages that
can conceal some of our most distressing domestic problems,
because our average standard of living, of education, and of commu-
nity amenities can rise nationally while falling in the central city.
Grave doubts must still persist about the quality of our technical
progress and its social consequences.
One set of doubts is aroused by portentous technologies such as
thermonuclear weapons and doomsday machines; uniquely powerful
computers which can remember what everyone has done, operate
factories, or gain fractional advantages in stock market or other
critical affairs; instruments of genetic, biological, or mental
manipulation; and other horrific products that could enslave men.
Hydrogen bombs are assuredly with us, and more economic weapons
of comparable deadliness will doubtless be developed. Each man
has his own nightmares, and it is as hard for mere facts to erase
unfounded fears as to instill those which do not register. However,
the fears of a computer-controlled society with mass unemployment,
enforced leisure, and key public decisions in the hands of an elite
are premature, and those of mad geneticists are even more
fanciful.34
Fortunately, truly portentous technologies are rarer in life than
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in science fiction, although even one, such as the technology of
nuclear weaponry, can pose vast, intractable problems. Yet some
lessons, if little comfort, can be derived from the largely unsuc-
cessful history of international efforts to control nuclear weapons.
It has proven easier, but not easy, to control the testing and prolif-
eration of weapons than their laboratory development. The same
may prove true of many potentially dangerous or noxious domestic
technologies; and, of course, we should expect more success with
controls that the government can impose than with those requiring
the agreement of hostile powers.
Most of our technical problems arise less from a few isolated
technologies than from the cacophonous assemblage of the whole.
Individually, our automobiles, roads, skyscrapers, telephones, and
power stations may be the best in the world; but in the center of
the average city they conspire to make an awful mess. Each
tailpipe, chimney, garbage pail, and dump may be the most con-
venient and economic way to dispose of the exhaust of a car,
factory, household, and town, but all together can make life highly
unpleasant in metropolitan areas. Open-pit mining, open-forest
stripping, open-sea fishing, dumping sewage in open rivers, and
running telephone and power lines through open country may each be
the cheapest method of its kind, but the economies of this generation
can impose onerous expenses on the next.
Although we recognize the systemic nature of our technological
problems, their technical and human sources are so complex and
our knowledge and foresight so inadequate that we have been unable
to deal with them comprehensively. Our technological policies
have, accordingly, been determined mainly on an ad hoc basis35 and
have been focused on immediate, not future, choices. And, despite
valiant efforts which deserve further encouragement and may
achieve modest success, that will long be true. Congress's con-
stituency is alive today, not in the year 2000. The technical
problems thrust upon government for decision are sufficiently
numerous and troublesome without searching for others that lie
patiently in the background. Should oil drilling be resumed off
Santa Barbara and nuclear testing near Las Vegas or Amchitka?
Should chemical mace be used on rioters? Should the laws on
marihuana be relaxed while those on other drugs are tightened?
What should be done about the supersonic plane, manned planetary
exploration, breeder reactors, urban transportation, interstate
highways, airport congestion, air pollution, garbage disposal, to-
bacco subsidies, multiphasic health screening, educational TV,
venereal disease, birth control, and gun control? Federal, state,
and local agencies are called upon frequently, if not constantly,
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for decisions on these and countless other issues of technological
policy.
The power and the will
Through the powers of taxation, regulation, and licensure, if not
of direct purchase or subsidy, government agencies can exercise as
much or as little control as they wish over the development and
deployment of new and old products and services. The government
has ample power to control technology in the public interest. What
is lacking is not the power but the will and/or the knowledge of what
is indeed in the public interest. It is also likely that a government
which in both its executive and legislative branches is organized
to represent and serve special interests lacks a central machinery
adequate to identify and serve the large common interest.
That the political will is often lacking to regulate industry,
to set minimum product standards, or to stimulate the development
and production of new products better suited to current needs can
hardly be disputed. This is the argument for the solution of our
technological problems often advanced by consumer representa-
tives. It concentrates on technological problems for which technical
solutions or improvements are known but not widely available,
often because there appears to be no special profit, goad, or other
incentive for industry to adopt the improvements. Ralph Nader
has offered many examples in his criticism of industry's failure
to produce a safer car and Consumer Reports provides innumerable
other examples of the failure of industry to manufacture (and of
the failure of government regulatory agencies to require the manu-
facture of) appliances as durable, safe, effective, or cheap as
would be possible if all models incorporated the better features
of some. While it is unrealistic to expect any automobile, washing
machine, or refrigerator to contain the best of all possible features,
it is more reasonable to expect a higher general standard of
safety or durability or economy, to describe these performance
standards honestly, and to offer the consumer an informed and
meaningful product choice.
If an industry's profitability is due to its heaping upon taxpayers,
consumers, and insurance companies the costs of repairing or
enduring its damages (such as automobile defects, lung cancer,
and soot-soiled clothes) it is reasonable for the government to
redistribute these costs more equitably. An already profitable
industry can thus be taxed, regulated, embarrassed, and cajoled
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into improving its products. Insofar as the harmful effects of a new
product can be anticipated, industry can be required to correct them
from the outset. But, of course, the inability to anticipate these
effects is a root cause of our technological troubles.
Nicholas Golovin of the Office of Science and Technology has
suggested that the shoe be put on the other foot: that instead of
the government having to demonstrate adverse effects before
regulating a new technology, industry has to demonstrate that the
technology does not have harmful effects before widespread market-
ing is permitted. Thus, manufacturers of a supersonic plane would
have to show that it would not lead to unacceptable noise levels
before the plane would be licensed, as manufacturers already have
to demonstrate that the location and design of a nuclear power
reactor meets minimum safety standards before the Atomic Energy
Commission will license its construction. Such control over the
proliferation of new technology is needed, Golovin argues, because,
due to the increasing rate of technological change and the speed
with which a new product can now be introduced, "the number and
variety of ways in which new technology can damage the environ-
ment and harm the population is also growing explosively."36 The
difficulty of demonstrating what a technology will-not do is apparent.
True, Golovin would require this demonstration only if "technically
plausible arguments" have been made "that the mass introduction
of a new product or process will tend to degrade environmental
characteristics i m p o r t a n t to physical and psychological well-
being;"37 but the problem of accurately defining all such charac-
teristics, let alone of showing that a new technology would not
"degrade" them, alone or in conjunction with other technologies,
would remain. The net effect (and, presumably, the basic objective)
would probably be to inhibit the introduction of new technology,
but that would depend on how the government was organized to
review technological proposals, for experience has shown that
regulatory agencies can be as sympathetic to industry as promo-
tional ones.
Central government organization
Which brings us again to the matter of government organization
and, more particularly, central government organization, since if
the separate executive departments and agencies represent and
serve special constituencies, who but the executive Office of the
President and the Congress as a body can speak for the nation
as a whole? Occasionally, this principle may have to be modified;
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if presidential and congressional staff do not always speak for
"the nation," they are at least in a position to advocate different
policies than those of the executive agencies and to subject agency
proposals to fresh critical scrutiny. Thus, the Office of Science
and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee
have been consistently partisan to basic research and academic
science; but they have dealt more critically with many proposals
for the development of new technology emerging from the Defense
Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other agencies.
Mere location in the executive Office of the President is no
guarantee of wisdom; time may prove the decisions made there
either more right or more wrong than those advocated by a "paro-
chial" agency. But if the White House staff do their job well, their
decisions should reflect a broader range of factors than those
of agencies with narrower responsibilities, and the net outcome
should be more in the public interest.
That, in any event, is the thinking behind a multitude of proposals
to establish in the executive Office of the President one or more
bodies to evaluate new technologies, to set policies and coordinate
programs in various fields of technology (national security, space,
oceanography, environmental quality, and urban affairs already
have their own presidential- or cabinet-level councils), to formulate
national goals (a White House staff on national goals is being
formed), to assess the status of the nation's science and technology
(the National Science Board has already initiated an annual report
on the former), and to evaluate the social state of the nation.
In some versions, responsibility would be assigned to an existent
body, but the proposals all reflect dissatisfaction with the way in
which the executive office, and especially the Office of Science and
Technology, has performed some part of its job. (Nothing is less
noteworthy than for the Congress to solve governmental problems
by reorganizing the executive, while White House staff would solve
them by reorganizing the Congress).
It is a mistake to believe that government reorganization by
itself solves any problem; the substantive technological problems
and their social and economic repercussions remain, regardless
of how federal or local authorities are organized to deal with them.
The fight for a place at the summit of government is, in part, a
fight to direct public and congressional attention to designated
issues. In part, it is a fight for a second chance to influence policy.
Those who are satisfied with departmental policies are decidedly
cool to their reexamination by the White House. And Democratic
congressional committees with strong ties to established bureaus
may suddenly discover that their (and, in their view, the public's)
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interests are better served by expansive bureau proposals than by
those of an economy-minded Republican White House staff. Finally,
it is an effort to introduce a greater degree of consistency and
rationality (or, as the charter of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations puts it, "effectiveness and efficiency") into the
discordant, overlapping government programs. Thus, some of the
same congressmen who have urged the establishment of new evalua-
tion of policy machinery in the executive office have also sought
greater utilization of the social sciences in the evaluation and the
formulation of governmental technical and social policies.
The attention-getting and second-chance functions of an executive
office agency organized by statute and responsible for reporting to
the public and the Congress are indicated by Senator Walter Mon-
dale's dissatisfaction with President Nixon's recent announcement
about the formation of a National Goals Research Staff. Though
the functions of forecasting social trends and preparing an annual
social report that this staff has been assigned are similar to those
that Mondale has advocated for a Council of Social Advisers, he
has criticized the move as an "inhouse effort" lacking the visibility
of a council and a counterpart congressional committee which would
be set up, under his proposal, to hold hearings on council reports.38
Technology assessment board39
Representative Emilio Daddario's suggestion that an independent
Technology Assessment Board of five members be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Senate, with a General Advisory
Council also appointed by the President, is bound to receive further
attention when the two experimental technology assessment reports
commissioned by his Science and Astronautics Committee from the
National Academies of Science and Engineering are published.
The functions of the board would be to "(1) make a continuing
assessment of applied research and technology, current and poten-
tial; (2) identify areas or aspects of applied research and technology
which may be or may become detrimental to the social, economic,
international, and other interests of the United States; and (3) deter-
mine and recommend how such detriments might be avoided and
inform the public accordingly."40
Plainly, these functions are too broad to be realized and, in
practice, the board would have to concentrate attention on a few
selected technologies. If these are too important, the board would
risk major political confrontations that could damage its reputation
for political independence; if they are too unimportant, it could
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quickly achieve a reputation for inconsequentiality. Technologies of
middle-range importance, or of larger potential importance but
with weak proponents, would offer a good compromise.
As with Golovin's proposal, a too-negative outlook presents
another danger. Daddario has recognized that assessment "could
easily become a stifling influence on progress if the dangers are
emphasized rather than the potentials for good."41 But emphasis
upon "the potentials for good" is a promotional function. How can
an independent review board respond to serious hazards, to which
countermeasures are not apparent, but by calling for additional
R & D to overcome them? The fear that overly critical assessment
by an overly powerful agency might lead to the unwarranted sup-
pression of new technology has been expressed by Philip Handler:
Years of caution, the unpleasant consequences of error—such
as approval of a drug which later proves to have serious, but
unforeseen, consequences—have engendered within the [Food
and Drug Administration] the most cautionary of attitudes.
The hero of the Administration almost necessarily now, is he
who has prevented the introduction into society, as a drug or
food additive, [of] some material which would have had
untoward consequences. . . . Were aspirin or beer unknown
and invented tomorrow . . . , I doubt that either could find
approval in the Food and Drug Administration.42
It is interesting to note that, while speculating about aspirin
and beer, Handler says of thalidomide only that it "could not have
been anticipated and no stepped up biological requirement would
have detected the problem which finally emerged." It is also
interesting to note that the day after resigning his post, HEW
Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs Philip Lee
charged Handler with "at least a possible conflict of interest"
because, as president-elect of the National Academy of Sciences,
he was also a director of the Squibb, Beechnut drug firm.42 Shortly
thereafter, former FDA Commissioner Goddard criticized the
academy's Drug Research Board as being "composed of the same
individuals who work elsewhere in the marketplace. The Board
represents ... a limited forum in which consensus is developed for
the [drug] Establishment. . . ,"43 I note these charges not to take
either side in the dispute but to indicate that absolute political
independence is a dream, not a reality, either in or out of the
government. The academy, the nation's most august and influential
scientific body, is supposed to provide the government with "inde-
pendent" technical advice, and Daddario has periodically called
upon it for such advice. But here are government officials charging
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that the academy is in league with the drug industry, whereas they,
in turn, are charged with frustrating that industry's innovative
efforts. No mortal men can escape one or the other charge of being
either sympathetic, or hostile, to the industry being assessed.
Countering the danger of suppressing useful innovation is the
practical reality that an assessment board must rely in good
measure upon data supplied by the developers of a new technology.
The Daddario bill would give the board power to subpoena wit-
nesses, records, and documents on penalty of contempt; to hold
hearings under oath; and to publish "technological and other infor-
mation."45 But developers can hardly be expected to furnish as
complete documentation of the drawbacks as of the advantages of
their technology, or to reveal proprietary details which might be
useful to competitors. Accordingly, the board would either have to
base its analysis largely upon information selected by advocates,
or invest substantial sums in obtaining its own data (as, for exam-
ple, the large sums spent by the Food and Drug Administration and
the Consumers' Union in their own testing laboratories). Where
very large sums have already been invested in a development on the
scale of a supersonic plane, a new type of power plant, or a high-
speed railroad, there seems little alternative to inspection of the
developer's own facility and/or the data yielded by it.
Technology assessment and related efforts to protect the welfare
of crowded populations dependent upon interlinked, vulnerable
services represent the emergence of a more critical attitude to the
virtues of technological innovation comparable to that which has
been increasingly directed at the virtues of basic scientific re-
search. And it is no coincidence that this attitude has arisen at a
time when government expenditures for both development and re-
search have been leveling off, for the practical function of such
criticism is to help in the stricter review of proposed expenditures
that must now take place.
Excessive faith
But it is as wrong to infer from this attitude any Luddite hostility
to new technology as for scientists to see know-nothing anti-
intellectualism in appropriations that rise by 5 instead of 15 percent
a year. On the contrary, the nation continues to display an exces-
sive faith in the power of science, reason, and rational technology
to solve national problems. Evidence of this can be found on every
hand: in the yearning for technologies to transform urban life,
glowing hopes for "systems" solutions to complicated technical
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as well as social problems, mounting efforts to forecast the future,
the upsurge of interest in the social sciences, and the attempt to
introduce more systematic procedures into the choice, evaluation,
and budgeting of governmental programs. Science has become a
powerful element of American ideology, and new technology remains
as gratifying to adults as new toys are gratifying to their children.
The faith is excessive not because the achievements of science
and technology have been inconsiderable but because technical
disciplines can solve only technical problems, whereas our persis-
tent national problems are palpably more human than technical.
Machines are as innocent as ideas: it all depends on how they are
used. I favor both gun controls and safer cars. Nonetheless, there
is truth in the gun dealers' slogan that "guns don't kill—people do,"
and in auto manufacturers' claim that defective driving causes
more accidents than defective cars.
If our most important problems are social and political, not
technological, then, with due deference to Alvin Weinberg's insights
about "technological fixes" to social problems,46 they will be
alleviated or aggravated mainly by social and economic, not tech-
nical, measures. The excessive importance widely assigned to
technology is a reflection of the excessive importance Americans
attach to material things and of a hope to avoid the sacrifices and
dislocations that would be entailed by more direct social action.
The implicit hope is that "new technology" can preserve the status
quo—that cheap housing can keep the poor content, clean air can
keep cities viable, and educational gadgets can keep our schools
functioning without major increases in taxes on the well-to-do
or major shifts in the political power of whites and blacks, pro-
ducers and consumers, urban and rural areas. I believe that hope
is futile—either we must deal more directly with our social prob-
lems or we will continue to live with them. In public affairs, as
in the private market, it is still roughly true that you get what you
pay for.
Conclusion
Briefly, to evaluate government policies toward the development
of new technology is almost impossible. The subject is too vast and
the degree of governmental responsibility for various technological
sectors too varied to permit a concise and meaningful discussion of
policy alternatives comparable to those that readily arise in
government policy toward academic research. Virtually all aca-
demic research is conducted by a hundred institutions and half by
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twenty; and all would like to receive more money from the govern-
ment, with fewer strings attached. By contrast, industry is not
merely divided but utterly fractionated in its attitudes toward
government R & D programs. The aerospace and munitions indus-
tries are heavily dependent upon government both for R & D funds
and for their market. The agricultural, medical, and nuclear power
industries are heavily dependent upon government for R & D but not
for a market. Much of the rest of American industry has tradi-
tionally received—and wanted—little R & D money from the govern-
ment, because such money does not come as a free gift. It opens
company books to government auditors and company performance to
governmental and congressional scrutiny. And, as R & D findings
belong to the government and, via the government, to the public,
they may also (subject to agency patent and information policies)
become available to competing companies. The government does
not simply supply money for any R & D a firm may like to do; it has
its own idea, or its own preference among the ideas offered to it,
about the kind that should be conducted.
In short, government R & D programs violate the traditional
rules of a free private marketplace. Inherently, such programs are
a reflection on the ability of the free enterprise system to meet all
the needs of the American people. As Congressman Daddario
observed in arguing for a mechanism to assess the value of new
technology by standards other than its immediate profitability,
"the marketplace does not take into account all the important values
to society as a whole."47 And there are enough alumni of the free
enterprise school to contest governmental intervention in civilian
technology as un-American, socialist, or worse. It is instructive
to recall that the modest program of R & D aid to textile and con-
struction technologies proposed by the Department of Commerce in
1962 was rejected by Congress and by many representatives of the
very industries it was designed to aid. One industrialist castigated
the proposal as "a threat to our American way of life,"48 and the
Construction and Community Development Committee of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce declared:
The construction industry leaders of business firms and
associations have not been asked if they want a centralization
of responsibility for research and development vested in the
federal government. . . . [The proposal] makes no contribution
to the private enterprise system. . . . [It] adds more govern-
ment intervention and more government spending at a time
when less government intervention and lower levels of federal
spending are most needed by the construction industry.49
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Proposed R & D programs in housing and urban technology, simi-
larly, were repeatedly defeated before Congress approved a modest
program for 1968.50
The social scientist is supposed to be able to help the public to
understand any social problem (especially ideological ones) and the
policy analyst to come up with clear recommendations on any issue,
including the future of mankind or, at least, of American civiliza-
tion. Therefore, to discharge my responsibilities, I should express
my unhesitant conclusions about the course that government policy
should take toward civilian technology; but to remain honest, I must
insist that these are only opinions.
The failures of our civilian technology cluster in unprofitable or
unforeseen tailings and interstices of industry and particularly in
the technical structure of underfunded public services. They
represent failures of the private enterprise system; failures of the
private citizenry to uphold communal rather than personal values,
goods, and services; and failures of political leadership at all
levels to demand and obtain from private interests the powers and
resources necessary to defend the larger public interest. Detroit
produces only cars; the traffic jams are produced by taxpayers
who will not allocate sufficient funds for efficient public transporta-
tion, and by governments too timid to tax, regulate, and police
traffic so as to prevent them. Housing R & D will never lead to
free housing, nor can public or private construction await any
particular advance in the perpetual evolution of technology. Just
as the military must always be prepared to fight with existing
weapons while attempting to develop better ones, so the nation must
make intelligent use of existing technology while attempting to
improve it. The development of new technology should not substi-
tute for needed public works and social action.
However, more R & D will also be needed to improve the quality
of technology in the public sector and in those private sectors that
befoul the public scene. As a practical matter, public funds will be
needed to stimulate that R & D in both sectors, but particularly in
the former. Stricter standards will also be necessary, their strict-
ness being proportionate to the hazards and the costs they impose
upon the public.
A technology assessment board should help to render noxious
technologies more fragrant and raw technologies more mellow, but
too much should not be expected of it, for, to be effective, such a
board must also be highly selective. The Office of Science and
Technology should also be strengthened, and it should more fre-
quently take the initiative to weld concerted policies out of scattered
public and private efforts to improve the urban environment.
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These and other measures will help but, in a larger perspective,
they are palliatives rather than solutions. If a nation's technology
represents the material expression of its 'social and economic
values, then the excesses of technology can only be subdued together
with the excesses of society. Insofar as our technological problems
stem from our rampantly expanding population, economy, and
industries, which have previously known few frontiers and brooked
few restraints, their more lasting resolution may require that we
foresake some of our most characteristically American habits and
philosophy for those of the more stable European populations we
have long spurned. As our own population grows more crowded and
eventually stabilizes, the notion of limited frontiers and resources
may grow more acceptable, and with it the notion of human limita-
tions, of ecological and human balance, of restraint on the size of
cities, families, and automobiles, even of restraint in production,
advertising, ambition, and change for the sake of change.
This is, to be sure, an idyllic—some will say, an idle—fancy,
and one man's idyll can be another's hell. But I would like at least
to imagine (if I cannot quite believe) that one day our restless,
raucous, rambunctious people will live in greater harmony, that
our technologies will be more happily and willingly orchestrated,
and that we will live at peace with ourselves in a natural, not
artificial, Eden.
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For America the sixties was a decade of rising social turbu-
lence. The well-informed and the ill-informed, Left, Right, and
Center, generally unite in the expectation that the seventies will
bring more, and perhaps increasing, turbulence. This essay seeks
the implications of such a milieu for making and administering
policy for technoscience.
As shown by the several references to campus turmoil, the
preceding authors are aware of the changing environment of techno-
science, and often seek the implications of various manifestations
of turbulence for the topics they discuss. Harold Orlans is es-
pecially aware of rapid and radical change as he discusses govern-
ment policy development. But I shall reverse the perspective:
Given the turbulent environment, what then follows? I shall say
some trite things, because they are important; and some foolish
things, because in predicting the future this is inescapable. But I
shall hope nevertheless to open to further inquiry some matters
of crucial importance to technoscience and its direction.
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The argument I shall be making is to these propositions, though
not with the rigidity they suggest:
That the causes of increasing turbulence are real, consisting
of a tangled skein of facts, dangers, and problems and that
turbulence will increase, not decrease, in the future
That technoscience is deeply implicated as the cause of
present and anticipated perils and problems and is also
perceived as the cause, which is itself a form of reality
That technoscience is also related and perceived as related,
positively or negatively, to the reduction of perils and the
resolution of problems
That given the real and/or perceived relationship of techno-
science to the perils and problems to which increasing turbu-
lence is a response, the milieu of technoscience policy and
administration will become increasingly unstable, problem-
atic, contentious, and politicized
That functions and roles in technoscience policy making and
administration will need substantial redefinition and change
That the direction of redefinition and change must be the
addition of knowledge, attributes, and skills
That what is now needed is nothing less than knowledge of
how to survive and be creative, wise, and effective in a turbu-
lent milieu
The use of "technoscience" in title and text is deliberate. lam
aware of the distinctions made between, and the arguments concern-
ing the relationships of, science and technology or pure science and
applied science. But for the most part these distinctions will not
be relevant to my argument.
AN ENVIRONMENT OF CRITICAL PROBLEMS, QUICKENING CHANGE. AND
INCREASING TURBULENCE
It is hardly news that we live in an environment that is problem
ridden, disturbed, and disturbing. We need, however, to take note
of its main features and dimensions as a necessary prelude to
understanding the present and future guidance of technoscience.
Staats and Carey's statement, "if the scientific community attrib-
utes its recent frustrations to either the accidents of politics or a
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temporary budget crunch, it will miss the point," indicates that
there is indeed much missing-of-the-point. A rough and incomplete
catalog of threats and/or problems follows.
At the global level
A threat of violent encounter of a type which would annihilate
a sizable part of humanity immediately and much (some say
all) of humanity ultimately, certainly destroying "civilization
as we know it"
A population explosion threatening at best misery, and at
worst extinction, for hundreds of millions of human beings
The depletion, or depletion relative to expectations or needs,
of the earth's unrenewable resources
The contamination and degradation of the biosphere, making
life increasingly unpleasant, danger-filled, and short
A revolution of rising expectations by reason of hundreds of
millions of people on all continents expecting to have more
of the material goods of life—a new and yeasty ingredient in
world history
A division of the world into more than sixscore nation-states,
each nominally an independent decision-making and adminis-
tering unit; superimposed upon these numerous nation-states
is a de facto division of much world power and influence be-
tween competing and more or less hostile "super-states"
and their ideologies and systems because no effective world
political-economic-social system now exists
At the national level
A racial-ethnic problem that centers upon the status and
ambitions of blacks but reaches out in concentric circles
of involvement, action, interaction, and reaction
The decay of the central city and beyond it, urban blight and
suburban sprawl: the problem of finding a design, technical
and human, to provide for increasing, and increasingly large,
agglomerations of people
The generation gap, presenting in this era a chronic problem
in social mechanics, dealing with the "continuous barbarian
invasion" of the young, which has assumed acute proportions
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with profound implications for all primary and secondary
societal institutions
The proper scope and direction of official force, centrally the
military and the police, seen by some as a problem of the
military-industrial complex and by others as a problem of
the nonmilitary-industrial complex
Constantly accelerating technoscientific change, with resultant
disorientation, even anomie, and what could be called "future
shock"
An interrelated crisis in values and crisis of authority
The delivery of promised and expected social services for
more social equity
Maintaining order and/or relevance and effectiveness in
educational institutions
Patently, the list of serious problems could be extended in-
definitely: escalating crime and lawlessness, actual and potential
destruction of privacy, an information explosion and communica-
tions overload, drug use and narcotics addiction, unemployment and
inflation, transportation inadequacies and crises, sexual inequal-
ities, refuse disposal and/or resource recycling. And other serious
problems are rapidly approaching, including weather modification
and genetic engineering. The listing is simply a sampling; my
categories are open to challenge, real distinctions between world
and national problems are impossible, and many of these problems
interrelate and intertwine. Problems in a large and complex civil-
ization parallel its size and complexity, or pessimistically, pro-
gressively exceed them.
My purpose in this recitation of problems which are well known
by all literate persons is to make it unmistakably clear that the
conditions under which technoscientific enterprises operate are
certain to become more turbulent, with resulting implications for
'making and administering technoscientific policies. The causes of
turbulence are there; and it is not simply that there is a tangle of
interrelated critical problems: an adequate institutional, emotional-
intellectual apparatus does not exist for their definition, much less
their solution. In addition, what is one person's solution is often
another person's problem, and vice versa. Thus USSR solutions are
USA problems, and the reverse is also true. Thus the Catholic
Church has its solutions to problems of birth control, but to others
the Church is a part of the problem. Thus an antiballistic safeguard
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system solves a grave security problem for some, but creates
a grave security problem for others. Thus to some, hippies are
drop-outs from the desperately earnest task of making a civilization
work, but to others they are the hope of the future.
Technoscientific factors, far from being peripheral or incidental,
are at the center of these problems because they are deeply in-
volved as the cause and are centrally at issue in proposed
remedies. There are of course many analysts who see the techno-
scientific as the cause of social change, but for this discussion,
it is enough to recognize that technoscience is involved as a com-
plex cause-effect-solution and is widely so perceived. The world-
wide revolution of rising expectations, for example, is unthinkable
without its technoscientific causes. Now there is also a growing
counterrevolution of declining expectations—a phrase to designate
the movement to save the environment, with all it implies for
reducing material consumption and changing life-styles. This
counterrevolution is a response to technoscientific factors and in
them finds its solutions. Clearly, in the confrontation of the two
revolutions we cannot escape turbulence, and we shall be lucky to
avoid chaos.
AN ENVIRONMENT OF INTELLECTUAL-SOCIAL CHANGE
I wish to discuss now factors in intellectual-social change that
stand between the turbulent environment resulting from the above
problems and technoscientific enterprises. These factors relate
in a complex way to both, and again I must risk belaboring the
obvious and oversimplifying the complex to reveal important
emerging considerations for the direction of technoscience.
A new romanticism
There is presently under way a change in mood, thought, and
life-style similar in many ways to the romantic reaction of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Romanticism as a
reaction to the classicism and rationalism of the eighteenth century
exalted feeling above reason, the senses above the mind, and
individual spontaneity, creativity, and self-fulfillment above conven-
tion and rules. The romantics saw man as inherently good but
corrupted by bad institutions, natural man as better than civilized
man, simple man as superior to sophisticated man. They often
sought fulfillment in new forms of community and sometimes in
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revolutionary activity in an attempt to break away from traditions
and start anew on sounder foundations.
The parallels to contemporary developments are many and
striking. It is beyond my purpose to dwell on them at length, but
in the West and especially in the United States parallels exist: in
music, in art, in literature, in drama, in philosophy, in manners
and morals, and in social and political movements. Of course, one
risks sounding foolish in pushing the analogies too far since it is
possible that another, and more pessimistic, comparison would be
the contemporary United States with second- and third-century
Rome. But in what follows I shall assume'the existence of a move-
ment akin in its nature and import to that of the romantic era.
The import is clear: resistance to and trouble for scientific -
technological enterprises since science emphasizes rationality and
discipline, mind as opposed to emotion. It is, or is perceived as,
demanding, impersonal, and abstract. Its spawn and ally is tech-
nology: cold, impersonal, artificial, meretricious, dehumanized,
and dehumanizing. Both science and technology, in a creator-and-
created relationship, are a part of the establishment. And the
establishment is the enemy. It causes wars, supports brutalizing
tyrannies, destroys and pollutes the earth, permits needless depri-
vation and suffering, squeezes out the joy of living in a mad, sense-
less scramble for power, wealth, and material goods—and at the
same time it professes noble ideals and even claims divine sanc-
tion. It is instructive to remember that Lavoisier got the guillotine:
"The Revolution has no need of scientists."
Of course, I oversimplify and perhaps exaggerate. But 400,000
young people did not gather at Oak Ridge to celebrate science, nor
at Cape Kennedy to celebrate technology, nor in Washington to cele-
brate American policies and power, nor on Madison Avenue to
celebrate the American standard of living. They gathered in a cow
pasture to celebrate individual and collective release from or
opposition to the establishment. My reading is that the overwhelm-
ing majority at Woodstock thought the moon landing was not a
triumph of science, technology, and the human spirit, but at best
senseless gadgeteering, at worst criminal folly. Some observers
thought they saw at Woodstock the lineaments of a future America
or—in the assertions by participants and their spiritual fellow
travelers—of a "Woodstock Nation."
A few years ago, impressed with the growing importance and
scope of science in American life, I predicted half-seriously that
by the 1980s we would elect a scientist-turned-politician as Presi-
dent. But in a time in which a Norman Mailer, not an Isidor I. Rabi,
seeks the mayoralty of New York City, I withdraw the prediction.
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An antiorganizational revolution
In 1953 Kenneth Boulding published The Organizational Revo-
lution. At base, his argument was that we live in a period of greatly
increased "organizationness"; that for a number of historical
socioeconomic reasons we are experiencing an increase in the
number of organizations, the size of organizations, and the intensity
of organizational phenomena. I suggest that an appropriate and
needed book at the present time is one entitled: The Antiorganiza-
tional Revolution, arguing that we have entered a period in which
the factors of erosion and decay in organizational life are in
ascendancy.
An abundant and complex organizational growth depends on
support and encouragement from the socioeconomic substructure
and because such support and encouragement existed, there was
an efflorescence of organizational life, which reached a climax
in mid-century. Recently, however, the basic social institutions are
changing toward a less supportive direction, and various forces
in our national life are either indifferent or hostile toward organi-
zational phenomena.
Much of the work of Max Weber was concerned with tracing the
supportive structure for the bureaucratic mode of organization,
which he regarded as the most rational and efficient way for human
being to relate to accomplish specific goals. As he viewed it,
bureaucratic organization rose and flourished only in a complex
social milieu, with relatively advanced religious, economic, educa-
tional, and legal institutions. Bureaucracy assumed and needed a
certain type of personality structure. To function optimally in a
bureaucratic organization, members must have the ability to accept
and impose discipline and an orientation toward punctuality, effi-
ciency, productivity, and "bureaucratic virtues" generally. Such
qualities, while they may be reinforced in a bureaucratic organiza-
tion, are basically the products of society—first of all of the basic
societal unity, the family.
Some argue persuasively that other types of organization are
more appropriate to and more efficient for other social arrange-
ments, life-styles, and personality structures. Perhaps this is
true, and perhaps we are moving, and should move, away from
bureaucratic modes of organization. But for the present purposes
the argument is simply that if there are currently significant
changes in the societal substructure for our predominantly bureau-
cratic organizations, then these organizations are experiencing,
and will further experience, stress and change.
It is clear that many of the currents and events that constitute
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the new romanticism are a part of, and further, an antiorganiza-
tional revolution. Organization is the establishment and the estab-
lishment is organization. Specific organizations are instruments of
evil: they invent fiendish devices for killing, force young people
into the dangerous and obscene business of war, plunder and destroy
the natural world, threaten to destroy all life—and educate for and
justify all this. More, the very "organizationness" of our society,
apart from the evils of specific organizations, narrows and crip-
ples, takes away our freedom and spontaneity, squeezes life dry.
So "drop out," destroy the establishment, or at least reform the
establishment. However, these three alternatives are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, and probably the majority of college-
educated youths are adopting a pattern of life that in part reflects
a combination of all three.
A change in values and interests
The new romanticism implies significant shifts in values and
interests in many disciplines, in philosophy, and in the enter-
prises of science and technology. There is a shift away from
"scientism," positivism, and neutrality of or indifference to
values and toward "policy," humanism, and concern for and
orientation to values; in still broader if more uncertain and argu-
able terms, the shift is from the abstract and rational toward the
concrete and affectual.
These trends are unmistakable in political science and public
administration—the academic-professional field in which I am a
card-carrying member. In both fields youth and New Left move-
ments have been directed against an establishment in the profes-
sional organizations considered part of the larger establishment,
with all that is thereby implied. There is an accompanying revolt
against positivism and "scientism" (though most would probably
still deny that it is against science), and a cry for personal sensi-
tivity, human concern, social reform—and perhaps, political activ-
ism. These movements have not succeeded in formally capturing
the professional organizations, nor are they likely to. But formal
capture is unnecessary and irrelevant; more gradual, subtle,
social-organizational processes are operating to effect a shift in
the direction of these new forces.
Somewhat similar movements are in progress, as I understand
it, in anthropology, sociology, and even economics. They also exist
in psychology and social psychology, where there is a vogue,
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especially among the young, for the personal-affective and the
"humanist'' psychologies. The professional schools are similarly
affected—and not just social welfare and public health, but engineer-
ing, architecture, law, and even medicine.
In philosophy the various varieties of positivism, while they
have scarcely disappeared, have become more refined and more
defensive, and are increasingly perceived as arid or irrelevant;
and phenomenology, existentialism, and still newer schools and
trends have moved toward the center of the stage. Philosophy of
science is of central relevance. Here, as I read the situation, there
is less dogmatism and more flexibility than a generation ago; most
important, the conception of natural science as a value-free activity
is now suspect.or openly challenged. The doubt and ferment spill
over into—and even flow from—the very centers of hard scientific
activity; such publications as Science and the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists show much new concern for the social relevance of
science and technology. Indeed, they show more concern with social
problems generally than many journals of social science. The end
of innocence which atomic physicists experienced with Hiroshima
is now a widely-felt phenomenon, as evidenced by the call from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology for a national "day of reflec-
tion" for all scientific researchers.
These matters I have discussed relative to an environment of
social-intellectual change are of course interrelated with the causes
and manifestations of problems previously inventoried. They are
also interrelated with the complex of technoscientific enterprises
for which they form the immediate intellectual, social, and institu-
tional matrix.
PREDICTIONS AND SPECULATIONS
What are the implications of the increasingly turbulent milieu for
making and administering technoscience policy and administration?
Can one do more than admit the fact of change and uncertainty?
I think so. That the turbulence does exist and that it has certain
known qualities make some predictions possible, with a large
measure of confidence. Prediction soon must give way to specula-
tion; but speculation, too, has its uses in preparing for a problem-
atic future. In presenting my thoughts on the future I intend, for
the most part, to predict. But at times this is a literary conve-
nience because the points at which predictions become speculations
are often not clear even to myself.
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Pro- and anti-technoscience contention
In the period ahead there will be increasing contention between
pro- and anti-technoscience forces. Concluding a long, secular
buildup of science and technology, the last generation has seen its
sharp upward spurt, some claimed its logarithmic progression.
Recall the much-quoted, portentous statement of a decade ago:
ninety percent of the scientists who ever lived are living now.
But presently there is a vigorous counterrevolution to the scientist's
image, ranging from neo-Luddite let's-go-dirty-and-let-our -hair-
grow movements to sophisticated arguments that we should now
put more resources into social equity, the arts, and the humanities
and/or that science and technology should be basically reoriented
to work on new problems—reoriented perhaps from national defense
to the inner city. NASA's "post-Apollo problem" is symbol and
harbinger.
Our society which is historically oriented toward science and
technology is now experiencing a revolt against both. Harold Orlans
is correct in saying that as a nation we still display "excessive
faith in the power of science, reason, and rational technology";
but Elmer Staats and William Carey are also correct in saying
that we are "a society which is waking from its romantic trance
with science and technology." In short we are, at this juncture,
.collectively confused, even schizoid.
A general movement against technoscience
A general movement against technoscience will arise in the
period ahead, insured by the variety and strength of ideas and
causes moving in this direction. The popular media often present
an anti-technoscientific message, and it is a leitmotif in the
counterculture and/or the youth culture. Technoscience is seen by
many people today as an accomplice if not a cause of most of the
perils and problems discussed at the beginning of this article.
But while general, this movement against technoscience will
be diffuse, divided, and also opposed since the issues involved, from
the level of high philosophy to simple social mechanics, are too
complex and divisive to permit a society-wide Luddite movement.
As a practical matter, technoscience is too fundamentally a part of
contemporary society to be simply repealed; and after all, many
reformist-Leftist causes require more, or different, technoscience,
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not its abolition. But nevertheless, generalized repugnance and
hostility toward it will be an important force with real conse-
quences, from national decisions on budgetary allocations to cor-
porate decisions on product development.
Related to anti-technoscientific sentiment is the belief that the
production of material goods has grown to monstrous, indefensible
proportions and should be reduced, accompanied by a rise in the
delivery of social services, the provision of amenities, or the
enjoyment of leisure. Although the arguments of this persuasion
are varied and complex in themselves, and by no means equate
precisely with a general opposition to technology or science, it is
indisputable that there is some mutual reinforcement between the
two currents of thought.
Single-issue movements against technoscience
Single-issue movements against or concerning some aspect of
technoscience will increase in number and intensity. The reference
here is to such matters as space exploration, the use of complex
and long-lived pesticides and herbicides, the manufacture of inter-
nal-combustion automobiles, the basing of defense-related or
industry-supported research in universities, and the modification of
weather. Often the argument will not be directed against techno-
science as such, but against its abuse or even directed toward
technoscientific alternatives. But such campaigns will become so
widespread and heated that they will tend to merge into and rein-
force the general anti-technoscientific mood, and certainly they
will be reinforced by this mood.
We are increasingly experiencing such single-issue movements
and countermovements—"disturbances." They are already a part
of our political life in a way that would have been inconceivable
in our fairly recent past. If one takes seriously the introductory
inventory of perils and problems, he can only conclude that they
will increase in number, complexity, and intensity; and in every
one, technoscience is clearly involved.
Politicization of technoscience policy and administration
Technoscience policy making and administration will become
increasingly contentious, public, and thereby politicized. The
political, according to the most widely quoted definition, concerns
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the "authoritative allocation of values." Clearly, what has taken
place in the last few decades is the creation of a new dimension
of the political with technoscience as it has become larger and more
centrally involved in our lives. It is difficult if not impossible
to find a significant area of public policy in which the issues-
economic, ethical, or legal—are not intimately joined with techno-
scientific issues. For all that is important for contemporary man,
decisions about the authoritative allocation of values are decisions
about technoscience.
Changes within technoscience
As technoscience becomes increasingly politicized and more
drawn into the center of social turbulence, the "cultures" of tech-
nology and science will change. "Culture" is used here as a
shorthand designation for such matters as orienting beliefs, institu-
tional arrangements, and procedures for getting work done. In
general, these cultural changes will be toward making technology
and science less autonomous.
Technology and science always exist in a social context and
relate to it in an intricate and significant way. In our history this
paradoxical situation has existed: (1) Both science and technology
have had a high degree of autonomy and an accompanying pervasive
belief that it was desirable; but (2) science and technology, far from
being autonomous with respect to their effects, were often prime
movers in the political-social realm. This imbalance is ending.
Given problems now perceived and forces now in motion, it is
certain that there will be more political-social control of technol-
ogy, resulting from movements dealing with specific causes such as
automobile safety, drug regulation, and crime control; from at-
tempts to deal more effectively with the larger problems of national
security, urban reconstruction, and environmental control; and from
problems now certainly emerging, such as weather modification,
and likely to emerge, such as genetic engineering. Whether tech-
nological research and development take place in private corpora-
tion, government bureau, independent institute, or university, the
trend is toward less autonomy.
Science, though separable from technology, will experience a
similar invasion and constriction of autonomy which will of course
touch the most sensitive feelings and imperil many values, specif-
ically, the values and beliefs that are deftly sketched in West
Churchman's essays: knowledge is a good, a value, in itself;
important problems for a science are generated internally by that
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science; and judgment on a scientific product can only be rendered
by scientific peers. But we can already see the process of limiting
autonomy under way; it should not be regarded as simply a threat to
a unified scientific community with a single, coherent set of beliefs;
the scientific community—if indeed the term is a meaningful one —
is itself in ferment since the issues that make for turbulence in our
society touch this community directly, and some may be bred there.
Distinctions between science and technology, or between pure
and applied research, are for some purposes real and useful but for
other purposes unclear, unrealistic, and impractical. As change
approaches, we may expect much rehearsal of old arguments and
the development of new ones to defend institutional arrangements
and intellectual climates. We may expect controversies over tech-
nology's uses and alternatives to carry over into what is regarded
as pure science, with resulting heat and confusion. Massive
politically-mandated research in new areas—e.g., education, crime
control, and urban reconstruction—will cause dislocation, turmoil,
and perhaps rebellion. Newly mandated research and development
requiring a new or closer joining of the biophysical sciences with
the social sciences will become increasingly common and will be a
fertile source of misunderstanding, confusion, and controversy.
Controversies about the institutional base and/or geographical
locale of research will also be intensified. (The disturbed univer-
sity is already becoming a less useful and less used habitat.)
Crisis in institutional development
We are entering a crisis period in adjusting political-govern-
mental theories and institutions to those of technoscience. Centuries
after the birth of modern science and generations after the rise
of a new, massive, science-related technology, we lack ideas and
institutions to help the two work together. Short of total societal
reconstruction—following cataclysm or long evolution toward uto-
pia—there probably is no grand and final solution to the present
tangle of problems since two worlds do exist: one oriented toward
knowledge, the other toward action; one toward certainty of fact,
the other toward workability; one toward an unending pursuit of
truth, the other toward seeking practical solutions and operating
in the present. In spite of these opposing orientations, ideas and
institutions must be devised for compromise, cooperation, and
coexistence between these two worlds.
Until recently, we have not done badly in devising such new
governmental functions to coordinate science and technology, as
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Don K. Price and James McCamy, among others, have made clear;
and paradoxically our present problems arise in part from certain
past successes. But with a new order of magnitude of problems,
we cannot continue with the haphazardly developed, complicated
structure of regulatory agencies, research bureaus, congressional
committees, advisory committees, institutes, research contracts,
and so forth, which collectively now attempt to link politics and
technoscience. While the entire structure must be revised, one
new direction is clear: increased political control of the applica-
tions of technoscience. Many interrelated movements and problems
make it inevitable, some of which have been indicated: a general
shift in mood away from fascination with technology, the environ-
mental crisis, the campaign against the military-industrial com-
plex, and compaigns for such specific reforms as safety of
automobiles and food additives.
Other developments, related to the preceding in complex ways,
also reflect the move toward more control of technology. One is the
growing interest in technology assessment and technology transfers,
attempts to establish how the second- and third-level effects of
technology can be determined so that choices can be made with
knowledge of consequences. Another is interest in social reporting,
the movement to broaden society-wide reporting to include all
significant social phenomena to obtain an adequate base of knowl-
edge for making decisions on public policy which consider not only
the technological but also its ramifications. Another development
is the recent growth of studies of the future: the establishment of
programs to project trends ("computerized crystal balls"), esti-
mate probabilities, and hypothesize results of alternative courses
of action.
Two aspects of the inevitable drive to gain more societal control
of technology's applications deserve special note. One is glaringly
obvious: the constriction of the present private, largely corporate,
sphere of private decision making about technology will on the
whole be vigorously resisted with the inevitable resulting conflict.
The other is not immediately obvious: the social sciences, and the
"soft sciences" generally, will be deeply involved in the making
and executing of decisions and will have a buffering role between
the technoscientific and the political. That the social sciences will
function imperfectly in this role needs no argument, much less one
as sharp and negative as that in Moynihan's Maximum Feasible
Misunderstanding; but without their participation in the process of
inventing and administering new policies, the changes for their
success sink to near zero. Since in any case they will be there,
they must be considered as a factor as early as possible.
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Increasing decentralization
The traditional tug-of-war between geographical localism and
centralism, or between functional (largely economic) autonomy and
governmental control, is entering a new phase for technoscience.
The arguments for decentralization that have recently been dis-
cussed are diverse but collectively impressive. They include
scientifically based theories that decentralized organization results
in better decisions and more efficient execution of them, as well as
ethical and philosophical arguments for personal freedom from
organizational coercion. The arguments appear in a wide variety of
programs and causes, from corporate reorganization to university
reform and from neighborhood control of schools to "intentional
communities."
In general, these newer forces toward decentralization spring
from or become identified with liberals or the political Left. In
the days, of the New Deal, liberals favored centralization. Many
still do, but there has been a falling away from it, especially among
the young. Meanwhile advocates of older trends toward decentrali-
zation have never been converted to centralization, nor have the
older trends weakened or disappeared. Business does not like to be
regulated, suburbs resist incorporation into metropolitan govern-
ments, white-controlled schools block integration, states seek to
defend themselves against federal pressures. The upshot is that
Left, Right, and Center, while in contest and even sometimes in
violent conflict, often seem, ironically, in agreement on the nature
of the solution: return the power to the people.
Allied with and nourishing the impetus toward decentralization
are the ideas and sentiments that form the antiorganizational
revolution, discussed previously; there is a general resistance to
organizational procedures and disciplines, a revulsion from the
inherent complexities and time-consuming organizational solutions
to pressing problems. Moreover there is a specific resistance to
governmental organization and a more specific resistance to federal
organization. From student anarchism to Peter Drucker's analysis
of "The Sickness of Government," the tide of antiorganizational
and antigovernmental sentiment is awesome—heartening, frighten-
ing, or perhaps both, depending on the point of view of the observer.
These forces toward decentralization exist and must be reckoned
with; there is much substance and persuasiveness in the arguments
made on its behalf, and it is beyond question that the solution to
some of our problems will come from more decentralized methods
of policy making and administration. But on the other hand it is
clear that decentralization will not solve all problems and that
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some centralized organization and even certain centralized coercive
control will be necessary. If one runs through the inventory of
vexing and urgent problems, it is obvious that they are so large
in both spatial and social dimensions that they cannot be dealt with
on a local, uncoordinated basis. Many of them, in fact—certainly
controlling violence and rescuing the biosphere—run far beyond
the national boundaries, and history up to this point has provided
us with only moderately effective methods for making and adminis-
tering policy within national boundaries.
POLICY MAKING AND ADMINISTRATION
In attempting to discern the characteristics of our mounting
social turmoil, I have suggested some implications for techno-
science policy and administration that I wish now to take up
directly, both reemphasizing and drawing further implications.
Major problems
We are entering a period of unprecedented stress in coordinating
the political and the technoscientific at the national level, and at
least four types of problems involved.
1. Policies regarding support for ttechnoscientific research.
Policies that originated after World War II are no longer
adequate. Allocation of research monies is already politi-
cized and will inevitably become more so; the camouflage of
political questions by the elaborate devices of "government
by contract" is ending.
2. National policies on overriding issues, preeminently the con-
trol of violence, both external and internal; the salvation of
the environment; and the attaining of more social and racial
equity.
3. Sectoral and partial policies, within larger national issues
and apart from them. This list is long, and their contempla-
tion disturbing. Few of them are local, although they are
more specific than the larger issues; many of them, such as
marine exploitation have worldwide implications.
4. The uses of technoscience in the making and administration
of policies. At a new level of urgency and complexity old
issues (e.g., expert versus amateur and the relationship be-
tween facts and values) must be reargued; old accommoda-
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tions and solutions (e.g., the independent regulatory commis-
sion and the independent institute) reexamined; and new
theories and technologies (e.g., computer science and social
reporting) must be adapted for use.
Changes in administration
The "culture" of administration of course must change as do
the "cultures" of science and technology. The changes in each are
interrelated to changes in the others; and the changes in all are
related to the social milieus. There are two important areas of
change, one in which the direction of evolution is clear and one in
which the outcome is quite problematic.
The direction of change is clear in attempts to bridge the gap
between politics and policy making on one hand and technoscience
and its effects on the other. I have in mind developments, now in
effect or proposed, indicated by such labels as PPBS (Planning,
Programming, Budgeting System), systems analysis, organizational
development, policy planning, social indicators, technology evalua-
tion, computer technology,' managerial science, studies of the
future—and still others. Such developments reflect a response
of the social sciences to a perceived gap between the social,
political, and institutional and technoscience and its effects. They
attempt to combine the concern of the social sciences for values
with technoscientific theory. The promise of such efforts and their
success or failure where now in operation are crucially important,
but beyond the scope of this article. The present point is only that
they exist and that these efforts to reconcile science and politics
will not only continue but will expand and that they will profoundly
affect methods of policy making and administration.
The area of the administration in which I would not make any
prediction, beyond the prediction that confusion and controversy
will intensify, concerns the conflicting currents of centralization
and decentralization discussed above. Here the variables are
unknown and too numerous for a direction of change to be apparent.
If we survey administrative theory, we find a great deal indeed to
suggest that for a generation if not longer the trend has been toward
'decentralization: toward functionalism, delegation, participation,
and democracy. The point is well demonstrated by Rensis Likert's
argument in this volume: "System 4" is superior and evolution
moves in this direction. Indeed, it can be persuasively argued that
the direction of this evolution is in response to the needs and re-
sults of technoscience and hence represents what the future will be.
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While not hostile to such theories and sentiments, I am not
certain of the universal applicability and inevitable triumph of
decentralization. As I have indicated, I think that the inherent
complexities and large scope of the many problems we face will
impose inevitable barriers to a general triumph of decentralized
organization. It is perhaps significant that the advocates of decen-
tralization have been on the whole students of private rather than
public administration. There is no need to question their conclu-
sions, based on study of R & D establishments, banking offices,
insurance firms, retail chains, and manufacturing plants. However,
there is reason to question some of their generalized prescrip-
tions—putatively for a whole society—which are loosely extrapolated
and currently fashionable. Legal norms, societal control, formal
organization, hierarchy—such are not about to disappear, however
nice it would be if they did. In fact, they are as likely to become
more prominent in the period ahead.
THE TECHNOSCIENCE ADMINISTRATOR
I conclude with some summary observations on the roles and
functions of the technoscience administrator, especially one in a
public context. I have tried to analyze an emerging reality, but
the future is always reached from the present, and even in a
revolutionary period, much of the present and the past is carried
forward. The present state of the art or science of administration
is relevant to any future one. Now, and in any foreseeable future,
budgets must still be made and executed; people must still be
hired and paid; supplies and equipment must still be ordered; and
space and transportation must still be provided. The developments
predicted in this article will change the conditions of performance,
but administrators will always be needed for these matters that
are literally the sina quo non of technoscience within organizations,
which is substantially all technoscience now existing or likely to
exist.
But the administrator with any significant general or program
responsibility cannot be simply an administrative technician, how-
ever competent. It is of course already well recognized that if the
program administrator is trained in some field of technoscience
he must learn about administration; and that if he is trained in
administration, he must understand at least that branch of techno-
science with which he is concerned. But if I am even partially
correct in my reading of the future much more will be necessary.
In terms of Lynton Keith CaldwelFs analysis, the "latent" function
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of the administrator will be greatly expanded in its importance.
The technoscience administrator will be at the very center of things
political; he cannot, if he would, escape participation in the
"authoritative allocation of values." He will have to direct and
channel conflicting pressures that arise from a society heatedly
contesting matters of life and death. He will have multiple roles:
technician, interpreter, counselor, analyst, policy maker, advocate,
therapist, leader, negotiator. What he will need, in addition to rare
native endowment, will draw not just upon administrative techniques
and upon technoscience, but upon the whole range of knowledge rep-
resented by the humanities and the social sciences. We will need
at least a fair number of wise men and statesmen. This is, to be
sure, an idealized portrait, an impossible set of "specs." But
even to muddle through, we will need to achieve very nearly the
impossible.
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Anthony et al. (1965) provide a set of readings on management control sys-
tems. Strong and Smith (1968) rely heavily on "information" as a basis of
control. Bonini et al. (1964) emphasize budgets and other accounting devices
in control. Vollmer (1967) writes about organizational design and its rela-
tion to control.
De Greene (1970) is a recent work which cites many references on
the psychology and sociology of system management, an important subject
virtually untouched in this chapter.
Sackman (1967) provides one of the most comprehensive books on
systems and computers. Koelle and Vos (1965) provide sources on the de-
sign of large space programs. See Webb (1969) for a broad perspective of
this problem from the point of view of NASA's former administrator.
Abt (1970) discusses the use of simulation games in management
control.
Bernstein and Cerron (1969) discuss one of many techniques of "tell-
ing the future," one very popular idea about long-range control.
CHAPTER 7
1. William D. Carey is the former Assistant Director of the Bureau of
the Budget from 1966 to 1969.
2. Energy R & D and National Progress, a report prepared for the In-
terdepartmental Energy Study under the direction of All Bulent Cambel
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).
3. Report of the President (Washington, B.C.: Carnegie Institution of
Washington, 1967-68).
4. Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and
Development (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Budget, 1962).
5. Elmer B. Staats, Need for Improved Guidelines in Contracting for
Research with Government-Sponsored Nonprofit Contractors, Report to the
Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States (February 10,
1969).
6. U.S. Congress, House, Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Confer-
ence Report to Accompany H.R. 10243, 92d Cong., 2dSess., H.R. 92-1436,
September 25, 1972.
7. Elmer B. Staats, Review of Economic Opportunity Programs, Report
to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States (March
1969).
8. Frederic M. Scherer, "Government Research and Development Pro-
grams," Measuring Benefits of Government Investments, ed. Robert Dorf-
man (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965).
9. Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United
States, to all Congressional Committee Chairmen, August 11, 1972, Comp-
troller General Letter No. B-161740, p. 2.
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CHAPTER 8
1. See also D. Cartwright, "The Economics of Deaning," Western
Economic Journal (spring 1965); Norman Kaplan, "The Role of the Research
Administrator," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 4 (June 1959); and
H. L. Dryden, "Responsibilities of the Research Director," Scientific
Research: Its Administration and Organization, G. P. Bush and L. H.
Mattery (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1950).
2. See, for example, L. R. Sayles and George Strauss, Human Behavior
in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 347.
3. For further discussion of researcher's goals, see Renato Tagiuri,
"Value Orientations and the Relationship of Managers and Scientists,"
Administrative Science Quarterly (1965), pp. 39-51; and Herbert A. Shepard,
"Nine Dilemmas in Industrial Research," Administrative Science Quarterly,
vol. 1, no. 3 (December 1956), pp. 295-305.
4. Among behavioral scientists, there is no consensus on the produc-
tivity of morals per se. See S. Katz and R. L. Kahn, "Leadership Practices
in Relation to Productivity and Morale," Group Dynamics: Research and
Theory, eds. Cartwright and Zander (Evanston, 111.: Row Peterson, 1953,
1st ed.; 1956, 2d printing, pp. 612-27 (1st ed.), pp. 559-70 (2d ed.); Robert L.
Kahn, "Productivity and Job Satisfaction," Personnel Psychology, vol. 13,
no. 3 (fall 1960), pp. 257-87; Donald C. Pelz and Frank M. Andrews, Scien-
tists in Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 112; and Raymond Miles,
"Human Relations or Human Resources?" Harvard Business Review, vol.
43, no. 4 (July 1965), pp. 148-63. But morale combined, say, with participa-
tion, is taken to be an important element of productivity.
5. I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals [ 1785].
6. D. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1960). McGregor argues that "the assumptions of Theory Y imply that
unless integration is achieved the organization will suffer" (italics his).
Thus management becomes committed to Theory Y to serve its own or-
ganizational ends.
7. For further elaboration of this point, see C. West Churchman,
Challenge to Reason (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968) and the reading sug-
gestions at the end of that book.
8. For a further discussion of these constraints, see A. Papandreou,
"Some Basic Problems in the Theory of the Firm," A Survey of Contempo-
rary Economics, ed. B. F. Haley, vol. 2 (Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1952), pp.
183-222.
9. For empirical evidence of a public's attitute toward research and
its importance, see H. Krauch and K. Schreiber, "Forschung und tech-
nischer Fortschritt im Bewusstein der Offenlishkeit—Ergebnisse einer
Reprasentativbefragung," in Soziale Welt, Jahrg, 17 (1966), Heft 4, S. 289-
315.
10. See C. West Churchman, Prediction and Optimal Decision (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), chapter 9 and its references.
11. A "classic" description of this process is given by Herbert A.
Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 5.
12. See, for example, Miles, "Human Relations or Human Resources?";
Rensis Likert, The Human Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967);
and Robert Tannenbaum and Fred Massarik, "Participation by Subordinates
in the Managerial Decision-Making Process," The Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science, vol. 16 (August 1950), pp. 408-18.
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13. See, for example, W. J. J. Gordon, Synectics (New York: Harper &
Row, 1961).
14. See J. Seligman, N. R. Baker, and A. H. Rubenstein, Control Mecha-
nisms in the Idea Flow Process: Model and Behavioral Study (Evanston, 111.:
The Technological Institute, Northwestern University, June 1966).
15. See L. A. Zadeh, "Fuzzy Algorithms," Information and Control, vol.
12 (1968), pp. 94-102.
16. See Merrill M. Flood, "Research Project Evaluation," Proceedings
of the Fifth Annual Conference on Industrial Research, ed. A. Rubenstein
(New York: King's Crown Press, 1955), p. 28; James B. Quinn, "How to
Evaluate Research Output," Harvard Business Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (March
1960), pp. 69-80; E. Mansfield, "Ratio of Return for Industrial R & D,"
American Economic Review, vol. 55, no. 2 (1965), p. 310; E. Mansfield and
R. Brandenburg, "The Allocation, Characteristics and Outcome of the
Firm's R & D Portfolio," Journal of Business, vol. 39 (1966), p. 447; Burton
V. Dean, Application of Operations Research to R & D (New York: Wiley,
1963); and Burton V. Dean, Evaluating, Selecting and Controlling R & D
Projects (New York: American Management Association, 1968).
17. See, for example, E. Duer Reeves, Management of Industrial Re-
search (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp., 1967), pp. 17-28; and Peter
C. Sandretto, The Economic Management of Research and Engineering (New
York: Wiley, 1968).
18. Dean, Evaluating, Selecting and Controlling R &D Projects, pp. 62-
63.
19. Ibid., chapter 6.
20. See R. L. Ackoff and M. Martin, "The Dissemination and Use of Re-
corded Scientific Information," Management Science (1963), pp. 322-26; and
H. Krauch, "Strukturwandel der Forschung," in Strukturwandel der Wirt-
schaft im Gefolge der Computer (Hrsg. F. Scharpenack), Verlag, J. C. B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen, Germany (1966).
21. See C. West Churchman, "The Design of Inquiring Systems," Inter-
nal Working Paper No. 107 (Berkeley: Space Sciences Laboratory, Univer-
sity of California, September 1969).
22. Edgar Schein et al., "Career Orientations and Perceptions of
Rewarded Activity in Research Organizations," Administrative Science
Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 4 (March 1965), pp. 333-49.
23. C. West Churchman, P. Ratoosh, and C. Kruytbosch, "The Role of
the Research Administrator," Research Program Effectiveness, eds. M. C.
Yovits et al. (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1966).
24. See T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962).
25. For the theory of these costs, see, for example, R. L. Ackoff and M.
Sasieni, Fundamentals of Operations Research (New York: Wiley, 1968).
26. What is being described in a simplified form is a version of the
"decomposition algorithm." See G. B. Dantzig and Philip Wolfe, "The De-
composition Principle for Linear Programs," Operations Research Journal,
vol. 8, no; 1 (January-February 1960).
27. For the dynamics of this process, see T. Marschak and J. Yahow,
"The Sequential Selection of Approaches to a Task," Management Science,
vol. 12, no. 9 (1966), p. 627.
28. As advocated, say, by Frederick J. Taylor, Principles of Scientific
Management (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1967).
29. See Miles, "Human Relations or Human Resources?" or Likert,
The Human Organization.
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30. The engineering term is "cybernetics." See S. Beer, Decision and
Control (New York: Wiley, 1966).
31. First introduced in this manner by J. Neyman and E. Pearson,
"Contributions to the Theory of Testing Statistical Hypotheses," Statistical
Research Memoirs, vol. 1 (1936). See also Paul Hoel, Introduction to Mathe-
matics & Statistics (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 48.
32. For example, the use of learning curves in the aircraft industry.
33. For further details of this argument, see C. West Churchman, The
Systems Approach (New York: Delacorte Press, 1968).
34. See Richard O. Mason, Dialectics in Decision Making: A Study in
the Use of Counter-planning and Structural Debate in Management Informa-
tion Systems, Internal Working Paper No. 87, Social Sciences Project
(Berkeley: Space Sciences Laboratory, University of California, June 1968).
35. A somewhat different but related view can be found in R. G. Siu,
The Tao of Science (New York: The Technology Press, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology and Wiley, 1957).
36. Kant, Fundamental Principles ofMetaphysic of Morals.
37. Carl G. Jung states the idea quite well in Two Essays on Analytical
Psychology, Bellinger Series XX (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), pp.
223-24.
38. See R. M. Hower and C. D. Orth, Managers and Scientists: Some
Human Problems in Industrial Research Organizations (Boston: Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1963).
39. A "discipline," as I use the term, may in fact be only part of a
larger discipline like physics, chemistry, and so on. It is essentially the
leaders and followers of one area of intellectual interest, and, of course,
may grow or decline, or even disappear altogether.
40. There is, of course, the old Germanic idea of a professor and his
flock of student followers, and the professor often did dominate. No doubt
some of this concept of the research community does occur today, but few
researchers would like to admit it if it does.
41. Or dean. The distinction between the research director and the dean
seems to be mainly a matter of emphasis. A college dean of a science de-
partment is emphatically committed to the scientist's philosophy, and his
problem is how to be a good administrator at the same time; a research di-
rector may be more emphatically committed to management's goals, and his
problem is how to serve the scientists as well.
CHAPTER 9
1. Ad Hoc Committee for Evaluation of Federal Support of Science, The
Crisis Facing American Science (New York: New York Academy of Sci-
ences, 1968), Foreword.
2. Quoted by Gene Bylinsky in "U.S. Science Enters a Not-So-Golden
Era," Fortune (November 1968), p. 197. Bylinsky adds correctly that "this
is a view widely shared by other leaders of science."
3. Harvey Brooks, "Physics and the Polity," Science (April 26, 1968),
pp. 396-400.
4. Basic Research and National Goals, a report to the Committee on
Science and Astronautics, U.S. Congress, House (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, March 1965), p. 1.
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5. Harvey Brooks, "Future Needs for the Support of Basic Research,"
Basic Research and National Goals, pp. 77-110, especially pp. 94 and 98.
6. "Much speculation has been directed to the identification of the
necessary rate of growth of graduate research and education. Some say that
a rate of 15 per cent per year is the necessary minimum increase in level
of support. But I have not yet encountered the thorough economic analysis
that one might expect to lie behind such a widely quoted figure," Gardner
told a meeting of consultants at the National Institutes of Health, August 23,
1966.
7. From an address by Donald Hornig to the American Physical Society
(Washington, D.C., April 26, 1967).
8. Clark Kerr, "New Challenges to the College and University," Agenda
for the Nation, Kermit Gordon, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1968), pp. 258-63.
9. "Private Enrollment Drops; Graduate Totals Fall Short," Chronicle
of Higher Education (March 24, 1969), p. 1.
10. When interviewed by the New York Times shortly after his designa-
tion as President-elect Nixon's science adviser, DuBridge stated: "If the
basic research budget of this country were right last year, it would not be
right this year or next year unless there was built into it something like a
10 per cent a year increase.
"Now, obviously, a 10 per cent increase can't go on for a hundred
years, or it would exceed the total Federal budget. But in the next few
years, at least something on the order of 10 per cent, maybe it is 12 or 19
per cent, is a built-in increase factor in the state and private university
budgets, and the Government must recognize this." DuBridge to Seek Closer
Ties of Government with Scientists," New York Times (December 17, 1969),
p. 30.
11. David M. Blank and George J. Stigler, The Demand and Supply of
Scientific Personnel (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1957), pp. 29, 105.
12. Nicholas DeWitt, Soviet Professional Manpower (Washington, D.C.:
National Science Foundation, 1955), pp. 256-57.
13. Meeting Manpower Needs in Science and Technology (Washington,
D.C.: The White House, December 12, 1962). The report declared, "Im-
pending shortages of talented, highly trained scientists and engineers
threaten the successful fulfillment of vital national commitments. Unless
remedial action is taken promptly, future needs for superior engineers,
mathematicians, and physical scientists will seriously outstrip the supply."
The report recommended raising the proportion of college students who go
on to graduate school and increasing the number of Ph.D.'s awarded each
year in engineering, mathematics, and the physical sciences from 2,000 in
1950 and 3,000 in 1960 to 7,500 by 1970. In 1965, 5,635 Ph.D.'s and in
1967, 6,785 Ph.D.'s were awarded in these fields.
14. The report stated, "In the years ahead, the nation's needs for
scientists and engineers unquestionably will increase, and probably at a
faster rate than they have in the past. Although the supply of this man-
power also will increase, it may not keep pace with all the possible needs
to which domestic and international influences will give rise." On the other
hand, the report noted, "At present, there are both unfilled positions and
unemployed scientists and engineers there are identifiable surpluses
resulting, for example, from industries changing from older to newer
technologies.... Currently, changes in the programs of the Department of
Defense are resulting in cutbacks in certain types of employment. A num-
ber of engineers face problems of adapting themselves to more advanced
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technologies as their older skills become obsolete. Thus, the employment
situation remains mixed." See also Toward Better Utilization of Scientific
and Engineering Talent, A Program for Action, report of the Committee on
Utilization of Scientific and Engineering Manpower (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy of Sciences, 1964), pp. 1-2.
15. Bernard Berelson, Graduate Education in the United States (New
York: McGraw-Hill, I960), pp. 76-77 and 79 (his italics). Deficiencies
in the NEA statistics were also noted in Harold Orlans, The Effects of
Federal Programs on Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1962), pp. 13-14.
16. Allan Cartter and Robert Farrell, "Higher Education in the Last
Third of the Century," The Educational Record (spring 1965), p. 125.
17. Ibid., note 5.
18. John Folger, "The Balance Between Supply and Demand for College
Graduates," The Journal of Human Resources (spring 1967), p. 167.
19. Toward a Public Policy for Graduate Education in the Sciences
(Washington, D.C.: National Science Board, 1969), p. 11.
20. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
21. Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science (New York: New
American Library, 1967), p. 291.
22. One is the National Science Board's proposal for a basic shift to
departmental grants in the government's funding of academic science. (See
Toward a Public Policy for Graduate Education in the Sciences, 1969).
23. Scientific Progress, the Universities and the Federal Government,
statement by the President's Science Advisory Committee (Washington,
D.C.: The White House, November 15, 1960), p. 20.
24. Ibid., p. v.
25. Ibid., p. 21.
26. Biomedical Science and Its Administration, A Study of the National
Institutes of Health (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1965),
pp. 36-37.
27. The Stans memorandum of September 21, 1959, "Commercial-
industrial Activities of the Government Providing Products or Services for
Governmental Use," is reprinted in The Future Role of the Atomic Energy
Commission Laboratories (Washington, D.C.: Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, October 1960), pp. 274-77; the Bell Report to the President
Government Contracting for Research and Development (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of the Budget, April 30, 1962).
28. In testimony on May 1, 1969, Science Adviser Lee DuBridge stated,
"Just in the last couple of years the number of classified research agree-
ments which DOD has with universities has been cut in half. Only about 4
percent of all the research agreements which DOD has with universities now
are in the classified area, and these are still being further reduced by
mutual agreement." U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Subcommittee on Government Research, Federal Support of
Project Grants: Indirect Costs and Cost Sharing, 91st Cong., 1st sess.,
April 22, 23, and May 1, 1969, part 1, p. 93.
29. In the course of an April 1, 1969, address to a conference of the
National Association of Manufacturers in Washington, D.C., Tonsor stated,
"In order to ensure circumstances in which teaching rather than research'
or community service [ is] the primary objective of the university, govern-
ment at all levels must forego the temptation of easy recourse to the enor-
mous resources of the university.... both the government and the university
would be better served, under most circumstances, were both basic and
applied research in the national defense area done in antonomous research
292
institutes." The address was distributed by President Nixon to his principal
staff and officials concerned with government policy toward higher education
with the note that "this happens to be my view.... I want everyone who has
anything to do with education to read this speech carefully and to follow this
line in their public announcements." (See Higher Education and National
Affairs, April 25, 1969, pp. Iff. and Chronicle of Higher Education, May 5,
1969, p. 3). To be sure, the President can hardly be said to have committed
himself to every sentence in Tensor's address, and his advisers would be in
sharp disagreement about the desirability of reducing military research on
campus.
30. Borges's library contained error as well as truth; however, one may
wonder if a library of the whole truth, every last speck of it in the universe,
would be of any greater help to man who could wander forever in the cata-
logs and stacks, unable to find, absorb, and use precisely those truths that
he needs each moment of his life. Jorge Luis Borges, "The Library of
Babel," Labyrinths (Norfold, Conn.: New Directions, 1962), pp. 51-58.
31. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960),
p. 262.
32. James L. Goddard, "The Drug Establishment," Esquire (March
1969), reprinted in Congressional Record, daily ed. (March 4, 1969), pp. S
2310-13.
33. Wall Street Journal (June 26, 1969), reprinted in Congressional
Record, daily ed. (July 7, 1969), p. E 5630.
34. See, for example, Donald Michael: "In twenty years, other things
being equal [just which "other things"?], most of the routine blue-collar
and white-collar tasks that can be done by cybernation will be.... Most of
our citizens will be unable to understand the cybernated world in which they
live.... There will be a small, almost separate society of people in rapport
with the advanced computers." Cybernation: The Silent Conquest (Santa
Barbara, Calif.: Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, 1962), p. 44.
35. In his historical review, "Technology and Public Policy," Morgan
Sherwood reaches the same conclusion. "With rare exceptions, the govern-
ment, throughout American history, has approached technological issues
pragmatically, one at a time " Eds. Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll Pur-
sell, Jr., Technology in Western Civilization, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1967), p. 497.
36. Ibid.
37. Golovin's full proposal is as follows: "In the presence of technically
plausible arguments that the mass introduction of a new product or process
will tend to degrade environmental characteristics important to physical and
psychological well-being, such introduction will be controlled by industry
and the local, state and federal governments so as to insure that mass public
exposure is minimized or does not occur until adequate evidence has been
accumulated of the absence of significantly deleterious or publicly undesir-
able consequences." Nicholas E. Golovin, "The Public and National Noise
Standards," presented at the symposium Where Do We Stand on Standards
for Noise? (Cleveland: 76th Meeting of the Acoustical Society of America,
November 19-22, 1968); see also "Golovin's Law," New Scientist (November
28, 1968), p. 478.
38. See "President Establishes Social Research Staff," The Washington
Report (August-September 1969), sec. A, p. 12.
39. The author's discussion of a technology assessment board was
written some months before the establishment by Congress in 1972 of the
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Joint Committee on Technology Assessment, shortly before this volume went
to press.—Editor's note.
40. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Re-
port of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, Science,
Technology and Public Policy During the Ninetieth Congress, 91st Cong., 1st
sess. (July 1969), p. 106.
41. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Pro-
ceedings before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development,
Technology Assessment (see statement of Emilio Q. Daddario, chairman),
90th Cong., 1st sess. (1967), p. 4.
42. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Re-
port of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, Tech-
nology Assessment Seminar, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (September 21 and 22,
1967), p. 152.
43. Morton Mintz, "Lee Questions Fitness of Next NAS Chief," Wash-
ington Post (February 17, 1969), sec. A., p. 12.
44. Goddard, "The Drug Establishment."
45. U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 6698, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (March 7,
1967), sec. 7.
46. See Alvin Weinberg, "Social Problems and National Socio-Technical
Institutes" (and the other papers by Weinberg cited in footnote 1 of that
paper), Applied Science and Technological Progress, a report to the Com-
mittee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. Congress, House (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy of Sciences, 1967), p. 415. A similar argument is devel-
oped by Amitai Etzioni, " 'Shortcuts' to Social Change?" The Public Interest
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